



Book reviews

Edited by Marcus West

DOURLEY, JOHN P. *Paul Tillich, Carl Jung, and the Recovery of Religion*. London & New York: Routledge, 2008. Pp. vii+208. Hbk. £55.00; Pbk. £21.99.

Tillich and Jung, though acquainted with each other's work, never met or corresponded, and this non-meeting has left us the tantalizing possibility of what might have emerged in the thought of each had they been in dialogue. Jung wrote in 1956: 'I have always wished to make the acquaintance of Professor Tillich, but I have never found an opportunity' (Adler 1976, p. 323), and Tillich read an important brief essay at the Memorial Meeting of the New York Analytical Psychology Club, convened in 1961, to mark Jung's death. They were near-contemporaries with shared roots in the German protestant tradition, and in many ways, Tillich might have been a more compatible and more deeply challenging sparring-partner than Fr. Victor White for Jung's development of his ideas about psychology and Christian religion.

John Dourley is both a Tillich scholar and an analytical psychologist whose work will be familiar to readers of this Journal and who has already published extensively on the comparative thought of Tillich and Jung. This book consists of eleven papers, most of which have already been published in theological journals and compilations to which few Jungian analysts will have had ready access, topped and tailed with a succinct Preface and Afterword highlighting Tillich's and Jung's common interest in providing an approach to religion which might make it possible for contemporary mankind to do justice to its religious instincts. The author, writing from his perspective as a Catholic priest and Jungian analyst, regards this as an urgent necessity at a time when 'the greatest current threat to the species is religious conviction, faith, in religious or political form' (p. vii). The book might bear the subtitle of 'How to save the religious baby while throwing out the ecclesiastical bath-water', the baby being man's essential religious nature and the bath-water being the poisonous stagnation of much contemporary institutional religion.

This work is, however, no polemic, but a series of scholarly and often densely argued papers. The author summarizes the potential interface on religion between Jung and Tillich – a guess at the dialogue that never happened:

Had Tillich pursued a Jungian perspective... he might have been able to see the Christ figure as a still reigning culture hero, but one expression of the communal self among many. Such a possibility might have forced Tillich to dwell on Jung's contention that the symbol of Christ, though historically valuable, is currently being corroded by the unconscious urgency toward a symbol of the self which would embrace a greater totality of opposites. Such an unconscious imperative would demand an image of the self more inclusive than that of the Christ image which has no apparent positive relation to the demonic, the feminine or the bodily instinctual. From this perspective, Jung might confront a broader minded later Tillich with Tillich's own repeated proposition that symbols grow and die and ask him if he could envision

such a fate for the Christian symbol as it sought to supersede its current state and incorporate elements more inclusive of humanity's matrix in a humanity that then enabled it to give divine status to more of what it is.

(pp. 44–5)

Dourley returns frequently to a concept of God and man involved in a mutual process of redemption, in which both God and man have a developmental task to pursue. This is, of course, the main thesis of 'Answer to Job' and corresponds closely to Tillich's view of a God in process. Essays on Jung and Tillich's common German intellectual and spiritual ancestors, Jacob Boehme and Meister Eckhart, support his argument that 'much, if not all, of Jung's mature psychology was an effort to reconnect the currently uprooted mind and soul of the West with their deep stabilizing roots in their intra-psychic 'maternal' origins' (p. 128). Dourley's point is that the contemporary religious and political scene is dominated by animus-possessed monotheisms in which father-gods are battling to the death for exclusive authority in a three-cornered fight between Judaism, Islam and Christianity. 'The holocaust', he argues, 'might well be described as the major religious event of the twentieth century and the culmination of the 'shadow side', if not the substance, of Jewish-Christian relations whose consequences are yet to be absorbed fully by the religious mind. The immediate statistically-verifiable benefit of the recovery of the Goddess will be the lowering of the religious body-count' (pp. 90–91). His discussion of Jung's insistence on divinity's reconnection with its feminine seemed helpful to me in illuminating Jung's dispute with Freud in 1913 over the evaluation of maternal incest, a theme which is currently re-emerging in Jungian analytic circles, as the developmental school, so indebted to the Freudian tradition, finds the self-confidence to re-examine the importance of what has often been uncritically and unfairly dismissed as 'Jung's mysticism'.

