
Jung's Answer to Modern Man

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Political scientists, in their forays into psychology, tend to ignore or give short shrift to the analytical psychology of Carl Jung, preferring the more down-to-earth approach of Sigmund Freud.' Freud, after all, could point to something we all have immediate experience of- sexual development- whereas Jung engaged in flights of fancy such as exploring the psychological dimensions of alchemy, gnosticism, flying saucers, and Eastern and Western religions. Jung also has the dubious reputation for defending Western ideals during the cold war, and arguing that true religious belief was the only effective weapon the West had against the political religion of communism. Even those sympathetic to his political commentary might be put off by the very fact that he is a psychologist, assuming that psychology must necessarily undermine religion, philosophy, or both, so that even Jung's version of psychology could be seen as ultimately corrosive to the contributions of both Athens and Jerusalem in the Western tradition.² Yet Jung writes so much on the nature of the state, political behavior, ideologies, and their relationship to religions, that the volume of such writing alone merits a closer, more systematic look at his political thought. The depth of his contribution also becomes impressive after a careful reading of a variety of his works. Moreover, at a time when we are speculating about the triumph of liberalism and the "end of history," Jung presents a decidedly different perspective, one that grapples with the spiritual and intellectual problems of modernity, including the value of liberal democracy. The ultimate questions are whether Jungian theory is true and whether Jungian theory is indeed a hindrance rather than a help in overcoming the problems of modernity. But to begin to consider these questions, political scientists need to take a more scrutinizing look at Jung's analysis of religion, ideologies, and the state, as well as his program for change.

God and the Collective Unconscious

Jung claims that "disunity within oneself is the hall-mark of civilized man" (*Two Essays*, 18). For Jung as well as Freud, civilization is defined by the split between man's inner and his civilized self. But for

Jung, man's inner self, the unconscious, cannot be defined in terms of sexuality or the ill-defined "death instinct" as it is for Freud. He calls the latter's approach, as well as that of Alfred Adler, forms of reductionism (*Two Essays*, 18-39). Concerning Freud's theory and its application to larger political and social questions, he writes, "[W]e could easily construct a political theory of neurosis, in so far as the man of today is chiefly excited by political passions to which the 'sexual question' was only an insignificant prelude. It may turn out that politics are but the forerunner of a far deeper religious convulsion" (*Two Essays*, 19).

This indicates the extent to which Jung differs from Freud on the subject of religion, a subject that is central to his psychological theory as a whole. For him, religion cannot be reduced, as Freud reduces it, to either a product of anxiety or of the "oceanic" feeling left over from infancy which still fools the masses into believing in God.³ According to Jung, each individual psyche contains a consciousness or ego and a personal unconscious. The latter contains repressed and forgotten memories, the shadow or dark side of the personality, and the anima or animus (the feminine component in men and the masculine component in women, respectively). The psyche also contains a "collective unconscious." It is the collective unconscious that Jung thinks truly explains why human beings are religious.

The collective unconscious is a stratum of the unconscious that is shared by members of different civilizations and cultures, in that the symbols by which the collective unconsciousness expresses itself differ according to civilization or culture. More fundamentally, however, the ground from which these symbols arise is shared by all human beings. Jung claims that the various archetypes or symbols of the collective unconscious are not consciously learned as such. Instead they are passed on through language, and "inherited with the structure of the psyche and . . . therefore to be found in all times and among all peoples" (*Modern Man*, "Dream Analysis," 24). The archetypes can be identified and studied in myth, religion, and language and are a product of a long, evolutionary process in which man's primitive herd instincts were reconciled with the conflicting development of individuation and social and political order.⁴ It is

Jung's impressive treatment of the similarities among myths, religions, and dreams across time and within and across cultures that lends his concept of the collective unconscious as much empirical weight as can be had in such matters.⁵

For Jung, the archetypes of the collective unconscious represent a "law of nature" from which the conscious mind departs at its peril (*Modern Man*, "Dream Analysis," 26).⁶ They assert themselves in dreams and in neuroses when they are denied acknowledgment and proper channeling in conscious life. When our conscious thinking is out of line with or denies the existence of these archetypes, or the power of the unconscious in general, psychic disturbance is bound to take place (*Modern Man*, "The Stages of Life," 113). In the dreams he analyzes, Jung often finds elements of both the personal and collective unconscious. In many cases, he surmises that the patient is not only working out his personal problems in his dreams, often by compensation, but working out the age-old problems of mankind. Hence his method of treatment not only involves bringing personal thoughts, feelings, and experiences to the fore when they have been repressed or forgotten, but also slowly calling the patient's attention to the ways in which his neurosis and the dreams and fantasies it produces are working out universal themes and problems of the collective unconscious. The greatest of these universal themes is embodied in the archetype of the Self which, for Jung, is the source of the human experience of God. The Self contains and represents the entire psyche and is experienced in dreams and fantasies as the ideal person, the *imago dei*.⁷

The Self archetype affects the ego in a god-like way in that it is capricious and beyond conscious control. It is numinous in that it is felt not as a part of us, but definitely some outside force which may be experienced as harmful, as well as loving and benevolent. Without a doubt, Jung thinks that if a person experiences this god, one does not and *should* not think of it as a mere psychological aspect of himself, because the latter is simply not true, or not completely true, precisely because this force within has its own will and ways.⁸

"There is in the psyche some superior power, and if it is not consciously a god, it is the 'belly' at least, in St. Paul's words. I

therefore consider it wiser to acknowledge the idea of God consciously; for if we do not, something else is made God, usually something quite inappropriate and stupid such as only an 'enlightened' intellect could hatch forth" (*Two Essays*, 70).

This statement goes to the core of Jung's theory concerning religion. Jung is very much concerned with the destructive tendencies of the Self archetype which emerge when the conscious ego denies its existence. The archetype is much more subject to such denial in modern man, who deep in his heart is convinced, along with Nietzsche, that God is dead. Jung defined religion as "the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been changed by experience of the *numinosum*" ("Psychology and Religion," 8). The numinous experience is the feeling of being gripped by an unknown force outside oneself, one might say possession by the unconscious forces of our psyche ("Psychology and Religion," 9). Religious ritual need not be lifeless or meaningless, but can actually satisfy the psychic needs of millions of people for eons. Yet it is when these rituals lose their meaning, or their ability to awaken the feeling of participation in a numinous experience, that their continuing unchanged can lead to psychic disturbance. These psychic disturbances, at the level of the individual, can lead to neurosis, even psycho-somatic illnesses ("Psychology and Religion," 12-14), or, if shared by enough people, they can lead to "psychic epidemics."

Jung believes that the terror which human beings can perpetrate in the name of some abstract idea or ideology is caused by misplacing the religious contents in our psyches. This is done by projecting them onto the mass movement or state, where they are turned into "fanatical obsession." He predicts that rather than being a thing of the past, the type of violence this produces will be even more prevalent in the future ("Psychology and Religion," 14). Once an individual becomes involved in a mass movement, gripped by a particular idea, his mind and his morals sink to a new low. The mass allows him to respond with no sense of personal responsibility to the always-present demons which dwell within his psyche.

Institutional religion-what Jung calls "creed" or "cult"-was developed in order to harness these arbitrary and destructive ten-

dencies of the psyche, erecting rules and procedures as walls around the unpredictable ("Psychology and Religion," 19, 43). But the advent of the scientific enlightenment made many people, still religious in the sense Jung uses the term, reject the Church-any church-because its forms seemed untenable. Jung implies that religion has clung to its dogma too long, that its forms must change, or else it will lose many people to the "other side"-secular mass movements ("Psychology and Religion," 22).

Jung thinks that though the existence of God can never be proven by reason, God's psychological existence has been proven beyond a doubt. Jung fully expected human beings to still believe in a God in some sense for "aeons hence" (*Two Essays*, 70). Thus, he must not have thought that his own peculiar teaching would produce a disbelief in God. In fact, as I will argue, Jung believed that his teaching could save mankind a great deal of turmoil as their concept of God was challenged by modern science and contemporary events. Though Jung thought of himself as a man of science, he had no admiration for the type of science that claimed that anything not directly, physically sensed and measured did not exist. This he considered an immature scientific position.

"We are moved by the laudable and useful ambition to extirpate the chaos of the irrational both within and without to the best of our ability. Apparently the process has gone pretty far. As a mental patient once told me: 'Doctor, last night I disinfected the whole heavens with bichloride of mercury, but I found no God.' Something of the sort has happened to us also" (*Two Essays*, 71).

This scouring of the heavens is the cause of the catastrophic nature of our age, according to Jung. In the age of Enlightenment which continues to this day, mankind has rejected the belief that the gods dwell outside ourselves, and has become convinced that they are nothing more than projections of human psychological needs and wishes. But the gods, as it were, have returned with a vengeance. No longer acknowledged, they have become angry with mankind. Even the Christian God, by this time considered wholly benevolent, broke free and descended on Christian Europe in a rage, provoking world war and mass murder (*Two Essays*, 92).

It is this God to whom we now turn. Jung's experience of God is the Self-archetype, and, as stated above, its activities are often demonically mercurial. Because the Self dwells within and affects man, moving, as we will see, not just individuals but human history itself, we must understand Jung's conception of God to understand his treatment of modern man.

Reinterpreting the Scriptures

It is in response to the problem of Western religion as outlined above that Jung wrote *Answer to Job*, a book produced specifically as a sort of self-confession of religious belief and biblical interpretation (*Answer*, 363). *Answer to Job* was written late in Jung's life.¹ It is a curious book because it contains mainly Biblical, instead of psychological, prose. It refrains from too much psychologizing and seems to take seriously the prospect that the biblical truths are indeed true. To Jung this means that "'physical' is not the only criterion of truth: there are also *psychic* truths which can neither be explained nor proved nor contested in any physical way" (*Answer*, 359).

