

C.G. Jung: Freud's heir or Janet's? The influence upon Jung of Janet's dissociationism

Paula A. Monahan

Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, Canada

'What Jung called "complex" was originally nothing but the equivalent of Janet's "subconscious fixed idea"', says Henri Ellenberger in his magisterial book *The discovery of the unconscious*, the work which first resurrected Pierre Janet's memory after decades of virtual oblivion. My purpose in this article will be to discuss the influence of Janet, with whom Jung studied in Paris in the winter semester of 1902–1903, upon the overall development of Jung's thought, and in particular upon his complex theory. Whilst the groundbreaking work of John Haule has gone some way to highlighting the importance of Janet's influence upon Jung, I hope to demonstrate that a further analysis of Janet's thought in the Jungian corpus gives promise of yielding many more insights into Jung's own thought, insights which might also contribute to the burgeoning research into dissociative disorders that has been taking place in recent decades.

Keywords: Janet; Jung; dissociation; complex theory; '*automatisme psychologique*'; '*abaissement du niveau mental*'

Introduction

'What Jung called "complex" was originally nothing but the equivalent of Janet's "subconscious fixed idea"', says Henri Ellenberger in the work which first resurrected Pierre Janet's memory after decades of virtual oblivion (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 406). My purpose in this article will be to demonstrate the influence of Janet, with whom Jung studied in Paris in the winter semester of 1902–1903, upon the overall development of Jung's thought, and particularly upon his theory of complexes. Whilst the groundbreaking work of John Haule (1983, 1984, 1986) has gone some way to highlighting the importance of Janet's influence upon Jung, I hope to demonstrate that an even closer analysis of Janet's thought in the Jungian corpus gives promise of yielding many more insights into Jung's own thought, insights which could also contribute greatly to the burgeoning research into dissociative disorders that has been taking place in recent decades.

Historical literature on Pierre Janet

Ellenberger places Janet's system of thought within the whole history of dynamic psychiatry, from its origins in the work of the flamboyant eighteenth-century figure of Franz Anton Mesmer, who coined the phrase 'animal magnetism', through the

*Email: paula@pmonahan.wanadoo.co.uk

long tradition of hypnotism or ‘artificial somnambulism’ stemming from Mesmer’s work. Ellenberger demonstrates that these authors were the early precursors of modern depth psychology, and with Janet, a fully-developed system, based upon the concept of dissociation, gave a solid underpinning to the claim for psychic realities distinct from normal consciousness. As Jung himself states in a number of places (Jung, 1946/1954, para. 371; 1951, para. 231; Jung et al., 1964, p. 9), Janet’s work, along with that of Freud, set modern depth psychology as a whole on a firm foundation. More specifically, Janet’s influence upon key elements of Jung’s own psychology can hardly be over-estimated. It is to the influence of Janet’s first book, *L’automatisme psychologique*, that Jung owed his characteristic way of considering the human mind as comprising a host of subpersonalities. As for the concept central to analytical psychology, we have seen that Ellenberger considered Jung’s ‘complex’ to be the direct heir of Janet’s ‘*idée fixe subconsciente*’.

The historical scholars Eugene Taylor and Sonu Shamdasani take up from Ellenberger’s historical researches and locate Jung himself within the history of depth psychology prior to its monopolization by psychoanalytic thought. Their concern is to demonstrate that the ‘Freudocentric reading of Jung’ which was virtually normative until the appearance of Ellenberger’s book ‘represents nothing less than the complete mislocation of Jung and analytical psychology in the intellectual history of the twentieth century’ (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 13). It is certainly true to the facts to maintain that ‘Jung had a history and a psychology of his own that appeared from beginning to end to be quite different from Freud’s’ (Taylor, 1996, p. 549). That history had its roots firmly within the tradition of ‘the French experimental psychology of the subconscious’, which included Alfred Binet (who coined this term for the movement in 1890; *ibid.*, p. 548), Charles Richet (a Nobel laureate in physiology as well as a pioneer in hypnotism), and of course Jean-Martin Charcot, the brilliant neurologist at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris whose lectures first inspired Freud to undertake the exploration of the unconscious. (It is no coincidence that Janet studied under Charcot and that Charcot gave him research facilities at the Salpêtrière.) Whilst the scope of this paper does not allow for a comparative study of the influence upon Jung of Freud’s psychoanalytic insights and the insights of Janet and the broader dissociationist school, respectively, it is against the background of the much more usual reading of Jung as Freud’s crown prince (albeit ultimately a rebellious one) that I set out here a counterbalancing introduction to some of the Janetian strands in Jung’s thought.

Taylor’s first field of study was the psychology of William James (Taylor, 1980, 1982/1983), and he quotes James’s famous summary of hypnotic phenomena in his 1896 Lowell Lectures: ‘the mind seems to embrace a confederation of psychic entities’ (in Taylor, 1982/1983, p. 35). In tracing the links between James and French dissociationism, Taylor went on to write of an even broader international grouping which he terms ‘the French–Swiss–English–American alliance’ (1996, p. 550). In addition to James and the Boston School of Psychotherapy, this grouping included the Swiss psychiatrists Forel, Flournoy, Meyer and Bleuler; and, in England, Myers, Sidgwick, Gurney and other members of the Society for Psychical Research. Charcot and his circle at the Salpêtrière Hospital were at the heart of this loose-knit international alliance, but there were many mutual connections worldwide among its representatives by way of personal friendships, conferences, and scholarly communications.

Most significant for our purposes is the fact that somnambulistic and hypnotic phenomena were understood within this broad community of thought in terms of a theory of co-conscious or successive states of alternative awareness, states brought about by the mechanism known as ‘splitting of consciousness’ or ‘*dissociation*’. In other words, dissociation theory was the scientifically accepted model for explaining subconscious or unconscious phenomena well before Freud and his concept of repression appeared on the scene.

We must turn to John R. Haule for the study of the specific influence of Pierre Janet upon Jung’s thought. Haule wrote three articles in which he traced the philosophical roots of dissociation psychology before sketching the development of Janet’s thought from *L’automatisme psychologique* through to his later emphasis upon mental weakness or ‘*l’abaissement du niveau mental*’ as the aetiological factor underlying dissociation, and indeed all forms of psychopathology. Haule then addresses the question of the influence of dissociation as a concept upon Jung’s thinking and traces its links with complex theory, where ‘the image guiding Jung’s thought is that of multiple, simultaneously active, subpersonalities’ (Haule, 1984, p. 254) – just that image expressed by William James as ‘a confederation of psychic entities’.

