

Ghost and self: Jung's paradigm shift and a response to Zinkin

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Abstract: Zinkin's lucid challenge to Jung makes perfect sense. Indeed, it is the implications of this 'making sense' that this paper addresses. For Zinkin's characterization of the 'self' takes it as a 'concept' requiring coherence; a variety of abstract non-contextual knowledge that itself has a mythical heritage. Moreover, Zinkin's refinement of Jung seeks to make his work fit for the scientific paradigm of modernity. In turn, modernity's paradigm owes much to Newton's notion of knowledge via reductionism. Here knowledge or investigation is divided up into the smallest possible units with the aim of eventually putting it all together into 'one' picture of scientific truth. Unfortunately, 'reductionism' does not do justice to the resonant possibilities of Jung's writing. These look forward to a new scientific paradigm of the twenty-first century, of the interactive 'field', emergence and complexity theory. The paper works paradoxically by discovering Zinkin's 'intersubjective self' after all, in two undervalued narratives by Jung, his doctoral thesis and a short late ghost story. However, in the ambivalences and radical fictional experimentation of these fascinating texts can be discerned an-Other self, one both *created and found*.

Key words: complexity, creativity, emergence, field, ghosts, Miss S.W., 'Spooks', paradigm, self, synchronicity, textuality

My own answer is that the self... is created, made and formed not by any single act but by a continuing interaction with others.

(Zinkin 2008, p. 394)

The patient pours her whole soul into the role of the Clairvoyante... she anticipates her own future and embodies in Ivenes what she wishes to be...

(Jung 1902, para. 116)

The self and the paradigm

Louis Zinkin's challenge to Jung's self makes perfect sense (Zinkin 2008). Indeed, it is possible to argue that it retrospectively convinces Jung as well! For Jung can accommodate Zinkin's objections to his various self-definitions by supplying his own narrative of the constructed self, as this paper will show. Yet, I also want to suggest that 'making sense' may, in Jungian terms, not be

an adequate response to the resonant possibilities of his work. Jung's writing is also a response to the *problems* of a psychology that always makes sense. After all, as Thomas Kuhn argued in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, explanations 'make sense' when they refuse to trouble the prevailing scientific paradigm (Kuhn 1962, p. 5).

Kuhn describes scientific paradigms as models of reality that 'frame' or shape what can be known in a particular era. Far from science proceeding in a linear narrative of verifiable progress, he suggests that what is recognized as scientifically valid is a matter of what Jung would call shifting myths. So Kuhn argues for declining paradigms, such as Aristotelian teleology, followed by a modernity dominated by a Newtonian science of 'reductionism'.

The great promise of Newton's scientific revolution was that by studying reality in its smallest constituent parts, eventually all knowledge would fit together to provide a complete picture. As both Kuhn and Jung in their differing languages point out, this great promise of 'enlightenment' fails before the discovery of persistent unknowability. A new paradigm is required for quantum reality, a part of the cosmos refusing to obey Newton's laws, and also for the implications of the unconscious.

Nobody drew the conclusion that if the subject of knowledge, the psyche, were in fact a veiled form of existence not immediately accessible to consciousness, then all our knowledge must be incomplete, and moreover to a degree that we cannot determine.

(Jung, 1947/54, para. 358)

To me this may be the most important sentence Jung ever wrote. For it provides the pivot around which all his writing revolves. It renounces certainty on the epistemological grounds that to assert absolute knowledge would be to deny the reality of the unconscious. So Jung gives us his 'metaphysical ground', which is, paradoxically, the absence of secure 'ground' in any measurable or rationally verifiable approach to the psyche. Here 'psyche' signifies the 'space' in which 'being' is embedded, for Jung. It includes all modes of consciousness as well as the unconscious with its unknowable bounds. So here Jung proclaims his independence from the paradigm of modernity. What this might mean for the 'truth' of the self and Zinkin's challenge will be the subject of this paper.

About this paper

In 'On the nature of the psyche', Jung makes a vital point about how we organize knowledge (Jung 1947/54). The foundational role of the unconscious in making meaning requires that all 'academic' disciplines are relevant to psychologies, or psychology (ibid., para. 421). On the other hand, unknowability of the unconscious also means that the 'other' must be respected in its integrity, including the 'other' that is the home and culture of another knowledge. This proposition is crucial to the rest of this paper. For I am going to write as a literary critic whose focus is the *processes* by which texts shape signifying.

I am not going to argue as a psychologist pursuing Jungian concepts. Instead, this paper is going to explore the narrative and imaginative means by which concepts are generated. So when I attempt to show a particular figure in the writing as potentially embodying Jung's self, and/or a future self for Jungian psychology, and/or the anima, I am not muddling concepts that Zinkin rightly argues should be regarded as discrete. Rather, I am aiming to uncover a creative fluidity and narrative flexibility in Jung's way of writing that feeds, funds or founds concepts and structures of analytical psychology.

Like the Jung of 'On the nature of the psyche', I do believe that this approach has import for the analytical psychologist. Also in accordance with the Jung who asserts that he does not aim to be a literary critic, I cannot claim to write as a psychologist (Jung 1922, para. 99). It is for psychologists and clinicians to decide what significance, if any, my literary approach might have for them.

So to the perspective of Zinkin, my reading of his desire for conceptual coherence is inevitably inadequate to his perspective as a clinician with a developmental understanding of the self. Hence the essential perversity of my reading of his work. In this paper, I am looking at two marginal 'ragged' texts by Jung, both demonstrating the disordering effect of the feminine presence in his writing, in order to push Jung's conceptual heterogeneity even further. My aim is to argue for an extra-ordinary semi-developmental narrative within and between these two works. They become them-selves as experimental, occult, fantastic and fantasy life-writing that are (to me) worth appreciating outside the terms of the developmental clinical framework.

