



**SUFISM AND JIHAD
IN MODERN SENEGAL**

THE MURID ORDER

JOHN GLOVER

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The modern form of transliterating Wolof vocabulary has generally been adhered to in this book. The only exceptions have been personal names of those figures who wrote, or currently write, their names using the French spellings. Their names have remained unchanged. As for place names, when dealing with the precolonial period, I have used the precolonial forms; however, when dealing with the colonial period, I have employed the French spellings, such as *Kajoor/Cayor*. Due to the irregular plurals in Arabic, I have only used the singular forms of words such as *shaykh*. Those words that have already been transcribed into other languages, such as *marabout*, have remained unitalicized.

INTRODUCTION

This is a history of intersections. An analysis of the development of the Murid Sufi order in Senegal in West Africa necessitates a certain blurring of historical and geographical boundaries and paradigms. This is at once a study of West African history, Islamic reform, Sufism, and European colonization. More specifically, this book examines the history of one branch of the Murid order, its founder, its primary town and environs, and its disciples in relation to Murid perceptions of their place in multiple intersecting histories. Furthermore, this Sufi order is presented as a participant in modernization rather than an opponent or a passive recipient. The Murid order and its leadership served as conduits to their disciples of modern trends coming from outside West Africa via European colonial rule and as authors of an indigenous form of modernity. Murid perceptions of modernity thus arise from disparate sources and are reflected in the production and interpretation of Murid historical narratives by notables and common disciples alike.

The Muridiyya was founded in the latter decades of the nineteenth century by Shaykh Amadu Bamba M'Backé, a descendent of a prominent family of local Muslim scholars. At the time that the Murid order began to coalesce, the Senegambian region was entering a new chapter in a history of conflict and change. Although the Atlantic slave trade had ceased to exist by this time, the social, political, and economic effects of the trade endured in the interior of West Africa. For centuries, interstate wars and raids had been a regular occurrence, and within the states of Senegambia, civil wars between aristocratic lineages and Islamic reformers had also served to disrupt life. A new dimension in Senegambian history was introduced with the French conquest of the interior that began in the 1860s and continued until 1890. Initially, the European conquest of the region was very destructive, and the early phase of French rule relied heavily on the aid of colonial chiefs drawn from the precolonial aristocracies that had previously battled Islamic reformers for control of the population. In the midst of these conflicts, Amadu Bamba forged a new identity for his followers who referred to their nascent order in Wolof as the *yonnu Muriid*, or the "way of the disciple." Amadu Bamba rejected both the authority of the local Wolof aristocrats and the tactics of the Islamic reformers who had previously led many armed jihad against the secular authorities. His renunciation of the political realm was not limited to African princes and *shaykh*. After French control was established, he uttered the now popular

saying “God alone is King” when he was summoned on one occasion to meet with the French governor. Fear on the part of the French administration and the colonial chiefs of the growing numbers of the Murids and the influence of their founding saint led to Amadu Bamba being exiled three times between 1895 and 1913 by the colonial authorities. In spite of these exiles, the Murid order continued to grow as Amadu Bamba’s brothers and lieutenants established new Murid settlements. By Amadu Bamba’s death in 1927, the French had come to an entente with the Sufi order through recognition of the vital and productive roles that the Murids played in maintaining social order among a large segment of the population and their contributions to the economic expansion of the colony.

The branch of the Murid order that is the subject of the present study followed Amadu Bamba’s younger brother and chief confidant, Ibrahima Faty M’Backé, better known popularly as *Maam Cerno*, which translates as “grandfatherly teacher.” According to Murid historiography, Maam Cerno was destined from birth to be the chief disciple and adjunct of his older brother who was acclaimed to be the *boroom jamano*, or “master of the age” in Wolof, a title translated from the Arabic *qutb al-zaman*, or “pole of the age.” In addition to being the dutiful follower, Maam Cerno was a distinguished scholar and teacher in his own right, a diplomat, a farmer, and a community leader. For his followers, he served as an important link in the *baraka*, or spiritual blessing, that he had inherited from Amadu Bamba and that stretched back to the Prophet Muhammad. Maam Cerno founded and settled dozens of Murid towns, the chief of which, Darou Mousty, was established in 1912. These settlements were aligned to Maam Cerno’s own interpretation of the Murid mission and were thus equally devoted to study and work. Murid disciples of Maam Cerno were expected to follow a course of study in Islam and Sufism and to work in the surrounding millet and peanut fields all the while maintaining a lifestyle in accord with the *shari’a*, or Islamic law. The disciples who placed themselves under Maam Cerno’s guidance were drawn from a wide range of backgrounds. Some were themselves the scions of scholarly Muslim families. Others were of aristocratic background who had come to terms with the Murid brand of Islamic reform. Most were from the common classes of artisans, peasant farmers, and runaway slaves who were seeking what my informants referred to as “the hope in this world and the next.”

Darou Mousty and its surrounding towns and villages weathered droughts, famines, and epidemics and eventually achieved a good deal of prosperity relative to non-Murid areas. In their dealings with the colonial administration, the communities mirrored Maam Cerno’s own spirit of accommodation that was not so much a reflection of collaboration as it was an effort to preserve Murid autonomy vis-à-vis the French. Accordingly, the Murids of Maam Cerno paid their taxes to the French and delivered themselves up as conscripted soldiers to fight for the French in both world wars. Maam Cerno’s successors



Figure I.1. Darou Mousty. Photo by author, 1997.

have presided over a continuing prosperity for their branch of the order and point with pride to their mechanized wells, telephone and electric service, and satellite televisions. Yet, Darou Mousty has maintained and developed its religious importance as a major pilgrimage site due to the presence of the tomb of Maam Cerno. Murid disciples from Darou Mousty are spread across much of the globe from the Middle East to Italy to Los Angeles and yet maintain close ties to their families and shaykh in Senegal.

History, Sufism, and the Murid Order

The present work proceeds from the assumption that the Murids of Senegal are a fairly standard, if that term can be used, Sufi order relative to other orders, contemporaneous and historical, in the wider Islamic world. As will be seen from the discussion of the early Western historiography on the Murids, this assumption is not made lightly. From this point of view, the Murids are reconceived from being an overtly local or “African” aberration of a higher religious and mystical tradition to being an integral part of a transcontinental progression of religious and mystical ideas and practices that have been developing for centuries and that have contributed to the construction of modernity for the Murids and the modernization of Senegambia. This assumption

does not deny any sub-Saharan African influences on the Murids; rather, it seeks to recalibrate the relationship between the global and the local aspects of belief and practice for the order. By linking the Murid order to this larger historical process, we must consequently deal with effects of certain historiographical trends within the larger fields of Islamic history and the study of Sufism and the Sufi orders. Issues such as Orientalism, its African variant referred to in French as *Islam noir*, and notions of modernity and modernization have played large roles in Western perceptions of Islam, the Sufi orders, and the Murid order of Senegal.

Perceptions of Islam and Sufism: Orientalists and Their Critics

In *Orientalism*, Edward Said posed several different but interrelated definitions for the concept of Orientalism. His third definition is the most applicable to the present study: “. . . Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”¹ The general Orientalist historical narrative of Islamic history at first resembles something of a biological life cycle with Islam being born and then growing into a brilliant civilization only to inevitably enter a degenerate path of decline in which the Islamic world ceases to be an actor on the historical stage and stagnates. This narrative conveniently relegates Islamic polities and societies to the sidelines of history at roughly the same moment that the West experienced developments such as exploration, political liberalization, and industrialization that many have identified with the creation of the modern world. Thus, Islamic participation in these watershed developments is excluded as the Islamic world passes into the traditional unchanging past while the West moves into the modern vibrant future. What was most important in Said’s perception of this process is the concern for power and control on the part of the West in terms of its developing dialogue and conflict with the Islamic world. The West’s desire for power and control manifested itself in imperialism and the colonization of Islamic societies across Africa and Asia, beginning in Algeria (for the French in Africa) in the 1830s and culminating in the aftermath of World War I.