Haule goes on, however, to show how Jung’s archetypal theory not only stands within this tradition but also marks his greatest step *beyond* the dissociationism he had inherited from Janet and others. Janet’s greatest contribution in *L’automatisme psychologique* was his study of ‘*l’idée fixe subconsciente*’, a memory or thought sequence (often traumatic in origin) around which an alternative state of consciousness comes to be constructed. However, after the turn of the century, Janet’s interest turned more and more to the ‘economics’ of psychopathology, whereby ‘psychological force’ and ‘psychological tension’ – and their relative strength or weakness – were to become the ‘Archimedean point’ (ibid., p. 250) of the whole of his subsequent thought. In this perspective, it is not the *content* of the ‘*idée fixe*’ that is crucial but merely the energetic effects upon primary consciousness of these split-off psychological systems. Jung (and indeed Freud), by contrast, were to consider the actual material unearthed by psychotherapy as critical both to the aetiology and to the healing of mental disease. Freud took a different course to Jung and made of the Oedipus complex as it were a *universal* ‘*idée fixe*’. In Jung’s case, Haule explains that ‘whereas the dissociation theory of the French school described purely idiosyncratic splitting, Jung begins to argue in *Symbols of transformation* (1911) that there are typically human patterns discernible in these splits’ (Jung, 1956/1976, p. 259). These ‘typically human patterns’ were, of course, the archetypes of the collective unconscious and these primeval patterns form the core around which complexes form. The concept of the archetype is indeed a giant step beyond Janet’s insights in depth-psychological terms.

What of Jung’s own testimony to the influence of Pierre Janet? It is easy to miss introductory remarks in article after article in which Jung pays tribute to Janet’s contribution to depth psychology and to his own development before moving on to the subject in hand, but the cumulative effect is remarkable. Here is just one example among many: ‘Pierre Janet, working at the Salpêtrière, devoted himself almost exclusively and with great success to the study of psycho-pathological processes. But it is just the abnormal psychic processes which demonstrate most clearly the existence of an unconscious’ (Jung, 1918, para. 2; see also 1907/1908, para. 28; 1918, para. 2; 1928b, para. 496; 1934a, para. 1034n.; 1951, para. 231; 1963, p. 169; 1973, p. 210;

1976, p. 152; 1977, p. 39, 417; Jung et al., 1964, p. 9; Jung quoted in Shamdasani, 2003, p. 92). On his own debt to Janet, Jung says in his famous 1957 television interviews with Richard Evans: 'Freud refers very little to Pierre Janet, but I studied with Pierre Janet in Paris and he formed my ideas very much' (Jung, 1977, p. 283). As regards the concept of dissociation in particular, Jung could not be more explicit: 'We have to thank the French psychopathologists, Pierre Janet in particular, for our knowledge today of the extreme dissociability of consciousness' (1934/1948, para. 202). To say this was to say a great deal because the concept of dissociation is ubiquitous in Jung's writings; from his medical dissertation through to those parts of *Memories, dreams, reflections* from his own hand (e.g. Jung, 1902, paras. 97, 110, 117–119; 1907, para. 304; 1930/1932, para. 761; 1937/1942, paras. 253–255; 1946/1954, paras. 365–366; 1956/1976, para. 58; 1963, p. 354; 1916/1938, paras. 312–313, 323; 1917/1943, para. 156; 1957/1959, para. 544; 1971, paras. 71–72, 113, 314; Jung et al., 1964, pp. 6–7, 37, 74). This is also true of any number of distinctively 'Janetian' phrases to be found in Jung, of which '*abaissement du niveau mental*' is only the most frequent (e.g. Jung, 1907, paras. 29, 157; 1917/1943, para. 344; 1936, para. 139, 154). Other terms borrowed from Janet and scattered throughout Jung's writings include '*parties supérieures*' and '*parties inférieures*' (of consciousness) (Jung, 1916/1917, para. 569; 1948, para. 39), '*fonction du réel*' (Jung, 1907, paras. 19, 186, 195, etc.; 1936, para. 21), 'disturbance of attention' (Jung, 1902, paras. 73, 318f.; 1907, para. 12, 162); '*sentiment d'incomplétude*' (Jung, 1907, paras. 170–172), 'reduction of attention' (Jung, 1907, para. 12), '*l'idée fixe*' (Jung, 1948, para. 1145) and 'psychasthenia' (Jung, 1971, para. 631). I suggest that a rereading of any number of Jung's writings in the light of this list would reveal in a surprising fashion the extent of the presence in Jung of Janet's thought and indeed that of the whole dissociationist movement.

Clinical literature on dissociation and trauma

In addition to historical studies, Janet appears in current clinical literature on trauma and dissociation by Jungians. Richard Noll (in his pre-*Jung Cult* incarnation!) was perhaps the first to apply Jungian concepts specifically to the clinical study of the dissociative disorders. For him, 'Jung is a heretofore unrecognised pioneer in the study of dissociation. Jung's "complex theory" is one of the earliest and remains the most comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the phenomenology of multiple personality' (Noll, 1989, p. 353). Noll goes on to make the crucial point (to which I will return) that, whilst for Janet psychic dissociability is always a pathological phenomenon, 'Jung posits that the "dissociability of the psyche" is a fundamental process of the psyche that extends along the continuum from "normal" mental functioning to "abnormal mental states"' (ibid., p. 354). Noll then suggests a series of 'major points of correspondence between recent research on multiple personality and Jung's complex theory', including aetiology (i.e. traumatic events), the autonomous nature of complexes/alternate personalities, therapeutic approaches and what he sees as a striking resemblance between typical 'alters' in multiple personality disorders and the familiar figures of Jung's archetypal theory: 'the child', 'the shadow' or 'persecutor', 'the wise old man/woman' (in the form of the 'inner self helper' or 'ISH'), and so on (ibid., pp. 363–365).