Jung explains his understanding of spiritual, as opposed to physical, truth by claiming an independent existence of the spiritual from the physical. "The psyche is an autonomous factor, and religious statements are psychic confessions which in the last resort are based on unconscious, i.e., on transcendental, processes" (*Answer*, 360). Jung goes so far as to assert the supremacy of the spiritual over the physical truth. The physical world may easily delude us, but the truths expressed by the unconscious psyche are eternal realities, those shared archetypes which express fundamental truths about the human experience (*Answer*, 362). In *Answer to Job* he asks the questions that the Biblical text itself begs the reader to ask, and he provides a well-reasoned and plausible answer, based on biblical, and not simply psychological, evidence.

Jung states that his focus will be Job's fundamental problem. The problem, which Job somewhat unwittingly has to deal with, is the dual nature of God. Job, in his pleas for mercy, "expected help from God against God" (*Answer*, 358, 369). Jung attempts to draw out the

implications of Job's problem for our understanding of God, and to show how that problem is at least partially resolved by the coming of Christ.

According to Jung, Job is a man caught in a trap laid by God. God has made a bet with one of his sons, Satan, that Job, an upright and God-fearing man, cannot be corrupted no matter what scourges are heaped upon him.¹ God authorizes Satan to do whatever he wishes to Job, only not to kill Job himself. Soon Job's animals and servants are destroyed, and then the house in which they are dining falls in upon and kills Job's sons and daughters. Job's reaction is not to blame or complain, but to fall down and worship God.

Jung notes that God admits after all this that Satan "movedst me against him, to destroy him without cause" (Book of Job, 2:3). Hence, even though Satan apparently does the destroying, God acknowledges that it is with His will.

Satan is unsatisfied, and gets God to agree to smite Job with boils. Job's friends come to comfort him, and at first they only sit with him and say nothing. But after Job curses the day on which he was born, his friends reproach him, each in his own way claiming that Job must have done something wrong to deserve this fate. In their own way, Job's friends also become afflictions. They insist on God's justice being comparable to their own notion of justice. They do not, therefore, know who to blame, unless it be Job. As Job himself says, "Miserable comforters are ye all" (Book of Job, 16:2).

Jung writes that in his pitiful ravings we find Job going back and forth between a conception of God as upholder of justice, and therefore Job's refuge and relief from these afflictions, and a notion of God as mysterious and mercurial, visiting his wrath on some, including Job himself, while allowing others-often the wicked-to live prosperously and without harm. Here Job raises our awareness from his own personal problems to our age-old question: how can there be a God when so much evil is allowed to exist? The Book of Job poses this problem very clearly because it presents the actual doer of evil as a son of God, an agent acting with God's permission, as if God were both perfectly righteous and unrighteous at the same time.

Job clings stubbornly to his own righteousness, with the faith that God will still recognize it and favor him despite the current evidence, but he seems to also cling to it for righteousness's sake. Job leaves us in the quandary in which he himself is caught. He can find no fault in himself that deserves such punishment. He believes that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and just, and he cannot really reconcile what is happening to him with such a God.

Thus, Jung starkly poses the problem of God's actions and Job's reactions. Job's behavior is just as intriguing as is God's. In the biblical narrative, Job seems to be more morally upright than God Himself. That is the crux of the mystery Jung finds in this particular book: How can God act like this, and how can Job—a mere mortal—react as he does, in a more morally superior way than the God he worships as the fount of all justice? Surely these are questions which the author of *Job* wished to raise.

Jung believes that the New Testament texts provide an answer to Job's question and reveal an evolving relationship between God and man. He points out that the Yahweh of the Old Testament was similar to other ancient gods, yet very different in one respect. He was similar in that He seemed to display both good and evil characteristics: He laid down the moral law, ordered wars, and punished disbelievers. He was different in that, from the beginning, His was a personal relationship, not just with one people, but with individuals within that people (*Answer*, 371). Therefore, when God seems to be hiding His face, or allowing injustice, the pleas of the faithful sometimes have the ring of personal accusations of breach of contract, as in the angry Eighty-ninth Psalm (*Answer*, 428).

Jung asks why Yahweh should need such personal involvement from his creatures, why he should demand appeasements and personal loyalty, if not that Yahweh needs recognition in order to be happy. Yahweh needs to be called perfectly just, and yet occasionally behaves, as in *Job*, with perfect injustice—at least by human measurement. If God were to consult his Omniscience, He would know exactly what his creatures would do ahead of time. But God seems to put away His omniscience, or choose not to use it, and then becomes angry when He discovers that His people are disobeying or ignoring

Him. God, Jung claims, acts as if He is not fully conscious of His own actions. Indeed, He seems to want to forget what His dark son Satan is up to, or more to the point, what His own dark side is up to. In this, He apparently differs from His chief mundane creation.

"But what does man possess that God does not have? Because of his littleness, puniness, and defenselessness against the Almighty, he possesses, as we have already suggested, a somewhat keener consciousness based on self-reflection: he must, in order to survive, always be mindful of his impotence. God has no need of this circumspection, for nowhere does he come up against an insuperable obstacle that would force him to hesitate and hence make him reflect on himself. Could a suspicion have grown up in God that man possesses an infinitely small yet more concentrated light than he, Yahweh, possesses? A jealousy of that kind might perhaps explain his behavior" (*Answer*, 376).

Man and his consciousness are often impeded by the physical, including afflictions like that Job suffered. He is not as free as God, who dwells in the psychic realm which, we have already seen, is quite independent of the physical. Jung is asserting here that man, at least in ancient times, was in some ways more conscious of himself, his actions and their consequences, than was God. God could afford to put away his omniscience, while man had to struggle to get and retain every bit of knowledge there was to be had. This also explains how man could be seen by Jung as more conscious of his actions than God. The physical body, and the human consciousness within it, need to survive in a hostile world, a world not only filled with unpredictable forces of nature, but also with unpredictability within. God has a dual nature, of which man must always be mindful and fearful.

Jung is thus saying that it is because God is not fully conscious of Himself that man has become more and more conscious of himself and of God. So, in the Book of Job, we see how God "unwittingly raises Job by humiliating him in the dust. By so doing he pronounces judgment on himself and gives man the moral satisfaction ..." (*Answer*, 385). Job witnesses God's dual nature, and we readers who observe Job's plight find it very difficult not to judge God Himself, or at least wonder with incredulity at His behavior (*Answer*, 386).

It is only with the aid of reading many of Jung's earlier works that one comes to an understanding of what Jung is telling us about God and man in *Answer to Job*. At first, human beings live in fear of God (or their experience of Him, the archetype of the Self), at the same time loving the lighter side of His dual nature. They at first do not find any fault with this conception of God as both good and evil, capricious and trustworthy. Then along comes Job, and no doubt the rest of civilization which he represents, and dramatizes the contradiction: How can God be omniscient and wholly just and benevolent when evil abounds? Job's cry of indignation is a cry to the Self, and an assertion of the moral supremacy of the conscious over the unconscious. The next step is the coming of Christ, who is God become man, or the Self, struggling to become conscious. The Book of Job supplies us with the reason, according to Jung, for God's wanting to become man, a process that Jung calls "individuation" (*Answer*, 397).

It is significant that Christ was born of the Virgin Mary, for according to Jung, she personifies the ancient goddess and the Old Testament companion of the Almighty, Sophia, or "Wisdom." "Her love of mankind, widely emphasized in the ancient writings, suggests that in this newest creation of his [-Christ-] Yahweh has allowed himself to be extensively influenced by Sophia" (*Answer*, 398). Jung is as explicit as possible about the true significance he finds in the development of the Incarnation, which he appears to believe actually did occur in Christ and was governed by forces beyond human control. The Incarnation is not for the redemption of man, but rather for the "differentiation of Yahweh's consciousness" which has been prompted by the moral upper hand gotten by Job centuries earlier (*Answer*, 406). The Paraclete-the Holy Ghost-is sent to represent the continuing incarnation of God in all men (*Answer*, 431-432). Hence, the Holy Ghost is the instrument of mankind's increasing individuation, a process which makes individuals more and more aware of the God within.

When Christ cries out to God on the cross and suffers such a terrible fate, Jung says that God was at that moment experiencing mortality and suffering a like fate as Job. It is this great act which is truly the answer to Job, according to Jung. It is God changing His

nature, becoming more conscious of Himself through man's consciousness, allowing and strengthening in man his moral sense and its wisdom. (*Answer*, 408). "It was only quite late," Jung writes, "that we realized (or rather, are beginning to realize) that God is Reality itself and therefore-last but not least-man. This realization is a millennial process" (*Answer*, 402). This reality appears to be a psychic reality, one which in its unfolding answers job by showing that "God and man both want to escape from blind injustice" by emphasizing the reign of the Son instead of the Father (*Answer*, 427).

That statement comes as close as any Jung ever made to claiming that man and God were one. Elsewhere, he says that it is *empirically* impossible to distinguish between the two, or more specifically, between God and the archetype of the Self ("Psychology and Religion," 468-469). But Jung attributes more to God than any man can encompass, and therefore it would be rash, especially in the light of some of his other statements on this subject, to accuse Jung of reducing God to man's psyche. Man's psyche, instead, is not wholly his, and is more than any mortal can possess and control.