Zinkin's challenge

In 'Your Self: did you find it or did you make it?' Zinkin exposes Jung's inconsistent definitions of the self, as either centring archetype or totality of being, as unhelpful for analytical psychology. He believes that the psychology must be 'explicable' or it risks becoming a 'mystery-cult to which one has to be initiated' (Zinkin 2008, p. 390). One issue he foregrounds here is treating the 'self' as a concept.

A concept is abstract in the sense that it is a notion universally valid; it does not depend upon a particular context. Hence, abstract concepts refer back to a very ancient division of knowledge by Aristotle and Plato. As described by Laurence Coupe in his book, *Myth* (Coupe 1997, pp. 100–1), *logos* is the abstract, conceptual knowledge derived from myth, while *mythos* is knowledge that is narrative itself.

Mythos means knowledge in the form of ever repeated stories. Because they always appear in different contexts, no one version of a myth can claim to be 'the true one'. So *mythos* works for the Jungian psyche in the form of stories that respect the founding unknowability of the unconscious. Individuation as *mythos*-stories refuses the *claim to certainty* made by conceptual language, as I have argued elsewhere (Rowland 2005).

Concepts are logos knowledge for they are 'above' or unaffected by context, hence abstract. Most importantly, Jung writes of concepts as necessary to rational understanding, yet *not* possessing superior purchase on psychic truth. He says that breaking down reality into portions, events, concepts *takes us away from the living mystery* (Jung 1922, para. 121).

Perhaps most explicitly here, Jung disavows Newtonian reductionism. Acknowledging the need for concepts *and* logos, Jung privileges mythos, endless individuation narratives in which the unconscious forges a relationship with the ego. His writing *performs, or enacts*, a mythos of self, in which more than one definition is not an embarrassment. Rather, it is a narrative resource in which the inconsistent definitions are a vital expression of how much *more than conceptual* the self is.

Jung's writing on concepts is dialogical. He weaves a text-ure of meaning-making relationship between the intrinsic comprehensibility of logos concepts and the *vitality* of living mystery through stories that touch the unknowable creative psyche. For example, in his essay on the trickster, it is the stories of this enigmatic and shocking figure in diverse locations that are shown to *embody* the concept (Jung 1954). In turn, the abstracting Logos qualities of conceptual thinking are needed to make Jung's multiple lenses of social analysis *interpretable*. Linking this mutually generating dialogue of experiential narrative and logos is the psychic figure's rootedness in energies that cannot fully be known.

Zinkin does not recognize the dialogical quality of Jung's writing. He does, however, have some sympathy with the argument that Jung is not writing traditional Newtonian science. What seems unbearable about the Jungian self to him is when Jung characterizes it in mythical terms as an endless quest. (Zinkin 2008, p. 392). Becoming the self is endlessly deferred, yet one-self, he says reasonably, surely exists all the time? (*ibid.*).

Zinkin's re-formulation of the self has three advantages. To begin with it enables him to connect Jung to other theorists. Secondly, it embeds self-making into a developmental narrative from early childhood. Finally, it enables Jung's stress on the individual versus a collective unconscious to be re-conceived in social terms. Zinkin prefers an intrinsically *socially* constructed psyche. The child makes the self, unwittingly, by relating to a carer.

Zinkin's argument is valuable in the contexts he assigns it. What I have tried to argue so far is that Zinkin's paper responds to Jung's *concept*, not to his *writing*. By missing the mythos that is in a creative relationship to Jung's logos, Zinkin omits something very significant in Jung's writing. Zinkin notes that it may be significant to *feel* that one has discovered oneself, but his argument here serves to prise away 'feeling' from ontological truth. Jung, on the other hand, senses the value in retaining the link to the *ground*, the messy, earthy matter from which logos emerges. In this way, Zinkin re-interprets Jung for modernity, re-shapes him for science and psychology dominated by conceptual logos. My counter-suggestion is

that Jung intimated that modernity's scientific paradigm was about to shift.

As Zinkin draws attention to the scarcity in Jung of the self considered in relation to other people, I want to consider his challenge further, by looking at one of the most sustained social and erotic dramas in *The Collected Works*. It is in Jung's doctoral thesis, where he analyses a series of ghostly séances.

Self in 'On the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena'

What is extraordinary about this thesis is that Jung used a member of his own family as chief subject and disguised this fact. Hélène Preiswerk (Miss S.W.) was a teenage cousin who developed a talent for mediumship in family gatherings. She was enthusiastically encouraged by her slightly older cousin, Carl (Bair 2004, pp. 47–52, 61–4). So what was in fact the passion of two inexperienced young relatives is later re-presented as a serious study.

I suggest that the doctoral thesis functions as a kind of occult auto/biography for Jung. An ardent relationship, of male observer and female medium, is quickly complicated by ghostly manifestations. In effect, S.W.'s ghosts appear as a Zinkin-like self-image. These could be fitted into his 'coherent scientific theory', by treating them as made through this potent relationship. Yet, what becomes even more perplexing in this scenario is *whose self is it anyway?* Does S.W. create her own self-image out of her erotic absorption in Jung, as he himself suggests? Or, is it possible that an-other self, Jung's own, is formed either during the séances or in the writing of the thesis? And where does the notion of ghosts come in? It is time to look at this erotic narrative more closely. Is the thesis a narrative mode of a self built by *relatedness*? Is Jung's writing a *mythos* of Zinkin's developmental self-image as logos? That is, how far does Jung's relational study bear out Zinkin's coherent developmental self concept?

Getting in touch with the Other

'On the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena' is full of borderlines that it problematizes and reconstructs. The title hints at a fear haunting the whole paper: when is 'normal' psychology sick? When is it pathology? It appears that the diverse characters figuring in the 'story' are designed to take up the burden of this question.

