Dynamic Psychology, Utopia, and Escape from History: The Case of C.G. Jung

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THE CONTEMPORARY PREOCCUPATION with authenticity in Western culture has produced a vast number of publications that deal with the more or less problematic relationship with the self and identity. The psychocultural "triumph of the therapeutic" (Rieff) has influenced the way we conceive our "inner self" and the basic frameworks that constitute a "good life" for us. We are taught by self-help guidebooks, therapists, and edifying philosophers to have faith in the possibility of becoming "authentic", to realise all the mental and spiritual potentialities that are inherent in us and to become "what we truly are". In the twentieth century, there emerged philosophical (existentialism), religious (anthroposophy, New Age Religion, etc.), and psychological forms of authenticity-seeking.

Whereas existentialism seemed to be too sombre and pessimistic for modern consumers of the authenticity "industry", the evolutionary optimism of the New Age and the psychological crusaders of "inner depths" have fared much better. As early as in the mid-1960s, Frank E. Manuel noticed that "eupsychia" (about the term, see Maslow 1961) was the characteristic form of the twentieth century utopia, and he put forward a tentative analysis of the authors who propagated the spiritualisation of humankind and the attainment of a "good state of consciousness" (Manuel 1966, 86–95). He claimed that by advocating the abolition of instinctual repression and the ensuing liberation of the libido, "Freudo-Marxists" such as Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse were psychological utopians (see also Manuel and Manuel, Ch. 34).

Some other students of utopianism, however, have been less convinced than Manuel that the concept of "psychological utopia" was worth examining. Krishan Kumar admits that Reich, Fromm, and Marcuse were concerned with psychological well-being, but he also emphasises, first, that these thinkers were also socialists and, second, that "[u]topia is essentially a form of social thought" (Kumar, *Utopianism*, 40). In the two recently published anthologies of utopias (*The Utopia Reader, The Faber Book of Utopias*), the editors of each book have included excerpts from about one hundred treatises, many of them from the twentieth century, and only one of them (B.F. Skinner's *Walden Two*) is explicitly psychological. In *Utopian Studies,* there are very few references to modern psychologists (for an examination of the relationship between utopian visions in psychoanalysis

and "rescue fantasy", see Berman). Thus, there is hardly any scholarly consensus regarding the existence of psychological utopias.

This paper argues strongly for the existence of psychological utopias and suggests that they represent a form of utopian thought in which the attainment of an ideal state of consciousness requires the employment of psychological insights and methods that are effective in transforming human personality and, thereby, the whole society or culture. This means that those who create psychological utopias have both a definite conception of the human psyche and a vision of a world that would provide an ideal matrix for psychological well-being. Psychological utopians do not have to be psychologists themselves, but they must have either adopted and possibly modified some particular theory of the psyche already in existence or developed their own conceptual framework for explaining the mind. Authors such as Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and D.H. Lawrence belong to the first category, while C.G. Jung, Wilhelm Reich, and Abraham Maslow belong to the second.

Psychological utopias were mostly created by dynamic psychologists (but see Barclay for a critical assessment of the "utopian legacy" in behaviorism and cognitive psychology). "Dynamic psychology" refers to Freudian psychoanalysis, Jungian analytical psychology, Adlerian individual psychology, and Pierre Janet's psychology of the "subconscious", all of which are based on the premise that psychopathologies and, by extension, all "unconscious" mental activities cannot be localised and explained mechanically because they are in their very nature intrapsychic processes. As such, they are accountable not through physical causes but through an examination of the *genealogy* of these processes. By shedding light on the origins (Freud, Janet) or on the individual dealings (reactions, reflections, etc.) with these processes here and now (Jung, Adler), we can explain the human mind. There are marked differences between the psychologies of these four figures, but together they are the founding fathers of dynamic psychology.