To support his view of God and Christ, Jung points to passages in the Gospels containing sayings of Christ such as, "The servant is not greater than his lord; neither he that is sent greater than he that sent him" (John 13:16), "At that day ye shall know that I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you" (John 14:20), and at one point, "Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods?" (John 10:34). Jung believes that Christ was a man seized by the needs of the unconscious archetype of the Self, that therefore He was exactly what He claimed to be-both God and man. It is as if God and Job dwelt within the same being, and the outcome was a God who showed Himself to be more universalistic, just, and compassionate than He previously had been (*Answer*, 409). This God could enter more palpably into the human experience, spiritualizing and inspiring man in a revolutionary way.

But Christ's concrete manifestation of God's desire to enter into man's consciousness is also incomplete, according to Jung, because Christ represents only one half of God, the side of light, but not of darkness. This darkness is still reflected in Christ's instruction to

pray, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil," as though God might still do the former instead of the latter. (*Answer*, 411). Christ comes into man and dwells there via the Holy Ghost, but the part of God which thus dwells in man is wholly good, while man still experiences evil within and without. Jung's account of the Apocalypse, or the Book of Revelation, points out that John's vision is full of God's fury and destruction as of old, and even Christ appears there to be full of wrath, even of hatred (*Answer*, 411). Man is given closer kinship with God, becoming through Christ his children, but according to Jung, God has still not revealed to man nor incarnated His entire self.

For Jung, the doctrine of the Trinity represents the Christian tradition's rejection of the capricious and dark side of God." But when God incarnates only his light self, an "enantiodromia in the grand style is to be expected. This may well be the meaning of the belief in the coming of the Antichrist, which we owe more than anything else to the activity of the `spirit of the truth- ("Psychology and Religion," 433). Jung warns that the Christian one-sidedness, its total rejection of evil, means that the unconscious self will react with more heathenism, especially since some of the values of heathenism are necessary for life. ("Psychology and Religion," 441). One sees this tendency in John's visions in Revelation, with its horrible destruction and terror. Jung sees the Book of Revelation as a sign that John's unconscious, reflecting the state of mind of God Himself, was rebelling against the imposition of a wholly good nature on the Self.

However, Jung contends that Christian ethics still lead men to a beneficial understanding of the opposites that are in God and the mystery of God's power. In struggling with moral conflicts which cannot be resolved, man "finds that God in his `oppositeness' has taken possession of him, incarnated himself in him. He becomes a vessel filled with divine conflict" ("Psychology and Religion," 416). Hence, the more human beings suffer under the burdens of Job, convinced of the Christian principles of justice and mercy, the more they will have to see and deal with the true face of God, which is not all light but also darkness. They realize that the fear of God and the love of God are both necessary and compatible. They are compelled

in this way to their own knowledge of the contradictory elements that affect their own natures ("Psychology and Religion," 418). The Christian continues to struggle with God's wish to become in man "exclusively good" ("Psychology and Religion," 424).

Hence, Christianity has a civilizing influence, and has made man more well-balanced psychologically than before. But Christianity so thoroughly represses the Self's darker side that man is in danger of having that side burst unconsciously forth. Still, Christianity, and especially the Catholic Church, have ways of dealing with the evil side, ways of acknowledging and expiating evil with ritual and symbolism. Worse is the modern development in which, according to Jung, Christianity and belief in God Himself are being rejected in favor of scientific rationalism, pushing spiritual elements even farther below the surface. In the mind of the modern scientific rationalist, evil simply does not exist, only ignorance. In much of modern philosophy, religion itself is turned into ignorance, and so there is no legitimate outlet for the evil in men, no way of getting rid of it, and nothing but shocked horror after the terrors from the depths of the psyche have wreaked personal or political destruction. To Jung, history is the account of man's various attempts to accommodate or deny the entire nature of God.

God's Hand in History

In order to understand Jung's view of human history, one must begin at the beginning, with his treatment of archaic or primitive man. Countering philosopher Lucien Levy-Bruhl,¹² Jung insists that primitive peoples' "psychic functioning is essentially the same" as our own, only the assumptions we start with differ (*Modern Man*, "Archaic Man," 129). Primitive man believes that everything is explained by magical powers, that nothing happens that is not intended by some outside force. It is not that he does not see the physical cause of what happens. But he feels that this is not a good enough explanation for why it happens. In contrast, modern man is fully satisfied with causality, that is, the argument that everything we see or feel has an empirical cause. He expects that the universe is wholly governed by rational laws, which if not already discovered, will be discovered in

time. He believes that he has disproved the existence of all supernatural powers and forces which cannot be seen and measured. Hence, he thinks of the primitive's belief in witchcraft and spirits, for instance, as complete nonsense (*Modern Man*, "Archaic Man," 131-132).

Jung points out the irony of this modern materialism, which sees the individual as a mere result of social and physical forces outside himself. Modern man has replaced the archaic way of thinking with a modern equivalent, since primitive man also believed that outside forces dominated his existence, and that he was merely an interchangeable unit in a social collective, not really a unique individual at all (*Modern Man*, "Archaic Man," 148-149). The real difference between the two is that modern man no longer attributes everything to God or gods but to scientific laws he claims to have discovered and that he believes can be manipulated endlessly to his own advantage.

Unlike modern man, primitive man in no way feels that he can master nature. All that he has is precariously given or taken away by superior powers. Modern man, who has taken over the role of God for himself, believes that nature is his laboratory, that it is possible to dominate nature completely. This belief, no more credulous than that of primitive man, is formed when man no longer believes in any powers superior or independent of himself (*Modern Man*, "Archaic Man," 144). Hence, Jung would link modern man's agnosticism or atheism to his quest to dominate nature completely, and its attendant monstrous miscarriages, such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the advent of totalitarianism. In order to believe that he can control nature to this degree, modern man must "take back all his archaic projections"-i.e., his gods- into himself (*Modern Man*, "Archaic Man," 145). But with these internalized and repressed instead of objectified, modern man is actually less in control of his own psyche, and especially his dark side, than he was before, so that the ironic result is that man, now equipped with tremendous technological power, is ever more capable of using it for evil when the unconscious darkness within bursts forth and projects itself upon the enemy.

By juxtaposing modern and primitive man in such a way, Jung

suggests that both are only half-correct. Modern man deludes himself about how much he can explain, and how satisfying such explanations are. Primitive man sees supernatural intention everywhere, even when the causation is obvious. But Jung credits primitive man with more perception than modern man. Primitive man "expects more of an explanation," which seems to suggest that even if events have an obvious empirical cause, Jung finds some truth in looking beyond that cause to a greater significance. Is Jung praising the primitive as having a better grip on reality? Does he think that human history has been spiritually regressive?

Jung brings forth modern philosophical and psychological evidence that seems to support the first contention. He invokes the names of Kant, Leibniz, and Freud as men who postulated the power of the unconscious but who were not listened to, so that modern man still denies the very existence of such a force (*Modern Man*, "Dream Analysis," 1). As for the second question, while there may be something Rousseauian in Jung's admiration for the primitive, like Rousseau, Jung does not believe it is possible to go back to the primitive's more "hygienic" psychic life, nor is it clear that Jung would find such a development at all desirable. Instead, by criticizing elements of modernity, he seems to suggest that history is poised to swing back to a mean between two extremes.¹³

Spiritual or psychic development does not occur in a linear fashion, but rather in a process of action and reaction. Jung gives some account of how specific historical events embodied swings in the spiritual history of mankind, leading up to the supposed impasse of the modern world. In "The Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology," Jung claims that the roots of the rejection of religion in favor of empiricism are to be found in the Enlightenment and in "the spiritual catastrophe of the Reformation," which "put an end to the Gothic Age with its impetuous yearning for the heights, its geographical confinement, and its restricted view of the world .. (*Modern Man*, "Basic Postulates," 173). Man's consciousness "ceased to grow upward, and grew instead in breadth of view," as the human mind turned to discovering and conquering new territory, until only material things appeared to have any reality and a new materialistic

philosophy and science were born. This amounted to nothing less than an intellectual revolution against the Middle Ages, restricting in a wholly different way what men thought of as reality, meaning and fact. This revolution had its greatest impact on the simpler or weaker minds, the vast majority who did not make sophisticated refinements or extrapolations from the new way of thinking but rather unconsciously absorbed the cruder message: the supernatural was denied, acquisition of material goods and temporal power were elevated (*Modern Man*, "Basic Postulates," 174-175). The Industrial Revolution, with its emphasis on materialism and earthly concerns, completed the historical swing away from God.

The mindset that these events formed is our own. Jung calls it "the spirit of the age," which holds almost all minds in its grasp. The spirit of the age has made matter into its god and materialism into its religion. The reason why our age focuses single-mindedly on material causation and rationalism is because the previous age "too much was accounted for in terms of the spirit" (*Modern Man*, "Basic Postulates," 177).¹⁴ Jung reminds us that similar, though less extreme, changes in the conception of god or divine spirit occurred in ancient Greece,¹⁵ but the spirit of the age is so strong that such observations about previous eras do not seem relevant to our own.

Thus history fluctuates, but Jung believes that it is possible for mankind to come to a state of equilibrium, in which spiritual history, so to speak, might cease. This equilibrium would occur if we allowed both the material and the spiritual aspects of reality their place (*Modern Man*, "Basic Postulates," 178, 191). This seems to be Jung's larger mission—to teach the reasonableness of and the means of reaching this equilibrium. Spiritual history has brought us to such an impasse that only a consciousness of that history and knowledge of the possible end of its oscillations that Jung can provide can save us from further violent upheaval and perhaps complete nihilism or destruction.

