

Carl Gustav Jung as a historical–cultural phenomenon

Luigi Zoja*

Analyst in private practice and independent scholar, Milan, Italy

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It can be argued that psychoanalysis was one of the most important revolutions of the twentieth century. It arose out of the person's need to reflect on his/her inner space. Essentially, the psychoanalytic technique is *talking*, an ancient human skill that locates the person as both the subject and the author of history, culture and society. Analytical psychology, with its specific sensitivity to cultural issues, cannot claim that it is a scientific discipline, in the sense that it has developed technical knowledge according to natural sciences; however, it has contributed substantially to developing a unique field of study within which one can reflect on individual and collective phenomena as they interact with each other and within their sociohistorical contexts. This article offers a reflection on our contemporary globalised world, with its subjective and changed sense of time and space; it is argued that a return to a Jungian humanism may enable us to grasp the complexities of people's interrelationship with the sociocultural realities within which they live.

Keywords: psychoanalysis; analytical psychology; collective; individual; culture; time

Who can be said to have triumphed in the twentieth century? It has been called the *American century*, but its real trademark has been two European world wars. This was the century of technology but also economy. Roughly, the twentieth century was the century of nationalisms until the Forties and of the socialisms and finally capitalisms from the Seventies on.

Nevertheless, there is another possible perspective on this question according to which it can be argued that the predominant hallmark of the twentieth century was psychoanalysis.

The psychoanalytical revolution spanned the entire century and left nothing the same as before. Under its influence, the person now reflects upon him/herself. And, after looking at him/herself for a whole century in the mirror or under the microscope, the vision that the person has of him/herself is not the same. The prominent literature (James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Franz Kafka, Marcel Proust) describes the inner space. Also the visual arts (painting) represent a space that does not privilege outer reality any more. Music, theatre or cinema of that century, whenever creative, are devoted to the psychological dimensions. With the advent of psychoanalysis, the way anthropology, sociology and historiography work has changed. It seems they cast a *psychoanalytic glance* upon peoples of different continents and social groups, and figures from the past. The actual analysis is both a

*Email: luigizoja@fastwebnet.it

methodological technique and a clinical tool. But the wider legacy that it has left in the twentieth century is a critique of the outlook of man/woman on him/herself. Psychoanalysis created a culture of therapy as well as a therapy of culture.

Nevertheless, the twentieth century ended with a pressing return of other forms of therapy, not psychoanalytic. Universities and hospitals are distancing themselves from psychoanalysis, blaming it for curing far too few persons in too long a time and with high costs. Admittedly, if we scrutinise psychoanalysis as a technique and as a science, we will find many problematic issues. Yet, it should not be forgotten that it was born and remained for over one hundred years as, fundamentally, a *talking cure*. *Talking* has been a human skill since Neanderthal man. What other technique is as rough and insensitive to develop and refine as talking? The progress of the analytical techniques actually looks like a form of adaptation to the changing cultural conditions. Had it been a science, its truths would have been accepted universally and it would have been possible to have cumulative improvements. Had it belonged to science, it would have been just a small fraction of another science, i.e. psychiatry, which is itself also a part of a wider science: medicine. It would have been a science of the human mental apparatus as described by a medical paradigm, i.e. fixed and independent from cultural, social and temporal variations. The neurosis of a modern European would have substantially been the same as that of an Aztec, exactly like lung infection or the fracture of a bone.

On the contrary, psychoanalysis, as it emerged from the encounter between Freud and Jung, and especially due to Jung's own contribution,¹ has become the study of the psyche as it dwells in culture, society and history. It is this psychoanalysis that has given us the 'psychoanalytic revolution': perhaps the only irreversible revolution of the twentieth century – and also the only one which has not shed a drop of blood.

It may be inappropriate to use the term 'psychoanalysis' when we try to capture the totality of this revolution. In doing so, we may be misunderstood as referring only to the psychoanalytic procedure or technique. Perhaps, following Jung's advice, we may be more accurate. He spoke in wider terms, referring to *psychology* in general or to analytical psychology in particular. Perhaps the key reference to the first part of the composite word psychology, *psych-* gives a reductive tone as it is too much associated with professionalism and technique. *Psyche*, in ancient Greek, meant *soul*, which in part is equivalent to the German *Seele*. On the other hand, in modern Italian, '*psiche*' is what is left when from '*psichiatria*' we take out *-iatria*, i.e. medicine. Quite a narrow territory which, for example, accepts myth just as a specific form of pathology. However, myth is the backbone of the soul, not its degeneration.