In the early years of Freudian psychoanalysis (1908–09) a number of Freud's pupils (Franz Riklin, Karl Abraham, and Otto Rank) undertook studies of large-scale cultural phenomena. This greatly extended the scope of psychoanalytic study, for the new psychodynamic interpretations of myth, art, and religion were devoid of an empirical, individual-clinical context. Freud himself had no utopian inclinations, except perhaps in *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), where he spoke in favour of the "rational operation of the intellect" and expressed "hope for the future": "Perhaps there is a treasure to be dug up capable of enriching civilization and (. . .) it is worth making the experiment of an irreligious education" (Freud 232). Whereas Freud was content with diagnosing the neurotic mentality of modern people, some of his closest colleagues and disciples (such as Jung, Adler, and Rank) were more inclined to leave the consultation room and develop doctrines that would not only analyse individuals and human culture but, more importantly, would have an impact on culture and the general world view (*Weltanschauung*).

Like all modern utopias, psychodynamic utopias anticipated the better life that could lie ahead in the future, but what makes them intrinsically psy-

chological are their fundamental conceptions concerning the interrelationship between self and society (on the emergence of the terms "self" and "society" in the context of utopian thought, see Mazlish). First, they emphasised the social and cultural significance of an "inner transformation". By "turning inward", psychological utopians transformed the classical point of departure of utopian thought, in which the ideas of change and transformation were conceived in the functional context of social and political activity, and in which the institutions of utopians were not the creation but the creator of their good qualities. By contrast, in psychological utopias humans are not united by the forms of their external activities, but by the structure of their minds which, as "psyche", "unconscious", "inner nature" or some other form of inner self, operates as an agent of change against the distorted or outright pathogenic structures of society. In psychological utopias, humans liberate themselves socially through the liberation of their inner selves.

The second basic assumption shared by psychological utopians is that there is an interconnection between the structure of personality and the structure of society. (The latter structure refers to forms of government, disciplinary and educational institutions, religion, morality, law, and the nature of economic and social hierarchy.) The popularity of this assumption can be explained by its predictive and ordering power: if there is a reciprocal link between these two distinct structures, then we could in principle change society by changing the structure of personality, provided that we have discovered the social, environmental, and psychological determinants that constitute this link. A belief in this assumption thus enables us to analyse the human condition with a neat and simple conceptual category, which is useful for making historical and cross-cultural comparisons. Moreover, it can be employed for producing quasi-nomothetic predictions based on investigations of the pattern of changes either in social structures or, as is the case with psychoutopians, in the structure of human personality.

The psychoutopian authors were inclined to investigate the possibility of transforming society through social therapy, in most cases through the employment of psychodynamic ideas for a variety of ideological purposes, from the most radical to the most conservative. The social implications of dynamic psychology attracted not only psychologists and philosophers but also the political authorities, especially in Soviet Russia in the 1920s, when psychoanalytic researchers discovered changes in personality that the new regime wanted them to find. In the Soviet Union, the purported scientific analysis of the psyche was dictated by Marxist ideological doctrines, and—as recent studies have demonstrated—psychoanalysis was used by the Bolshevik government as a tool for producing a "new edition of humans" (Etkind; Miller). The assumed interconnection between the structure of personality and the structure of society was later examined, for example, by the social philosopher Theodor Adorno *et al* (1950) and, more recently, by the German sociologist Norbert Elias (1996).

Thirdly, psychoutopians argued that individual psychopathologies reflect the pathogenicity of society. This assumption, which is closely

related to the two previous assumptions, was founded on an anthropological conception of illness, according to which social and cultural factors play a major role in the aetiology of mental disorders. Typically, psychoutopian authors exaggerated the number of the sick (Reich estimated that as many as 90 percent of all women and 70 to 80 percent of all men were neurotic!) as if to emphasise the urgency of social therapeutic measures against the pathogenicity of society. Their utopian propensity manifested itself in their claim that, at least in principle, the whole society could be healed by restoring the health of single individuals who are psychically disturbed or in a state of "inauthenticity". With the help of a psychological interpretation and therapy, the illness of modernity could be cured, and there would no longer be any notable social obstacles on our road to authenticity. By promoting an anthropological conception of illness, psychoutopians translated social critique into clinical language and, consequently, gave their interpretations of culture and society a distinct diagnostic stamp. Instead of employing traditional moral, legal or philosophical categories, they—and social theorists who were influenced by them—tended to view modern culture and society in terms of sickness and health. Not only individuals but whole societies could fall into a pathological state. (For a critique of medicalised conceptual categories, see Szasz.)