Jung begins with S.W. by describing the medium as an actress. Her first significant spirit is her grandfather, and she 'copied' dead relatives and acquaintances (Jung 1902, para. 400). As the séances become more intense, so too does the acting heighten into 'whole dramatic scenes' with rapturous emotion (*ibid.*, para. 40). To herself, we learn, S.W. is not an actress but a traveller. The spirits entice her from her own body and wing her to distant realms. Moreover, the unremarkable teenager now feels that she has found her true vocation. Convinced by the reality of her visions, S.W. achieves a sense

of authenticity in her role as medium. She has found her-self. Despite Jung's scepticism, she stands by the truth, *to her*, of her occult experience.

I do not know if what the spirits say and teach me is true. . . but that my spirits exist is beyond question. . . They must be real.

(*ibid.*, para. 43)

Much later, Jung himself will assert the primary reality of psychic phenomena in similar terms. For *The Collected Works*, S.W. is beginning to sound like a ghostly precognition of Jung. Indeed, Jung describes S.W. as taking the *position* of a self-image by being 'herself' when half in the so-called 'real' world and half in the occult or dream one (*ibid.*, para. 44). This gives her a 'double life', as Swiss teenager and occult personality (*ibid.*).

A figure whom Jung calls the 'somnambulist ego' begins, in the manner of a spontaneously generated image, to blossom into a person of substance with a fantastic history (*ibid.*, para. 44). She is Ivenes, a poetically evoked woman with authority in the spectral world. For Ivenes, like the Jung who was later to write *Seven Sermons for the Dead*, has a mission to instruct black spirits (*ibid.*, para. 59; Jung 1992). She was seduced by Goethe and became Jung's 'unofficial' ancestress (para. 63). Less luckily, as Jung's actual mother in a previous incarnation, Ivenes was burnt as a witch (*ibid.*).

We discover that Ivenes is always a 'medium and intermediary' between this world and that of the 'other'. Here, apparently, is Zinkin's constructed self. So perhaps between the charged atmosphere of the teenager who was not quite a professional medium, and the young scholar who was not quite a doctor, these *relations* have brought into being this fascinating self figure. The fact that it is unclear to whom this 'self' belongs, to medium S.W. or the entranced Jung, does not invalidate this portrayal as a figure generated through relating.

Conversely, the poignant haunting of these two young people is not entirely accounted for by Zinkin's coherent scientific concept. For what is *related* is of cultural, historical, and even cosmic importance. First of all, the erotic romances of Ivenes offer a significant *intermediary* between those two competing 'origin stories' of the nineteenth century: Genesis and Darwin.

She and her brothers and sisters were descended from Adam, who arose by materialization; the other races. . . were descended from monkeys.

(*ibid.*, para. 64)

Here is an attempt to reconcile the Bible and evolutionary science on the origin of Man. There is also a colonial narrative with two different sources for human beings. From what Jung calls 'family romances', S.W. draws a star map of occult power (*ibid.*). Jung calls this 'mystic science', to go along with the biblical merging with Darwin (*ibid.*). In effect, Ivenes comes to stand for the convergence of conventionally demarcated matter. 'She' scandalously and erotically *relates* science and theology. In her realm, the Bible embraces Darwin, spirits live in

magnetic zones of power and sexuality, while illicit love affairs make up the history of Ivenes herself.

Once S.W. has flourished her mystic science, her spirits, her in-spiration, seem to flag. Soon she is caught out in fraud (*ibid.*, para. 71). Jung then turns his hand to defining her amazing psychic productivity as merely the product of adolescent sexuality (*ibid.*, para. 73).

The troubling presence of the Other

In his struggle with the narratives generated by S.W., Jung makes some useful observations. He suggests that the spirits may indicate some independent activity by the unconscious (*ibid.*, para. 79). He implies the existence of an interactive field. The observer affects what is observed by asking questions that then 'synthesize' unconscious personalities (*ibid.*, para. 87). Here Zinkin could find evidence for his relational self. Yet one could also argue for a 'found' personality based upon unconscious possibilities.

What is evident is a problematizing of the division between the pathological and the 'normal'. S.W.'s spirits are 'identical' to normal dream images (*ibid.*, para. 101). 'Composed' Ivenes is the projected ideal self. S.W. has dreamed her-self into the person of magnetic Ivenes. No copy of a woman in a book, Ivenes is *more original* than the preceding text.

Ivenes, however, is not just a copy of the Clairvoyante; the latter is simply a sketch for an original. . . she anticipates her own future and embodies in Ivenes what she wishes to be in twenty years' time.

(*ibid.*, para. 116)

Here S.W. succeeds in something explored later: a healed 'self' requires a new origin story that shapes the psychic energies seeking identity. The self is *more original* than the ego, even though its narratives may appear to be 'fiction'. They are more properly 'mythos', founding stories of self with no prior template in an ur-myth or a concept. Without Ivenes, S.W.'s spirits divide into two types: the frivolous and the pompous (*ibid.*, para. 126). Ivenes is a 'medium', a mediation of opposites.

Similarly, Jung himself has to find a 'medium' between the authority of the male doctor and his dangerous intimacy with *relations* to a female medium who may not be entirely pathological. Famously, he has a moment of identifying with Sigmund Freud's work by saying that S.W.'s spirits are 'nothing but sexuality' (para. 120). Yet he ends by finding a formulation that allows his deep kinship with S.W. some visibility. Although she is 'ill' with hysteria, her sexually repressed spirits show the potential for 'independent existence' of psychic phenomena that Freud might find hard to stomach (para. 133).

'On the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena' is a complicated textual weaving of self. On the one hand, Jung's disguised *relations* with S.W. are paralleled by how much the thesis anticipates the 'self' (the partly

unconscious potential) of future Jungian psychology. Here are nascent concepts (self, transcendent function, individuation etc.), and future narratives. On the other hand, the potent presence of Ivenes cannot just be restricted to S.W. She is as much a self for Jung when she insists upon the creativity of the unconscious that will form the foundation of his future ideas. In addition, more than Zinkin, Jung here demonstrates (albeit more in the voice of S.W.) the importance of certain types of stories in the making of the self.