Indeed, Jung does not shy away from presenting the development of his own psychology as the link between the two psychic extremes, as a way for modern man to understand the unconscious, the spiritual side, perhaps even God Himself. Jung sees his psychol-

ogy as the only means for dealing with the truly modern man who has completely shorn himself of all superstitions and beliefs. Most people are clinging at least to religious forms, but the truly modern man is an atheist. He has cut himself off from the herd mentality to a high degree. Jung uses Nietzschean terms when he describes this man as standing at the "abyss of the future before him;" living completely in the "immediate present" (*Modern Man*, "Spiritual Problem," 196-197).¹⁶ "The values and strivings of those past worlds no longer interest him save from the historical standpoint. Thus he has become 'unhistorical' in the deepest sense and has estranged himself from the mass of men who live entirely within the bounds of tradition" (*Modern Man*, "Spiritual Problem," 197). Like Nietzsche's Superman, the truly modern man knows that he confronts the abyss of nothingness that is the source of everything (*Modern Man*, "Spiritual Problem," 197).

In a later edition of *The Undiscovered Self*, Jung identifies both Socrates and Jesus as modern in this sense." But in reality, Jung seems to have intellectual, political, and moral leaders of the world in mind, and not men as rare as Socrates and Jesus. Science has torn the veil away from the "illusion" which the medieval man enjoyed of a world governed by heaven, in which everything and everyone was in its place. These leaders are aware of how little the human efforts of the past have worked. They have experienced the First World War, and they no longer believe in the moral superiority of Christianity or the Christian nations. They have seen how science and technology can be used for horrible destruction as well as for good. They have come to realize that the ideals of international social democracy, or the benefits of economic unity, or agreements to outlaw war, are elusive or fatally flawed. "At bottom, behind every such palliative measure there is a gnawing doubt. I believe I am not exaggerating when I say that modern man has suffered an almost fatal shock, psychologically speaking, and as a result has fallen into profound uncertainty" (*Modern Man*, "Spiritual Problem," 199-200). Jung states that he is not competent to judge whether Western man, particularly white man, is sick or not, but simply by saying so the implication is clear, and indeed, Jung's focus is the sickness of

modern Western man. (*Modern Man*, "Spiritual Problem," 200).

As we have seen, the hallmark of modern Western Civilization is that the psyche is to be found on the inside, as opposed to many other past and current cultures in which the psyche is still on the outside.¹⁸ Suddenly, human beings have to deal with all the elements of the psyche that they had before kept at a distance.¹⁹ Suddenly there is stress between what the "inner man" and "outer man" want. As modern man rejects religion and religious beliefs, it appears that he must struggle with God within himself, the God defined in *Answer to Job*. The more civilized and in control he is, the more the unconscious within expresses its more barbaric tendencies, and the individual is led to suffer from bizarre fantasies, obsessions, and neuroses primitive man would never have experienced. The tension builds in the collective psyche until, Jung suggests, it bursts rationality asunder in a stroke with obsessive violence.

It is because of crises like this, which seemingly cannot be stopped by reason, that modern man is now put into a position where he must acknowledge the power of the unconscious psyche, "that the dark stirrings of the unconscious are active powers, that psychic forces exist which, for the present at least, cannot be fitted into our rational world order" (*Modern Man*, "Spiritual Problem," 203). Psychology is born out of this necessity. It is therefore a product of the development of modern Western man's consciousness, and specifically of the disillusionment that ensued after the First World War. *Psychology is the historical reaction to the rationalistic spirit of the age.*

Jung finds modern men turning more and more to gnosticism, which, as he defines it, is a belief in underlying psychological or spiritual causes. Laymen are interested in psychology, psychic phenomena, "spiritualism, astrology, Theosophy, parapsychology, and so forth" (*Modern Man*, "Spiritual Problem," 206). They have rejected traditional religion, but they are increasingly also rejecting scientism. They wish to experience the psyche first-hand; they wish to *know* rather than believe. It would seem that Jung thinks this exploration basically healthy and good, or at least better than the rationalistic alternative, which to his mind excludes too much of

reality to call itself true science.

Modern man lives in a relativistic world, but this new interest in psychology is evidence that he wishes to escape from relativism, that he wants to know reality with certainty, that he wants true foundations. This new interest in the psyche and psychic forces is the beginning of what Jung hopes is to be a sea-change in the Western mentality.

Fighting the Cold War and Beyond

Jung felt that more recent events than World War I could provide the impetus for such a sea-change. Shortly after World War II, Jung's thoughts on this cataclysm were broadcast over the BBC. Here Jung displayed his conviction that the mass movement of National Socialism was caused by a disruption of the unconscious of the mass of Germans, exacerbated by their defeat in World War I. Jung claimed that as early as 1918 he could observe abnormalities in the unconscious of his German patients that could not be ascribed to personal experience. He encountered shared archetypes of which emerged in dreams and fantasies in a way that expressed "primitivity, violence, and cruelty" ("Individuation," 4). Writing in 1937, Jung noted the pagan content of the Nazi movement. He saw Nietzsche as a prophet who heralded the coming of Dionysius, or his "Teutonic cousin" Wotan in Germany ("Essays," 28). Jung predicted that these tendencies were dangerously close to bursting forth in the German people, but he also explained that Germany at that time was simply the most susceptible to those forces which were gathering power throughout the West.

Communism, to Jung, represented a direct assault on man's moral and spiritual freedom. Communism was systematically lifted up as a substitute for religion by the state; authentic religions were suppressed.²⁰ The system's emphasis on conformity actively suppressed individualism, obstructing the individual's ability to have the singular spiritual experience necessary to know himself (*Undiscovered Self*, 261-262). It strove to make the individual into a unit which functioned within organizations, having no inherent worth or meaning apart from the community or State. For that reason, Jung

referred to it as an archaic social order, one which attempted to revert to primitive collectivity in a time when man had outgrown such an organization.²¹ Communism was as great an evil as fascism "because it robs [the individual] of his freedom not only in the social but in the moral and spiritual sphere" (*Undiscovered Self*, 289).

Jung points out that, when consolidating their rule, the leaders of such totalitarian regimes "invariably try to cut the ground from under *religion*" (*Undiscovered Self*, 256). The individual must be severed from anything that is not of the State, but religion taps into the internal numinous experience which has nothing to do with the State or the material world with its needs and demands. Religion, for Jung, represents the realm of more perfect freedom, for, as we have seen, the unconscious psyche is much freer than the ego, and one can extrapolate that the expression of what dwells in the unconscious psyche through religion is an expression of that which is most free within the individual. Religion, internal experience and internal worth, gives the individual a point of reference from which to judge the external world, a point of reference that the totalitarian state cannot afford its citizens to have. The state would rather its citizens be wholly concerned with material well-being and comfort, and forget all spiritual matters, which, according to scientific rationalism, after all do not exist.

The individual should not give himself up to and be responsible to "God," but only to the totalitarian state. The state then asks for the same loyalty and faith as would have been given to God, but, Jung implies, it deals with the individual less fairly than would the regulating factors of the Self. The individual's relationship to God emphasizes the importance of a strong ego to maintain personal responsibility, which the state wishes to destroy.

No wonder, then, that the newly formed Soviet Union did whatever it could to destroy the religious impulse in the people and replace it with sterile Marxist-Leninist doctrine.²² "The State takes the place of God; that is why, seen from this angle, the socialist dictatorships are religions and State slavery is a form of worship" (*Undiscovered Self*, 259).²³ And when this substitution inevitably fails to satisfy man's inner yearnings, the compensation is fanaticism,

expressed by the leaders and the masses alike. As the State becomes more and more godlike, suppression and terror become more likely. It has the power over life and death, the power of arbitrary judgment, just as if it were God. It is above criticism and treats dissenters as heretics, deservedly eliminated for their sins. Hence, the eternal religious function is perverted through repression.

But according to Jung, the West, the only possible defender against communism, is in danger of corruption by "subversive minorities," who are sheltered by our humanitarian ideals of freedom and justice (*Undiscovered Self*, 247). More importantly, despite the stratum of relatively stable, rational individuals within it, the West is susceptible to the type of mass politics-in this case "democratic collective psychology"²⁴-which have infected the East. The effect of this mass psychology is that democratic societies themselves are in danger of tyranny (*Undiscovered Self*, 248). Jung states that there is a sizeable stratum of the Western population that is already susceptible to irrational fantasy, and this stratum is easily activated by mass movements. This is because Western man has come to think of himself merely as a statistic.

The individual is consummately unique, and can gain self-knowledge only if he does not rely on anyone else's theory or statistics in determining who he is (*Undiscovered Self*, 249-250). Therefore, inasmuch as the scientific viewpoint holds sway in modern democracies, such that the individual is seen as a unit or a statistic for the purposes of social engineering, the individual's moral responsibility is taken from him and replaced with state policy (*Undiscovered Self*, 251-252). Inasmuch as people follow the dictates of society, including morals, simply because they are rational-the teaching of liberalism and the Enlightenment- or because the state tells them to, their convictions will be empty and susceptible to being overturned by fanaticism.

"We ought not to underestimate the psychological effect of the statistical world-picture: it thrusts aside the individual in favour of anonymous units that pile up into mass formations. The moral responsibility of the individual is then inevitably replaced by the policy of the State (*raison d'etat*). Instead of moral and mental

differentiation of the individual you have public welfare and the raising of the living standard" (*Undiscovered Self*, 252).