Among Jungian clinicians who address the mechanism of dissociation, Donald Kalsched mentions Kugler, Fordham, Proner, Redfearn, Plaut, Salman, Savitz,

Schwartz-Salant, Skea, Curran, Early and Sidoli, in addition to his own contributions (Kalsched, 1999, p. 465). To these names must now be added those of Everest (1999), Knox (2001, 2003), and Wilkinson (2003, 2004), the last two of whom draw upon the latest developments in neuroscience and attachment theory to explore dissociative defences and the nature of memory and emotional development in both normal and traumatic contexts.

It is impossible within the scope of this article to summarize even a few of the above-mentioned authors' contributions, but of particular interest is Kalsched's creative use of archetypal theory in the field of the dissociative disorders. He demonstrates clinically the importance of the *positive* effect of dissociative defences against early trauma:

Psychoanalysis has long understood that these primitive defenses both *characterize* severe psychopathology and also (once in place) *cause* it. But rarely in our contemporary literature do these defenses get any 'credit', so to speak, for having accomplished anything in the preservation of life for the person whose heart is broken by trauma. And while everyone agrees how maladaptive these defenses are in the later life of the patient, few writers have acknowledged the miraculous nature of these defenses – their life-saving sophistication or their archetypal nature and meaning. (Kalsched, 1996, p. 2)

Dissociative splits in the literature

What is striking even from the most preliminary examination of both the historical and the clinical Jungian literature on Janet and dissociation, is the marked cleft (dare one say dissociative split?) between those who approach the question of Janet's influence upon Jung from a primarily historical point of view, and those Jungian authors concerned with the role of dissociative defence mechanisms in the clinical sphere. Of the clinical Jungian writers listed in my references, only two actually cite a work by Janet in their own reference material. Even Haule's work on Janet is cited specifically in only two cases. On the other hand, mainstream clinical literature on trauma and dissociation by such authors as Hilgard (1977), Nemiah (1989), Van der Hart (Van der Hart, Brown, & Van der Kolk, 1989; Van der Hart & Friedman, 1989; Van der Hart & Horst, 1989; Van der Hart & Brown, 1992; Van der Hart, Van der Kolk, & Boon, 1998), Putnam (1989a,b), Herman (1992/1997), Mollon (1996), Van der Kolk (Van der Kolk, Brown, & Van der Hart, 1989; Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, 1998), Nijenhuis (Nijenhuis, 1999/2004; Nijenhuis, Van der Hart, & Steele, 2004), Sinason (2002) and many others, whilst demonstrating considerable familiarity with Janet's thought, shows no awareness of the close relationship between Janetian thought and Jung's complex theory, nor of either the historical or the clinical work being done by Jungian writers on Janet and dissociation. It is this *double* cleft which, in my view, needs urgently to be addressed, in order both that the knowledge of Jung's Janetian roots may provide a lens for a deeper understanding of Jungian thought as a whole, and that Jungian insights may become more commonly known and applied in theoretical and clinical work on dissociation and trauma-related disorders. In this age which has seen an explosion in awareness of the prevalence of childhood abuse (studies have demonstrated an overwhelmingly high incidence of abuse as the aetiological factor in multiple personality disorder, now more often called dissociative identity disorder or DID; Putnam, 1989a, p. 417), as well as the high incidence of other trauma-related mental disorders as a result of war or natural disasters, one can hardly imagine a more timely moment in which to attempt to bring

the still astonishingly contemporary clinical insights of Janet to the broader Jungian world, and (perhaps more importantly) to bring the wealth of Jungian thought to the wider clinical discussion of trauma and its cognitive and psychological aftermath.

L'automatisme psychologique

It is virtually impossible to summarize briefly the closely-argued and clinically rich contents of Janet's first book, 'the definitive work in the field of dissociation psychology' (Haule, 1984, p. 246). *L'automatisme psychologique* condensed the experience of several years of clinical observation of severe hysterical cases at the hospital in Le Havre where Janet was working as a teacher of philosophy at the city's *lycée*. Remarkably, this book was written before Janet had even commenced his medical studies, yet it laid the foundations for his vast psychological synthesis of later years. In particular, it summarized his insights concerning dissociation as the mechanism by which pathological 'subconscious' phenomena could be explained.

Janet first makes a very important correction to the common conception of '*automatismes psychologiques*'. The term refers to reasonably complex and intelligent actions which, to all appearances, are the result of conscious volition and judgment, but which are not in fact the actions of normal conscious awareness. Whereas for other French psychologists of the time, psychological automatism were the products of a sort of human automaton devoid of all consciousness, Janet argued cogently that these were psychological phenomena in their own right and entailed at least 'a rudimentary form of consciousness' (Janet, 1889, p. 71). This is crucial because it meant that such actions, as illustrated for instance by the typical paralyses of acute hysteria or the behaviour of someone acting out a post-hypnotic suggestion, had *some* basis beyond the sheerly physiological which called for explanation. But if not the products of full conscious awareness, what *was* their psychic source? For Janet, the only logical answer was to posit a form of consciousness midway, as it were, between pure physiological reaction and fully conscious reasoning and volition:

It is precisely a consciousness of this sort, purely affective, reduced to sensations and to images, with none of those links, those ideas of relationship which constitute personality and judgement, that we believe it is legitimate to presuppose in catalepsy and analogous states. Neither total absence of consciousness and pure biological working [*mécanisme*], nor conscious awareness capable of comprehension and obedience seem to us likely here; on the contrary, it is a question of a particular form of consciousness intermediate between these two extremes. (Ibid., p. 79; this and subsequent translations my own)

Post-hypnotic suggestion was a particularly fascinating phenomenon and perhaps the most conclusive 'proof' of Janet's conclusion that, if truly 'psychological' phenomena did not emanate from ordinary consciousness, there must be some manner of '*subconscious*' psychological awareness to account for such behaviour. How else could a person hypnotized and instructed to carry out certain actions after being woken from the hypnotic state, possibly 'remember' to carry out the given instructions? The information had to be stored *somewhere* in the person's psyche and yet Janet and all the early magnetizers and hypnotists agreed that a hypnotized person was absolutely unable to recall what had happened whilst under hypnosis once roused from that 'somnambulistic' state. Instructions given under hypnosis would be duly carried out (even days later) without the previously hypnotized subject having any idea as to why he or she felt impelled to perform the action in question. Again, where was the memory of the order lodged until the action could be carried out at the

time prescribed, and why was it absent from normal consciousness? The answer, Janet reasoned, was that there was *another* area of consciousness outside and apart from normal waking consciousness, and for which waking consciousness was amnesic (*ibid.*, pp. 209–210).