It is quite possible that when he was studying Miss Miller's fantasies, Jung had felt the need to found a cultural discipline in the strict sense of the word. Not because he refused to give way to Freud's sexual theory but because he understood that Freud's theory risked reducing myth to a distortion of sexuality. In fact, if one accepts the supposition that everything could be derived from sexuality, psychological suffering could be understood without studying the individual as part of history and culture, two realities that express themselves in religion, in myth and art. Jung formulated the hypothesis of the unconscious and of a collective consciousness because he was the first to understand (at a time when anthropology was still in its infancy) that the modern European's neuroses could not be the same as that of an Aztec or a Chinese of the Qin dynasty. So, he introduced cultural relativity into psychology and founded a cultural psychology – a psychology which does not study an abstract man but a person immersed and enmeshed in his/her world.

In analysing culture, this psychology enters into a circular process. Its influence becomes at the same time one of the cultural components and (not too secretly) a therapy of culture. Not just an eye that observes, but also a hand that acts. Being itself the result of culture, it also becomes one of its causes.² The value of this psychology is demonstrated by the fact that it actually worked retroactively on Freud. Gradually, in time, without ever using the idea of the collective unconscious or re-establishing any contact with Jung, Freud directed his attention from the individual *Unbehagen* (discontent) to that of *Kultur*,³ and declares that he considers psychoanalysis an instrument to change the whole of society.

In trying to conclude on all the above, it can be argued that psychoanalysis is devalued by the scientific and academic world as a *therapy with a limited influence*; nevertheless, we should smile at such a deprecation, *as psychoanalysis influenced the whole of the twentieth century*. For good or ill, it has been a therapy for an entire epoch. In a century in which masses and violence seemed to dominate, psychoanalysis cultivated, almost like an antidote, this attention towards the inner dimension.

It would not be inappropriate to claim that Jung was the main pioneer of this movement. More strongly than Freud he broke considerably away from medicine by introducing the collective psyche as a central object of his project.

The Freudian model of the individual psyche is the psychic expression of a body as described by medicine. There is no such thing as a science of the individual body different from the science of the body within society: my body is the same, whether I am alone or part of a crowd. The Jungian collective psyche, instead, refers to the *psychological expression of a social body* as studied in anthropology, sociology and historiography as well as psychology. This collective psyche is not simply the sum of the individual psychic entities of which it is made. If we used the analogy of trees, the collective psyche would not just be only the forest: it would also be the land on which the trees grow.

The individual psyche's project is individuation and, yet, its roots are firmly planted in the collective psyche. If one wants the branches and fruit of individuation to flourish, it is the roots and its overall nourishment system that one needs to attend to. Complexes and neuroses cannot be addressed only as individual problems. The individual not only originates in society and within a culture but is always in relation to them. Therefore, the medical model of the natural sciences is not sufficient. It is not accidental and not inappropriate that the Jungian project was characterised as humanistic, focusing on human potential as well as belonging to the human sciences. It can be argued that much more than Freud, the Jungian opus has the potential of proposing a humanist utopia of a truly radical nature (see Tilman, 1987, ch. 3).

In this sense, Jung has left an unresolved antinomy. On the one hand, he says that the origin of every problem within society can be found in the psyche of the individual. On the other hand, he asserts that the individual psyche is the product of a difficult and intricate differentiation from the collective psyche: even in the original natural state, psyche is still immersed in the collective (see Guggenbühl, 1992). Perhaps more than an antinomy, here again we are dealing with a circular process. The collective psyche is the *historic* origin of the individual one. This latter, however, exactly because it is differentiated, is in its turn the *moral* origin of new collective problems. Certainly, the analyst (unlike the medical doctor and the specialist psychotherapist, who limits himself to using a medical model) must concern himself with the interaction between the opposites of society and the individual. These are in

a mutual relationship of reciprocal guilt.⁴ To favour excessively one or the other burdens man with a sense of guilt.

Men are as the time is (King Lear, Act V, Scene III)

If we turn our attention to the first part of the twentieth century, we observe that more or less up until the Forties the world was dominated by nationalisms. Nationalism – as observers such as Arnold Toynbee or Octavio Paz noted – is the most powerful, the most terrible motor driving modernity. It stirs up the *national* collective unconscious which internationalist movements such as the French and Bolshevik revolutions had declared outdated; perhaps the opposition to globalisation today is based on comparable sentiments – maintaining the local and resisting the global.