Analytical psychologists might find the final three chapters the most clinically relevant part of this work as Dourley examines the relationship between the theological concept of salvation and the psychological process of healing. Tillich's most popular book, *The Courage to Be*, in common with Jung's *Psychology and Religion*, was first presented as the Terry Lectures at Yale and, like Jung fourteen years earlier, Tillich addressed contemporary anxieties with resonant profundity. In these chapters, Dourley synthesizes Jung's and Tillich's approaches to the nature of salvation and healing as the inherent and necessary demand of the human condition itself. Tillich's lectures famously began from the premise that humanity is universally anxious in the face of death, guilt and meaninglessness. In existence, man has self-conscious finitude which removes him from God perceived as the ground of his essential self. Tillich therefore distinguishes existential anxiety from pathological anxiety, the former the province of the minister of religion as the agent of grace or salvation, while pathological anxiety is the proper concern of the psychologist as the agent of therapeutic healing. Dourley has, however, found in the later Tillich the concession that the psychologist may be 'the mediator of the essential', provided certain premises are respected, and these premises correspond very closely indeed to an ontological basis for a Jungian analytic attitude.

I found in the author's synthesis of Jung and Tillich a compelling analysis of the nature of the human condition and of the basic premises of a therapeutic approach to the dilemma of existence. Dourley, however, goes further, and identifies the specific area in which Tillich might have been of incalculable help to Jung by drawing on Tillich's contribution to the New York memorial meeting on Jung's death, in which Tillich addresses the well-known problem that Jung insisted that he was nothing but a Kantian phenomenologist with no metaphysical thesis to advance, when on Tillich's reading, Jung is advancing metaphysical propositions and has no need to be shy of this.

Finally, the author asks how Western religion has fallen into the predicament he has described, and finds both Jung and Tillich pointing the accusatory finger in the same direction – to thirteenth century scholasticism. Thus Jung writes of ‘a turning away from our psychic origins as a result of Scholasticism and Aristotelianism’, and Tillich argues that ‘even if this method [i.e., scholasticism] builds the way to science (scientia), it utterly destroys the way of wisdom (sapientia)’ (p. 179). In Dourley’s view, both Tillich and Jung were attempting to reverse the dangerous and possibly devastating truncation this has inflicted on the Western mind and spirit.

This important book illuminates that aspect of Jung’s thought which has too often been dismissed pejoratively by uninformed critics as ‘mysticism’. It is not an easy read as, sadly, theology and psychology rarely engage with each other at such depth and with so great an understanding as in Dourley’s mind. This non-meeting, like the non-meeting of Tillich and Jung in their lifetimes, has been to the serious detriment of both disciplines, and, as Dourley argues, may have weakened each in its capacity to respond to the urgent needs of contemporary humanity.

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George Bright
Society of Analytical Psychology

TACEY, DAVID. *Edge of the Sacred: Jung, Psyche, Earth*. Einsiedeln, Switzerland: Daimon Verlag, 2009. Pp. 213. Pbk. £16.99 / €19.00 / \$25.00.

The author is a well-published academic from Melbourne, Australia, best known for *Jung and the New Age* (2001). This book was first published in Australia in 1995. This is the first international edition; chapters one, two and three are new, as is chapter 10. I learnt about the liminal spaces between ecology, psychology, spirituality and about ‘the greening of analysis’. I particularly enjoyed the last section and final chapter (11) on ‘Tracking the sacred’, with its wise guidance on how symbol-making skills can help reinstate the spiritual in our increasingly troubled world.

The book divides into four sections: psyche and earth, going native in Africa and Australia, the psyche down below and spiritual renewal. The author shares his lived experience, which is deeply engaging. For example, hearing the term ‘Mother Earth’ at primary school created a timeless moment in which meaning transformed (p. 11); he could experience ‘Earth as Mother’, not simply as a projection, but as lived and felt through a boy’s skin. His account of growing up in Alice Springs poignantly captures being lost and re-found within ‘Mother Earth’s’ culture, accepting the blessings of the land from native Australians whom he knew. I’d love to have read more (chapter 4).