These extraordinary ‘splits’ (*scissions*) between normal conscious behaviour and actions of which the person’s normal consciousness had neither awareness at the time nor any recollection afterwards, were the sort of clinical phenomena which led Janet to focus upon the concept of ‘dissociation’: ‘the exaggerated development of an idea, of a feeling, of a psychological state, in a word, of a system of thoughts, which takes place outside the memory and the normal consciousness’ (Janet, 1907, p. 318). The manifestation of ‘dissociated states’ could be fairly rudimentary and involve only one particular aspect of the person’s life or behaviour (as for instance some compulsive activity that interferes with normal life but does not take it over entirely), or it could develop to such an extent that the person alternated between completely different personalities:

Somnambulisms [i.e. dissociated states] are existences ... having their own particular memory and personality: their essential character is to be an abnormal psychological state which does not constitute the whole of the life of the individual, and to alternate with other states and other memories which are unable to retain the memory of them. (*ibid.*, p. 175)

We have seen that Janet saw dissociation as a fundamentally *pathological* mental phenomenon, and this view of matters was probably reinforced not only by the fact that the whole of his medical career was spent dealing with acute mental disorder, but also by his observation that there was often a connection between such cases and events of a traumatic nature in the patient’s past. Although (unlike the early Freud) Janet was never willing to see trauma as the *sole* cause of hysterical illness, many of the clinical cases with which he dealt did reveal a traumatic origin. It is in this context that Janet highlighted the role of ‘*l’idée fixe subconsciente*’. Probably the most striking case in this regard was that of Marie, a young woman of 19 who had been brought to the hospital at Le Havre as a mental patient. She had long periods of convulsive attacks with delirium and it was observed that her worst attacks tended to coincide with her monthly periods. She had also lost the sight in her left eye and all feeling on that side of her face at age 6. On conducting one of his scrupulous ‘*analyses psychologiques*’ (very detailed case histories), including sessions under hypnosis, Janet uncovered two important incidents from Marie’s childhood. One was the fact that, at the age of 6, she had been obliged to sleep next to a child who was suffering from a severe and unsightly infection to the whole left side of her face. More striking still was Marie’s revelation that (owing to her notion that menstruation was shameful), when her first period arrived at the age of 13, she had attempted to stop the flow by means of immersing herself in a tub of freezing-cold water – a method that succeeded but was followed by violent shivering and a delirium lasting for days. It was not difficult for Janet to surmise that Marie’s blindness and facial anaesthesia were connected to the incident of sleeping next to the child with the eye infection, and that her extreme convulsions and delirium were nothing but a dramatic re-enactment of the incident at age 13 when she had taken such drastic measures to stop her menstrual flow. An important fact was that Janet had been able to extract the two stories about Marie’s childhood only under hypnosis: in her normal waking state she was completely amnesic for these events. Yet around these two incidents, which had

lodged in her subconscious psyche, were constellated a whole host of extreme somatic symptoms and behaviours for which no physical explanation could be found. In other words, these '*idées fixes*' were the core or 'centre' around which the split-off part of the personality formed. Most extraordinary of all, Janet found that once these traumatic memories had been recovered and as it were lived through again, the patient's symptoms disappeared and never recurred. Marie's was the second of two notable cures by 'catharsis' published by Janet (1889, pp. 436–440) some years previous to Breuer and Freud's *Studies on hysteria* (1895).

To summarize, we have seen that the 'fixed idea', the dissociated part of the personality, can vary from simple, rudimentary forms right through to the extreme of what became known as multiple personality states. Allowing for varying degrees of pathology, Janet's concept unifies all of the following historical and modern terms: mesmeric states, somnambulisms (spontaneous or artificial), hypnotic states, dissociated states, doubling of personality, split personality, subconscious states, multiple personality states or 'alters', trance state, co-consciousness, and alternative states of consciousness.

For Janet, the pathological mechanism of dissociation lies at the very heart of an understanding of neurotic pathology:

We have concluded that certain illnesses termed neurotic 'merit just as much to be named psychological illnesses', and that the phenomena of division of the personality, whether successive or simultaneous, constitute precisely an essential symptom of these mental maladies. (Janet, 1889, pp. 28–29)

In his 1909 work, *Les névroses*, which is a summary of the whole of his thought to that date, Janet goes even further and makes dissociation the distinguishing mark of *all* mental disease:

Just as synthesis and association are the great characteristics of all normal psychological operations, so dissociation is the essential characteristic of all the mental maladies. Dissociation exists in all of them and one could say that in states of dementia [here Janet would include schizophrenia, still termed 'dementia praecox' at that time], one finds oneself in the presence of a chaotic dust-heap of ideas, habits, instincts, in place of constructions now fallen into the most complete ruin. To say that dissociation of functions exists in hysteria is simply to repeat yet again that this neurosis belongs in the large group of the mental maladies. (Janet, 1909, p. 343)

Janet and Jung: convergences

'*Idée fixe*' and complex

I suggest that it would be difficult for anyone with a reasonable acquaintance with Jung's works *not* to notice the striking similarities between Janet's formulations concerning '*l'idée fixe*' and Jung's concept of the complex. Here is a definition of Janet's '*idée fixe*' proposed by two contemporary clinicians in the field of dissociation:

Fixed ideas (*idées fixes*) are thoughts or mental images which take on exaggerated proportions, have a high emotional charge, and, in hysterical patients, become isolated from the habitual personality, or personal consciousness... When dominating consciousness, they serve as the basis for behavior. These ideas also manifest themselves in what we now term flashbacks or intrusive thoughts. Janet considered them dissociative phenomena. (Van der Hart and Friedman, 1989, p. 14)

Let us compare this with one of Jung's own definitions of the complex:

What then, scientifically speaking, is a 'feeling-toned complex'? It is the *image* of a certain psychic situation which is strongly accentuated emotionally and is, moreover, incompatible with the habitual attitude of consciousness. This image has a powerful inner coherence, it has its own wholeness and, in addition, a relatively high degree of autonomy, so that it is subject to the control of the conscious mind to only a limited extent, and there behaves like an animated foreign body in the sphere of consciousness. (Jung, 1934/1948, para. 201)

The similarities are glaring: high affective charge, inner coherence, isolation from habitual consciousness, interference with that consciousness, autonomy.