Put another way, here is Jung *wanting* to be like Zinkin in producing a developmental narrative of early trauma from which to generate an abstract logos concept. Jung does this by taking Freud as a safe professional model. Yet the thesis is heaving with stories that resist modernity and its conceptual reductionism into abstract logos. The spirits challenge modernity by seeking to reconcile Darwin and Genesis, by proclaiming their occult reality, and by being such a fertile source of 'romances' as endless 'fictional' tales of sexuality. If Jung cannot intuit something more than relationality making the self, then S.W. will do it for him.

Years later, Jung revisits the same psychic space of himself versus an occult woman. In a tiny ghost story, his re-writing of the 'self' of the doctoral thesis is marked (Jung 1950).

Revisiting the spectral self: 'Spooks' (Jung 1950)

This extraordinary fragment in *The Collected Works* shows Jung as now able to occupy the occult territory previously inhabited by S.W. In essence, *here he is S.W.*, a figure afflicted bodily and psychically by spirits, framed by an unsympathetic masculine authority. Now Jung's 'medium' for his journey into the 'other' is the literary ghost story. Moreover, the key activity of 'journeys' experienced by S.W. becomes here 'psychic space'. The occult may refer to unknown unconscious realms (*ibid.*, para. 22). So where for S.W. she was spiritually transported to the stars, Jung here envisions the psyche as an unlimited field of potential being.

By developing the topos of psychic territory, Jung exhibits his typical oscillation between colonial and postcolonial modes of understanding. If the occult is unexplored land, then this suggests modernity's attitude of confident colonization of the 'other', with its structures of rationality. To counter such a drive into the claim to 'possess' via rational and conceptual knowledge, Jung's approach here is to structure an uncanny experience in literary terms that will preserve a space for the 'other'. For the literary ghost story he writes here is never fully 'mapped' into rational explanations.

By asserting that the observer affects the observed, or that particular *ways of knowing produce* an-Other, Jung suggests a crucial paradigm shift. There is no neutral position upon which to judge the psyche for the more we emphasize rationality, 'the more alive becomes the spectral world of the unconscious' (*ibid.*, para. 759).

Jung now values stories of individual experience of the unknown psyche (ibid., para. 761). For, although these stories record synchronistic phenomena, they do not ‘prove’ the existence of ghosts or spirits. Stories are important for synchronicity because the meaningful coincidence of psyche and world is not subject to statistical analysis (ibid.). By making this rather significant claim, Jung is taking synchronicity out of Newtonian science and starting to evoke something like the complexity of the new paradigm of holism. In a radical break with reductionism, the new paradigm recognizes reality as best explicable in terms of entangled, mutually creative systems.

Science developed complexity theory as the notion that evolution proceeds by the interpenetration of ever more complex wholes, as argued by Joseph Cambay and Jerome Bernstein (Cambay 2004; Bernstein 2005). New kinds of ordering *emerge* (hence some call this *emergence theory*) from these holistic systems locating an intrinsic creativity in nature. To complexity theory, the human imagination is a special form of Complex Adaptive System (Bernstein 2005, pp. 48–55).

Jung’s synchronicity has much in common with complexity theory. In the interactive field of psyche and cosmos, complex intermingling can give rise to new forms of ordering between psyche and world that Jung called ‘synchronicity’. When Jung turns to conventions of literature, as he does in this ghost story, he uses it to record or perceive synchronistic phenomena. Implicitly, it suggests that complexity, inhabiting the human psyche, generates culture to forward the creative evolution of human consciousness. What is implicit in Jung has been explored by later writers such as Bernstein as I shall show below.

Now let us look at Jung’s excursion into Gothic literature!

‘Foreword to Moser: “Spooks: False Belief or True?”’ (CW18)

Written as a foreword to a collection of ghost stories, Jung’s piece is remarkable for offering his own. In it he describes an experience he claimed to have had thirty years previously when staying in England in a weekend cottage. Like most literary ghost stories, Jung’s is set in a cottage at a remote location (ibid., para. 764). Strangely, it is cheap – no one else wants to stay there! It is in a foreign country (England), where Jung is the guest of Dr. X. These two important professional men are waited on by local women who refuse to remain at the cottage after dark (ibid.).

Jung suffers a series of spectral assaults over several weekends.

In this text, Jung is in a different *position* because it is he, not a female medium, who generates or contacts a feminine ghost, and then has to face a sceptical male authority. In effect, *he* is the medium. Secondly, he has taken on some of S.W.’s ontological assertions that the occult is not necessarily lies or fantasies; it can be psychic reality. The Jung of the thesis dwelt upon S.W. as an ‘actress’, and later a downright fraud. He concluded by ascribing her imaginative fertility to sexual fantasy, perhaps to ward off her dangerous

proximity to him. How terrifying would it be if her *relatedness* to him was not wholly pathological? Now, years later, Jung feels able to experiment. In placing himself closer to S.W., he risks getting more intimate with her as self image.

Before embarking upon his strange tale, he outlines his idea of synchronicity, the meaningful coincidence between inner psychic and outer material events. By coining the term 'synchronicity', Jung was able to generate a logos, an abstractly understood concept for what is properly mythos, stories that are intrinsically *stories*, forms of knowing that cannot truly be abstracted from their narrative context. As we will see, these synchronous stories are authentically 'origin' stories. For whenever they occur, like the *originality* of Ivenes (who makes a prior book publication into a copy), they originate psychic reality.

So Jung tells his own ghost story when only *he* suffers the occult visitation. At first he is sleepless, yet afflicted with a terrible drowsiness. Then a smell arrives to torment him. It is sickly, and he realizes that it resembles that of an old woman whom he treated in the past. She had an open cancer sore on her face. Next he hears a dripping tap, despite being unable to find the source. The room begins to creak and moan, again without a material cause.