Orientalism served in part as a legitimization of European colonization. The portrait of a stagnating and deviant society complimented the civilizing missions of both the French and the British that were popularized to help justify imperialism. On the part of the French, *la mission civilisatrice* was promoted as a paternalistic extension of the liberal ideals of the French

revolution to African and Asian peoples languishing under the rule of medieval despots. According to the mission, after the conquest freed the population from their overlords, Western education, commerce, and good administration would bring modern advancement and development to the colonial subjects.²

Sufism and the Sufi orders (*tariqa* [singular], *uruq* [plural] in Arabic) have played a pivotal role in the discourse of Orientalism. This role can be described as resting upon three assumptions. The first is the belief that the history of Sufism has generally mirrored the Orientalist vision of Islamic history. According to this view, as presented by J. S. Trimingham, early Sufi theologians such as Hasan al-Basri (d. 728 C.E.) occupy a pristine position emerging as they did during the Arab conquests and the consolidation of first the Umayyad and then the Abbasid empires and arguing for a more ascetic lifestyle and spiritualism in the face of the extravagant materialism of the times. Sufism enjoyed its golden age from the eleventh to the thirteenth century C.E. as witnessed by the influential careers of al-Ghazzali, Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani, Ibn Al-Arabi, and Jalaluddin Rumi. Yet, even as this golden age reached its zenith, the signs of decay and decline began to appear with the popularization of Sufism through the systemic organization of the Sufi orders. Herein lays the second assumption that with the expansion of Sufism outside of its initial relatively narrow confines and into the general public came a corresponding dilution of Sufi beliefs and practices. The remainder of Sufi history, which constitutes something of a dark age from this point of view, is largely negative. The Sufi orders instituted a cult of saints, the intellectual heritage of the earlier Sufis was never matched by their successors, and charlatans posing as Sufi clerics came to command the spiritual allegiance of masses of ignorant disciples.

An eminent scholar of Sufism A. J. Arberry described this final period in Sufi history as an inevitability, “Thereafter, although through the numerous and ever multiplying Religious Orders the influence of Sufi thought and practice became constantly more widespread, and though sultans and princes did not disdain to lend the movement their patronage and personal adherence—the signs of decay appear more and more clearly, and abuse and scandal assail and threaten to destroy its fair reputation.”³ Arberry characterized these Sufi saints of the popular orders by stating, “To live scandalously, to act impudently, to speak unintelligibly—this was the easy highroad to fame, wealth and power.”⁴ These interpretations while supporting Orientalist conceptions of Islamic history in general also reflect a type of scholarly religious elitism in which only a select few who have almost entirely divested themselves of the material world can share in the mystical path of Sufism. Likewise, Orientalists have implicitly declared that only those who could have devoted their lives to study and writing merit scholarship. There is an almost total dismissal of the popular followings of the Sufi orders and the voices and perceptions of the common disciples.

The last assumption is that Sufism, especially in the context of the popular orders, arose out of extra-Islamic origins. This notion goes beyond a simple exposition of the syncretic nature of some aspects of Islamic mysticism. Authors, both western Orientalists and Muslim fundamentalists, have stressed the influences of pre-Islamic Asian and African religious beliefs and practices upon Sufism to divorce it from the perceived grandeur and purity of Islam at its height. This approach served the Orientalist notion of the decline of Islam by providing an explanation for this decline that had nothing to do with European colonial expansion. Colonial authorities could also seize upon this notion to create a hierarchy among their colonial Muslim subjects (Arab versus non-Arab) that was exploited to promote European rule. Muslim fundamentalists utilized this assumption condemning the innovations, or *bida*, attributed to popular Sufism, which conveniently came from outside of Islam. This served their own goal of reforming Islam and society in hopes of promoting an Islamic revival that would return the community of believers to a purer state.⁵

Contrary to such attitudes, Marshall Hodgson offered a new analysis of Sufism and the Sufi orders in *The Venture of Islam* that challenged the notion of a Sufi decline. To begin, Hodgson considered the Sufi orders to have been multifaceted, operating at both the popular level and at that of “high-cultural creativity.”⁶ Hodgson also looked at Sufism from a more global point of view and considered the surge in Sufism after the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to be similar to the rise of other forms of mysticism across Eurasia at roughly the same time. Furthermore, Hodgson linked the rise of the orders to the political decentralization and social disorder that accompanied the decline and fall of the Abbasid Empire, the Turkish migrations, and the Mongol conquests. Hodgson paints a portrait of a vibrant Sufism composed of international orders that deserve much credit for expanding and supporting an increasingly cosmopolitan Islamic world. In the absence of an international centralized bureaucracy reminiscent of the Abbasids, the hierarchy of the Sufi orders provided believers with an important sense of unity and structure in addition to spiritual consolation and direction.⁷

Hodgson’s reappraisal of the historical development of Sufism and the Sufi orders has been fruitfully built upon by others such as Carl Ernst in his works on Sufism and the Chistiyya order. Like Hodgson, Ernst also rejected the theory of a decline that accompanied the popularization of Sufism via the orders and instead saw Sufism as a “vast cumulative tradition” that “. . . rests upon multiple contributions to a common resource both contested and deployed over generations.”⁸ Stagnation, from this perspective is replaced by activity, development, and progression. Ernst also called for a reconceptualization of Sufism to include extrareligious contexts in which to view the orders and for the inclusion of previously ignored “collectivities,” such as families, whose contributions to Sufism and the orders have gone largely unnoticed by Orientalist scholars who have instead focused on the most distinguished Sufi notables.

The Orientalist Effect on Murid Historiography

Why would the Orientalist notion of Sufism and the Sufi orders come to be so pervasive? As mentioned previously, part of the support for the Orientalist interpretation rested upon notions of power and control as manifested in colonization. In many Islamic areas, including Senegambia, after the recognized Islamic political authorities had been neutralized by the European imperial power through conquest or submission, the Sufi orders remained the most important corporate body of believers with an organized hierarchy that remained sovereign of European control and thus was a potential threat to colonial rule.⁹ Portraying these orders as deviant, immoral, backward, and greedy was a propaganda tool the colonial authorities employed with the colonial population in an attempt to sway loyalties away from the local Sufi shaykh toward the local colonial administrator or representative of European rule. As a part of this propaganda, an appeal was made by European authorities, strangely enough, on behalf of Islam and the fundamentalist vision mentioned above.

In the mid-eighteenth century in Arabia, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab established a fundamentalist movement, the Wahhabiyya, that sought to cleanse Islam of what he perceived to be the innovations of the Sufis such as saint veneration that in his perception amounted to idolatry and return the religion to its original purity.¹⁰ Later, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the Salafiyya reform movement came to prominence rejecting the Sufi orders not in an effort to return to the past but in an effort to better cope with the modern challenges represented by Western advancements and the future. Salafis considered the Sufi orders as anachronistic and a hindrance to Muslim societies hoping to modernize in an effort to keep up with the European powers. Both movements, even though they criticized Sufism from different vantage points, influenced the perceptions of European Orientalists and colonial researchers in regards to Sufism and the orders. Both movements also provided a valuable confirmation from within Islamic circles that colonial authorities could use to attack those orders that posed a threat. As will be seen below, French colonial officials employed views of the Murids influenced by Orientalist, Wahhabi, and Salafi thought.