'Synthèse' and individuation: obstacles to the goal

Yet one cannot discuss dissociation or 'splitting' of the personality meaningfully without a prior notion of unity, and the concept of '*synthèse*' is absolutely central to Janet's whole psychological system. Indeed, in the case of the neuroses, it is not that the various mental functions are impaired in and of themselves (as in some cases of severe psychosis), but that they are not all appropriated by a single directing centre in order to make for one fully integrated personality:

In what does hysterical dissociation consist essentially, seeing that the system that constitutes the function is not destroyed? It concerns uniquely the combination [*réunion*] of these functions into a network, a synthesis that has for its effect the constitution of the personality. (ibid., p. 344)

As Janet says in one of his 1907 Harvard lectures: '[Hysteria] is a malady of the *personal synthesis*' (Janet, 1907, p. 332). For Janet, the goal of human mental development – and the mark of psychic normality – is unity, synthesis: 'The tendency to synthesis and personality remain the general characteristics of psychological phenomena' (Janet, 1889, p. 19). It is precisely a weakness in the psyche's function of synthesis which leads to dissociated states, and although many circumstances can result in such a weakening in otherwise normal individuals (fatigue, illness, intoxication, strong emotional states), for Janet it is above all where there exists a prior disposition to mental disease that serious, and sometimes permanent, clefts of personality occur.

'According to the more recent formulations of Janet', says Jung in *On the psychology of dementia praecox*, 'dissociation is the result of the *abaissement du niveau mental*' (Jung, 1907, para. 55). Although Janet does not use this term in *L'automatisme psychologique*, '*abaissement*' is just that 'lowering' or 'depression' of the mind's *powers of synthesis* which lies behind Janet's notion of dissociation from the outset. '*Abaissement*' is linked to Janet's later notions of 'psychological force' and 'psychological tension' (all three terms were introduced in his 1903 book, *Les obsessions et la psychasthénie*), and an absence of psychological tension refers to the defective capacity for psychic synthesis that leads to dissociation and the consequent 'emancipation' of parts of the personality. Every time that Jung employs the term '*abaissement*', then, he is conjuring up the very essence of Janet's psychological system, based as it is upon the concept of pathological dissociation, or conversely, upon mental health seen as complete psychic integration. We need only think of Jung's fundamental understanding of the goal of analysis as a healing of

dissociations, the bringing together of consciousness and unconsciousness in the interests of wholeness: ‘In all cases of dissociation it is . . . necessary to integrate the unconscious into consciousness. This is a synthetic process which I have termed the “individuation process”’ (1934/1954, para. 83).

‘Synthèse’ and individuation: the ever-receding goal

So far, this is to compare Janet and Jung as regards the invidious results of the fragmentation of human personality, but there are also interesting parallels as to the positive goal: a fully integrated individual, living to the limits of his or her capacities. Jung’s notion of the unity of the personality was, of course, summed up in his concept of the Self. Salman makes the interesting point that Jung may originally have postulated the Self, as archetype of human wholeness, ‘in direct relation to pre-individuation dynamics: as a counterpole to the dissociation theory . . . The Self provides an image of order within the seemingly chaotic world of dissociation’ (Salman, 1999, p. 71). This powerful archetypal image has no counterpart in Janet’s thought, and a number of writers have underlined the acute personal relevance of psychic fragmentation for Jung given the ‘personal equation’ factor of Jung’s own conflicted psyche – the more reason that Jung should be the one impelled towards the intuition of this powerful symbol of psychic wholeness.

Nevertheless, Janet and Jung are in agreement on one point: the ideal of human integration is just that, an *ideal* to be worked towards, but an ever-receding horizon. ‘Unity and systemisation seem to us to be the end-term and not the starting-point of thought’, says Janet in his introduction to *L’automatisme psychologique* (Janet, 1889, p. 35). In a similar vein, Jung can write: ‘The achievement of personality means nothing less than the optimum development of the whole individual human being . . . [But] personality, as the complete realization of our whole being, is an unattainable ideal’ (Jung, 1934b, paras. 289, 291). For Janet too, *personality* was the ultimate human ideal and it was precisely the *im*-personal (or sub-personal) aspect of automatic behaviour that was for Janet the prime indication of its essentially pathological nature.

Idée fixe, complex, and trauma

We have yet to speak of another very significant point of contact between Janet’s ‘*idée fixe*’ and Jung’s complex, and that is the question of their traumatic aetiology. When Janet speaks of ‘strong emotional states’ (*émotions véhémentes*) as a source of dissociation, he is using the phrase in an almost technical sense – in the same way that Jung will use the term ‘shock’ to indicate affect arising from traumatic experiences. I have mentioned that Janet did not accept trauma as the inevitable explanation in all cases of hysterical dissociation, and Jung also refused to accept a traumatic aetiology for every complex: ‘In by far the greater number of ordinary cases there is no question of a traumatic aetiology’ (1921/1928, para. 256). Nevertheless, and in the context of the multitude of cases of shell shock arising from the battlefields of the Great War, Jung goes on to say:

Now, if we set aside the numerous cases of war neurosis where a trauma – a violent shock – impinged upon an established neurotic history, there still remain not a few cases where no neurotic disposition can be established, or where it is so insignificant that the neurosis could hardly have arisen without a trauma. Here the trauma is more than an agent of

release, it is causative in the sense of a *causa efficiens*, especially when we include, as an essential factor, the unique psychic atmosphere of the battlefield. (ibid., para. 261)

Even more crucially, in this paper entitled ‘The therapeutic value of abreaction’, Jung is making reference to an article by William McDougall (another early psychologist steeped in dissociationism) in which McDougall has pointed out that abreaction has been quite useless in a large number of cases of war neurosis. Jung declares:

McDougall ... has laid his finger on the right spot when he argues that the essential factor is the dissociation of the psyche and not the existence of a highly charged affect and, consequently, that the main therapeutic problem is not abreaction but how to integrate the dissociation. This argument advances our discussion and entirely agrees with our experience that a traumatic complex brings about dissociation of the psyche. (ibid., para. 266)

If, in the majority of ‘ordinary cases’, the cause of a complex need not be sought for in severe trauma, in later writings Jung seems to feel on balance that ‘complexes are psychic fragments which have split off owing to traumatic influences or [at least] certain incompatible tendencies’ (Jung, 1937/1942, para. 253). Janet was also forced by his experience of pathological dissociation to acknowledge the frequent traumatic background to the formation of ‘*idees fixes subconscientes*’, as seen so clearly in the case of Marie.