Psychoutopians regarded the repression of inner nature as the most fundamental pathogenic factor in modern culture and saw themselves as both unmaskers of the social determinants of "psychopathologies" and visionaries of a better life where the principles of "hope" (as Ernst Bloch puts it) and "renewal" (E.M. Cioran's phrase) could be realised. In psychoutopias, negativity and unnaturalness were mostly associated with the idea that rational hegemony, the demand for a rational control and self-control, may repress us and lead to an increasing alienation from the world that is ruled by "instrumental reason", as the Frankfurt School theoreticians put it. There were, however, differing views among utopian writers about the dangers of civilisation based on the "tyranny of reason". While a number of them (Otto Gross, Jung, and Reich) were more willing to embrace the impulsive, uncontrollable forces of "Dionysian unreason", others (Fromm, Maslow) displayed a cautious and more sober attitude in their articulation of the antagonism between culture and inner nature, between the demand for a domestication of instinctual urges that is considered an essential element in the civilisation process and the almost equally powerful demand for expressive fulfilment and self-realisation. This tension between the internalised forms of self-control and meaning-inducing forms of self-realisation is at the very centre of the psychoutopian concern.

The two notable exceptions to the main trend of psychological utopias, which found inspiration in psychodynamic insights, were B.F. Skinner and Abraham Maslow, both from the United States. Unlike psychodynamic utopians, Skinner and Maslow explicitly acknowledged their utopian aspirations, and Skinner is the only psychologist who actually wrote a "speaking picture utopia" (*Walden Two*), which in its vision of social engineering

enraged most humanists and delighted most behaviourists. In contradistinction to psychodynamic utopias, Skinner's behaviourism and Maslow's transpersonal psychology represent a scientistic-naturalist and a spiritualistic-individualist form of psychoutopianism, respectively. They either do not share the same basic assumptions as their European counterparts or their way of presenting them is different. First of all, "inner transformation" is entirely absent in Skinnerian behaviourism, while in Maslow's psychology it is less radical in its implications than in psychodynamic utopianism. Maslow's conception of the unconscious minimizes conflicts: the unconscious inner nature can be good, beautiful, and healthy, and the world is "in itself interesting, beautiful, and fascinating" (*Toward a Psychology of Being,* 199). Second, while the assumption of the interrelationship between the structure of personality and the structure of society is absent in Maslow's psychology, Skinnerian behaviourism is concerned with the interrelationship between environment and behaviour. Third and last, although both Skinner and Maslow see individual illnesses as having effects on the social sphere, and vice versa, they are not as concerned with pathologies and conflicts as utopians in the psychodynamic tradition. While their utopianism, and especially that of Maslow's, has resemblances with European psychoutopianism, they both represent distinct forms of psychological utopia to which we cannot apply the same conceptual categories that we use when we examine European psychoutopias (for an insightful discussion of Skinner's utopia, see Kumar, *Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times,* Ch. 9).

Psychological utopias are based on these three assumptions (inner transformation, an interrelationship between the structure of society and the structure of personality, and an anthropological conception of illness), all of which are characteristically holistic by stressing the interdependence of mind and body, psyche and soma, self and society. Consequently, psychoutopian authors have propagated total therapy and the reconstitution of the harmony between culture and (inner) nature. A perceptive student of utopianism, Ruth Levitas, has correctly remarked that the "pursuit of a better way of being does not always involve the alteration of external conditions, but may mean the pursuance of spiritual or psychological states" (Levitas 192). This is true, but one should distinguish between those who pursue a good state of consciousness *per se,* without relating their pursuit to the public sphere, and those who make such a relation between the private and the public spheres explicit. It is this latter group of thinkers that creates psychological utopias, because they do not exclude society and/or culture from their vision of the good life. Otherwise, why call them "utopias" in the first place?

Utopianism in Jung's Analytical Psychology

The idea of psychological utopia is commonly associated with Freudo-Marxism, which denotes a group of German-speaking authors such as Wilhelm Reich, Siegfried Bernfeld, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse (on Marxism and psychoanalysis, see Kätzel, Dahmer). Being Marxists, they

had strong faith in the social utility of their own theories, which they combined with faith in the ability of psychoanalysis to scientifically explain the objective "psychic determinants" of subjective inner life (e.g., why the proletariat does not have strong enough class consciousness). They gave Freudian interpretation of Marx's thesis that in the ideal socialist society all human activities derive directly—that is, naturally—from human nature and that in his or her most individual mode of being a person would at the same time be a social being (*Gemeinwesen*). In their psychological utopias, human nature is both socialised and essentially good, because humans are not alienated from their true nature, as is the case in the present capitalist society.