Generally, the limited Western historiography of the Murids has succeeded in presenting the tariqa as a predominant force in the colonial and postcolonial history of Senegal. The initial historical studies of the Murids were produced by French colonial officials who were primarily interested in securing French rule over this important segment of colonial subjects and justifying the “civilizing mission.” To that end, research and surveillance were undertaken to identify any threats that may have been posed by Muslims in Senegal and potential problems for the consolidation of French rule. Most of the early colonial authors of these reports had been recruited from the colonial service in France’s first colony in Africa, Algeria. Paul Marty and Xavier Coppalani,

among others, came to Senegal with knowledge of Muslim society, Islamic history, and Arabic that was steeped in Orientalism and guided by a will to dominate rather than truly understand. In Senegal, these colonial scholars encountered a form of Islam that was different in some respects from that of Algeria and was termed *Islam noir*, or “black Islam,” and generally derided and criticized as a lesser, infantile form of the religion.

Paul Marty’s *Études sur l’Islam au Sénégal*, published in 1917 for the colonial administration, stands as the germinal work concerning the Murids. Although the order is only one part of the two-volume study, Marty presented some of the earliest information and figures associated with the Muridiyya. Produced ten years before the death of Amadu Bamba, Marty had some benefit from hindsight. By 1917, French control in Senegal had been an established fact for almost thirty years, and the French fear of a large Islamic-Murid revolt had begun to subside. The growth of French colonial confidence, however, did not remove much of the Orientalist and *Islam noir* bias present throughout Marty’s study. With the notable exception of the founder, Amadu Bamba, most Murid shaykh were treated by Marty as ignorant charlatans whose involvement in the tariqa was motivated primarily by self-interest and greed. Coming long before A. J. Arberry’s condemnation of popular Sufi mystics, Marty commented on the activities of the Murid shaykh: “Today, the Murids, without earthly or spiritual worries, use all their forces in frenzied labor for the great profit of the shaykh. With the emancipation of slavery in 1905, the Murid shaykh sensed and appreciated the benefits of liberty and placed freed slaves under their rule. What resulted was slavery of a new genre—voluntary and religious in form.”¹¹

The Murid disciples, by extension, were even more ignorant and at a loss to resist the order and succumbed to a form of religious slavery. For the most part, Marty and his contemporaries held that the Muridiyya as an African Sufi order used Islam as a mere façade to accumulate political influence and economic wealth for its leaders. The racist perception on the part of the French colonial authorities that their African subjects in Senegal were practicing an inferior and diluted form of Islam gave the Orientalists from the Algerian service even more reason to place Murid-Sufi Islam and its developing society at odds with the seemingly progressive and modern nature of French rule that promised peace, development, and justice. Evidence of this attitude can be found abundantly in Marty’s study: “The black mentality is completely incapable of bearing the metaphysical concepts of the oriental Semites and the ecstatic digressions of the Sufis. These scenes are nothing other than an act of common prayer, soon followed by dances, choreographed mimes and bamboulas of which the Blacks are so fond.”¹²

Marty’s biography of Amadu Bamba acknowledged his scholarly credentials and charitable persona, yet at the same time sought to subsume these positive qualities by confusing Amadu Bamba’s religious notoriety with political ambition. In this context, Marty labeled Bamba as a member of the “eternal

insurgency” of Islamic reform in the region that had fought for centuries to gain power. Amadu Bamba’s early experiences in the courts of the Islamic reformer Mabda Jaxu and the last king of Kajoor, Lat Joor, were judged by Marty as inspirational to his political ambitions. Bamba’s subsequent movements and the establishment of various Murid centers were considered by Marty as political acts that exploited the weaknesses of certain local rulers and threatened French plans for control.¹³ In fact, as we will analyze later, Bamba’s experiences in both courts were involuntary and disgusted him and led him to renounce all forms of politics whether they were secular or based on Islamic reform. In truth, Amadu Bamba saw both forms of political organization as one and the same and equally damning for those participating.

Later, seeking to compliment Amadu Bamba’s reputation as a scholar, Marty compared him to a medieval European sage.¹⁴ This attitude, of course, relegated Bamba, his religion, and the Murid order to the past and to a static tradition opposed to the “civilizing mission” and by extension to modernity as conceived of at the time by a Western power. In terms of further criticizing the practice of Islam noir by the Murids, Marty himself noted that a French governor attempted to admonish Amadu Bamba over the doctrinal errors of some of his disciples in 1889. In spite of the Orientalist bias against Islam, the Islam of the Arab cultures in North Africa and the Middle East was held to be of a higher civilizational order than indigenous or non-Islamic African beliefs and practices. In conceptualizing the Murid development, Marty explained that the “tainted Islam” of the Sufi order was a step in the progression of the Wolof from their pre-Islamic beliefs to some kind of perceived orthodox Islam. Conversion to Islam, in this context, was a means of societal advancement. In the achievement of a higher form of civilization, it was hoped that Africans in the colonies would be more amendable to rule by an even higher civilization, that of Western Europe.

By the term *tainted Islam*, Marty was alluding to what he believed was the persistence of pre-Islamic African beliefs and practices within the Murid order. Surprisingly, considering Marty’s extensive background in studying Islam and Muslim societies, the chief piece of evidence put forward for the syncretism of the Murid order with pre-Islamic African beliefs is the veneration of Amadu Bamba and other Murid notables by disciples and the extremely close relationship between Murid followers and their particular *shaykh*, or spiritual leader. The veneration of living and dead Sufi masters is common throughout the Sufi world and not an African influence per se. Marty’s misunderstanding on this point may be due to his exposure to an Islam in North Africa that had come under the reforming influence of the Salafis who would have identified the elevation of Sufi leaders by their disciples as a religious influence from outside of Islam and thus indictable as an innovation.

Marty’s conclusions concerning Amadu Bamba and the beliefs and practices of the Murid order are better understood by a consideration of how the

issues of power, influence, and fear guided those conclusions. The governor-general of French West Africa, William Ponty, had summed up the basis of French concerns about the Murids in 1910, seven years prior to the appearance of Marty's study.

The followers of the sect rely entirely on their shaykh for the direction of their earthly life and for guarantees of their future one, it matters little to us. But we cannot turn our eyes from the repercussion of a form of propaganda which concerns equally our political, administrative, and social actions. *It is undeniable that for the Murid our authority scarcely exists* and that in matters concerning his disciples it is often the shaykh who intervenes and decides for them. Finally, one cannot disguise the fact that if the sect develops it will greatly disturb the economic life of Senegal. Under the cover of religion, a part of the public fortune is removed from the colony each year.¹⁵

Thus, the Murid Sufi order was considered to be a contemporaneous colonizing force within the colony of Senegal that was competing with the French for the loyalty and the revenues of the people. Further evidence of this perception of the Murids as a competitor comes in the repeated use of the phrase *terres neuves* by the colonial authorities to describe new Murid settlements such as Darou Mousty. For the Murids, of course, these were not new lands. Darou Mousty, for example, is only a short distance from the older settlement of Mbacké-Kajoor where Maam Cerno and Amadu Bamba's father had previously resided. Marty's perception of the Murids and the early actions undertaken by the administration to counter Murid expansion vividly illustrate Said's view that Orientalism was linked to questions of power and rule.

Modernity and the Murids

In addition to rectifying aspects of the Orientalist approach to Islamic and Sufi history, we must also come to terms with the related discourse surrounding Islam and its supposed antipathy to all that is termed modern. Scholarly discussions of the correct meanings of the terms *modern*, *modernity*, and *modernization* have produced numerous and sometimes conflicting definitions of each word. As mentioned above, according to Orientalists, the Islamic world did not participate in the creation of the modern age characterized by many historians as variously encompassing the European voyages of exploration, the industrial and liberal revolutions, and the expansion of state power. On the part of the Islamic world, there was either outright resistance to modern trends, hopeless attempts to "catch-up" as demonstrated by the Ottoman Empire ("The Sick Man of Europe"), or an inherent inability within Islam to

become modern with the Sufi orders receiving much of the blame in this respect.