Jung paints a picture of the mass statistical man whom the modern Western welfare state is capable of producing which is indeed frightening and less than human.²⁵ All decisions, major and minor, are taken away from him. He has no choice about how to live, down to food, clothing, education, housing, tastes, and manners. The government officials are theoretically simply units in the bureaucratic machine, but the mass, in its need for meaning and direction, almost forces upon the leaders magical qualities they do not really possess. The leaders fall victim to their "own inflated ego-consciousness," and begin to tyrannize (*Undiscovered Self*, 252-253). They form a sort of symbiotic relationship with the masses, who are convinced of their lack of importance as individual human beings and who now derive any feelings of importance they have from the state and its officials.

The ironic outcome is that the individual in this type of large centralized state really is not important; the conviction of scientific rationalism is borne out in reality—man is reduced to statistic. He trusts his judgment less and less, and turns more and more over to the organization. "Thus the constitutional State drifts into the situation of a primitive form of society—the communism of a primitive tribe where everybody is subject to the autocratic rule of a chief or an oligarchy" (*Undiscovered Self*, 255).

Hence, liberal democracy is not simply applauded by Jung. Inasmuch as the liberal democratic states grow and become more encompassing, Jung thinks the same dynamic that is at work within communism and fascism is also at work within them. After discussing National Socialism, fascism, and Stalinism in a 1936 lecture, Jung did not hesitate to mention the British and Americans. He criticized quite vehemently the trend toward the welfare state²⁵ represented by the Roosevelt administration in the United States.

The more Western society emphasizes public welfare and economic well-being over the moral and intellectual development of the individual, the more it removes from him crucial decisions concerning how he will live, and the more the state stifles the individual's

conscience and consciousness of his personal relationship to God (*Undiscovered Self*, 252). Eventually, even the free citizen of liberal democracy will feel insignificant, and, therefore, "on the road to State slavery" (*Undiscovered Self*, 254).

Jung juxtaposes the tendency of modern capitalistic mass democracy with "true democracy." Such a democracy is "a conditional fight among ourselves, either collective or individual" ("Essays," 224). True democracy comes closest to adequately expressing the internal conflicts of individuals and society because it turns these conflicts inward; in other words, the conflict is not projected onto other nations. For Jung, numbers are a matter of great importance. Once a democracy, or any other type of government, encompasses too many people, it can hardly help but produce a herd mentality. Thus, it is not really a democracy. Also, it seems, the nation's attitude towards commerce is important. It is not that Jung is anti-capitalist, for he knows all too well the power that economic centralization gives to the totalitarian state. But Jung does credit capitalism at the stage it is now, in which markets move beyond any individual's control, with what we might call "alienation," and he apparently would have loathed the lowering of culture and values caused by commercialism. At the time, Jung could hold up his native Switzerland as a relatively good example of the small democracy he preferred, where the strife was internalized (no wars in 400 years) and the government had not become too big ("Essays," 224).

This small, legally-restricted civil war called democracy, however, is only the best *political* solution to the human problem. "Our order would be perfect if only everybody could direct his aggressiveness inward, into his own psyche," and if they could thus "fight the overwhelming power-drive of the shadow" ("Essays," 224). If this becomes widely possible, Jung believes that even the civil strife of democracy will cease. Then, it seems, human beings will really be in control of themselves and their own fate. Jung is an optimist, for, though it may take the experience of long periods of various forms of state-slavery to drive people to it, he apparently believes that the time will come when people are ready to begin the confrontation with the evil within on a conscious basis. If any intent can be discerned from

his various writings, it is that he wishes to be a herald for that time.

As concerns the actual dynamics of the Cold War, Jung presents the East as having been overtaken by the unconscious and having succumbed to a mass mentality. Despite Soviet rhetoric, rationality-economic or social-does not dominate the Eastern mind. The West, on the other hand, is in danger of succumbing totally to the conscious ego which is now ruled by scientific rationalism. This is a picture of a "global split personality." The world psyche has been ripped asunder by modernity, and the West must bridge the gap by seeking a healthy relationship with the unconscious, therefore providing a spiritual as well as rational rival for the East, or, perhaps more accurately, a spiritual guide for the East instead of a rival (*Undiscovered Self*, 289-291). The West is to embrace true religion rightly understood in order to be that guide.²⁸

It is this goal that prompts Jung to still define himself as a scientist. If he can give his recommendations the authority of a science, scientific Western man might be inclined toward them. In this light, science, strangely, would breed an openness to mystery. Jung hoped that the psychological truths which he discovered could bridge the relativistic rift in modern faith for people who are well-acquainted with the beliefs of others (*Undiscovered Self*, 294-295). Psychology can be, in a sense, the ultimate science. Self-knowledge would then be scientific knowledge.

"If only a world-wide consciousness could arise that all division and all fission are due to the splitting of opposites in the psyche, then we should know where to begin. But if even the smallest and most personal stirrings of the individual psyche-so insignificant in themselves-remain as unconscious and unrecognized as they have hitherto, they will go on accumulating and produce mass groupings and mass movements which cannot be subjected to reasonable control or manipulated to a good end" (*Undiscovered Self*, 299).

The Jungian Prescription

Jung's work, while seemingly pessimistic, is actually quite hopeful that someday the West can be cured. The very things that have caused the spiritual crisis of our times also hold open an unparalleled

opportunity. Jung's work is a call for change ("Psychology and Religion," 79). It is a change in which the individual is "reconciled" to himself-to his Self ("Psychology and Religion," 81)-including all the repressed primitive and even barbaric tendencies below the surface in his unconscious which he would rather project onto others. In order to achieve the required balance, modern man would have to: 1) accept the existence of his entire Self, not just his ego; 2) understand that there is evil as well as good in that self, primitivism as well as civilization; and 3) be able to confront these contents within the psyche directly and consciously, and allow them their place without losing control over them. Man would attain individuation, a state in which he could deal responsibly with the powers within.

Jung believed it possible for *individuals* to return to an authentic and healthy relationship with God through introspection. Organized religion could still serve its purpose using "ritual, initiation rites and ascetic practices," but only if a person could first be brought back around to a point at which faith was comprehensible (*Modern Man, "Freud and Jung,"* 119). This would not only involve a recognition of the existence of other parts of the psyche besides the ego, but also a recovering of respect for the "natural and accidental" which has fallen into contempt as man has obtained more and more mastery over nature. Jung connects this new knowledge to a religious experience which brings the individual into an "immediate relation to God," which can keep him or her from "dissolving in the crowd." (*Undiscovered Self,* 292).

"It is not ethical principles, however lofty, or creeds, however orthodox, that lay the foundations for the freedom and autonomy of the individual, but simply and solely the empirical awareness, the incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal, reciprocal relationship between man and an extramundane authority which acts as a counterpoise to the 'world' and its 'reason- (*Undiscovered Self,* 257).

Individuality without an adequate understanding of and appreciation for community, however, is dangerous. Jungian individuation means a true acknowledgment not only of the Other-God-but of our spiritual connection to other human beings.²⁹ Individuation,

therefore, does not mean the selfish one-sidedness of the Yuppie, but rather a wholeness or completion of all aspects of the human being, both individual and collective. This makes the difference between "mass man" and an individual with a conscience toward other individuals and his community at large. Indeed, a central aspect which we have seen of mass man is his lack of conscience.

Yet in a world in which "sin has .. become something quite relative" (*Modern Man*, "Psychotherapists or Clergy," 232), how can the psychoanalyst provide the patient with any true religious feeling, with any meaning which in the final analysis must always be, at least in part, strong belief? Jung attempts to deal with the inevitable suggestion that psychology undermines true belief by distinguishing between religious experience of God and knowledge of a metaphysical reality known as God. Jung claims that the unconscious psyche is the medium through which the experience of God flows and should not be considered God Himself. However, Jung believes knowledge of God cannot be solved by reason, and does not need to be solved in order for individuals to experience what is in their unconscious (*Undiscovered Self*, 293-305). It is a reasonable question to ask whether the type of modern Western man he describes will be willing to try to tap into these feelings without that proof, which has never been convincingly given, of the existence of God as a real entity. Will such a man take psychological imperatives as evidence? Even Jung himself says this is not evidence enough. To be convinced of God, Jung says, one must have the experience of God. But how is one to have this experience if one is not open to the idea of such an experience? In order to be seized by the experience, wouldn't one have to have at least a smidgen of belief to begin with?

These questions become more troubling when one surmises that, as a scientist, Jung is probably more doubting than his patients about particular religious doctrines. Will not his teaching, if put before the average man or woman, simply plunge them deeper into a relativistic abyss? Even if it is possible for a Jungian doctor to still believe in, or even know, God, will not Jungian theory have a dilatory effect on all but the most understanding sort? Jung forms a picture of a typical conversation with an inquiring patient. The patient asks,

for instance, what makes Christ's teachings superior to Buddha's? How can we choose which belief is correct?

"But if I take them seriously, I must admit to the patient that his feelings are justified. 'Yes, I agree, Buddha may be right as well as Jesus. Sin is only relative, and it is difficult to see how we can feel ourselves in any way redeemed by the death of Christ.' As a doctor I can easily admit these doubts, while it is hard for the clergyman to do so. The patient feels my attitude to be one of understanding, while the pastor's hesitation strikes him as traditional prejudice, which estranges them from one another" (*Modern Man*, "Psychotherapists or Clergy," 233).

Considering Jung's teaching as a whole, though he probably thinks that Buddha offers spiritual insights which may parallel or even be superior to some teachings of Christianity, it is doubtful that he thinks that sin is truly relative, since his patients most often develop their neuroses through sin, or at least through internal moral conflict. Furthermore, we have seen in *Answer to Job* that Jung believes that is possible, given the correct reading of that book and the Bible as a whole, to feel redeemed by the death of Christ. What Jung is saying is that his ability to remain open to his patient's doubts, and his ability to acknowledge the fact that he knows nothing with absolute certainty, make him a more sympathetic ear for modern man than the clergy, by definition, can possibly be.