Yet, Freudo-Marxists were not the only group of psychodynamic thinkers who displayed utopian propensities. One of the most distinct psychoutopians, C.G. Jung, was an author who detested socialism, broke off with Freud, and rejected the basic tenets of psychoanalysis. Jung differed radically from Freud in that there were strong streaks of Romanticism, German idealist *Naturphilosophie*, and holistic utopianism in his thought. He developed an idiosyncratic version of psychoutopianism, a version which until recently was not even recognised as a form of utopian thought at all (Noll; Pietikainen, *C.G. Jung and the Psychology of Symbolic Forms*). In his utopian striving for totality and wholeness, his ideas converged with those of the early twentieth-century German holistic thinkers, who envisioned wholeness at an individual as well as at the cultural level (for accounts of holistic tradition in Germany, see Harrington, Ash).

An examination of Jung's holistic utopia elucidates a mode of thinking that manifested not radical left-wing thought patterns but a conservative value system, which was prevalent among the German-speaking middle classes during the first decades of the twentieth century (on the life of the Swiss bourgeoisie, see Tanner). It is among the educated members of the Central-European bourgeoisie that we can find the first adherents of modern dynamic psychology. The same bourgeoisie that in the early twentieth century was at the receiving end of contempt and hatred from both the Left and the Right, was also in the feverish quest for the "self". This idea of the self fashioning itself was partly a result of the precarious social position of the bourgeoisie: as they were making money and/or occupied key positions in governmental institutions, they were perceived by one group (the extreme Left) as the class enemy and by the other (the extreme Right) as greedy materialists. It was this social group, once it fell under the spell of Marxism on one hand and dynamic psychology on the other, that attempted to redefine its position *vis-à-vis* other social groups. Among bourgeoisie citizens, this led into conversions to Marxism and right-wing ideologies but also into psychological "identity crises", self-doubt, and a yearning for an individual and cultural wholeness. An incessant self-scrutiny of the early twentieth-century bourgeoisie and the success story of dynamic psychology are inescapably intertwined.

Where Jungian psychology differed from Freudian psychoanalysis was that whereas psychoanalysis aspired to offer tools for an increased self-

knowledge and psychological insight, Jungian psychology went beyond this analytic attitude and offered transcendental doctrines that included strong psychoutopian elements. What most of all makes Jung a utopian writer is his imaginative application of his own archetypal theory to ideas that are related to personality transformation (individuation) and an ensuing cultural regeneration. The doctrine of the collective unconscious and its archetypes is Jung's major contribution to twentieth century intellectual culture, and while the scientific status of Jung's theory is rather feeble, to say the least, the very idea of an archetype has filtered into common usage and influenced popular psychology, especially growth-oriented therapeutic practices.

Jungian archetypes are inherited supraindividual predispositions of the collective unconscious (CW 8, 200–16), which we all share regardless of nationality, ethnicity, or cultural background. Jung based his conviction of the universality of the archetypal mental structure on the questionable premise that it is biologically inherited. He argued that since the "deeper layers" of the human psyche are everywhere the same, people living in different cultures are united by these archetypes in the sense that there are universal human experiences that are structured by them. Jung of course was not the only thinker who argued for the fundamental identity of (unconscious) mental functioning, the so-called "psychic unity of humankind", but he was unique in placing the speculative idea of the collective unconscious at the very centre of a psychological theory.

What is remarkable about the development of Jung's analytical psychology is that he spiritualised the world of nature, the world of drives and instincts. Thereby, he stood Freud on his head, much as Nietzsche stood Schopenhauer on his. In contradistinction to Freud, who had naturalised the world of spirit and reduced even the loftiest of ideas to the level of elementary drives, Jung proposed that there are spiritual and ethical values that manifest themselves as drives. In fact, he gave a vitalist interpretation of the key-term of German idealistic philosophy, Spirit (*Geist*), which he saw as "the sum of the ancestral spirits" (*die Summe der Ahnengeister*) and as the fundamental spiritual principle: "I must (. . .) emphasise that the spiritual principle does not, strictly speaking, conflict with instinct as such but only with blind instinctuality, which really amounts to an unjustified preponderance of the instinctual nature over the spiritual. The spiritual appears in the psyche also as an instinct, indeed as a real passion, 'a consuming fire', as Nietzsche once expressed it." (CW 8, 58). In brief, Jung remade the unconscious in his own, more transcendental image.