Regarding modern history or the modern age, Hodgson saw the signal events referred to above as encompassing much more than Western Europe alone and, in fact, considered them to be world events characterized by *transmutation*, or the interrelated unity of changes both within and outside Europe. The transmutation as it evolved in the West could not, according to Hodgson, have occurred without drawing upon influences from as far away as China and especially from the Islamic world. Furthermore, the Western transmutation did not proceed in isolation but was affected by and in turn influenced events outside of Europe so much so that Hodgson refers to a corresponding “transmutation in Islamdom.”¹⁶

Hodgson also criticized the very use by scholars of the term *modern* as relative and subject to being frequently defined “. . . according to various parochial European standards.”¹⁷ He has not been alone in questioning the politics behind the employment of the term.¹⁸ Along different lines, Frederick Jameson has pointed out that the term *modern* was used as early as the fifth century C.E. in Europe to differentiate the contemporary present from the historical past, and Jonathan Friedman has noted that successive empires frequently made a similar distinction between themselves, as modern, and the past.¹⁹ According to this line of criticism, the Abbasid Empire of the ninth century C.E., for example, was termed *modern* for its time in relation to preceding historical events. In this relative sense, *modern* has been used by many European authorities and writers in a similar fashion as the word *civilized* had been employed by colonial authors to separate the West from Asia and Africa. The use of modern and its antithesis, however, denotes that the “other” in this case is antique or “traditional,” unchanging, and thus outside of historical development and progress. The use of the terms *modern* and *civilized* denigrates the unmodern or uncivilized “other” and places them in need of Western colonial intervention via the “civilizing mission” or, in later neocolonial periods, “development.” Therefore, the employment of the idea that Islam and Sufism are not conducive to being modern really says nothing about the subject under discussion but rather simply indicates a variation of the Orientalist point of view.²⁰

Modernity as a useful concept is also problematic. The term has frequently been employed for many of the same purposes discussed above as modern. Michel-Rolph Trouillot has remarked that in its use, “Modernity always required an Other and an Elsewhere.”²¹ Modernity, in the sense of an awareness of being modern, has long been associated with the West as both the originator of modernity and the administrator of modernity to others elsewhere. However, modernity as a unique formulation of the West has been under much challenge from those envisioning the possibility of alternative modernities existing outside of the Western model trumpeting European developments such as capitalism, individualism, and so on. Michel Foucault’s

comments in regard to modernity and the European Enlightenment was indicative of this possibility due to his statement that *modernity* may be considered to be an attitude rather than a historical era or period of time. According to Foucault, “Modernity is often characterized in terms of consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition.”²² This definition, even though it was framed in terms of the changes brought on by the Enlightenment, opens up the possibility that societies and cultures outside of the West and at different times can forge their own modernities based upon perceived developments or changes in relation to their own historical past. In this case, *modernity* is understood to be not only an awareness on the part of individuals and collectives of historical changes but a consideration of what these changes mean as well. These changes cannot be understood only in terms of cultural and religious developments, but must also consider social, political, and economic changes as well. Likewise, for a truly comprehensive analysis of modernity, the interactions between local as well as global influences on historical change must be incorporated.

The present study makes the argument that the Murid Sufi order was, in fact, more than just “alternatively modern” in a Senegambian context by generating its own modernity that reflected both regional and international influences. This approach, however, necessitates a blurring and crossing of historical and geographical boundaries that have influenced much of the historiography concerning the Murids. In terms of historical boundaries, the watershed point for many historical studies of Africa has long been the European colonial conquest accomplished between the latter decades of the nineteenth century and the onset of World War I in 1914. The tendency has been for historians to either focus on the period before or the period after this conquest and to treat the two opposing eras, *precolonial* versus *colonial* or *modern*, as distinct and relatively unrelated. The interchangeability of the terms *colonial* and *modern* have not occurred by accident in the Western historiography of Africa. The emergence of modern Africa has been long attributed to the European colonization of Africa.

Donal Cruise O’Brien’s *The Mourides of Senegal*, published in 1971, is a good demonstration of the effects that such a tendency has had on the Western historiography of the Murids. In regards to the impetus behind the founding of the order, O’Brien clearly stated, “The Mouride movement originated, of course, as a response to French imperialism, which (in its direct and indirect effects) created the social environment in which the brotherhood took root and grew.”²³ This thesis held that the political vacuum created by the French conquest and the subsequent introduction of a cash crop economy were the chief influences behind the establishment of the Murid order. There is no sense of historical agency whether African or Muslim within this explanation and no allowance given to the important history of Islamic reform and Sufism prior to the French conquest. Influenced by Marty’s study of the Murids, O’Brien condensed Murid religious beliefs and practices into the “charisma”

surrounding Amadu Bamba and stated, “The exact means by which the disciples expect to accede to paradise were not altogether clear to the observer, and are not always entirely clear even to the followers themselves.”²⁴ Murid disciples, in this perspective, were relegated to being gullible and largely voiceless followers of shaykh who exploited their labor on behalf of their own self interest.

Fortunately, the emphasis on the French conquest as the starting point for an understanding of the Murids has come into question recently. For Senegambia, there are varying dates for the colonial conquest. The regions closest to the French post at St. Louis and their bases in the lower Senegal River valley fell under European control by the 1860s. The interior kingdoms of Kajoor, Bawol, and Jolof, however, did not fall to the French until the 1880s and 1890s. David Robinson’s latest book, *Paths of Accommodation*, is an excellent example of the beneficial blurring of the precolonial-colonial boundary. His examination of the emergence of accommodation on the part of Muslim societies in Senegal and Mauritania (including the Murid order) and the French begins in 1880 prior to much of the conquest of the interior and includes the inaugural period of colonial rule to 1920. Robinson’s chronology reflects the important roles that precolonial political, social, and economic factors played not only in the French conquest itself but in the very formation of colonial rule. The process of colonization is presented as a gradual trend marked by various periods of war, negotiation, retreat, and consolidation. Most importantly, one can see through Robinson’s temporal framework the crucial influence of precolonial historical forces such as Islamic reform and Sufism on the colonial era. Thus, rather than positing the conquest as an abrupt about-face in West African history, an important sense of continuity and transformation is conveyed.²⁵

James Searing’s latest work entitled “*God Alone is King*”: *Islam and Emancipation in Senegal* proceeded even further in this vein. Like Robinson’s, Searing’s time frame extended from the period prior to the conquest to the functional period of the colonial administration in the interior. An African, or to be more precise a Senegambian, chronology was the basis of Searing’s study in which the French conquest and colonization of the region appear as episodes in a continuing Wolof history. For example, the conquest is examined as a chapter in the long-running Wolof civil war between the local secular aristocrats and Islamic reformers. Not only was the course of the French conquest shaped by this African conflict, but the structure of the colonial administration and its functions were also influenced by the struggle between Wolof secular and religious elites. The Murid order, rather than springing to life from a French-made mold, was instead viewed as a product of the centuries-old development of Islam in Senegambia and the conflict between secular and religious power in the region.²⁶

Harkening back to Foucault’s notion of modernity, the present study, influenced by the approaches of Robinson and Searing, claims that the historical

“discontinuity” that makes up the core of Murid notions of modernity came not with the European conquest but rather began to emerge with the rise of Islamic reform movements and Sufi orders that sought to break with the past and to revolutionize West African society, culture, politics, and economics. The Murids, as a Sufi order and promoter of reform, played an integral role as an agent in the development of this modernity for its followers in Senegambia.

If modernity is viewed as a perception or awareness of change, we must address the various historical factors that contributed to this change. For this purpose, the identifiable social, cultural, political, and economic components of historical change or discontinuity will be considered as factors within the process of modernization. The modernization of Senegambia must be studied from multiple angles. The progression of the Islamic reform movements and the growth of the Sufi orders is one important angle, but the impact of the growth of French influence and the subsequent colonization must be considered as another major angle. Murid modernization and their corresponding modernity therefore originated from within and without.