After the two World Wars, the more aggressive nationalisms were officially defeated and the more powerful tide of history seems to be dominated by two international, indeed, transnational, movements: those of Socialism and Communism. This second phase lasted until the end of the Seventies (or, according to a more external point of view, to the falling of the Berlin wall in 1989). Up until the Seventies it appears that there was a continual advancing of Social-Communism. On the international front, Marxism conquered Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Vietnam and a good part of Africa; but the Sixties and Seventies opened also an internal front in Western countries, where unions, minorities and student movements asked for radical reforms to society. Personally, I have a rather particular opinion of the youth movements: although they proclaimed to want a more social society, in effect, by proclaiming the liberation of desire and by practising tolerance towards individual anarchy, they foreshadowed the individualism of the subsequent decades (Zoja, 2009, ch. 3).

In the Eighties the radical movements in the West rapidly dissolved. In 1989, we saw the sudden, almost unexpected fall of Communism. The surprise generated by this rapid collapse is a typical example of lack of attention to unconscious factors. Soviet propaganda and the paranoid tendencies of American nationalism unknowingly collaborated in overestimating the strength of Communism.

Naturally, there was also the distortion caused by the lack of far-sightedness and the inevitable lack of historical perspective: when located within an epoch-making movement it is difficult to afford an outsider's perspective and a balanced view, just as a neurosis is more visible to the analyst than to the neurotic immersed in it. This holds true throughout history: even the Roman Empire, and the colonial empires of Spain and of Great Britain, reached their maximum extension and seemed invincible even while the invisible factors leading to their downfall were already in operation. Probably the psychological components of history acquire more importance the closer they are to us, because the psychological war between its players grows in importance. In any case, that which stirs up the unconscious of history is the most interesting part of history itself. And it seems to us that the collaboration of historiography with our discipline could assert more openly the debt owed to the Jungian idea of the collective unconscious.

What does the fall of socialist utopias mean for our field? It means, first of all, the rapid disappearance of Freudo-Marxism, or, if I may express a personal opinion, the demonstration of its excessive abstractness and a certain vacuity.

Second, from the point of view of the analysis of great social and historical phenomena, Jungian psychology (in contrast to Freudo-Marxism) does not lose any of its relevance. It offers a model for understanding both the individual and the collective psyche, and requires a particular attention to their equilibrium.

Jung's thought emerged in the first part of the twentieth century, which was overwhelmed by nationalist movements, and it was completed at a time when Socialist movements dominated the scene. In both these phases, we are faced with *collective movements* which tend to crush the individual. Naturally, therefore, the main value that Jung indicated as necessary, and that his followers understood, was that of *individuation*. In this sense, Jung was a beacon for individual values at a time when they were in danger of being neglected or even trampled upon. Compared with this solitary courage, coherently sustained throughout the course of his life, the accusations that he may have occasionally favoured certain nationalisms are not only incomplete in their proof, but lapse into a lesser weakness, as an illness that occasionally attacks even the body of the doctor whose whole life has been waged in the name of healing.

The final part of the twentieth century and the beginning of the current one sees the triumph of individual values within politics. Combined with rapid economic and technological innovations this victory degenerated (in common practice if not in ideals) into individualism, hedonism, and consumerism. Could anyone suggest that this would have pleased Jung?⁵ At this point, the second assumption of Jungian psychology becomes radically relevant: no man is an island, we are all citizens of culture and history and we cannot limit our attention solely to the individual.

Naturally, this does not mean undervaluing the individual and dedicating ourselves to the masses. It means deepening our understanding of the social aspects of the individual him/herself. Individuation is the expression of harmonic individual potential within society, not the omnipotent creation of models of abstract individualism such as those proposed by commercial advertising or the entertainment industry in the mass society.

The complexity of Jung's psychology (it is not by chance that it was also called 'complex' psychology) is applied first of all to the balance of opposites. During his lifetime, Jung offered a correction to the unilateral nature of a culture that preferred the mass to the individual. Today, it should offer the opposite, i.e. to correct individualism by reminding us that it represses collective values within the unconscious: these values have roots in the archetypal depths of the psyche and thus cannot be eliminated.

It is vital that we appreciate, as Jungians, the importance of Jung's legacy as well as the difficulties that imposes on us.