For Jung, as for vitalist biologists and philosophers such as Hans Driesch and Henri Bergson, there is a vital force operating in an organism, and that force appears as a disposition to move towards fulfilment. The spiritual principle is not influenced by external factors but acts like a Leibnizian monad in the sense that there are *inner* determining factors that animate these spiritual processes, which Jung conceives almost as *ens realissimum,* the most real of all being. He followed vitalists in his basic conviction that archetypes have formative power, and that therefore they can *direct* or

change the movements of psychic energy. Like vitalism, Jung's basic doctrines of the collective unconscious and archetypes are irrefutable, for they are formulated with a degree of vagueness sufficient to exempt them from empirical refutation. Nevertheless, intellectual obscurantism in Jungian psychology has not prevented it from gaining popularity in authenticity-seeking psychoculture. In particular, it is the Jungian notion of the archetypal process of individuation that is suffused with psychoutopianism.

Individuation and National Individuation

Jung coined the term "individuation" in 1916 to denote the psychoutopian inner journey into wholeness (CW 7, 284). In this developmental process, which usually starts at the age of 36–38, at the threshold of the "second part of life", we first become aware of the artificiality of our social self (the Persona) and encounter the infantile and inferior part of our personality (the Shadow, which denotes more or less the Freudian unconscious). The next stage is reached when we acknowledge our contrasexual aspect, which is Anima in man and Animus in woman. For man, Anima also signifies his relationship to his Soul. These demanding encounters with the Persona, the Shadow, and Anima/Animus pave the way for attaining a new understanding of life and gaining insight into our inner nature, represented by the Wise Old Man (or, the Great Mother) and, at the end of our journey, the Self, an archetype of psychic totality.

Jungian individuation promises a spiritual adventure, which begins with the descent into the psychic underworld, where one has to confront archetypal entities in order to gain wisdom and understanding. After these "numinous" confrontations, one can attain authenticity and find one's "personal myth", something to live by. In brief, inherent to Jungian psychology is the psychoutopian search for the Philosopher's Stone that would give our life meaning and depth. This individual process has a social meaning as well, for an "individuated individual" is in a position to provide the necessary "creative impulses" that culture needs for continuous development. Every progressive step in cultural evolution is psychologically an expansion of consciousness, a semi-divine act of becoming conscious (*Bewusst-Werdung*). As Jung states in a broadcast talk for the BBC in late 1946, "it is a most difficult task, demanding a high degree of ethical responsibility. Only relatively few individuals can be expected to be capable of such an achievement, and they are not the political but the *moral* leaders of mankind. The maintenance and further development of civilisation depend on such individuals, for it is obvious enough that the consciousness of the masses has not advanced since the first World War" (CW 10, 221).

What Jung is saying here is that there are only a limited number of exceptional individuals, who in their individuation process can confront the archetypal figures to their "spiritual" advantage. Appropriately, these individuals act as agents of cultural renewal or even rebirth. Jung's individuated individuals are psychological equivalents to Platonic philosopher-kings,

who possess the knowledge of Truth and Right. The reason this Jungian minority has a privileged access to the Truth is that they can divine the psychological processes in the deep recesses of the human mind and explain to other, less privileged individuals what is wrong with them and how to right the wrong and to become true personalities.

On some occasions, Jung envisaged "national individuation", an attainment of authenticity on a national level. In his Visions seminar on 10 May 1933, Jung expressed undisguised enthusiasm for the "German revolution", while acknowledging its "positive and negative aspects":

> It is a regression and injustice, there is no doubt about that; but they [the Germans] cannot get together as a nation, they cannot celebrate their love feast, if strangers are in between. Of course you can say that Jews are scapegoats; of course they are scapegoats, but other people, individuals, do the same thing: in the process of individuation, for instance, they exclude many things, they may desert their relations, which is unjust, cruel, or foolish perhaps, but it serves that one purpose of individuation, of coming together (VS II, 976).