Within the order, the restructuring of personal and social life according to a revitalized emphasis on Islamic law was an integral part of the reformist message of Amadu Bamba and received much emphasis by his younger brother Maam Cerno. In terms of Sufism, the theology of the Murid order was relatively similar to that of most other Sufi orders, with the exception that work on behalf of the order was elevated to a form of devotion and worship. The organizational structure of the Murids also followed a general Sufi pattern with a hierarchy led by the founding saint who is succeeded by a *khalifah*. Below the *khalifah*, was a strata of *shaykh* who led groups of disciples, or *taalibe*, who made up the base of the hierarchy. Within Murid communities, this hierarchy was not just applied to religious matters but also served to provide a new sense of political, economic, and social order. The Murids, in a definite sense, provided their followers with a shadow government that ruled over most aspects of personal and communal life.

The other important thread of the modernization of the Murids came from outside the order via French colonial rule and encompassed economic and sociopolitical developments. In terms of economic changes stemming from French rule, much attention has been paid to the significant Murid involvement in the colonial cash crop economy of Senegal through peanut production, which in turn tied the order to the European capitalist economy and international markets. Therefore, economic studies of the Murids have understandably focused primarily on the link between the Murid order and peanut production. Jean Copans' *Les marabouts de l'arachide* (The Peanut Marabouts, or holy men) is most indicative of this approach. According to this Marxist-inspired examination, the birth of the Murids was the result of the combination of the Sufi character of Senegalese Islam in the organizational sense and the cultivation of peanuts for the colonial cash crop economy. For

Copans, the attraction of the order for its disciples was a material one centered on economic needs and desires. Copans found nothing inherent in Murid ideology that produced the form of labor found in their villages. In fact, he stated that Murid labor relations were based on preexisting Wolof patron-client relationships and that the repartition of land under the order generally followed Wolof historical practices.²⁷

While much has legitimately been made by historians of the Murid connection between work as devotion and the peanut production that brought the order significant wealth, this study seeks to balance this view by pointing out that Murid communities such as Darou Mousty straddled two different types of economies. On the one hand, the Murid town exhibited aspects of a moral economy as described by James Scott in his work on Southeast Asian peasantries in which subsistence food production dominated the activity of a precapitalist society.²⁸ Success in food production, particularly during the earlier years, did much more than peanuts to attract disciples to the order. Murid and French sources attest that farmers such as Maam Cerno who could maintain agricultural surpluses of the main food crop, millet, even during prolonged famine and drought were greatly distinguished among the population. While the attraction of grain supplies supports, in a sense, Copan's focus on the economic lure of the order, Murid shaykh and disciples interpreted the full granaries from a spiritual point of view as a sign of divine approval of the Murid way. Yet, contrary to Scott's view that a moral economy could not withstand the imposition of a colonial export economy, cash crop production did become integral to later Murid success. Rather than avoiding or succumbing to a capitalist market economy, the Murids embraced it and adapted cash crop production to their beliefs and practices resulting in material and spiritual benefits for the community and its members.

Another aspect of Murid modernization via colonialism came from the inevitable political relationship that emerged between the order and the colonial government and the incumbent social change due to this relationship. The colonial government, of course, was not the first secular authority in Senegambia. Sufi leaders and Islamic reformists had long grappled with the question of what kind of relationship, if any, should properly exist between their communities and secular rulers. Mention of Christian Coulon's *Le Marabout et le Prince* is warranted here to provide a view of the historical context for this issue. This study was mainly concerned with issues surrounding power in Senegambian society rather than economics. In Coulon's view, the rise of the Murids should be seen as a movement of social and political reconstruction within a colonial society as Sufi shaykh came to replace the former aristocratic rulers shorn of their power and influence in the eyes of the general population. According to Coulon, Sufi Islam with its long-standing distrust of secular political leadership provided the marabouts with the perfect foundation for their power in an oppositional sense. In the context of the transition to colonial rule, since the Sufi shaykh were not a part of the secular

leadership and based their power and influence on their religious notoriety, they were much more adaptable to political changes. The capitulation of the precolonial states did nothing to diminish the power of the Sufi clerics while the same cannot be said of their secular counterparts. Notable to this work and serving to support the argument against colonization as a historical boundary, Coulon placed the expansion of the Murids within a regional historical context that took account for some of the precolonial history of Islamic reform and the Sufi orders.²⁹

In spite of, and because of, Amadu Bamba's renunciation of all political authority, his lieutenants, including Maam Cerno, took on the roles of diplomats and mediators with the colonial government. From the beginning, Maam Cerno sought accommodation with the French authorities in order to preserve as much autonomy for his communities as possible, and he was largely successful in this respect. He understood and exploited the structure of the colonial government to advance and defend the interests of his branch of the Murid order. Yet, colonization did make inroads into Murid life. The French sought to institute public health measures and offices in Murid regions and to build *écoles* in Murid communities such as Darou Mousty. These efforts were constantly negotiated between Murid shaykh and the colonial authorities with the French only achieving limited success from their point of view. Additionally, Murids paid their colonial taxes, provided labor to the government, and served as soldiers during both world wars. Colonial efforts to develop the interior also affected the order as roads and railroads were built providing faster and easier transportation between the Murid areas and the main ports of St. Louis and Dakar. Murids inevitably took those roads to the coastal ports and joined the cosmopolitan milieu emerging there. Many, such as the Murid recruits, went even further to other African colonies, southwest Asia, and Europe and returned to their communities as different men and yet still Murids. To a great extent, all of these colonial interactions and obligations, such as peanut production, taxes, labor, and military service, were recast into a Murid discourse by both Murid shaykh and disciples to fit Murid conceptions of their history and modernity.

Methodology and Sources

The methodology of the present study seeks to expand the view of Murid history outside of the relatively narrow political and economic paradigms of the older studies of the order. Several of the more recent works concerning the Murids and Sufism in West Africa have influenced my methodology. David Robinson's latest work, *Paths of Accommodation*, discussed in a different context above, was not specifically concerned with the Murids but did introduce very important themes to any study of the order. Most useful was Robinson's

attention to the accumulation of capital in various forms of value whether economic, social, or symbolic by Islamic leaders and Sufi orders. While economic capital consisted of material wealth, social capital was based upon “networks of relationships and skills that could be mobilized for particular needs and constituencies.”³⁰ Logically, social capital, according to Robinson, is dependent upon the possession of economic or symbolic capital or both and the possession of one form of capital tends to enhance the others. In this context, symbolic capital was defined as “the accumulation of prestige and power within a group marked by language, custom, kinship, or religion.”³¹ This form of capital was possessed by contesting groups: Wolof aristocrats, Muslim notables, and the French colonial administration. Muslim social capital could be based upon a number of factors from scholarship and teaching to making the hajj and leading armed jihad. For Sufis, there were additional factors that composed symbolic capital such as genealogical and scholarly descent, baraka, the reception of visions or dreams or both that provided divine confirmation of the receiver’s mystical status and the performance of miracles. Robinson’s use of the term *symbolic capital* was vastly superior to the previously popular term *charisma*, which was too simplistic in its Weberian definition to fit a Sufi and West African context.

James Searing’s *God Alone is King*, discussed above, has also served to help redefine the parameters of any examination of the Murid order and has influenced the methodology of the present study. The elevation of a local Wolof historical context with the accompanying return of African-Muslim agency has been crucial to truly reconceptualizing Murid history.³² Central to Searing’s success in this matter was the inclusion of Wolof and Murid historical sources both written and oral. These sources have historical value as primary sources to compliment and contest the French archival record and, unlike the French sources, provide Murid analyses of the historical events and trends that have contributed to the formation and development of the order.