Many important followers of Freud studied the phases of psychic development around birth. Melanie Klein and others dedicated themselves to the first years of life. It is now trite to argue that those years count more than all those that follow. But the more the study of the psyche is near to birth, the less the surrounding culture counts. The nearer you are to birth, the more important becomes the 'biological machine', composed of the actions and reactions of the baby. Perhaps the thrust towards these studies is also driven by an unconscious fantasy of finding the definitive laws of the natural sciences and escaping from the disparate complexity of meddling with culture. It can be argued that it was this unconscious 'fantasy of origins' that led to the study of *Naturvölker*,⁶ which eventually crashed against the unpredictability of cultural complexity.

The role of myth and religion in the early phase of human development is decisive. It is of paramount importance to locate life within the society that enables it in the first instance. It can be argued that it is because of these considerations and not because he underestimated the role of infancy that Jung did not take a particular interest in studying the early phases of life. The tendency is to conceptualise the psycho-nursery as located outside society and history. The psycho-nursery is a specialist study and not a humanistic one. The model of the psycho-nursery is almost completely fixed. The modern problems of the psycho-nursery (e.g. drives, relationship to the breast) are almost exactly the same as they were for the Aztecs.

The growing attention to the psycho-nursery in the field of depth psychology is therefore one of the conditions that prepares the new supremacy of biology in psychiatric studies, the separation from social meaning and the triumph of individualism in everyday life. In an effort to specialise oneself and equip oneself with techniques (driven by the need to survive in a continually more competitive market for psychotherapy) even many Jungians take this direction. They do not realise that, in doing so, they neglect the richest inheritance of analytical psychology. In the often illusory hope of finding a few more patients to cure, they renounce the very vocation of healing; moreover, they also forfeit their own healing, ending up tending to patients that are seen only as immersed in a life that is focused on the uterus or the breast of the mother. They renounce our birthright, as Jungians, for a small reward; they neglect the historic responsibility of our discipline in order to carve themselves out a small but comfortable niche as a specialist. This manifests as the inadvertent repetition of individualism, which they unknowingly favour.

This is quite bitter to us because we feel that they go with the winning spirit of the time. We feel a bit more alone because we feel there is a greater distance between Jung and the neo-Jungians of the developmental school than between these and Klein, Freud and all the other forms of prevalently clinical positivist modern thought, guided by the ideal of betterment and not of completion. The courageous anachronism of Jung is, precisely, a humanism. It does not look for specialisation but the completeness and consciousness of man as a subject.

The analytical disciplines, however, do not promote individualism with these regressive and reductive tendencies. This is also for practical motives. When I began to work, in the Seventies, analysts were infinitely less numerous and legal restrictions to their activity almost did not exist. Recently, together with the increase of patients in analysis, the number of therapists has increased even more rapidly, especially those who offer the most enticing short-term therapies. This means that in the 'market' of analysis a competition has spread which did not previously exist: both because society in general has become more competitive and because the field of analysis is subjected to an exaggerated competition. The laws, the licences, the conditions imposed by the insurance companies and Medicare for the reimbursement of therapy have done the rest. They have defined the legitimacy, the deductibility, the reimbursability of therapies on technical, medical and specialist terms.

Those who offer techniques using a medical model have at their disposal a product which is easier to measure and thus a service which is easier to buy and sell. Even those who deal with cultural psychology do something very important both for the culture and the individual that is immersed in it. Yet, it is something almost without market value, especially when the recipients are no longer patients but health institutions or public health care plans. Like in television programming or in publishing houses, culture is eliminated in favour of more commercial products.

How can one explain to a ministry official or a public health care plan employee the importance of myth, justify the courses on the history of religions or of anthropology in the training programmes for psychoanalysts? But the considerations of these officials are short-term, like the duration of the budgets that they must compile. In the long run, I would argue that future generations will appreciate the importance of the relationship between psyche and myth much more than the therapeutic techniques that are privileged now. It should not be forgotten that we have grown to appreciate the immense role the unconscious myths of Fascism and Communism played in supporting such movements to get their grip on people.

Our young colleagues are first and foremost those who do not have much choice because they do not have enough work. The laws that define psychoanalysis and allow one to work are focused on prescribing therapeutic techniques. Market competition rewards the more efficient therapeutic techniques: and 'more efficient' is considered synonymous with the most rapid.

Caught in this vicious circle, reduced to specialist techniques that act on the parts of man considered defective (thus losing sight of the man as a whole and his relationship with humankind), analysis risks becoming part of the disease that it is trying to cure. While it may help some individuals, it could reinforce the very individualism that has left them isolated and riddled with symptoms – symptoms that, in fact, were less present in societies that had more supportive systems.