Yet, also by definition, Jung has to move his patients past these doubts to some kind of peace and understanding of their own religious instincts. While Jungian analysts might be able to do so on a very personal, individual basis, working with the individual's unique background and beliefs, how is the rest of mankind to be reached? If the need for mass politics is to be tempered in the future, the masses—despite Jung's distaste for the very term "masses"—must avail themselves of the Jungian insight. Is such insight possible for the vast majority if they do not have access to or do not understand informed religious teachings or psychoanalysis?'

If societal change becomes possible only with a change of attitude on the part of society as a whole, then a general, societal questioning of the modern faith in science would seem to be the

answer to the dilemma of modern man. Jung tells us that the climate of the age is "scientific materialism." The belief that nothing exists that cannot be sensed is exactly what has driven the spiritual so far underground. Jung argues that if human beings were capable of more humility, they would adopt a broader perspective, and the scientific insight of their own time would appear neither new nor wholly convincing. One gets the sense Jung thinks that, at the moment, only a few such as himself are capable of refusing to accept rationalism's omnipotence. When human beings in general learn that both explanations are valid and have a place, when man becomes capable of both a horizontal and a vertical perspective, then he will have come closer to grasping the mystery of reality and his place within it. With an air of Socratic skepticism, Jung claims, "As to the *ultimate* we can know nothing, and only when we admit this do we return to a state of equilibrium" (*Modern Man*, "Basic Postulates," 177-178).

This attitude of humility toward the ultimate Jung thought essential in order for society to reject rationalism and to be open to the healing possibilities of religious experience. It seems much more plausible that humanity will at some point arrive at such an attitude en masse, through disillusionment with the products of scientific rationalism, than that world leaders will listen to Jungian theorists or become Jungians themselves, as some contemporary Jungian analysts seem to hope.³¹

Jung felt that his brand of psychology could lead this societal change (*Modern Man*, "Analytical Psychology," 180). He suggests that if this is possible, humanity will have re-learned the ancient view that eternal spirit is the creator and moving force of the body (as well as of the world), and not the other way around. The outcome of this realization is individuals who are more self-aware and are provided a buffer from the flux of everyday reality by a higher, eternal, reality.³²

In "Analytical Psychology and 'Weltanschauung,'" Jung suggests quite openly that Western man at least would be better off introducing analytical psychology, of Jung's brand in particular, into his current Weltanschauung, or "attitude" toward life. This attitude is our own created "picture of the world," which conditions every single

aspect of the way we think and live. Jung intimates that significant scientific discoveries may, as we know, significantly change the *Weltanschauung*, even overturn it. And it is clear that he believes that analytical psychology is and should be one of those paradigmatic discoveries. He wishes us to move forward, toward a scientific understanding of what cannot be seen but is strongly felt. Freudian analytical psychology is too rationalistic and materialistic, too deterministic, and hence resembles an attempt to revert to a more primitive mind-set ("Analytical Psychology," 365-366). To move forward to an understanding of what is and is not under our conscious control is much more desirable. The human mind, he insists, is not *a tabula rasa* at birth ("Analytical Psychology," 371). We need to acknowledge the eternal existence of certain tendencies and needs found in the archetypes.

"That the world has an inside as well as an outside, that it is not only outwardly visible but acts upon us in a timeless present, from the deepest and apparently most subjective recesses of the psyche-this I hold to be an insight which, even though it be ancient wisdom, deserves to be evaluated as a new factor in building *a Weltanschauung*" ("Analytical Psychology," 376).

Jung writes that the problem with every *Weltanschauung* so far is that it has claimed universal significance. Yet this claim runs up against many other nationalities' beliefs that do not find it acceptable. It would seem that this experience shatters modern man's confidence in his own *Weltanschauung*, a dilemma which Nietzsche put forth most clearly in "On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life." Jung, claiming a way around the Nietzschean dilemma, tells us that all other "*Weltanschauungs*" have erred in believing themselves to be the truth in themselves, instead of expressions-prone to perspective and error-of the ineffable. They are our names for things, not the things themselves, which, not surprisingly, we can never grasp in their totality. The names may vary, but the things they describe remain the same ("Analytical Psychology," 378). While this may not be wholly satisfying, it is Jung's attempt to prove a type of universalism in what he views as a relativistic, nihilistic world. If we admit our fallibility, he argues, we are at least half way to admitting

that a larger truth exists.

Hence, Jung is not pushing "all ideas are equally valid," but he appears to be promoting very actively, "my idea may not have all of the truth, and I should not foist it on others in any case." In this case, mankind needs a "horizon" of sorts, in that he needs a picture of the world in order to deal with the world. So he creates a temporary perception of that world and his relationship to it. But perception and reality are different things. According to Jung, in contemplating ourselves we come as close to reality as we possibly can.

"Nowhere are we closer to the sublime secret of all origination than in the recognition of our own selves, whom we always think we know already. Yet we know the immensities of space better than we know our own depths, where—even though we do not understand it—we can listen directly to the throb of creation itself ("Analytical Psychology," 380).

Jung urges cooperation between analytical psychology and Christianity—especially the Protestant variety. Jung's purpose is to reach the few clergy who will listen and perhaps to nudge mankind into spiritual progress.³³ The Catholic Church has less need for the help of psychology, because her symbolic and ritual apparatus is fairly adequate for plumbing and channeling the depths of the human soul, as long as it is still accepted and believed. But Protestantism sharply juxtaposes good and evil and has no means to deal adequately with evil. In Protestantism, forgiveness is intangible, unseen. The message, Jung implies, is that God forgives those who forgive themselves.³⁴ The Protestant clergy stands in need of psychology precisely because it can no longer use the old symbolic apparatus.

For many Protestants, turning to psychology might be the only choice since, thoroughly imbued with rationalism, they would scoff at the very prospect of being turned over to ministers, or even to philosophy, which they find likewise barren. They do not know they have a spiritual problem. And even if they should go to a pastor, he will seldom be equipped with enough knowledge of the psyche to pinpoint the problem. Indeed, modern man senses this dilemma as he begins to abandon religion and take up psychology. He cannot see his way clear to blindly believe and obey any longer. So, it would

seem, doctors of psychology are obliged to somehow lead those lost souls to at least an initial realization of their spiritual problem and potential for spiritual growth. In this regard Jung writes:

"The wave of interest in psychology which at present is sweeping over the Protestant countries of Europe is far from receding. It is coincident with the general exodus from the Church. Quoting a Protestant minister, I may say: 'Nowadays people go to the psychotherapist rather than to the clergyman- (*Modern Man*, "Psychotherapists or Clergy," 28).

Jung claims that all of his patients thirty-five or older can be said to experience problems that amount to a desperate search for religion, a way to come to grips their doubt. None of these older patients are fully healed without attaining a way in which their doubt and their religious yearnings can be reconciled. (*Modern Man*, "Psychotherapists or Clergy," 229). Jung believes, though he cannot statistically prove, that the number of neuroses increases in direct proportion to the decline in religious conviction. Protestants are more likely to need such psycho-spiritual help. Indeed, he can recall only a few believing Catholics who needed his services (*Modern Man*, "Psychotherapists or Clergy," 229). In a survey which Jung undertook, of those who had needed help, fifty-seven percent of Protestants and only twenty-five percent of Catholics sought the psychiatrist out. At some point, fifty-eight percent of Catholics had sought the help of the clergy, while only eight percent of Protestants had (*Modern Man*, "Psychotherapists or Clergy," 230). Hence, it is those would-be believing Protestants that Jung thinks experience the most psychological difficulties in the modern Western world; it is the fallen-away Protestants who may still attend Church but no longer really think about what it means who come to the psychiatrist's couch. The Protestant clergy, then, particularly needs to seek the instruction of psychoanalysts.³⁵ This is the way Jung preferred psychoanalysis find its way into the popular mind.

In *Answer to Job*, Jung claims that Protestants are in danger of "a species of rationalistic historicism," which cannot account for or accommodate the spiritual dimensions of the apocalyptic happenings of our times (*Answer*, 463). By focusing on what has already

happened, i.e., biblical revelations of the past, Protestants have no way of expressing in symbols or in acts the divine drama which is still unfolding. Though some "dogmatic symbols" and hermeneutical allegories remain in the Protestant service and hymnology, Protestants in their rationalism have lost touch with their true meaning. Jung thus thought that an alliance between the Protestant clergy and psychiatry was "entirely legitimate."

Here we can see what Jung really wishes to change within the structure of institutional religion.³⁷ For true religion to be reborn in the West, the religious institutions must realize that literalism in interpreting the scriptures no longer satisfies the more sophisticated mindset of modern Western man. "But if, for instance, the statement that Christ rose from the dead is to be understood not literally but symbolically, then it is capable of various interpretations that do not conflict with the knowledge and do not impair the meaning of the statement" (*Undiscovered Self*, 266). Jung urges that to save Christianity it must be interpreted symbolically by the Church. Only then does it have a chance of becoming more alive and potent than its Eastern communistic rival. Indeed, until then, Western man is in danger of being lured by the communistic religion, since it may appeal more to his rationalistic and materialistic tastes than his own stale religion. Indeed, America, the bulwark against communism, is the most vulnerable.

"America, which-O *quae mutatio rerum*-forms the real political backbone of Western Europe, seems to be immune because of the outspoken counterposition she has adopted, but in point of fact she is perhaps even more vulnerable than Europe, since her *Weltanschauung* with its statistical truths, and her mixed population finds it difficult to strike roots in a soil that is practically without history" (*Undiscovered Self*, 267).