He continues recording the escalating occult activity, another traditional trope of ghost literature. A mysterious knocking is followed by some creature rushing around the room. A dog, perhaps? Finally, the most horrific manifestation arrives. Opening his eyes, Jung sees on his pillow the head of an old woman with half her face missing. He leaps out of bed. From then onwards he changes his bedroom and has no further trouble.

As traditionally occurs in ghostly tales, a couple of twists are added. Jung's male colleague plays the role that Jung himself adopted towards S.W.: the modern sceptic. Jung challenges him to spend a night in the house alone, where Doctor X. is horribly assailed by knocking and wailing. He ends up sleeping in the garden. Secondly, modern society itself is defeated for the house persists in terrifying all inhabitants. It is finally demolished.

Jung does not leave his spooky narrative here. Ghost stories belong to the genre of Gothic literature, which is, like Jung, concerned with the boundaries that modernity erects to regulate the Lacanian real. Indeed, at its conclusion, a Gothic text will often re-erect conventional boundaries. Yet the imaginative power of the mythos, or story, will often include a residual openness to the unknown. For example, at the end of Emily Bronte's *Wuthering Heights*, the narrator points to two graves and asks who can imagine that the ghosts of Catherine and Heathcliff still roam the moors? The answer is, most of the readers! Although in negative form, the final image is of the lovers still wandering, uncontainable even by death (Bronte 1847, p. 367).

A more conventionally inclined author than Bronte, Jung does his best to fit his occult matter back into the conceptual categories of his theories. Yet his explanation begins by refusing to account for the dripping tap. Thus, a 'gap' in the ability to convert mythos into logos is made overt in the text.

Then Jung offers another narrative of the events, one that paints his body onto the walls of the haunted cottage. He speculates that his body has been spatially and psychically re-formed in/as the ghost story. The knocking he heard could be heartbeats; the smell may have 'embodied' a psychic situation (*ibid.*, para. 778–80). Moreover, the spectre of the old woman was probably a memory of the patient with cancer. The dog rushing round could represent his 'intuition' (*ibid.*).

Fascinatingly, Jung points out that the extension of his psyche in the form of a dog resembles the work of a shaman, or 'primitive medicine men', who can smell ghosts (*ibid.*, para. 779). Indeed, Jung carefully weighs this evidence of a dog in his psyche. Dogs can smell blood where humans cannot. Might the psyche be such a dog? Jung recalls a story from a relative who dreamed of a murder in a hotel room. The next day he was told that such a killing had occurred (*ibid.*, para. 781). So the psyche, in Jung's sense of a 'space' in which individuals find themselves embedded, may possess heightened sensory perception.

Jung's ghost-dog is interesting because of the link here between psyche and its penetration into the psychoid, where it joins the body. It is impossible to tell whether subliminal bodily perceptions of blood in the room stimulate the psyche to sniff out the truth like a dog, or, whether a psyche, excited by the strangeness of the environment, rouses the body to extra heights of sensory awareness. Which comes first, body or psyche? Crucially, neither determines the other. Rather, body and psyche form a creative partnership.

Secondly, Jung as medicine man is entering the territory of 'origin stories', similar to S.W. Not for the first time, Jung has to go outside modernity's figurations to point toward the sort of self that he wants to evoke. Where S.W. tried to conflate Darwin and the Bible, Jung dips a toe outside Western epistemology altogether. Again, Jung is deconstructing the conventional boundary between the normal and the abnormal. What is noticeably different from the thesis is that he takes on the role of S.W., the medium for the Other, at least for a while. He temporarily accepts what he earlier distained as the 'feminine' position of the one 'haunted'.

Of course it is important to Jung that the gender instability signified by occult experience is resolved. For much of 'Spooks' Jung is in the same *position* as not only S.W., but also the women servants, his social and gender others. So it is necessary to have the coda in which Doctor X. is similarly afflicted, whereupon Jung is triumphant. This time, the sceptical masculine scientist is displaced from centrality in the text. Haunted Jung triumphs.

So what can be concluded about such a minor text apart from its resemblance to the doctoral thesis? For one thing, 'Spooks' confirms much of Zinkin's reasonable criticism of Jung. Jung refuses to drag his psychology definitively into coherence and concepts. He refuses to securely convert mythos (the ghostly narrative) into logos (conceptual truth of psyche). Gothic 'openness' to the other persists in the obvious hanging thread of the dripping tap, and by Jung refusing to decide whether body or psyche is more originary in producing the ghost dog.

All that Zinkin's might object to in Jung here, far from the point of view of privileging concepts, are, alternatively, characteristics of Gothic literature. So is Jung producing something closer to literature than science?

I suggest that Jung is trying out the literary genre of the ghost story as the best *medium* to preserve what is most important to him about his psychology: the creativity and, in part, unknowability of the unconscious. In effect, the 'flaws' listed in the previous paragraph are actually the text's valuable ingredients, for they prevent concepts from squeezing out the living mystery. After all, if we want to see what could have been, then the doctoral thesis offers us Miss S.W., impeccably diagnosed as suffering from 'nothing but' sexuality.

Jung's later writing is dedicated to preserving the mysterious reality of the unconscious. In this *he is the S.W.* who asserts the reality of her spirits, however others define them. So here is a riposte to Zinkin: one problem in conceptualizing the self as essentially socially constructed is that it bricks over any sense of psychic reality as existing beyond our ability to conceptually comprehend it. I am arguing that 'Spooks' is a disguised return to the territory of the doctoral thesis. The return is to stake a claim to two images of Jung's self: S.W. and Ivenes.