Naturally, it is Janet’s exposition of clear-cut cases of traumatic dissociation that are of most interest to modern clinicians dealing with PTSD and severe dissociative disorders. For them, Janet is a unique pioneer and, so far as it goes, the following passage from three such clinicians is an excellent summary of Janet’s position in *L’automatisme psychologique*:

[Janet’s] basic argument was that when a person experiences emotions which overwhelm his capacity to take appropriate action, the memory of this traumatic experience cannot be properly digested: it is split off from consciousness and dissociated, to return later as fragmentary reliving of the trauma, as emotional conditions, somatic states, visual images, or behavioral reenactment. Janet was the first to identify dissociation as the crucial psychological mechanism involved in the genesis of a wide variety of post traumatic symptoms. (Van der Kolk et al., 1989, p. 365)

Janet and Jung: divergences

We must look briefly now at some of the important ways in which Jung diverged from, indeed developed beyond, the insights of Janet. These divergences become much more evident from the perspective of Janet’s later work: of 18 major works and countless articles published by Janet up to his death in 1947, Jung cites only five of the earliest books and two articles, the latest references being to *Les névroses* of 1909. Even so, what is probably the most significant divergence of all relates to Janet’s position as early as *L’automatisme psychologique* on the pathological nature of dissociation.

Dissociation: normal or pathological?

Janet’s view of dissociation as inherently pathological was at odds even with a number of his dissociationist contemporaries. For instance, the heart of the divide between the Salpêtrière School and representatives of the Nancy School, notably

Bernheim, was the latter's claim that hypnosis was not a pathological condition found only in hysterics but the effect of 'suggestion', suggestibility being present to some degree in every human being (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 87). Janet is willing to accept that there may be types of 'suggestibility' which apply to normal individuals, but he feels that the term should be reserved for those cases where, in his view, a true (and therefore pathological) dissociation of personality is the underlying cause.

In contrast to Janet, Jung is in no doubt that 'the dissociability of the psyche' is a fundamentally normal and universal phenomenon, just as complexes are a normal and universal phenomenon: 'there is no one who has no complexes, just as there is no one without emotions' (Jung, 1905, para. 736). Jung is fully aware of the potentially disastrous psychological consequences of extreme dissociations, but in the whole approach of complex psychology, 'dissociation is . . . the rule, not the exception, in the life of the psyche' (Noll, 1989, p. 356). Whilst it *can* lead to extreme pathology, dissociation is not only a natural psychic phenomenon but actually 'fundamental to the operation of the psyche as a whole' (ibid., p. 354). In Jung's own words:

Let us turn first to the question of the psyche's tendency to split. Although this peculiarity is most clearly observable in psychopathology, fundamentally it is a normal phenomenon . . . It need not be a question of hysterical multiple personality, or schizophrenic alterations of personality, but merely of so-called 'complexes' that come entirely within the scope of the normal. (Jung, 1937/1942, para. 253)

In treating dissociation as a normal function of the human psyche, Jung is in accord not only with many of Janet's contemporaries but also with the consensus view of modern theorists on dissociation. By envisaging dissociability as a continuum extending from normal to seriously abnormal states, Jung anticipates Frank Putnam (a pioneer in the modern study of dissociative disorders), who speaks of a 'dissociative continuum' extending from such everyday occurrences as daydreaming, 'spacing out' or being 'entranced' by books or films to psychiatric disorders such as dissociative fugue, psychogenic amnesia and multiple personality disorder (now DID) (Putnam, 1989a, pp. 415–416).

Idiosyncratic splitting or archetypal pattern?

We have noted that Jung sees dissociation itself as a process conducive to the ultimate goal of psychic unity. But what *sort* of unity? This is a very important question from both the theoretical and the clinical points of view, and it draws together the remaining key divergences and developments in Jung's understanding of dissociation *vis-à-vis* Janet. We have discussed Haule's highlighting of the momentous step taken by Jung when, following on from his grasp of the complex as a normal phenomenon, he intuited that these psychic fragmentations were not wholly arbitrary and chaotic events but had a logic, an *archetypal* logic. Whilst Janet had made the signal discovery that psychological automatisms, however apparently meaningless and bizarre, actually formed themselves around a coherent and meaningful '*idée fixe*', he did not (and perhaps could not) take this insight further and see that this core might be even more meaningful and therapeutically relevant than if viewed merely as the residue of some unfortunate event which had better never have occurred – or rather that, even *within* a painful and traumatic scenario was nevertheless contained a deeper meaning which carried in itself a healing purpose. It fell to Jung to make this immensely consequential leap forward and, as Jungian clinicians such as Kalsched

have seen with such clarity, archetypal theory has many implications in the field of pathology as well as for the individuation process of the ‘normal’ psyche or at least ‘good-enough’ neurotic personality.

Fusion or individuation?

As to the *nature* of the ultimate goal – be it termed ‘*synthèse*’, ‘wholeness’, ‘individuation’ or simply mental health – is there also development in Jung *vis-à-vis* Janet’s conception of psychic unity, with its notion of any kind of consciousness alongside normal (‘ego’) consciousness as inherently pathological? Among the ‘major points of correspondence’ between Jungian complex theory and modern research into multiple personality listed by Noll, he mentions that of ‘healing through the assimilation of complexes/the fusion of alternate personalities’ (1989, p. 362). ‘Fusion’, that is, the development of personality unification by means of the gradual abolition of alter personalities (a procedure developed by Richard Kluft, another modern pioneer in the study of dissociative disorders; *ibid.*, pp. 362–363), is here identified by Noll with Jung’s notion of complex ‘assimilation’. Fusion is a therapeutic concept that would likely resonate with Janet, who defined his cures in terms of the ultimate *disappearance* of the alternate personalities. I wonder, however, if Jung would be entirely happy with Noll’s comparison. Is ‘unity’ in the Jungian vision a monolithic state in which every facet of the psyche is under the tight rein of a single, all-powerful CEO, so to say? Or is it truer both to Jung’s thought and to his own experience to think of psychic wholeness more in terms of a ‘democracy’ of inner voices, held together in some coherent manner to be sure, but each given its place and its say? Jung’s could be a vision that might speak to the dissociative patient in profoundly healing and constructive ways, and indeed it is common for DID patients to feel immense anxiety at the prospect of the ‘death’ of their various alters, who after all have served a crucial purpose often in the patient’s very psychic survival. In this regard, these words of Jung can sound almost prophetic:

If the unconscious figures are not acknowledged as spontaneous agents, we become victims of a one-sided belief in the power of consciousness, leading finally to acute tension. A catastrophe is then bound to happen because, for all our consciousness, the dark powers of the psyche have been overlooked. *It is not we who personify them; they have a personal nature from the very beginning.* Only when this is thoroughly recognized can we think of depersonalizing them. (Jung, 1929/1958, para. 62, emphasis added)

For Janet, dissociated personality states militate *against* that single unified personality which can enter into healthy social dealings, including healthy relationships, only once ‘normal’ synthesis has been achieved. For Jung, by contrast, personification and the archetypal complexes are precisely in the *service* of relationships, both interpersonal and intrapersonal.

Conclusion

What, then, is the answer to the question posed in the title of this article: is Jung Freud’s heir or Janet’s? He is *both*, surely. But it is equally true that Jung came to both Janet and Freud with ideas and attitudes of his own and, as any heir worthy of the name, he did not allow his heritage to stagnate but breathed new life into it and took it forward into the future as a dynamic and developing investment.

As for my overall aim, to show how a knowledge of Janet can provide a lens for deeper insight into Jung's own thought, I hope that I have demonstrated that this is so in regard to Jung's direct indebtedness to Janet: above all for the foundational concept of dissociation, central both to Janet's '*idée fixe*' and Jung's 'complex'; for Janet's notion of psychic synthesis and its loss through '*abaissement du niveau mental*'; and for Janet's immensely rich clinical experience of the frequently traumatic source of dissociative pathology. I hope also to have given some indication of how Janet's thought can act as a useful foil in understanding better Jung's own emphases: in regard to the essential normality of dissociative processes and their teleological function; in Jung's momentous intuition of the archetypal nature of personified complexes; and in his notion of psychic wholeness as inner democracy rather than ego-totalitarianism.

As to the potential for Jungian thought, with its strong Janetian roots, to provide important theoretical and clinical contributions to the mainstream of today's burgeoning research into trauma and dissociation, my remarks could only take the form of an all-too-brief acknowledgement of the contributions already made by Jungians in this area and a few very sketchy hints as to how Jungian concepts might provide an even richer resource in the future.

Again, there may be valuable contributions to be made to such current debates as those surrounding 'false-memory syndrome' and claims of a solely iatrogenic origin for the dissociative disorders if it is more widely known that these are not new but very old debates, already being grappled with a hundred years ago by Janet and his contemporaries, by Jung, and indeed by the earliest magnetizers. In all of these areas, and more, a closer study of Janet, and of Jung's Janetian roots, gives promise of much illumination.

Notes on contributor

Paula Monahan has an MA from the Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies, University of Essex, England, where her dissertation topic was on the influence of the early French psychologist Pierre Janet's thought upon Jung's complex theory. She went on to PhD studies at the CPS, continuing the same research topic, but has recently returned to her native Canada and intends to complete her doctoral dissertation at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto where she is currently enrolled. She is also working on an English translation of Janet's first book, *L'automatisme psychologique*, his definitive work on the subject of dissociation.

References

- Breuer, J. & Freud, S. (1895). *Studies on hysteria* (J. Strachey, Trans. and Ed., vol. 3.) London: Penguin, 1974.
- Crabtree, A. (1993). *From Mesmer to Freud: Magnetic sleep and the roots of psychological healing*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Ellenberger, H. (1970). *The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry*. New York: Basic Books.
- Everest, P. (1999). The multiple self: Working with dissociation and trauma. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 44, 443–463.
- Haule, J.R. (1983). Archetype and integration: Exploring the Janetian roots of analytical psychology. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 28, 253–267.
- Haule, J.R. (1984). From somnambulism to the archetypes: The French roots of Jung's split with Freud. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 71(4), 635–659.
- Haule, J.R. (1986). Pierre Janet and dissociation: The first transference theory and its origins in hypnosis. *American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis*, 29(2), 86–94.