Tacey examines ideas prevalent in the ‘thirties within analytical psychology, about the influence of landscape on culture, based on Jung’s excursions. Saying that much of Jung’s culture, style and language is imprecise and grates to contemporary readers is helpful, but the nettle of his cultural lordliness could be more firmly grasped. The author might have drawn more widely on post-Jungian ideas; Andrew Samuels’ work on ‘resacralizing society’ or even ‘Death of a Princess’ – which accounts for a different sort of ‘Dreamtime’.

It is a pity *The Red Book* had not been published before this book was revised. It gives the ‘back story’ to Jung’s exploration of Tacey’s theme: the split between our outer and inner narratives. *The Red Book* lives this dialogue. It would have been good to read more examples of this dialogue from native Australians: dreams of Dreamtime, stories and legends which take us into their world. These may be well known in Australia, but are not elsewhere.

The second and third sections may have a philosophical problem, ‘after this, therefore because of this’ (‘post hoc, ergo propter hoc’). Do we see the numinous because it’s ‘out there’, or because it’s ‘in here’? Or is it ‘both/and’...? That is, we see the numinous *both* because it is out there, objectively real, *and* ‘in here’ subjectively experienced. This is the central point of Jung’s questing travels and inner journal.

I don’t like the ‘Aboriginal good : Western bad’ argument. It is like ‘four legs good: two legs bad’ in Orwell’s *Animal Farm*, and is, understandably, guilt-tinged. In that context, it was good to read new material about the Australian Prime Minister’s apology to the aboriginal people (pp. 132–4) but I wanted to learn far more of the aboriginal people’s responses; that might be a cultural version of a ‘clinical example’. Similarly, further examples of the social impact of the Western on native culture could ground his thesis. There are many anthropological studies of drug use, glue sniffing and delinquency in native teenagers, consequences of their spiritual disenfranchisement. I felt we were being ‘told’ in these two sections, rather than ‘shown’, as before.

I wanted wider discussion of whether ‘seeing the Spirit in nature’ is projection, projective identification or objective reality (chapter nine). What makes the ‘spiritual’ immanent as well as transcendent? For support, he quotes Hillman extensively, but few authors from the ‘developmental perspective’. Is this an illustration of a similar split, as if, after *The Red Book*, we could go on imagining that there were two Jungs? Clearly, the mystic ‘native’ and the scientific ‘Westerner’ are the same person. There is neither sacred nor material, both sacred and material.

Recent advances in neuroscience—showing we *both* create our reality and *are also* created by it—could have been mentioned as a bridge between cultures. Neuroanatomy is the same regardless of culture, and not so different from our fellow mammals. I would have liked him to tell us more about animal spirituality, and ‘animal helpers’.

I liked his use of the ‘developmental spiral’ and the oscillation between spiritual and material, so similar to Michael Fordham’s ideas about integration and deintegration. There is considerable careful scholarship here, deep feeling and good writing. There are attempts at linking across a heart-rent divide in society. There is much more to be said, and I look forward very much to his next book.

Dale Mathers
Association of Jungian Analysts

STEPHENSON, CRAIG E. *Possession: Jung’s Comparative Anatomy of the Psyche*. London: Routledge, 2009. Pp 188. Pbk. £ 21.99 / \$34.95.

The phrase ‘possessed by a complex’ can be almost trite in Jungian circles, a simple nomenclature designating that the ego has been usurped by other portions of the personality, that in our fluid, multiple selves, something ‘other’ than the way we would like ourselves to be has taken over. However, to those outside Jungian circles, the same phrase can sound like abdicating responsibility, or even a return to the middle-ages. In this book, Craig Stephenson, a Jungian analyst practising in Paris takes the concept of possession back to the middle-ages, deliberately invoking demonic imagery to reshape our thinking of possession beyond the dissociative characteristics of an

individual psyche, bringing to the fore the religious realm, as well as cultural dynamics. His thinking grows from an essay Jung (1961) wrote shortly before his death:

[the psychologist] cannot even see the analogy between a case of compulsion neurosis, schizophrenia, or hysteria and that of a classical demonic possession if he has not sufficient knowledge of both.

Beginning with the seventeenth century possessions of Ursuline nuns in Loudun, France, Stephenson shows us demonic possession in its historical and social context. This was a time when characteristics such as clairvoyance that defined demonic possession also defined possession by the Holy Spirit, a time when women could gain public influence through either good or demonic possession. In part, the Loudun possessions ended with the insight of a priest who took some of the suffering on himself, and provided one of the nuns with a speaking tour where she displayed ‘marks’ left by her possession.