The relatively recent publication in French of *Mame Thierno Birahim* by Ousseynou Cissé also exemplifies the great value of using indigenous Murid sources. Cissé drew upon both written and oral sources in his study of Maam Cerno, his relationship to Amadu Bamba, and his impact on Murid history. The reliance on Murid sources gave Cissé’s examination a strong Murid voice that is not present in many other works in addition to filling in much of the historical “gap” concerning his topic at large. There is, however, an inherent drawback in taking this approach too far. Cissé’s book does not pretend to be objective and roughly constitutes a hagiography with little consideration of French sources or theoretical issues.³³

A similar approach to utilizing indigenous sources was previously employed by Louis Brenner in his work on a Tijani cleric who was a contemporary of Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno. In *West African Sufi*, Brenner relied heavily upon one informant, Hampate Bâ, who was a disciple and biographer of the Sufi in question, Cerno Bokar Saalif Taal. Brenner’s work

attempted to explore the degree to which spiritual practices and mystical teachings had remained important within Sufi Islam in West Africa after European colonization. His portrait of Cerno Bokar reveals a vibrant Sufism in West Africa during the colonial period in which the foundational texts of Sufism and the Tijaniyya were actively being taught through newly developed pedagogical devices adapted to local conditions in the region. Noting that many prior studies had focused on the political or social contexts of West African Sufi orders, Brenner relied on indigenous oral and written sources to provide insight into the religious beliefs and practices of an influential Sufi cleric. These sources provided a much-needed voice within the literature of Islam and Sufism during the colonial era, which had been dominated by reference to the French colonial record. Although Cerno Bokar was not the epitome of West African Islam and Sufism in its entirety, Brenner justified his largely biographical approach by noting the important popularity of Cerno Bokar and his teachings and by positing the religious leader as a product of the historical development of Islam in West Africa. Additionally, Brenner's use of such indigenous sources necessitated a discussion of the critical value of consulting informants who are admittedly unobjective regarding the subject under research. A sole reliance on self-consciously biased indigenous sources for factual information was problematic, to say the least, but as Brenner noted, the French sources contained comparable biases in their interpretations and even in their omissions. Brenner reasoned that the perceptions of his informant had an inherent value regardless of their factual applicability due to their alternative point of view in relation to the French colonial sources.³⁴

The present study employs a similar methodology regarding its use of indigenous oral informants and written sources. The written sources are either in Wolofal (Wolof written in an Arabic script) or Arabic. One text, a biography of Maam Cerno authored by one of his sons, Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, was written in both Wolofal and Arabic. Another important source is the epic poem *An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Biraḥim*, composed by the celebrated Wolof poet Shaykh Moussa Kâ. Although the biography of Amadu Bamba entitled *Les bienfaits de l'Éternel ou la biographie de Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké* by one of his sons, Sëriñ Bachir Mbacké, does not specifically concern Maam Cerno and Darou Mousty, it contains valuable information and insights into Maam Cerno's role within the Muridiyya. There are also numerous letters written from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno that have been preserved in Darou Mousty by the archivist and historian, Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla.

The oral sources for this study were drawn in part from various notables in and around Darou Mousty. Within the town, I interviewed three distinguished authorities, Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, and Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, regarding general information about Maam Cerno's life and the history of Darou Mousty. However, the majority of my

informants were simply the descendents of some of the original settlers of Darou Mousty and its satellite villages. This aspect of the research was designed to gain information concerning the lives of the taalibe who broke ground at Darou Mousty and their perceptions of the Muridiyya and the work to which they had devoted themselves. Fortunately, I was even able to interview the last two surviving original taalibe who came to Darou Mousty in 1912. Though these informants spoke primarily about their fathers, or themselves in two cases, they also provided a portrait of Maam Cerno and the Muridiyya from a disciple's point of view. The voice of the simple taalibe has never been present in previous studies of the Murids.

Due to rules of proper behavior, I was prohibited from interviewing any of the daughters or female relatives of the original taalibe or even inquiring about the experiences of the mothers of my informants, beyond a very general nature. However, in one case, I was able to ask a question of a Murid matron through her son. Women did play an important role in the settlement of Darou Mousty and considered their work as a contribution to the realization of the Murid vision. The part that Murid women played in the history of Darou Mousty will be dealt with, in a very limited fashion, in the context of the establishment of the town.

On the one hand, Murid sources help to fill in the gaps that exist in the French colonial record regarding the history of the founding of Darou Mousty and the work of its founder, Maam Cerno. On the other hand, these same sources frequently contest French accounts. The political, social, and economic themes that have characterized so much of the prior work on the order will be examined in this study from a Murid point of reference through the inclusion of Murid written and oral sources. The life of Maam Cerno and the establishment of Darou Mousty serve as an excellent environment to test some of these ideas and to reinterpret them. Likewise, such an examination will raise new themes that, while well known to most Murids, are lacking in other studies.

Organization

The book proceeds thematically. The first theme concerns the historical context out of which the Murid order developed and analyzes the emergence of the Muridiyya as a reform and revival movement within the historical milieu of Senegambia. The development of Sufism in West Africa and the concordant ascendance of reformist Islam prior to the advent of the Murids is traced in the larger historical context of the effects of the Atlantic slave trade and the Wolof civil wars. The prospect of a Sufi reform movement may appear as an oxymoron in light of Islamic fundamentalist and modernist views of the incompatibility of Sufism and orthodoxy. Yet, across West Africa during the

period under discussion, Sufism and the Sufi orders provided a major vehicle and a distinct discourse for reforming Islam and promoting social and political change. The widely perceived dichotomy between Sufism and orthodoxy in the context of reform was not present in West Africa during this time.

The second theme deals with the formation of Murid identity as a process of synthesis by integrating Amadu Bamba and then Maam Cerno into the historical process examined in the first theme. The early career of Amadu Bamba and his relationship with Maam Cerno is reconstructed with the inclusion of Murid sources that serve to fill in many of the gaps in the colonial historical record and provide important Murid perceptions of the historical setting in which the order first began to develop. The establishment of French rule is also dealt with particularly concerning its effects upon the growth of the Murids. Rather than being portrayed as a detriment to the Murid mission, French actions helped to fuel the increasing popularity of the order, and, likewise, French inability to completely take charge of the situation in the new colony left the order with much latitude in which to expand.

The third theme considers how a community of Murids put Amadu Bamba's mission of reform and mysticism, which effectively composed a new moral order, into practice. This process is examined as the product of a Murid "social imaginary" in terms of the images and stories that were generated about the founding and early years of Darou Mousty. In a related sense, Darou Mousty also exemplifies an "imagined community" in which the preservation of life histories and historical narratives help to bind a community together, give it meaning, and confer legitimacy. This third theme follows Maam Cerno and the history of his branch of the order from 1912 until the independence of Senegal in 1960. It is in this context that the two streams of modernization for the Murids truly came into contact on an increasingly regular basis. We are thus presented with a story of continuity, adaptability, and development in which the Murids of Darou Mousty simultaneously attempted to continue the religious mission of mysticism and reform and negotiate the developing French colonial environment. I argue that the best way in which to conceive of the relationship between colonialism and the Murid order is to view the relationship as symbiotic. Colonial policies and actions did affect the development and organization of the Murid order, yet these same policies and actions were influenced and negotiated by the Murids.

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 ultimately led to the practical incorporation of Darou Mousty into the colonial administration for the first time. Yet, this incorporation was not easy. In 1914, the French saw Darou Mousty as a threat and the Murids as a rival colonizing force in the rural areas. By the end of the war, due to Murid contributions of soldiers and requisitions to the war effort and a change of heart within the colonial administration, a spirit of mutual accommodation was achieved and would characterize the remainder of the period of colonial rule. The accommodation that was achieved, however, was the result of an almost continual process of dialogue between the

Murids and the French. As an integral part of this process, Murid notables and disciples came to assimilate aspects of colonial rule such as taxation, military and labor recruitment, and participation in the cash crop economy into Murid perceptions of history and identity using a distinct Murid discourse. Darou Mousty preserved a surprisingly high degree of autonomy during the colonial period and due to its accumulated symbolic and socioeconomic capital was able to project a potent influence into the realm of colonial politics. This influence was used to both protect and advance Murid interests in Darou Mousty.