- Herman, J. (1992/1997). *Trauma and recovery*. London: Pandora.
- Hilgard, E.R. (1977). *Divided consciousness: Multiple controls in human thought and action*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Janet, P. (1889). *L'automatisme psychologique: Essai de psychologie expérimentale sur les formes inférieures de l'activité humaine* (4th ed.). Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1989/1998.
- Janet, P. (1907). *The major symptoms of hysteria (fifteen lectures given in the Medical School of Harvard University)*. New York: Macmillan.
- Janet, P. (1909). *Les névroses*. Paris: Ernest Flammarion (1936 printing).
- Jung, C.G. (1902). On the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena. In *Collected works*, vol. 1, *Psychiatric studies* (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Jung, C.G. (1905). *The psychological diagnosis of evidence*. In *Collected works*, vol. 2, *Experimental researches* (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Jung, C.G. (1907). The psychology of dementia praecox. In *Collected works*, vol. 3, *The psychogenesis of mental disease*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Jung, C.G. (1907/1908). The Freudian theory of hysteria. In *Collected works*, vol. 4, *Freud and psychoanalysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961/1970.
- Jung, C.G. (1916/1917). Psychoanalysis and neurosis. In *Collected works*, vol. 4, *Freud and psychoanalysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961/1970.
- Jung, C.G. (1916/1938). The relations between the ego and the unconscious. In *Collected works*, vol. 7, *Two essays on analytical psychology* (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Jung, C.G. (1917/1943). On the psychology of the unconscious. In *Collected works*, vol. 7, *Two essays on analytical psychology* (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Jung, C.G. (1918). The role of the unconscious. In *Collected works*, vol. 10, *Civilization in transition*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1964.
- Jung, C.G. (1921/1928). The therapeutic value of abreaction. In *Collected works*, vol. 16, *The practice of psychotherapy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Jung, C.G. (1928a). On psychic energy. In *Collected works*, vol. 8, *The structure and dynamics of the psyche*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1960.
- Jung, C.G. (1928b). Mental disease and the psyche. In *Collected works*, vol. 3, *The psychogenesis of mental disease*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960/1972.
- Jung, C.G. (1929/1958). Commentary on 'The Secret of the Golden Flower'. In *Collected works*, vol. 13, *Alchemical studies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Jung, C.G. (1930/1932). Introduction to Kranefeldts 'Secret Ways of the Mind'. In *Collected works*, vol. 4, *Freud and psychoanalysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961/1970.
- Jung, C.G. (1934a). A rejoinder to Dr Bally. In *Collected works*, vol. 10, *Civilization in transition*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1960.
- Jung, C.G. (1934b). The development of personality. In *Collected works*, vol. 17, *The development of personality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954/1964.
- Jung, C.G. (1934/1948). A review of the complex theory. In *Collected works*, vol. 8, *The structure and dynamics of the psyche*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1960.
- Jung, C.G. (1934/1954). Archetypes of the collective unconscious. In *Collected works*, vol. 9i, *The archetypes and the collective unconscious* (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Jung, C.G. (1936). The Tavistock lectures. In *Collected works*, vol. 18, *The symbolic life*. London: Routledge, 1977.
- Jung, C.G. (1937/1942). Psychological factors in human behaviour. In *Collected works*, vol. 8, *The structure and dynamics of the psyche*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1960.
- Jung, C.G. (1946/1954). On the nature of the psyche. In *Collected works*, vol. 8, *The structure and dynamics of the psyche*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1960.
- Jung, C.G. (1948). Depth psychology. In *Collected works*, vol. 18, *The symbolic life*. London: Routledge, 1977.
- Jung, C.G. (1951). Fundamental questions of psychotherapy. In *Collected works*, vol. 16, *The practice of psychotherapy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Jung, C.G. (1956/1976). *Symbols of transformation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Jung, C.G. (1957/1959). Recent thoughts on schizophrenia. In *Collected works*, vol. 3, *The psychogenesis of mental disease*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Jung, C.G. (1963). *Memories, dreams, reflections*. London: Fontana Press.
- Jung, C.G. (1971). *Psychological types*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jung, C.G. (1973). *C. G. Jung letters*, vol. 1 (G. Adler & A. Jaffé, Eds.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Jung, C.G. (1976). *C. G. Jung letters*, vol. 2 (G. Adler & A. Jaffé, Eds.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Jung, C.G. (1977). *C. G. Jung speaking* (W. McGuire & R.F.C. Hull, Eds.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jung, C.G., von Franz, M.-L., Henderson, J.L., Jacobi, J., & Jaffé, A. (1964). *Man and his symbols*. New York: Dell.
- Kalsched, D. (1996). *The inner world of trauma: Archetypal defenses of the personal spirit*. London: Routledge.
- Kalsched, D. (1999). Response to 'The multiple self: Working with dissociation and trauma'. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 44, 465–474.
- Knox, J.M. (2001). Memories, fantasies, archetypes: An exploration of some connections between cognitive science and analytical psychology. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 46, 613–635.
- Knox, J.M. (2003). *Archetype, attachment, analysis: Jungian psychology and the emergent mind*. Hove: Brunner-Routledge.
- Mollon, P. (1996). *Multiple selves, multiple voices*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Nemiah, J. C. (1989). Janet redivivus: The centenary of *L'automatisme psychologique*. *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, 146(12), 1527–1529.
- Nijenhuis, E. (1999/2004). *Somatiform dissociation: Phenomena, measurement, and theoretical issues*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Nijenhuis, E., Van der Hart, O., & Steele, K. (2004). Trauma-related structural dissociation of the personality. Trauma Information Pages. Retrieved December 31, 2004 from <http://www.trauma-pages.vanderk.htm>.
- Noll, R. (1989). Multiple personality, dissociation, and C. G. Jung's complex theory. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 34, 353–370.
- Putnam, F.W. (1989a). Pierre Janet and modern views of dissociation. *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, 2(4), 413–429.
- Putnam, F.W. (1989b). *Diagnosis and treatment of multiple personality disorder*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Salman, S. (1999). Dissociation and the Self in the magical pre-Oedipal field. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 44, 69–85.
- Shamdasani, S. (2003). *Jung and the making of modern psychology: The dream of a science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sinason, V. (2002). *Attachment, trauma and multiplicity*. Hove: Brunner-Routledge.
- Taylor, E. (1980). William James and C. G. Jung. In R. K. Papadopoulos (Ed.), *Carl Gustav Jung: Critical assessments*, vol. 1. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Taylor, E. (1982/1983). *William James on exceptional mental states: The 1896 Lowell lectures*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Taylor, E. (1996). The new Jung scholarship. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 83, 547–568.
- Van der Hart, O. & Brown, P. (1992). Abreaction re-evaluated. Retrieved December 31, 2004 from <http://www.trauma-pages.com/vdhart-92.htm>. [Originally published in *Dissociation*, 5(3), 127–140.]
- Van der Hart, O., Brown, P., & Van der Kolk, B. (1989). Pierre Janet's treatment of post-traumatic stress. *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, 2(4), 379–395.
- Van der Hart, O. & Friedman, B. (1989). A reader's guide to Pierre Janet: A neglected intellectual heritage. Retrieved November 17, 2004 from <http://www.trauma-pages.com/vdhart-89.htm>. [Originally published in *Dissociation*, 2(1), 3–16.]
- Van der Hart, O., & Horst, R. (1989). The dissociation theory of Pierre Janet. *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, 2(4), 397–412.
- Van der Hart, O., Van der Kolk, B., & Boon, S. (1998). Treatment of dissociative disorders. In J.D. Bremner, & C.R. Marmar (Eds.), *Trauma, memory, and dissociation*. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press.

- Van der Kolk, B., Brown, P., & Van der Hart, O. (1989). Pierre Janet on post-traumatic stress. *Journal of Traumatic Stress, 2*(4), 365–378.
- Van der Kolk, B., & Van der Hart, O. (1989). Pierre Janet and the breakdown of adaptation in psychological trauma. *American Journal of Psychiatry, 146*(12), 1530–1540.
- Wilkinson, M. (2003). Undoing trauma: Contemporary neuroscience. A Jungian clinical perspective. *Journal of Analytical Psychology, 48*, 235–253.
- Wilkinson, M. (2004). The mind-brain relationship: The emergent self. *Journal of Analytical Psychology, 49*, 83–101.

Copyright of International Journal of Jungian Studies is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.