Here Jung compares the rise of the Third Reich ("German revolution") with an individuation process writ large, with an attainment of a new condition of collective consciousness. In other words, in a national individuation process, the whole nation can experience a spiritual regeneration or rebirth, as a result of which the nation can attain an unprecedented cultural and spiritual level. What is required to achieve this goal is a sudden eruption of the collective archetypal forces that can initially bring about social confusion but that can also lead into a creative cultural channelling of psychodynamic archetypal energies. In his (in)famous 1936 essay on the Teutonic God Wotan, Jung gave a psychomythical interpretation of the rise of National Socialism and spelled out its alleged archetypal roots. He saw the reawakening of the primordial Wotan archetype as the key factor in the rise of National Socialism, and he expressed his hope that through the inherently dialectical development of culture, Germany will perhaps enter into a new Golden Age after she has gone through the initial spiritual regression (CW 10, 179–93). What Jung fails to make clear in this context is whether he saw the utopian "Golden Age" emerging as a later phase of the National Socialist "revolution" or as a totally new, post-Nazi era, although it can be inferred that a political turnover was not a prerequisite for a better future for Germany.

As Jung saw the "German psyche" as historically much younger than, for example, the Latin or Jewish psyche, he could argue that just because the level of consciousness is weaker and thinner among Germans, they are in a possession of greater archetypal energies than more cultured "races". Hence, the Germans and the "Nordic races" in general have a greater potentiality for national individuation: they may be barbaric as compared with the Latin or Jewish "races", but the relatively primitive and undeveloped German psyche has stamina, youthfulness, and vigour that is lacking in more developed and refined consciousness. However, while he saw the "German revolution" as a collective individuation process, Jung was already in 1933 mildly worried that the "suppression of free speech" and "expulsion of valu-

able people"' might "have a very bad influence on the further development of the German mind", because Germans were isolating themselves from the world. Therefore, "for the time being", stated Jung in May 1933, "we must suspend our judgment" (VS II, 976–77).

There was clearly some interest in Jungian psychology in National Socialist circles in the early years of the Third Reich. It seems that the ideological implications (especially the search for wholeness and a unifying *Weltanschauung*) of Jung's psychology were accepted and even favoured by the Nazi authorities, and government officials followed his activities. The so-called *Gleichschaltung* (co-ordination) of German psychotherapy boosted Jung's popularity, although, as Geoffrey Cocks points out, Jung's psychology played only a minor role in the actual work of German psychotherapists. His ideas were too theoretical, too aesthetic, and too far removed from everyday life to be of practical use to psychotherapists. Hence, the German regime "displayed little *scientific* interest in Jung or his followers" [italics added] (Cocks 138). What united National Socialists and Jung was their common aspiration to transcend historical time with its contingencies and create a sense of experiencing Sacred Time. Nazi authorities wanted to connect the Germans with the transhistorical, mythical *ur*-time of the Teutonic race (Griffin), while Jung tried to connect his patients and readers with the inner universe of the collective unconscious, where the primordial era of myth continues its *ur*-existence in the form of transhistorical archetypal symbolism. Both National Socialists and Jung expressed this symbolic and ritualistic transportation to mythical, transhistorical time in the language of the living organism, as a vitalist healing and rebirth of the *Volk* (Nazis) or the psyche (Jung). Just as in National Socialist ideology historical determinism was replaced by racist biologism, in Jungian theory and therapy an individual life history is subsumed under the transhistorical "laws" of the collective unconscious. For Jung, what is merely historical has no true value. The "law of motion" that he discovered was not that of history and society, as in Marxist and other historically determined utopias, but that of archetypal processes.