The final part of the book focuses on the oral tradition of Darou Mousty; its preservation, interpretation, and transmission. For the most part, the Murid oral traditions under examination are in the form of life histories and were collected in interviews with the descendents of the original settlers and the last two surviving members of that group. These men were largely ordinary Murid disciples who, prior to this study, have been ignored or relegated to an anonymous and faceless mass. In some ways, by consulting these informants, we are examining the perceptions of a subaltern group of the subaltern.

The oral traditions are analyzed from two perspectives. The first considers how the framing of the life histories by my informants emulated and contributed to the generally accepted Murid ideology of the proper role of a Murid taalibe within the order. In this sense, the life histories that were presented to me were meant to validate the Murid mission and to provide a model for present-day Murid disciples to follow. Also, in many ways, the presentations of the life histories mirrored the popular interpretation of Maam Cerno's own life and the relationship that he had with Amadu Bamba. The other perspective returns to the concept of modernity outlined earlier with additional considerations from Baudelaire.³⁵ In his criticism of art, Baudelaire believed that modernity contained within it the desire on the part of individuals to grasp the "heroic" aspect of the contemporary moment involved in historical change and to "heroize" the actors and actions that were a part of that moment. The biographies composed by Murids of Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno understandably present the two notables as heroes who are at the center of monumental actions. What may be surprising about this perspective is that it can also be applied to the life histories of common Murid disciples that were collected for this study. The descendents of the original settlers of Darou Mousty have heroized the oral traditions surrounding their ancestors to signify the importance of their lives and actions and the times that they lived in, especially in relation to the changes that have since occurred. Furthermore, for Baudelaire, being modern meant adopting a certain attitude toward recapturing that which is "eternal" within the perpetual movement of history. It is possible to glean from the oral traditions Murid perceptions of what this eternal aspect was, and is, considered to be. The Murid view of the eternal encompasses the past, present, and future and revolves around the twin

concepts of Islamic reform and the Sufi mission of an understanding and union with God. For the Murids of Darou Mousty, the eternal was a continuum that traversed the earthly world and paradise. The Murids were not the first Sufi order to search for this way, and the knowledge that they were a part of a larger historical process also informed the Murid understanding of the eternal. Yet the distinctive way in which Amadu Bamba and his followers interpreted the search did make the Murids unique as opposed to prisoners of that history.

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SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE, ISLAMIC REFORM, AND SUFISM IN WEST AFRICA

Introduction

This chapter proceeds from the contention that the advent of the Murid Sufi order was a part of a larger historical process involving the progression of Islam across West Africa. In this sense, it is necessary to examine the major trends within the history of Islam in West Africa and how those trends both shaped and reflected the larger societal context of West African history. To go a step further, the societal context within West Africa was continually affected by events from outside of the region emanating from either North Africa or the Middle East and later from Europe. What results from this discussion is the presentation and analysis of a more comprehensive view of the historical forces that influenced the emergence of the Murids. In this sense, the Murids are not a product largely of French colonization, devoid of agency and a place within the larger history of Senegambia and West Africa. Rather, the Murid order is considered to be an integral part of the continuing historical development of Islam in West Africa.

The arrival and early spread of Islam in West Africa constitutes the logical start of this progression. For the purposes of the present study, the initial phase of the implantation of Islam in West Africa encompasses a span of time from roughly the eighth century C.E. to the sixteenth century C.E. This phase was characterized by the predominately pacific conversion of an important yet a small minority of West Africans and the existence of the expansive empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay that looked largely to the trans-Saharan trading networks as their foyer for cross-cultural contact and trade with the world. Largely absent from this initial phase is a significant presence of Sufism and its associated orders and an ideology of Islamic reform and revival in West Africa.¹

During the sixteenth century, however, West Africa began to undergo a series of changes largely due to the rise of the Atlantic slave trade and the reorienting of commerce away from the desert edge and toward the coast.

Concurrently, the foci of political power in the region also witnessed shifts that largely reflected the influence of the Atlantic slave trade. The stabilizing effects of the medieval empires vanished with the fall of Songhay in 1591 as many smaller states emerged to compete over access to the growing Atlantic trade. In general, the era of the Atlantic slave trade witnessed the militarization of West African societies and an accompanying environment of political and social disorder that approached chaos at times in certain regions. This is the historical context in which Islam in West Africa entered into a new phase this time marked by the popularization of Islam via Sufism and the Sufi orders and bearing a strong imprint of reform and revival.

The most overt effect of this transformation within Islam in West Africa was the promotion of armed jihad as a means of reforming society. Although there was an obvious religious component to these armed movements in the sense that the leaders and participants sought to correct the doctrine and behavior of West African Muslims, particularly those who held political power, the jihad must also be considered as critiques of the social, political, and economic conditions within West Africa that were significantly impacted by the Atlantic slave trade. *Jihad* in this context thus takes on the aspect of a revolution complete with grievances, a guiding ideology, an organizational structure, and a vision of a postrevolution future.² In most of the reform movements of this era, Sufism played a vital role in both the ideological and organizational realms. From the Sharr Bubba jihad in the Senegal River valley during the late sixteen hundreds C.E. through the Islamic revolution of Usman dan Fodio in the early nineteenth century C.E. and culminating with the jihad in Senegambia on the eve of French colonization in the latter decades of the eighteen hundreds, the tide of Islamic reform and revolution in West Africa was of no less regional historical impact than the liberal revolutions in Europe at about the same time period.

The long-term result of the many efforts at Islamic reform and revolution, regardless of whether or not they were successful, and the simultaneous expansion of Sufism and the Sufi orders was the creation of a new layer of identity in West Africa that was recognizable prior to colonization. This identity was marked by an understanding among those affected individuals that change of a historic nature had been taking place because of the Islamic reform movements and the expansion of the Sufi orders. A new sense of collectivity had emerged in these centuries that sought to reshape the social, cultural, economic, and political landscape largely in response to the devastating impact of the Atlantic slave trade. The struggles, both violent and pacific, of the reformists and Sufis may also be interpreted as an attempt to introduce and develop a new moral order in West Africa founded upon Islamic revival and mysticism that incorporated the new identity referred to above and simultaneously conferred new legitimacy upon those involved in the movements. This process, which was undertaken across much of the West African savannah for centuries, constitutes the first thread of modernization that ultimately contributed much to Murid modernity.

Early Path of Islam in West Africa

Islam and the Great Empires

Humphrey Fisher has proposed an intriguing model for examining the early history of Islam in West Africa.³ He identified the initial period during which Islam arrived south of the Sahara and the first sub-Saharan African converts were made as the “Quarantine Stage,” during which Muslims in West Africa segregated their living quarters, and thus much of their social lives, from indigenous non-Muslims. Foreign-born Muslims and local converts were a minority within West African societies for centuries, yet they occupied important political positions as officials and scribes and served as commercial agents in the trans-Saharan trade and the regional trade within sub-Saharan West Africa. Their utility to West African governments and economies and their relatively small numbers led to the establishment of a mutual relationship of toleration with their non-Muslim hosts. Fisher’s model is probably best demonstrated by the accommodation of Muslims within the royal court of Ghana as described by Al-Bakri in the eleventh century C.E.⁴ Yet, his model is also generally characteristic of the state of Islam in most of West Africa up to the seventeenth century as outlined below.



Map 1.1. Precolonial West Africa. Map by author.

Without descending to a utopian description of West Africa during the eras of the great empires such as Ghana, Mali, and Songhay (ca. fifth century C.E. to 1591 C.E.), it can be successfully argued that in many of the regions of West Africa that fell under the rule of these large states, there existed a greater degree of social order and political stability relative to the situation in these same regions that would come to exist during the height of the Atlantic slave trade and the century preceding European conquest. Traveling through the Mali Empire in 1351–52, the great traveler Ibn Battuta expressed admiration for the sense of justice in Mali and noted that “there is also the prevalence of peace in their country, the traveler is not afraid in it [Mali] nor is he who lives there in fear of the thief or of the robber by violence.”⁵ The three great empires referred to above existed to a large degree to service the trans-Saharan trading network and the maintenance of some semblance of peace and security was of obvious importance. Yet, these regions of West Africa were not without war, either between competing states or within states in the form of conflicts over succession to the throne.