Here Jung is close to Zinkin on the self, and also not close at all. For S.W. and Ivenes are indeed socially constructed self images. Firstly, Ivenes is a self image for both Jung and S.W., created by their erotic, familial interaction. Secondly, S.W. is then a self image for Jung *constructed in the medium of writing*. S.W. is self for the future of Jung's writing. She is the anima of his *Collected Works*. Jung in the thesis makes a crude ego distinction from her by reducing her creativity to 'nothing but' sexuality. Here he has failed to appreciate the imaginative dimensions of the self that have been offered to him.

So, much later on, in 'Spooks', Jung has a second chance to write on the female medium, *this time as him-self*. In the transition between the doctoral thesis and 'Spooks', we see Jung integrate the self image of the feminine occult other by drawing upon non-western (shamanistic) epistemology. S.W.'s Darwin and the Bible prepare the way for Jung as medicine man. So these two texts bear out Zinkin in showing the generation of relational self images.

On the other hand, both these works are too 'untidy' to completely bear out Zinkin, who has called for coherence. Ghosts are inconvenient for a modern science like Zinkin's. Indeed, ghosts are precisely part of that Gothic landscape where the irrationalities evicted from the Enlightenment are forced to reside. So Jung gives us a relationally constructed self, but one dwelling over the border of what can be fitted rationally into Zinkin's concept. Selves such as Ivenes, scraps such as the dripping tap, indeterminable beings such as the shaman's dog, point to a possibility of a self which is both created *and* found. These are synchronous selves, for synchronicity also insists upon discovering moments of meaningful order beyond what can be reasonably believed to be formed by erotic relations!

Another way of looking at these two *related* texts is to recall how far they insist upon the role of the observer in shaping what is observed. Here Jung

embarks upon a new scientific paradigm, that of the 'field'. Here, too, Zinkin's formulation of self may need some significant revision.

Self, textuality and field

Jung was fascinated by the new quantum physics of the early twentieth century. It seemed to countermand what modernity's Newtonian science had previously understood about matter. For if the observer really affects what is observed, is an active factor in reality, then there is no fundamental 'objective' reality. Rather, reality becomes a 'field' of mutual interactivity. Jung himself expressed something like this in ecological terms. To seize upon an idea via a concept is to radically intervene in its 'ground'!

One has taken possession of it... like a slain creature of the wild that can no longer run away. It is a magical procedure such as the primitive practices upon objects and the psychologist upon the psyche...

(Jung 1947/54, para. 356)

This may be Jung's most delicate 'response' to Zinkin. While he does not say outright that privileging conceptual ego thinking kills the other, he does show how the wild otherness of psychic reality cannot *remain alive* in the vicinity of the theorist's greedy certainty.

There is another context for Zinkin's formulation that is relevant to 'ground' its cultural ancestry. Sometimes called 'the linguistic turn', it is also subject to confusion with the notion of reality as a field. Deriving from the linguistic research of Jacques Derrida, amongst others, post-structuralism suggested that reality is profoundly textual (Derrida 1976). Or, access to reality, including our sense of our-selves, is constructed by and through language. Systems of signs, forms of language, have a dynamic structuring input into the 'real'. Moreover, these interlocking signifying systems are radically unstable. There is no fixed meaning, no 'one' reality.

Even science, with its large claims to 'frame' and regulate what we consider to be 'real', is actually subject to linguistic construction. Language constructing the world operates at a subliminal and unconscious level. What we consider to be evidence of our own characteristics, our 'real' being, is really manufactured by social discourses (pre-existing organizations of language) that, for example, in our society serve to create the impression of our uniqueness.

Here we approach Zinkin again, in his self that is created socially according to the individual coloration (discourses) of any particular society. However, Jung's invocation to the slain creature of the wild points to what the linguistic turn and Zinkin leave out: the meaningful *animation* of the non-human. The paradigm of 'the field' is able to encompass both the linguistic turn *and* Jung's animated 'natural' psyche.

For while 'the linguistic turn' challenges Newtonian modernity in the textuality of reality, it remains stuck within its rational divisions by restricting

language to the human. It is not true that only human cognition is capable of using signs.

Far from language and signifying being the unique property of human cultures, new research shows a level of semiosis (signifying systems) functioning in plants, let alone in non-human animals. The new sciences of emergence and complexity theory argue that ‘the importance of human semiosis [is] more widely understood as an evolved complexity in which nature, in humans, produces culture’ (Wheeler 2006, p. 16). Nature has her indigenous ways of signifying that have evolved to produce a complex adaptive system of language in humans. Human language stems from nature’s capacities in us, not our transcendence of nature. Here reality as an interactive field takes expression as a *mutuality*, just as, for example, Jung insisted upon in the relationship between humans as conscious ego and unconscious nature. Jung hypothesized deep forms of potential patterning in psychic nature (archetypes), a *field* or ‘space’ producing being. So this new understanding of evolution sees *nature’s creativity* as originary.

So human language, learning and the arts are actually a highly specialized form of innate creativity apparent everywhere in nature. Hence synchronicity is a conceptual way of expressing the *mutual* creativity of psyche and nature, by making stories of meaningful coincidence. Mythos is not confined to humans; we have simply only recognized it in humans.

One of the key points about complexity science is that ‘complexity’ is too great to be measured in the precise, objective way Newtonian science advocates. Indeed, the complex, creative, semiosis of nature-and-humans cannot be measured ‘objectively’ precisely because we humans, in our psychic absorption into the world, are affecting what we purport to observe. Complexity science means that *the human psyche is cognate to nature’s creative and creating interactive field*.

Therefore, given the unmappable nature of complexity’s creativity, this new science suggests the need to include mystery in its perspective on reality. Mystery is necessary to posit the autonomous and un-measurable creativity of inter-relating ever more complex wholes. Again, Jung proves prescient in his core assertion of the intrinsic creativity and partly unknowable unconscious. To eliminate mystery from the Jungian self is to repress his insights into the holism of our future scientific and artistic cultures.