Jung urges the Church to encourage individual spiritual experience, and not to emphasize concern for "community" to the exclusion of this experience. It is quite possible, as Jung would claim, that many a Western pastor no longer believes in the possibility of individual religious revelation, which is why so many emphasize social and political concerns, no longer dwelling on such factors as

sin, guilt, personal sacrifice, and spiritual change. It is difficult not to see the continuing trend of both the Catholic and the Protestant churches towards becoming social and political organizations, entities which have succumbed to the rationalistic trend and no longer believe themselves in spiritual metamorphosis (*Undiscovered Self*, 276-277). Jung believes that the only way to reverse this trend is for the Church, especially the Protestant Church, to start listening to Jungian psychology.

Moral Problems of Jungian Theory

We have seen that Jung attributes the emergence of violent and oppressive mass movements to uncontrollable forces of the psyche which burst forth after large-scale repression. This argument is especially powerful whenever one considers how in the world the atrocities of Stalinism or the Holocaust of Nazi Germany could ever have been allowed. How else, unless the majority, and not simply a few, were mentally unbalanced? How else, unless they had given up their duty of individual responsibility to the State or its dictator? But does this "mass psychosis" argument absolve the perpetrators of such crimes, because they were out of control, or "possessed" by some higher force? Does the state, through its ceremonial functions and its persistent charismatic rhetoric, enthrall the people through some natural function, so that, for instance, the German people as a whole were in no way directly responsible for the Holocaust? Such a conclusion, if it were Jung's, would indeed be reprehensible, and a good reason for rejecting Jungian theory on moral grounds.³⁸

It would seem that Jung at the very least blames the leaders of such crimes, for he believes that the "leaders and dictators, having weighed up the situation correctly, are therefore doing their best to gloss over the all too obvious parallel with the deification of Caesar and to hide their real power behind the fiction of the State ..." (*Undiscovered Self*, 261). The leaders, having in a very real sense been given their power by the masses, do appear to know what they are doing. But are the masses, without whom no such crime could happen, absolved by Jung?

Jung tells us that the evil necessary to commit atrocious acts is

within us all. Barbarity is nothing new to the modern age, only its vehemence and the technology at man's disposal has increased. Each individual has this barbarism lurking within his soul, but most often he opts to project this evil onto another, which justifies attacking the other. Each of us must realize that this capacity is within us, and is not created solely by the enemy. "Man has done these things; I am a man, who has his share of human nature; therefore I am guilty with the rest and bear unaltered and indelibly within me the capacity and the inclination to do them again at any time" (*Undiscovered Self*, 296). In this sense, the crimes of the past, whether of slave-traders or crusaders or Nazis, really are our own, an inheritance of all humanity and a warning of the dangers to come.

But this "original sin"-like teaching seems to mitigate the guilt of the individuals who partake in heinous mass crimes. Am I to proclaim that I have the evil of the Nazi within me, but the Nazi was simply more susceptible to losing control at the time? If we can all be Nazis under the proper circumstances, why should we blame the Nazis or expect them to take responsibility for their crimes, especially since the Nazis were not equipped with Jungian psychology when assessing themselves and their victims. This is an important question for Jungian theory because Jung wishes to promote individual responsibility as the bulwark against mass movements of precisely this type.

Before, during, and after W.W.II, Jung wrote essays and spoke on the Germans, their peculiar psychology, their fantasies, thoughts, and deeds. This was very delicate subject matter, and Jung was open to criticism, for claiming the Germans suffered from a psychosis, and excusing their behavior, as well as for condemning it too harshly. Jung was, in these essays, very circumspect about the responsibility of the German people, and individual Germans, in the catastrophe. Jung's position towards the Germans seemed to be more sympathetic before than after the war, but after the war it remained somewhat sympathetic. Jung often seems to say that the German people as a whole were swept up into an uncontrollable psychic epidemic, and therefore had no ability to stop their behavior, and at the same time to claim that individual Germans were ultimately to blame. How can Jung claim both?

Jung gathered some of his war-related essays into a work entitled "Essays on Contemporary Events" ("Essays," 175-243). The earliest essay he includes is "Wotan," first published in March 1936. Jung had treated some German patients and had discovered in them similarly disturbing manifestations of collective archetypes. Here Jung conjures up the old Teutonic god Wotan, and claims that it is this peculiarly Germanic archetype which, long superseded by Christianity, began forcing its way back into the conscious lives of the Germans in a variety of ways. Worship of Wotan is seen in the German Youth Movement, which sacrificed sheep to celebrate the summer solstice. Wotan, associated with the devil by Christendom, was made into a legendary wandering wraith and, in the middle ages, was associated with the Wandering Jew. "The motif of the wanderer who has not accepted Christ was projected on the Jews, in the same way as we always rediscover our unconscious psychic contents in other people" ("Essays," 181). Anti-Semitism arose again when the god Wotan was reawakened in the German consciousness, for the evil of Wotan needed to be projected onto another people or else it would be internalized as a characteristic of the Germans themselves.

This supposition alone, that the Germans were "possessed" by Wotan, overtaken by numinous psychic contents, is enough to give the reader pause, for possession hardly seems to be something an individual can avoid, since the forces to be reckoned with are larger and stronger than any individual. Had the Germans any choice but to yield to Wotan? First, let us look at exactly what brought the god "back to life."

Jung cites a variety of causes for the rejuvenation of the god. One of those causes was "the accumulation of urban, industrialized masses," who felt as though their fates were out of their hands and in the control of an amorphous entity, the capitalist economy ("Essays," 200-201, cf. 222). This was an underlying condition to be found, however, throughout all Europe. All of Europe was susceptible to a psychic crisis, but Germany was more susceptible than the others. Germany's "system of moral and political education" was also to blame for inculcating "a spirit of dull obedience" that encouraged mass mentality. Thus Jung credits Germans with a characteristic he

finds peculiar to their culture, a sort of rigidity and emphasis on efficiency and duty which could be tapped into by leaders.

In "After the Catastrophe," Jung claims that the German people suffered from feelings of inferiority and projected those feelings onto those they labeled "inferior" or "subhuman" ("Essays," 203). This scapegoating is a very human tendency, but one not very often ending in systematic genocide. However, if the German people felt inferior enough, Jung's hypothesis might be plausible—the Germans had to exterminate the Jews, they felt, in order to exterminate the evil within which was the source of their inferior feeling. This desire to rid the world of a "subhuman" race Jung calls a "hysterical neurosis" ("Essays," 203). Along came a leader who symbolized the height of this neurosis, and who, if the people had not been suffering to a great degree from psychopathic inferiority, would have been taken for the pathetically imbalanced and evil man that he was. Hitler, who might have been a rather harmless neurotic at another place and time, was taken seriously by the German people and elevated to a stature where his megalomania could develop and act in a truly dangerous way.

"Although we may be able to understand why the Germans were misled in the first place, the almost total absence of any reaction is quite incomprehensible. Were there not army commanders who could have ordered their troops to do anything they pleased? Why then was the reaction totally lacking? I can only explain this as the outcome of a peculiar state of mind, a passing or chronic disposition which, in an individual, we call hysteria" ("Essays," 206).

Such a statement could readily be perceived as an excuse or justification for the Germans' or any other group's inexcusable acts. But if we contemplate the horrors that occurred during this period, it is difficult not to think that the people who perpetrated them or knew about them were not in some way disturbed. Can we really say, for instance, that mass murderer Jeffrey Dahmer was entirely mentally stable while committing his atrocities? Indeed, can we honestly say that anyone who would torture or kill another without dire necessity is completely sane? Do we need to do so if we are to assign culpability to the perpetrator? Obviously in practice we do not,

or else thousands of murderers would have to be set free from Western prisons or sent to mental hospitals, whereas only some of the worst end up in the latter. Can this be for any other reason but that we think they are in some way responsible for their very madness?

In the latter part of "After the Catastrophe," Jung uses the language of responsibility, intertwined with the language of "possession." The Germans "*allowed* themselves to be driven to the slaughterhouse," "they showed the least *resistance* to the mental contagion" ("Essays," 212). They had the opportunity to reflect upon their own national weaknesses, especially in the philosophy of Nietzsche, but they did not reflect. They "*allowed* themselves to be deluded by these disastrous fantasies and *succumbed* to the age-old temptations of Satan, instead of turning to their abundant spiritual potentialities ..." ("Essays," 213; emphases mine). Hence, the Germans had both philosophy and religion at their disposal and ignored all elements in both which did not confirm their current illusion. They had the wherewithal to summon the mental strength to resist their madness, but they chose not to. "[T]heir Christianity forgotten, they sold their souls to technology, exchanged morality for cynicism, and dedicated their highest aspirations to the forces of destruction" ("Essays," 213). The alliance of the conscious will with that which is good within the unconscious psyche is needed in order to keep the evil within the psyche at bay. Therefore, one can assign moral responsibility to the National Socialists and every other criminal, whether deemed unstable or not. The will remains free to choose its master, but once the choice is made for evil, it seems, the will may no longer be free. Once God is proclaimed dead, both the light and the dark side of God, which Jung described *in Answer to Job*, come forth in perverted form and the hysteria acquires the quality of "God-Almightiness," creating a "diabolical caricature of man," comically inferior because man can in no way assume the characteristics of God.

It is this lesson that Jung hoped the Germans would learn from their terrifying past, and he thought Western civilization must learn from carefully studying the character of the 20th century. Jung's

answer to modern man is that he must return to a belief in the gods, and that Jungian theory itself can be the impetus and a guide for that return.