What Jung taught us is that once we develop a unilateral emphasis, the collective unconscious will sooner or later steer towards some form of compensation. Transference in analysis can be considered not only the expression of individual problems but also, through its continual repetition in different situations, the indication of a general need to break out of this solitude. This solitude which is endemic in the West and seems to be instrumental for the high number of suicides compared with pre-modern societies.

The loss of the sense of the collective as a background is not only the result of our new, more individualistic values. It is also the fruit of economic and technical developments which appear falsely neutral with respect to those values. The time and space in which society and history live are rendered evanescent, literally unreal.

I often hear repeated the claim by Hans Magnus Henszenberger that in the twenty-first century the truly privileged will be those with free time. It is difficult to say if this is true. Naturally the statement contains a truth. But what is free time? Is it something objective, measurable, or is it a subjective feeling? Here is a paradox of our time. On the one hand, our machines and techniques are more and more efficient and objective in their performance and this contributes to altering our very experience of time and space. On the other hand, we have feelings/sentiments coming from those experiences that are more and more subjective.

Machines, for example, compress space: we can move between two distant places as if they were close to each other. Moreover, machines also compress time. Not only fast cars, but also microwave ovens or computers are time-condensers. For this reason, those using them often are breathless, as if they were running or anxious, as if they were doing too many things at the same time and they feel that something could escape them.

Analysis, instead of trying to compete with the specialist therapies in emphasising the ideal of the short-term, thus imitating machines and compressing time, should perhaps affirm with pride one of its few particular specificities, i.e. *analysis respects time for what it is*. Analysis is the 'slow food' of psychotherapies: it cannot (and it

does not want to) speed up the time for the preparation of a finished dish. Confronted by the pressing nature of an economy and a technology that distort the circumstances of life we should stand up not only for unspoiled natural space but also time. We should include time (along with natural spaces and other resources) as a protected natural resource! In this way, analysis (a situation that has survived in which time is still respected) would be preserved, like a protected panda, to nourish itself and reproduce in its own natural habitat, within its own *cultural* reserve.

Reflecting on other activities, such as meditation, prayer, the erotic relationship (sadly not many more have been preserved) we appreciate the value of time. Time is a priceless commodity, absolutely vital for the survival of the collective and of culture.

Even if it were no longer justifiable as an investment for the single individual (for time costs money), analysis should survive for another reason. If reserves have as a goal the preservation of biodiversity, analysis could serve to conserve psychodiversity. The human, in its complexity and completeness, not divisible into parts, is today endangered by the specialist offsprings of analysis.

Undoubtedly, the specialist is more productive. However, analysis based on Jung does not have the ambition to help man become more specialized; on the contrary, it wants him more complete, attentive to the understanding of everything, not of something in particular. The humanist person that this type of analysis promotes appears to be an investment without immediate returns. However, the short-term-goals society composed only of specialists and without any humanist vision would lose what is called quality of life. This latter depends not on the number of things, but on the depth of psychic experience.

In the past, the rich owned land, buildings, and factories that lasted over time and occupied large areas of space. Today, an immense wealth can correspond to stocks and funds that are not even pieces of paper, but only immaterial memory in a computer network, numbers that are everywhere and nowhere. In the past, the value of land or factories was in proportion to how much was being produced there at that moment. Today, a company can be quoted in the stock exchange for incredible figures even if it has not yet produced a thing, and only has a project that it is not clear when and if it will be carried out. This may not yet be the death of time and space but it is at least the death of time and space as containers in which we were used to organising our economic values, in an economy that preserved the mark of its original meaning (*oikos*: house, place where life is lived).

It is significant that when we contact a friend with our mobile phone or computer, our first question is not 'How are you?' but 'Where are you?' It is true that these technologies have allowed us to stay in touch with people far away but at the cost of being much more indifferent to those nearby. Our human heart is limited: it cannot increase its attention or capacity to live keeping up with the rhythm of technology. So, with our mobile phone we express affection for our friend far away. But we do not attend much to our neighbour; we isolate ourselves from him, talking while staring into space as if he could not hear and were invisible. That neighbour to whom the Christian commandment suggests we should begin to practise our love (Zoja, 2009, ch. 1).