These issues of the seventeenth century echo into the present. Stephenson draws out contemporary debates of power and feminism, following critical thinkers of today to explore the performative nature of possession both then and now. Whereas nuns once saw demonic visions and cut themselves (and in some places, still do) we now have eating disorders, major dissociations and suicide bombers. For Foucault, and by inference, for Stephenson, possession is the enactment of a social problematic. It is a performance. The question then becomes: What exactly is being performed and who within the person is performing? In their possessed state, the Ursuline nuns spoke and were acknowledged by the power structure. Yet to maintain their power the possessed nuns had to stay outside the structure, never get pinned into it. The doctors and priests attempting to name possessions and bring them into some defined place within the norm were curtailing them, making them other than what they were, so power was lost.

The possessions of Loudun show some of the ways a psychological issue can be understood and appropriated—how the language of possession is fluid, and possessions themselves are phenomena with as many social dimensions as anything intrinsic to those involved. As Jung’s theory often eschews prescribing normative behaviour, it becomes uniquely positioned to address such issues. However in doing so, it needs to be held accountable for its own biases, such as Jung’s misappropriation of available knowledge to further his ideas. Stephenson points out several such discrepancies, including Franz Boas’ paper read at the 1909 Clark University conference attended by both Jung and Freud. There Boas argued that anthropological observations could not be used as proofs for the universality of psychoanalytic/psychological principles, but Jung overlooked this paper, continuing to read selectively anthropological literature in universalizing ways in order to legitimize his psychology.

Stephenson highlights the first use of ‘possession’ as a category in the 1992 American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, an event that sounds as if it could bring about a shift in thinking, an awareness of ‘otherness’ even within the establishment—because what can we be possessed by if we are unified beings? However, in today’s world, much of ordinary human experience is pathologized, making it all too easy to look to psychiatry to make meaning of suffering. Stephenson points out ways that including ‘possession’ as a category of psychiatry submerges it in the larger purposes of that establishment, causing it to lose imagistic power. In contrast, Jung’s deliberate use of metaphorical and equivocal language creates a space for both precise psychiatric knowledge and mystery, both suffering and healing; a way to conceptualize our fluid, plural, embodied selves embedded in all that is beyond us.

The film *Opening Night* becomes Stephenson’s clinical example for these ideas, underlining possession’s themes of theatricality and performance. But when this

example is juxtaposed against the complexity of previous pages, I am left with a myriad of questions. In the tradition of equivocal language such questions may be Stephenson's intention—a way of furthering the interrogation of Jung's thought both within and without. Yet I find myself wondering: What of those possessions does the culture itself share? For example, if a business executive were to look at a group of Jungian types, would such Jungian types be obviously performing something that within the culture of Jungians it is impossible to see? The proverbial fish is always swimming in water, so what do we do as professionals when we need to name that which possesses us? Are we imposing a norm artificial to another's experience? If so, how do we use diagnostic categories, the naming and the exploration of commonalities in treatment?

Many things possess us as humans. We are subject to divisions within ourselves, to the multiplicities of ourselves. We are subject to what is beyond us, to what we see as different, as diabolical, and what we do not see at all because we consider it normative. In his exploration of possession, Stephenson has written a book for those with Jungian proclivities, as well as those highly critical of such proclivities, a book for anthropologists and historians as well as poets, a book to read not once but many times.

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Gretchen Heyer
Inter-Regional Society of Jungian Analysts

MADDEN, K. W. *Dark Light of the Soul*. Great Barrington, MA: Lindisfarne, 2008. Pp. 261. Pbk. \$25.00.

Kathryn Wood Madden's *Dark Light of the Soul* begins with the premise that 'a unitary reality underlies all psychological experience' which is the 'culmination of an encounter with the deepest layer of the collective unconscious, the psychoid, archetypal layer, in which we meet all forms of otherness' (p. 1). Out of this encounter, a 'star is born — a unitary reality that enables' one to see through 'to a pre-differentiated, universal ground' (p.18). For Jung this is the Self and for the 17th century mystic writer, Jacob Boehme, it is Christ (p. 1).