Inevitably, Jung supplied ammunition to his critics by his insistence that there are elements in Nazi Germany that are potentially beneficial to the German people. It was only after the utterly violent and destructive nature of National Socialism had shattered his illusions about the positive nature of the "Aryan myth" and "national individuation" that Jung changed his attitude in 1937–38 and became suspicious of the Third Reich and the reactionary völkisch ideology, to which he had felt some affinity in the early 1930s (Pietikainen, *The Volk and its Unconscious*). Jung's political and ideological sentiments between the two world wars shared a great deal with the conservative decryers of modernity, but it would be an exaggeration to claim that his psychology has been fatally tainted by those sentiments. While being anti-Semitic to some degree, Jung was neither a fascist nor a National-Socialist in the 1930s. (For Jung's "national psychology", see Pietikainen, *National Typologies, Races, and Mentalities*). And when Jung's

anti-Semitism is under discussion, it should be borne in mind that even during the 1930s there were not only Protestants but also Jews (and some Catholics) among his patients and pupils. Because they were in search of spiritual values, a number of Jews seemed to be attracted to Jung's and not Freud's ideas. Through becoming initiated into Jungian psychology, these assimilated, secular Jews were able to interpret Judaism from a point of view that was modern and "scientific" and yet affirmed the significance of religion, spirituality, and "rootedness". Even today there continues to be a great number of Jews among Jungian analysts (Kirsch).

In the latter half of the 1930s, Jung began to identify himself more pronouncedly as a republican Swiss and drew further and further away from the psychotherapeutic scene in the Third Reich (see Cocks). He became more and more involved with alchemy and the Christian and hermetic traditions, but he never abandoned his insistence on the explanatory power of his archetypal theory in the fields of history, society, and culture. Although the more explicit elements of völkisch national-romantic ideology (such as the fusion of blood, landscape, and race) disappeared from his writings, in his infatuation with things primordial and mythical, Jung retained a basic element that can be found not only in völkisch ideology but in a mode of thought which manifests uneasiness with the ideas of change and impermanence in general. Applying his doctrine of archetypes to historical phenomena, he continued to give psychomythical interpretations of cultural evolution and to probe into the timeless truths "behind" the contingencies of historical time (see, e.g., the large essay The Undiscovered Self [1957] in CW 10).

Myth, History, and Utopia

Jung belongs to a group of modern authors who turned to myth rather than to history in their portrait of the human condition. With authors such as Thomas Mann, James Joyce, Aldous Huxley, and Mircea Eliade, Jung was an antitemporalist in his attempt to transcend historical time. Antitemporalists questioned historical progress, namely the idea that cultural evolution equals technological, social, and scientific development. What counted for Jung was the cycle of aions or "Platonic months", not the linear process of historical time, which he saw as stimulating pathological symptoms in its mechanical chronology and quantification of temporal processes. It is no coincidence that antitemporalism gained ground in Europe after the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution: the war had torn to shreds the belief in the necessity of historical progress, while the Russian revolution had sacralised history and, therewith, thisworldly salvation of the Proletariat. What united antitemporalists was their common rejection of history as a meaningful category of experience. If, as they argued, human nature is constant and invariable, then contingencies and chance occurrences of history are not the true constituents of human life. Like his literary colleagues Mann and Joyce, Jung reasoned that as humans are the same in (their archetypal) essence, they would act essentially the same throughout time.

Jung's remedy for the malaise of modernity was to impose an archetypal order on the haphazard or even chaotic flux of historical experience and to establish a transhistorical relationship between individuals and their psychological origins. This relationship could only be accounted for by mythical ideograms, not scientific concepts. The collective unconscious, an ideogram denoting the deep continuity between one's origins and one's current mental state, impinges upon a form of mythical existence outside space and time. For the transcendentalist Jung, humans cannot be reduced to their historical conditions, for through myth they are in contact with the timeless sphere of the collective unconscious, which in its archetypal representations changes through time and yet retains its basic identity.

Where Jung differed from authors like Mann and Joyce was that his antitemporalism has its roots in the nineteenth-century German *Naturphilosophie*, which deliberated upon the essential holistic reality underlying phenomenal world (Faivre). More often than not, this essential or ultimate reality was seen in spiritual and religious terms. Thus, it is not surprising that Jung, more than any other dynamic psychologist, struggled with religion all through his life and incorporated religious elements in his psychology. If, indeed, Christianity is "one of the dominating influences in the development of utopianism" (Claeys and Sargent 6), then Jung's psychological utopia of individual (spiritual) and collective (cultural) wholeness can be seen as an example of a form of modern utopianism that has not dismissed the traditional religious ideas but only transformed (in Jung's case, psychologised) them so as to make them more acceptable for modern disenchanted individuals.