In this section, I have suggested that the linguistic turn, field theory and complexity imply that Jung was more prescient than Zinkin. While Zinkin’s relational self with social discourses works within late modernity, it omits the Jung who fished for meaning in the obscure waters of occult practice and animate nature. Through his ‘fanciful’ Gothic speculations, and by carving out a notion of synchronicity, Jung anticipated a self that inscribes itself into a paradigm of holism and complexity science. By regarding the non-human as capable of signifying and embedding the psyche is this delicately creative reality, it no longer makes sense to ask Zinkin’s question: The self, created or found?

For in finding the creativity of the 'other', we make our-selves, the self: created and found.

Ghost, self and stories

I want to end this paper by taking another look at Jung's two ghost stories in the context of Jerome Bernstein's development of Jung and complexity theory. Bernstein's work also continues Jung's fascination with non-western cultures, by considering Native American Navajo attitudes toward healing.

In a superb study, *Living in the Borderland* (2005), Bernstein brings together Navajo medicine and Donald Kalsched's groundbreaking research into trauma (Kalsched 1996). Kalsched demonstrates that early trauma can produce a self that is dangerously punishing. It takes hard work in analysis to put together a trauma story, which functions as a therapeutic narrative capable of holding the pain. Only by giving the suffering a *place* in the space of being through a story, something that re-stories the self, can trauma begin to heal.

Unsurprisingly, Navajo medicine, from a different worldview, takes another approach to helping psychic and bodily disorder. Here physical illness is not separate from mental and spiritual realms. Hence the Navajo do not see a person as existing in essential separation from their familial, social, natural and spiritual world. So, there is no such thing as treating an individual.

Healing centres on re-balancing the cosmos. For illness is a tear in the fabric of the world, and must be repaired by re-incorporating, re-inscripting, the sufferer bodily and psychically into the Navajo universe. So healing is a social matter, involving re-telling the origin stories of the tribe. These are enacted bodily and psychically by ritual chanting, sand painting and dancing. Since there is no effective differentiation between religion, art, and medicine, all the creative mental, psychic and somative resources of the culture are involved in (re)making the origin story.

Bernstein is careful to show how Navajo practices cannot be simply co-opted by an-other culture. His book scrupulously compares the 'Western' practice of analysis to Navajo medicine. He seeks echoes, resonances and a similar psychic turn to nature as source of creativity.

His achievement is to show how far self-making and healing can be understood as a story-building arc between two types of stories: trauma stories and origin stories. *Living in the Borderland* itself becomes an origin story for those analysands whose trauma story is not ultimately satisfying. Trauma stories made in analytic practice do not usually trouble the traditional paradigms of modernity's reality. They do necessary work by incorporating psychic pain into something comprehensible, making it more liveable. So trauma stories are narratives that provide a mythos to re-connect psyche and body, and regulate a relationship to a world conceived of as 'out there'.

Zinkin's concept of the self is a formula for making a trauma story. Because a trauma story stays within modernity's paradigm, it can be re-fashioned into

a logos or concept. Freud made trauma stories, limited by his adherence to the Oedipus myth as an abstract logos structure. Jung, in his doctoral thesis, struggles with, and ultimately offers a trauma story of, S.W.'s 'nothing but' sexuality.

However, there are two centres of creativity in the doctoral thesis, not just the 'one' of the author. While Jung aims for a trauma story, S.W. offers an origin story. In her creation of Ivenes *as original*, her re-storying of the traumatic split between religion and science, and especially in her insistence upon the reality of her spirits *to her*, S.W. reaches out of Jung's confining text. She reaches out, unwittingly, thousands of miles to a non-Western culture of healing that would offer a whole cosmos for her complex evolution of psyche.

Of course, later, Jung was also to find figures to accommodate this fertile (feminine) complexity. 'She' is present vividly in the wayward, wandering anima. Most particularly, I argue, 'she' is in the space of the fertile reality of the 'other', in the core principle of the unconscious as creative and partly unknowable.

I would like to suggest that we could see Jung's 'Spooks' as partly a tribute to S.W. By S.W. I do not mean the historical H el ene. Rather I refer to the written textual figure of the thesis, that portrayal of the 'other' (to Jung) becoming 'self'. Just as the thesis with the feminine source of S.W. is origin mythos for Jung's later writing, so too 'Spooks' is also an origin story trying to free itself from a trauma story. Here Jung's 'other' is occult. The 'other' of his apparently scientific writing is literary and Gothic. In the tale, Jung takes these categories of modernity, such as rational science, occult, literature/fiction, Gothic ghost stories, and shows psychic reality unravelling them as a more complex interaction of emerging phenomena.

From a trauma story confronting an origin story in the doctoral thesis, 'Spooks' shows Jung drawing from deep personal and cultural resources to incorporate mystery in the self as *psychically and corporeally real*. By showing how neither body nor psyche can claim to be the dominant source of the 'other', or occult, Jung does work comparable to the Navajo medicine man restoring body and psyche to self. Moreover, Jung, too, inscribes the self-in-process back into the cosmos stories of *his* culture, by making his tale so obviously a literary ghost story. Jung shows what the Navajo know: that narratives in the genres of literature and religion are part of 'self' construction, in a universe of mutual creativity between self and other. Indeed, Gothic literature is arguably an unstable amalgam of religion and fiction, its psychic potency a sign of its powers to map a cosmos for the self.

In conclusion, Zinkin's argument that the self is created developmentally according to different cultural conditions remains an important way of interrogating Jung's legacy. However, it is not a complete re-evaluation of that legacy. No more is my own here. Zinkin's formulation is limited by its dependence upon a scientific paradigm of modernity as comprehensible by rational means alone. This paradigm is fast diminishing in importance. Rather,

understanding the Jungian self as both created and found, as the product of a radically interactive world of mutual meaning-creation, offers a Jung for a new age of conceiving reality as the product of interacting wholes, or holism.

TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT

Le défi lucide de Zinkin à l'égard de Jung fait parfaitement sens. C'est de cette manière de « faire sens » et de ses implications dont il est question dans le présent article. Car Zinkin envisage le « soi » comme un concept tirant sa cohésion d'une diversité de savoirs abstraits, eux-mêmes issus d'un héritage mythologique. Qui plus est, Zinkin affine l'oeuvre de Jung en cherchant à la calibrer au regard du paradigme scientifique de la modernité. Le paradigme de la modernité lui-même doit beaucoup à la conception newtonienne et réductionniste du savoir. La connaissance ou la recherche procèdent par division en unités aussi petites que possible dans le but de leur réunion finale en un tableau de « la » vérité scientifique. Malheureusement, le réductionnisme ne rend pas justice aux résonances multiples de l'écriture de Jung. L'expression de ses potentialités nécessite le paradigme scientifique nouveau du vingt-et-unième siècle, celui de l'interactivité des « champs », de l'émergence et de la théorie de la complexité. L'article repère paradoxalement le « soi intersubjectif » de Zinkin dans deux récits sous-évalués de Jung, sa thèse de doctorat et une nouvelle tardive où il est question de fantômes. Cependant, dans les ambivalences et la radicalité de l'expérimentation fictionnelle de ces textes fascinants peut se discerner un soi-*Autre*, à la fois *créé et trouvé*.

Zinkins geistvolle Herausforderung an Jung ist völlig schlüssig. Speziell auf die Implikationen dieses 'Schlüssigseins' zielt dieser Text ab. Denn Zinkins Charakterisierung des 'Selbst' nimmt selbiges als ein 'Konzept' das Kohärenz verlangt; eine Form abstrakten nicht-kontextuellen Wissens das selbst einem mythologischen Erbe entspringt. Ferner versucht Zinkins Veredlung von Jung dessen Werk passend für das wissenschaftliche Paradigma der Moderne zu machen. Auf der anderen Seite verdankt das Paradigma der Moderne viel Newtons Begriff von der Wissensgewinnung durch Reduktion. Hier wird Wissen oder Untersuchung in die kleinsten möglichen Einheiten aufgespalten mit der Absicht, sie schließlich zu dem 'einen' Bild der wissenschaftlichen Wahrheit zusammenzufügen. Ungünstigerweise wird 'Reduktionismus' den vielschichtigen Möglichkeiten, die Jungs Werk eröffnet, nicht gerecht. Diese sind auf ein neues wissenschaftliches Paradigma des einundzwanzigsten Jahrhunderts gerichtet, eines des interaktiven 'Feldes', der Emergenz und Chaostheorie. Der Aufsatz arbeitet gegenläufig durch das Aufdecken von Zinkins 'intersubjektivem Selbst' in zwei wenig beachteten Mitteilungen Jungs: seiner Doktorarbeit und einer späten kurzen Gespenstergeschichte. Wie auch immer kann in den Ambivalenzen und der radikalen fiktionalen Experimentierweise dieser faszinierenden Texte ein anderes Selbst erkannt, sowohl *geschaffen* als auch *gefunden* werden.

La sfida lanciata da Zinkin a Jung ha perfettamente senso. Tuttavia questo scritto si rivolge alle implicazioni che questo 'senso' comporta. Poiché la caratterizzazione di Zinkin considera il 'sé' come un 'concetto' che richiede una sua coerenza, una sorta

di conoscenza non contestuale astratta che in se stessa ha un'eredità mitica. Inoltre la revisione di Jung fatta da Zinkin cerca di rendere il lavoro adatto per il paradigma scientifico della modernità. Viceversa il paradigma della modernità deve molto alla nozione di Newton di una conoscenza che passa attraverso il riduzionismo. Qui la conoscenza o l'indagine si divide nelle più piccole unità possibili allo scopo di metterle alla fine tutte insieme in un 'unico' quadro di verità scientifica. Sfortunatamente il 'riduzionismo' non rende giustizia alle risonanti possibilità degli scritti di Jung. Questi guardano al futuro a un nuovo paradigma scientifico del ventesimo secolo, del campo 'interattivo', della teoria dell'emergente e della complessità. Questo scritto lavora paradossalmente scoprendo dopo tutto un 'sé intersoggettivo' di Zinkin, in due sottovalutati racconti di Jung', la sua tesi di dottorato e una breve storia di fantasmi posteriore. Tuttavia, nell'ambivalenza e nell'esperimento radicalmente immaginario di questi testi affascinanti, si può scoprire un Altro sé, entrambi *creati e trovati*.

El lúcido desafío que Zinkin hace a Jung tiene perfecto sentido. Verdaderamente, son las implicaciones de este 'tener sentido' la razón de este trabajo. Zinkin toma la caracterización el 'ser' como un 'concepto' que requiere coherencia; una variedad abstracta del conocimiento no-contextual que tiene una herencia mítica en sí misma. Más aún, el refinamiento de Zinkin de Jung busca adecuar su trabajo al paradigma científico de la modernidad. A su vez, el paradigma de la modernidad debe mucho a la noción del Newton del conocimiento a través de reduccionismo. Aquí conocimiento o investigación son divididos en las más pequeñas unidades posibles con el objetivo de, finalmente, poder estructurar en 'una' imagen la verdad científica. Desafortunadamente, el 'reduccionismo' no hace justicia a las resonantes posibilidades de los escritos de Jung. Estos esperan un nuevo paradigma científico en el siglo XXI, para el 'campo' interactivo, la teoría de la salida y de la complejidad. Los trabajos de Zinkin, descubriendo paradójicamente 'el ser intersubjetivo' después de todo, estas se encuentran en dos narrativas de Jung infravaloradas, su tesis doctoral y un breve cuento tardío de fantasmas. Sin embargo, en las contradicciones y en la experimentación ficticia radical de estos textos fascinantes, puede ser discernido un Otro-ser, uno que es al mismo tiempo *creado y encontrado*.

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