Madden's opening statement places her argument within a veritable tradition concerning the problem of the 'one and the many', debated since earliest Greek thought. It is also related to the problem of relations between universals and the particular, and between monism and pluralism. In monism the totality of things is seen ultimately to be reducible to a single entity, whether substantial, logical, physical, spiritual, psychological or moral.

Madden makes a comparative reading of Boehme and Jung's monistic views, both focusing on a 'unitary reality, a ground of being that contains all opposites in potentiality'. Jacob Boehme (1574–1624) explored the one-many problem metaphysically, both as a process of divine emanation and personal urges towards reintegration into the ground of being, a unitary reality behind all diversity. Jung applied it psychologically. Psychologically, the one-many problem poses the question of whether the Self is one unitary, eternal, unchanging and consistent being or is multiple, impermanent, forever in flux and changing. If change and multiplicity are acknowledged, is there still a

persistent, unitary feature, some essence which distinguishes one person from other selves? Jung emphasized the unity of the self as a psychic totality: 'The self is not only the centre, but also the whole circumference which embraces both conscious and unconscious; it is the centre of this totality' (Jung 1947, para. 44). Jung also recognized the multiplicity of the self, stating that 'the self is like a crowd, therefore being oneself, one is also many' (Jung 1988, p. 102).

Boehme's *Ungrund*, Madden tells us, refers to a groundless abyss, beyond the created world, an emptiness which is also a fullness, beyond space and time, from which emanates all potential, from which all creation emanates. Likewise Jung's *Pleroma* 'describes an uncreated potentiality beyond time and space from which all being emerges. It is a given state of oneness or unity in which all potential opposites commingle in their uncreated state' (p. 79). This is also linked to 'primordial unconsciousness, undifferentiated nothingness and fullness' (p. 83), the 'source or agent of everything', whole, self-sufficient, perfect. This 'mysterious Nothingness' is 'a harmony of opposites: emptiness and fullness . . . our beginning and our end'. It is 'boundless, continuous, and eternal' (p. 84).

Madden shows how 'throughout history' a psychological breakdown accompanies 'breakthrough to this unitary reality' (p. 1). Both Jung and Boehme made their own personal journey of discovery into this realm of spiritual experience and both experienced breakdown in their descent to the depths of their being. So too, did Madden's patients such as 'Christina', whom Madden uses to illustrate a 'spiritual and psychological breakthrough' to a 'shattering in-breaking of numinous experience' (p. 206), a 'transformation through engagement with the transcendent function—a spiritual renewal' (p. 231).

Madden draws on Erich Neumann's description of the 'mystic's experience of the universal diffusion of the unitary reality' in which human and divine spirit are one (p. 2). This 'conjunction or sacred marriage conjoins the spirit of the divine with the body of nature', a 'life-transforming encounter with the collective unconscious' (ibid.) in the one unified ground of being.

Madden also describes how Jung connects the *unus mundus* with the psychoid, a layer where matter and psyche meet as but two aspects of one substance. This is known as substance monism, which, for example, underlies Spinoza's theory of the double identity of substance. The soul yearns to return to the 'psychoid, archetypal layer of the collective unconscious as a deep layer of existence in which a breakthrough experience of the numinous points to a pre-differentiated reality' (p. 241).

One difficulty with the monistic perspectives put forward in this book is the question of how to reconcile otherness, diversity and plurality with this view of the unified oneness of experience, without the dangers of homogenization, universalizing and denial of difference, if not solipsism. Madden addresses the problem of otherness and diversity by suggesting that the ground of being contains all diversity and otherness within it. It is glimpsed through 'the radical otherness of dreams, in the transference and countertransference, through the experience of the transcendent function', and 'through the trauma of breakdown, creative depression, deintegration experience' or other spiritual crises. Otherness, for Madden, is seen to refer to the ego's view of otherness whether relational or primordial or spiritual. Diversity refers to the 'distinctions we recognize in gender, race, ethnicity, and lifestyle choices'. Primordial otherness is seen as a '*transcendent ultimacy*', beyond the psyche as distinct from '*surface immediacy*' which pertains to 'our experience of the real at the level of our needs and projections' (p. 5). Transcendent ultimacy 'pertains to experiences in which our previous notions and images of God, the transcendent, the ultimate . . . are shattered and redefined' through an experience of 'unitary reality', a 'Holy Other' or Wholly Other, beyond being itself (p. 5).