Recently we seem to have lost, in the depths of our soul, many Judeo-Christian values. But until recently we had not completely lost the notion of 'neighbour': somebody to whom you are close in spirit, in society, in culture. Even in the simplest sense neighbour, as that one near to you in space, evokes in us other and more complex kinds of nearness. It was assumed that they had an education, taboos,

modesty and a sense of dignity similar to our own. The very fact of their physical closeness to us activated our feelings because we took for granted that they were close to us psychologically and culturally. We avoid embarrassing them, even indirectly. In a waiting room where there are people you do not know, you do not talk about things that are too personal, or you do so in a low voice. Suddenly almost all of this is disappearing. On the mobile phone one recounts sexual encounters even on a crowded train.

Christianity reduced the Judaic values to the essential: love God above everything and therefore love your neighbour. At the end of the twentieth century, Nietzsche upset Christians by announcing that God was dead. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the symptoms of the competitive and indifferent society are announcing to post-Christians that our 'neighbour' is dying, too.

A Jungian orientation points to appreciating the dynamics of the psyche (both collective and individual) as forms of equilibrium between two poles. At the end of the Cold War the equilibrium between the opposites seemed to have been upset leaving the world unbalanced because of the lack of one of its poles: in international politics the Soviet Union balanced the United States; in terms of values, Communism opposed Capitalism. Even in psychic dynamics, as in those of fluids, empty spaces are quickly filled: in international politics Islam has offered itself as the new counterbalance. In terms of values, conservative popes have set themselves up as checks against individualistic capitalism.

But strictly speaking, from our point of view, how can we react to this unbalanced, unilateral world that cultivates individualism and competition and forgets the moral values of solidarity? Certainly not by reducing ourselves to specialists of therapeutic techniques in competition with the other, until we are wholly caught up by individualism even in our profession, allowing ourselves to be swallowed up by the whale and living in its belly while not seeing it. Certainly not with Freudo-Marxism, a couple of abstract and unbalanced opposites that proclaimed to synthesise the individual and the social sense.

The only solution that seems to offer some hope seems to be a return to a Jungian humanism – a complex thought in which man cannot be separated from the complexity of the culture in which he lives – without drawing from it specialised knowledge or techniques that Jung never thought of nor would ever have thought of.

Such an approach maintains the equilibrium between opposites because it studies and respects the collective as well as the individual psyche. Moreover, it does not stoop to compromises with the individualistic extremisms of the global, postmodern world that we are accepting too passively as a victor.

Notes

1. The fact that Jung first foresaw the cultural psychoanalytic revolution is already evident in an inspired and almost exalted letter to Freud on February 11, 1910. Going even further than Nietzsche, Jung foresaw that Dionysus could thrive again on Christian soil. Freud answered him immediately (February 13, 1910) with a dry and reductive tone: 'I don't have similar ambitions, occupy yourself with the next congress'.
2. This process repeats in general psychology what has already happened in psychiatry: psychiatry's definitions become co-authors of madness, they influence it, while, in turn, the historiography of psychiatry plays an active role in the changes of psychiatry. See Borch-Jacobsen (2002).

3. *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (1929) is the title of one of Freud's most celebrated works, always much-discussed because its title has been translated slightly differently in various languages. In Italian the title is *Il disagio della* [instead of *nella*] *civiltà* [instead of *cultural*]. In English the title is *Civilization and its discontents*.
4. See Jung's little-known text 'Adaptation, individuation and collectivity' (1916).
5. Jung was very clear about this. He wrote that: 'As the individual is not just a single, separate being, but by his very existence presupposes a collective relationship, it follows that the process of individuation must lead to more intense and broader collective relationships' (Jung, 1921, para. 758). Also, in his attempt to distinguish between individualism and individuation Jung emphasized that individualism privileges 'peculiarity rather than ... collective considerations and obligations' whereas individuation focuses specifically on a 'more complete fulfillment of the collective qualities of the human being, since adequate consideration of the peculiarity of the individual is more conducive to a better social performance than when the peculiarity is neglected or suppressed' (Jung, 1928, para. 267).
6. The German expression corresponds in English to the less politically correct 'primitive peoples'.

Notes on contributor

Luigi Zoja is a Jungian analyst. He was president of CIPA (Centro Italiano di Psicologia Analitica), and from 1998 to 2001 was president of the IAAP. Later he chaired the IAAP's International Ethics Committee. He has taught regularly at the Zurich Jung Institute and also, on occasion, at the Universities of Palermo and Insubria (between 1984 and 1993). His essays and books have appeared in 14 languages.

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