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NOTES

1. To give the reader an idea of the imbalance in scholarship between the two in the social sciences and in philosophy, from 1983-1992 the Social Science Index yielded 41 articles on Freud or having substantial content about Freud, 4 dealing with both Freud and Jung, and 4 on Jung alone. From 1982-1992, the Philosopher's Index listed 321 articles on Freud or Freudian psychology, and 30 on Jung and Jungian psychology. It is interesting to note that the number of articles on Freud listed in the Philosopher's Index decreased from an average of 31 per year from 1982-1991 to 2 articles so far listed in the 1992 edition of the index, while the number of Jungian articles have remained rather constant at an average of 3 per year. Thanks to my assistant, Meer Md. Mizanur Rahman, for collecting this information.

2. For an attempt to earnestly deal with these concerns, see Robert C. Fuller, "Psychological Religiousness: Resisting the Tide of Disenchantment," *Pastoral Psychology* 36:3 (Spring 1988), 146-163. See also G.A. Elmer Griffin, "Analytical Psychology and the Dynamics of Human Evil: A Problematic Case in the Integration of Psychology and Theology," *Journal of Psychology and Theology* 14:4 (Winter 1986), 269-277.

3. See Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents*, Chapter One.

4. Cf. Volodymyr Walter Odajnyk, "The Political Ideas of C.G. Jung," *The American Political Science Review* 67:1 (March 1973), 142-152; Odajnyk, *Jung and Politics: The Political and Social Ideas of C.G. Jung* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).

5. See in the *Collected Works*, "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass," Vol. 11; *Symbols of Transformation*, Vol. 5; *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, Vol. 9; *Aion*, Vol. 9; *Civiliza-*

tion in Transition, Psychology and Religion: East and West, Vol. 11; *Psychology and Alchemy*, Vol. 12; *Alchemical Studies*, Vol. 13; *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, Vol. 14.

6. See Barbara Eckman, "Jung, Hegel, and the Subjective Universe," *Spring* 31 (1986), especially pages 91-94.

7. See Mary Ford-Grabowsky, "Flaws in Faith Development Theory," *Religious Education* 82:1 (Winter 1987), 80-82.

8. Again, Jung suggests that God does exist, that he did exist, in whatever form, independently of human beings, and that he is now in the process of incarnation within human beings. Jung writes:

"The question is nothing less than this: does the psychic in general—that is, the spirit, or the unconscious—arise in us; or is the psyche, in the early stages of consciousness, actually outside us in the form of arbitrary powers with intentions of their own, and does it gradually come to take its place within us in the course of psychic development?" (*Modern Man*, "Archaic Man," 147-148).

9. It was first published in German in 1952, and in English in 1954.

10. God's explicit motivation is to prove Satan is wrong in his contention that Job is righteous and will continue to be so only because God continues to reward him with blessings. This motivation is largely overlooked by Jung, an omission of which the reader should take note.

11. See "Psychology and Religion," 107-200.

12. French philosopher and sociologist, author of *La Morale et la Science des Moeurs* (1903); *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Societies Primitives* (1910); *L'Ame Primitive* (1927); and *Le Surnaturel et la Nature dans la Mentalite Primitive* (1931).

13. For an exposition of, as Jung put it, "a remarkable coincidence between certain tenets of Hegelian philosophy and my findings concerning the collective unconscious," see Sean Kelly, "Hegel, Jung, and the Spirit of History," *De Philosophia* 5 (1984), 1-19. The above quote is taken from p. 1 of this article.

14. The reason why our age focuses single-mindedly on material causation and rationalism is because the previous age "too much was accounted for in terms of the spirit" (*Modern Man*, "Basic Postulates," 177).

15. Jung is no doubt referring here to presocratics such as Anaximander, Heraclitus, Pythagorus, and Democritus, all of whom tried to define the world in physical terms, as opposed to Socrates, who does not try to reduce the soul to physical phenomena and does not try to dismiss the existence or influence of the gods.

16. Nietzsche's influence on Jung was strong. Jung ran a seminar for several years on Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. The transcript of this seminar has been published in two volumes: *Nietzsche's Zarathustra: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1934-1939 by C. G. Jung*, ed. by James L. Jarrett, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

17. C.G. Jung, *The Undiscovered Self*, Trans. by R.F.C. Hull, (New York: Mentor, 1958), 485.

18. Jung writes, "Whenever there exists some external form, be it an ideal or a ritual, by which all the yearnings and hopes of the soul are adequately expressed-as for instance in a living religion-then we may say that the psyche is outside and that there is no psychic problem, just as there is then no unconsciousness in our sense of the word" (*Modern Man* "Spiritual Problem," 201).

19. See Nietzsche's "On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life," part two of *Untimely Observations*.

20. cf. C.G. Jung, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, "A Rejoinder to Dr. Bally," 537; *The Undiscovered Self*, 256.

21. cf. *Undiscovered Self*, 255, 279; "Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth," in *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, 430.

22. See Lynne Viola, "The Peasant Nightmare: Visions of Apocalypse in the Soviet Countryside," *Journal of Modern History* 62:4 (December 1990), 747-770; Yaacov Ro'i, "The Task of Creating the New Soviet Man: 'Atheistic Propaganda' in the Soviet Muslim Areas," *Soviet Studies* 36:1 (January 1984), 26-44; Reverend Michael Bourdeaux, "Secular Inhumanism: The Soviet Union's War Against Christians, Muslims, and Jews," *Policy Review* 34 (Fall 1985), 70-75. See Also George B. Hogenson, "Elements of an Ethological Theory of Political Myth and Ritual," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 17 (September 1987) for a Jungian interpretation of symbolic political rhetoric as more than a "device by which a political

elite manipulates the masses." Hogenson argues that both leaders and those they lead are tapping into natural psychic functions such that political "myths" cannot be understood as simply cynical creations of self-interested groups.

23. See Gottfried Kuenzlen, "Secular Religion and its Futuristic-Eschatological Conceptions," *Studies in Soviet Thought* 33:3 (April 1987), 209-228.

24. *Undiscovered Self*, 289.

25. For an eloquent argument concerning the similar deficiencies of communism, nazism and liberalism, see Dietrich Von Hildebrand, "The World Crisis and Human Personality," *Thought* 65:258 (September 1990), 459-470. This article was originally published in September, 1941.

26. "Psychology and National Problems," in *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, 575.

27. "Essays," 222.

28. The stories of religious revival are coming from the East now, of parishioners "repossessing" their old sanctuaries and of erecting new ones, of Western evangelists who are converting the ex-Soviets and Eastern Europeans by the thousands. But is this Eastern spiritual revival genuine? Or would Jung worry that these peoples might embrace the institutional "Church" over the State and still not gain true religious experience and therefore individuation?

29. See John Weir Perry, "Individuality: A Spiritual Task and Societal Hazard," *ReVision* 8:1 (Summer/Fall 1985), 58.

30. "The answer which he so often gave-that transformation could only take place within the individual-is not enough, in my opinion. His own insights and theories clearly implied that he realized that there may not be enough time for enough individuals to heal themselves sufficiently to dispel the collective energies which are impelling us toward our doom . . ." Jerome S. Bernstein, "Jung, Jungians and the Nuclear Peril," *Psychological Perspectives* 16:1 (Spring 1985), 32.

31. Jerome S. Bernstein, "Jung, Jungians and the Nuclear Peril," *Psychological Perspectives* 16:1 (Spring 1985), 35.

32. See *Psychology and Religion, Collected Works* Vol. 11, 281.

33. Jung is very explicit in his methods and goals. "The effect on *all* individuals, which one would like to see realized, may not set in for hundreds of years, for the spiritual transformation of mankind follows the slow tread of the centuries and cannot be hurried or held up by *any* rational process of reflection, let alone brought to fruition in one generation. What does lie within our reach, however, is the change in individuals who have, or create for themselves, an opportunity to influence others of like mind" (*Undiscovered Self*, 302-303). See "Essays," 221, in which Jung calls explicitly for moral leaders to take up the task of spreading the Jungian insight.

34. See *Psychology and Religion, Collected Works*, Vol.11, 352, 350.

35. An interesting example of how the clergy might take Jung up on his offer is Swanee Hunt-Meek's "The Anthropology of Carl Jung: Implications for Pastoral Care," *Journal of Religion and Health* 22:3 (Fall 1983), 191-211. See also Morton Kelsey, "Reply to Analytical Psychology and Human Evil," *Journal of Psychology and Theology* 14:4 (1986), 282-284.

36. *Psychology and Religion, Collected Works*, Vol. 11, 353.

37. For an author who apparently senses Jung's program and is troubled by it, see Edward V. Stein, "Jung or Christ?" *Pastoral Psychology* 35:1 (Fall 1986), 61-74.

38. While this article does not deal specifically with this issue, it is well to note that Jung's role in the International Society for Psychotherapy during the 1930's has led some to claim that he was anti-Semitic. A valuable collection of articles on this topic is *Linger-ing Shadows: Jungian, Freudians, and Anti-Semitism*, ed. by Aryeh Maidenbaum and Stephen A. Martin (Boston: Shambhala, 1991). See also Aniela Jaffe, "C.G.. Jung and der Nationalsozialismus," *Analytische-Psychologie* 16:1 (January 1985), 66-77; and James Kirsch, "Jung's Sogenannter Antisemitismus," *Analytische-Psychologie* 16:1 (January 1985), 40-65. Specifically on his relationship and break with Freud, see James Kirsch, "Jung's Transference on Freud: Its Jewish Element," *American Imago* 41:1 (Spring 1984), 63-84. The evidence seems to favor the conclusion that Jung was in fact not anti-Semitic.