Radical otherness refers to a transcendent divinity, or a divine Self, rather than to human others. Although some reference is made to the relational aspects of individuation, Madden's emphasis is the relationship of the self to a spiritual rather than an interpersonal ethics of alterity. I suspect that Levinas would critique any account of otherness that inclines towards a universalizing of diversity, otherness and difference into 'the Same' (*le Même*) or in Jung's case The Self, denying all that is beyond Being, truly alterior to Self: that is the otherness of the other (*l'Autre*). (This reminds me of Buber's criticism of Jung as being guilty of solipsistic, if not narcissistic, introjection of the absolute alterity of another human being, the Thou of Another morphs into the Thou of the Self). Both Jung and Boehme, as depicted by Madden, tend to reduce the plurality of human beings to a unity of the 'same' glossing over the irreducible otherness of the Other. Furthermore, would Buber's critique of Jung be apposite? 'Every alleged colloquy with the divine was only a soliloquy, or rather a conversation between various strata of the self' (Buber cited in Stephens 2001, p. 268).

Madden attempts to bring a unitary spiritual reality into metapsychology and also clinical psychological experience such as breakdown and transformation. Although some clinical examples are given, this book is not clinical in orientation so much as a book on the interface between mysticism and Jungian psychology. Clinical examples are used to illustrate profound psychological crises ultimately leading, through confrontation with the abyss, to spiritual experiences of unitary reality. She argues that 'If, as I contend, a unitary reality underlies all psychological experience, then as clinicians we ignore the "spiritual realm and the divine" at the risk of the total psychic health of those in our care' (p. 99). Yet it is also true that recourse to mystical experiences of a transcendent realm of unitary reality behind all phenomena can be used by some patients as a defensive avoidance of embodied, interpersonal encounters with human rather than divine Others. Human love requires the courage to face the impossibility of truly knowing another, a capacity for interpersonal rather than spiritual forms of alterity: that of the human other beyond conceptualization, yet paradoxically thus (re)cognized in their true alterity.

Madden's detailed vision of depth theology will appeal greatly to Jungians who wish to explore the interface between spiritual and psychological individuation.

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Judith Pickering
 Australia and New Zealand Society for Jungian Analysis

STEINMAN, IRA. *Treating the Untreatable: Healing in the Realms of Madness*. London & New York: Karnac Books, 2009. Pp. vi + 207. Pbk. £29.99 / \$35.00.

'As a field we have lost our way in treating severely disturbed and delusional patients'. So writes Dr. Ira Steinman, a San Francisco psychiatrist, at the end of his new book *Treating the Untreatable*. The book is provocatively titled, and what Dr. Steinman

presents is a direct challenge to clinicians working with schizophrenic and very dissociated patients: to reclaim the lost art of psychotherapy as the treatment of choice. Furthermore, he insists upon the success, even the superiority, of in-depth therapy with these highly disturbed patients.

Steinman decries what he sees as mainstream psychiatry's current claim that our most ill patients are untreatable by therapy and amenable only to medication. Rather, intensive psychodynamic psychotherapy on an out-patient basis is the heart and soul of the work, which his book aims to demonstrate with twelve examples of the often 'hopeless' cases he is called in to treat as the physician of last resort. Steinman does not eschew the use of medications or hospitalization when necessary, but for him they serve their more traditional adjunctive purpose. Not so radical as the anti-psychiatry movement of Ronald Laing, with whom he did some training, Steinman does not view schizophrenia as a sane response to an insane world. But he is no less dedicated to understanding psychosis and multiple personality psychologically rather than biochemically. To those who suggest that medications are 'the best that can be done', Steinman simply states, 'They are wrong'.

Steinman's philosophy and work is in the humane tradition of Harry Stack Sullivan, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, D. W. Winnicott, Harold Searles, Laing and so many other clinicians whose outstandingly dedicated work with long-suffering patients embodies the idea, as Sullivan said, that 'We are all much more simply human than otherwise'. Jung has a crucial historical place here too, as we know, as the first psychoanalytic interpreter of psychosis, via complex theory. As Laing wrote at the end of *The Politics of Experience*, though he was probably referring as much to Jung's personal knowledge of 'the geography of inner space and time' as his pioneering work with psychotics, 'Jung broke the ground here but few have followed him'.