To understand Jung's preference of myth over history, we should not forget that he was in many ways a Romantic, and as such he saw the Enlightenment tradition with its endless rationalizations as expelling the various forms of mystery and imagination that he himself valued so much. The way Jung saw it, the psychology of the unconscious successfully avoids the depreciation of the psychic world that characterises the "enlightened" attitude. Therefore, dynamic psychology has a cultural mission: to revive the symbolic universe of Western culture, which has died or become obsolete in the external reality, but which is still vibrating in the deepest structures of the psyche in the form of archetypes.

If there is such a thing as an "essence" of Jung's psychological utopia, it seems to be the mythification of human life and the ensuing escape from the collective history to the personal myth. Myth transforms history into nature, and Jung transforms "external" history into "inner" nature, into a transhistorical interplay of the compensatory psychic forces of consciousness and the unconscious. He himself claimed that a mythical universe of (archetypal) symbols helps us to give our existence "a glamour [*Glanz*] which we would not like to do without" (MDR 331). With the help of a mythical universe, our daily commerce with the world becomes more bearable and we can overcome the diseases afflicting modern humanity, anxiety (*Angst*), neurosis, and sheer boredom. In other words, the locus of meaning

and purpose resides in the "deep self" of each individual, not in one's social activities or human relationships. However, despite the solipsistic implications of Jungian psychology, Jung could argue in a holistic fashion that we are all connected with each other through the collective unconscious. Hence the deepest level of the psyche is the matrix of collective psychic epidemics (such as Communism or National Socialism) but also of utopian renewal, as Jung suggests in his Visions Seminar (VS) and in his essay on Wotan.

Jung gave expression to a utopian yearning for a deeper and more meaningful world than the one he and his patients and pupils had to live in. By instituting the absolutism of archetypal images against the oppression of historical contingency, Jung's analytical psychology signifies a therapeutic move from the alleged pathogenicity of historical time to the timeless symbolic universe of (potentially) healing archetypes. He was one of the first therapists to notice that in many cases the patients (or clients) were not suffering from serious mental disturbances (due to childhood trauma, etc.) but from the feeling that they lack purpose in their lives, and it was the therapist's duty to help the patients to find some purpose—a myth to live by—so that they can carry on with their lives. What actually took place in Jung's therapy was that the private life of his patients was expanded to universal proportions and the patients' contemporary problems were viewed through the prism of myths and symbols only dimly connected to these problems. Apparently, the majority of his mostly upper middle class patients, who were often of Anglo-Saxon origin and in most cases quite well of financially, accepted this therapeutic procedure. His patients enjoyed political freedom and economic independence and were steeped in the liberal-democratic values of personal autonomy and individualism. They had also a potential thirst for a psychological and, which often characterizes Jungians, spiritual "growth". The way Jung sees his therapy, the emptied tubes of existence have to be filled by something that could be called a substantial good, or, to put it in Jung's own words, the "inner man has to be fed" (JS, 358). And as the "inner man" is "archetypal", he must be nourished not with facts and theories but with psychological myths and utopias—otherwise he may become disturbed and troublesome, like so many inner men that Jung discovered in his therapeutic practice.

In the last analysis, Jung's psychoutopian conceptions dismiss scientific truth and embrace truth of a "higher" kind, that which represents the testimony of a deeper and more privileged insight—a truth so profound that if human nature does not conform to it, why then, so much the worse for human nature. As a representative of modern psychology-fiction, he developed a therapeutic belief system that offers neither empirical facts nor analytic arguments but articles of faith. Jung's psychology functions not as a scientific theory but as a form of holistic utopia that wants to edify, inspire, and offer consolation to disenchanted Western individuals, who are devoid not of material goods but of spiritual nourishment. The utopian elements in his psychology have had some influence on developmental psychologists, New Age religions, and various therapies that focus on the "restoration of

the self" and on the archetypal processes in human life. Most importantly, Jungian psychology has contributed to the Western therapeutic culture, in which individuals interpret themselves and the selves of others with the help of terms and models that are derived from dynamic psychology. When people want to "understand themselves more deeply" and to "develop as personalities", they affirm the principal value on which Jung founded his psychology: we should become "what we truly are".

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