Steinman, like Jung, is intensely interested in the content of his patients' delusions and encourages psychiatrists 'to have the courage of their psychodynamic convictions' and decipher 'the symbols contained in delusions' and 'the language and meaning of these paranoid schizophrenic productions'. Unlike Jung (that is, the late rather than early Jung), however, he does not pursue archetypal directions but directs interpretive attention to the personal, often traumatic, background in his patients' delusions. In the best sense of the word, his approach is 'reductionistic': Steinman is technically quite consistent in insisting to his patients that they are defensively placing their devastating emotional upsets outside themselves into hallucinations, delusions, or alters. Many of Steinman's patients in his examples have been woefully and chronically ill, or horribly traumatized by toxic interpersonal situations, usually parental. He strives, not without empathy but with conviction, to 'drive a wedge' between them and their 'psychotic beliefs' by interpreting the sources. First, he might try to establish 'an enquiry beachhead' by asking a patient what hallucinated personage she is staring at or listening to. Early on he asks for the personal history of imaginary persons and when they first appeared. He accepts but challenges the ultimate reality of delusions. Steinman offers ongoing and quite considerable out-of-session contact when needed—in some examples for as much as thirty years—and seems to provide a containing, auxiliary ego when defences and symptoms have collapsed. Patients appear to be held, and psychological structure maintained, by the power and strength of his belief in their 'unity' rather than their multiplicity or hallucinated voices.

At first, it was not quite clear for whom or to whom this book is written. I was reminded initially of Irvin Yalom's short but catchy stories of treatment in *Love's Executioner* or Robert Lindner's old book *The Fifty-Minute Hour*. In these books, case histories are presented as 'Tales of psychotherapy', intriguing short stories for the public though not quite ripping yarns. Dr. Steinman's case examples, which are

highly variable in length, are more clinical than these predecessors, though not formally so. His presentation style is relaxed, somewhat repetitive (which may correspond in a sense to the way he works). It becomes evident that his audience for this book is professionals, perhaps more specifically young psychiatrists or those in training, whom he asks to 'reconsider your positions about the primacy of antipsychotics, supportive psychotherapy, and ancillary therapies . . . I hope some of you will begin to follow your analytic understanding of a patient's pathology into an intensive psychotherapy'.

I could not venture to say how much weight this will carry with psychiatrists, veterans or otherwise, on the front lines of treatment with such difficult cases. And to work psychodynamically, with true understanding, requires years of psychotherapy training and experience. In the U.S., medical students receive precious little, *if any*, psychotherapy training, so Steinman's is a tall order in terms of psychiatric trends, economics, and zeitgeist. The very difficult cases he presents just might not be enticing to many therapists, psychodynamically oriented or not. Dr. Steinman says, 'Even though these may sound like heroic psychotherapies, they were not'. But they strike me as such, and utterly exhausting. It takes a special, admirable individual to work at such depth and length with these patients, and such therapists may be born, not made.

Dr. Steinman reports that he is often asked how he does it. His responses are not satisfying: he believes in his technique, lets his feelings 'play through' (like golf!), has a 'central core of calmness' as well as outside interests, and is forgiving of inevitable mistakes. Countertransference issues are noted but not in significant ways, and some of his references to 'transference interpretations' seem to refer not to transference to the therapist per se but of the past to the present in the form of an encapsulated delusion or alternate personality in the here and now. Although there is obviously intense involvement, the reader does not hear a description of the intricate mutual involvement described by Searles, for instance.

This book is recommended, but Dr. Steinman's case would have been more strongly argued if the book were better organized, edited, and written. His publisher did him no favours in this regard, but the responsibility must lie with the author. The chapters are sometimes overlong, with repetitive material, or overshort: chapter three, 'The causes of a delusional orientation', is two pages long, while the next chapter on 'The method' is one page. These are not 'chapters'. The next to last example, a fascinating if repetitively presented case, is thirty pages long, but is senselessly followed by a dull two-pager that saps any momentum. There must be a hundred times when some variation on the phrase 'judicious use of antipsychotic medications' is used. A change of tone occurs in the appendices, which are informative, especially on outcome research, but were not written by the author. The book gives a slight feeling of being cobbled together.

David Sedgwick
North Carolina Society of Jungian Analysts

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