Islam played a limited but important role in the affairs of these empires. Arabic sources dating from the eleventh century C.E. refer to Islamic states and Muslims in sub-Saharan West Africa. The kingdom of Takrur in the Senegal River valley, for example, occupied one end of the spectrum in regards to the prevalence of Islam in West Africa. The king of Takrur was noted by Al-Bakri as an ardent Muslim who applied the shari’a, or Islamic law. The neighboring kingdom of Sila was also under the rule of a Muslim king who, in contravention of Fisher’s idea of toleration, waged jihad against his pagan neighbors. In the middle of the spectrum existed states such as Ghana (ca. fifth to thirteenth centuries C.E.) and Gao (ca. tenth to fifteenth centuries C.E.). In an Arabic source of the eleventh century C.E., it was noted that the emperor of Ghana, while not a believer himself, welcomed Muslims to his court and employed Muslims within the bureaucracy. The capital of the empire consisted of two towns. One was reserved for the Muslims and contained mosques with salaried officials. At the royal court, Muslims were exempt from prostrating themselves before the ruler in respect to their beliefs and a mosque was maintained near the palace for their use while visiting or working in the court. There had been Muslim kings in Gao, the future political capital of the Songhay Empire, since the eleventh century.⁶ Yet, many non-Muslim practices were maintained in the court of Gao reflecting a syncretism of belief and practice among the upper class of the state. Meanwhile, the common people of Ghana and Gao, who made up the majority of the population as farmers, herders, and fisherfolk, remained unconverted.

In closer regard to Ghana, there are indications in al-Bakri that West Africans had converted and were counted among the Muslim population. These converts were primarily of the Soninke, or Serakhulle, ethnic group indigenous to Ghana and more specifically were noted to be engaged in the lucrative gold trade between the markets of Ghana and the southern gold

fields.⁷ This early group of West African Muslims would come to increasingly enjoy a reputation not only in commerce but also in Islamic learning and teaching as their families plied the trade routes in West Africa spreading both contact with the trans-Saharan trade and Islam. The scholarly and commercial lineages eventually came to be known by many names depending on what part of West Africa they had relocated to such as the Jakhanke in Senegambia, the Wangara along the desert edge, the Marka in the Niger Valley, the Juula in the more southerly regions, and the Wangarawa in Hausaland. Regardless of the name by which they are known, each group enjoys a similar reputation and claims descent from the early Soninke converts of Ghana. After the fall of Ghana around 1200 C.E., the Soninke Muslim merchants of Ghana emigrated to the Niger Valley where a new focus of political and economic power was emerging in Mali and subsequently made important contributions to the spread of Islam throughout much of West Africa.⁸

The Jakhanke branch of this commercial-Islamic diaspora is of most importance to the context of the present study. The written and oral sources concerning the history of the Jakhanke look to al-hajj Salim Suware as the founder of the Jakhanke. The noted scholar and teacher is credited with leading his family and followers from the clerical community of Dia on the Niger River to Bambuk around the year 1200 C.E. From their new base, the Jakhanke spread into much of Senegambia in the following centuries imparting their own brand of Islam characterized by a high level of scholarship and teaching and a pacifist interpretation of Islam's role in society at large in which the religion was held to be politically neutral. Al-hajj Salim Suware's pacifism and attention to learning would influence Islamic notables, such as Amadu Bamba, in later centuries and set this interpretation of Islam apart from the beliefs and activities of more militant Muslims, some of whom embraced scholarship yet rejected the position of political neutrality.⁹

In spite of the activities of these West African merchant families, Islam still remained a religion of a minority throughout this period. Robin Horton's theory of conversion illuminates why acceptance of Islam during these early centuries, even to a limited extent, was pursued primarily by the upper commercial and aristocratic classes in states such as Ghana, Gao, Mali, and later, Songhay.¹⁰ In a sense, the common people of West Africa occupied a different world from the long-distance merchants and aristocrats. For the farmers, pastoralists, and fisherfolk, what was important was the local environment in which they lived. This environment was dominated by local deities in many cases linked to nearby natural features such as mountains and rivers. Reverence for family ancestors was also instrumental in navigating this local environment, and access to the ancestors came in many forms including possession rites and divination. Belief in a supreme creator was present, but for the most part, this deity was remote from the daily practices of the common people that centered instead on local deities and familial ancestors for protection, healing, and guidance. The aristocrats and merchants, however, lived in a world that included a more global

context. Due to their contact with the trans-Saharan trade, these classes found it advantageous to convert to a greater or lesser extent to the new universal religion that in many instances could be superimposed over the general belief in West Africa of a supreme creator. For long-distance merchants, the universality of Islam allowed for a sense of religious well-being and protection when far from home and the local deities and ancestors. For the ruling class, Islam provided a new source of legitimacy for their power, both internationally and locally. Yet, the aristocrats had to be careful not to alienate the majority of their subjects who remained unconverted and thus frequently maintained local religious rites and aspects of culture within the court. Conversion to Islam among the commercial families of these states was generally more complete and stable, whereas, as will be seen below, conversion among the aristocrats was generally more syncretic with rulers vacillating from one generation to the next between a more “orthodox” form of Islam and a more syncretic form that was mixed with the local beliefs and practices.

The empires of Mali (ca. 1250–1600 C.E.) and Songhay (ca. 1450–1591 C.E.) present a more complex part of the spectrum of Islamization. Al-Bakri noted that while Mali was still a small vassal kingdom of the empire of Ghana, its monarchy had been converted by a visiting Muslim cleric, but the holy man had instructed the royals in only the rudiments of Islam.¹¹ This form of incomplete conversion is best demonstrated by the actions of Sunjata Keita, the founder of the empire of Mali. In the Mande oral tradition, Sunjata is presented as at best a nominal Muslim who relies for the most part on his abilities as a sorcerer for his success in both defeating his enemies and gaining the support of his people who in the vast majority are not Muslim. As the empire expanded, however, it came to rule over important commercial towns such as Jenne, Dia, Walata, and then Timbuktu that were linked more closely to the international trade across the Sahara and were thus more Islamic in character and practice. The rulers of Mali subsequently engaged more with Islam as characterized by the reign of Mansa Musa (1312–37 C.E.) who, in addition to being a pious Muslim, performed the hajj, built mosques, and endowed Islamic scholarship. Yet even after this shift toward a greater degree of Islamization, the royal court of Mali still exhibited aspects of the local culture and religion in ceremonies as described by the Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta who visited the court of Mansa Musa’s brother and successor, Mansa Sulayman in 1352–53 C.E.¹² As Mali declined in the fifteenth century and lost control of the great commercial towns, the rulers of the Mande successor states generally reverted back to a more nominal adherence to Islam in which Muslim clerics were still maintained at court but primarily to provide a continued sense of added legitimacy rather than to advance conversion.

Islam in the empire of Songhay developed in a similar fashion yet ultimately became more of a political factor than it had been within Mali. Sonni Ali Ber, the founder of the empire, was very similar to Sunjata Keita in relation to the manner in which both rulers practiced a mixed form of Islam. While Sonni

Ali observed Ramadan, prayed intermittently, and gave gifts to certain Islamic scholars, he still remained heavily involved with the pre-Islamic religion of sacrifice to natural objects and relied much on diviners and sorcerers. Sonni Ali's conquests brought many of the Islamized commercial cities of the region into the empire, most notably Timbuktu, and thus this nominally Muslim ruler also had to contend with a populace more deeply affected by Islam. Timbuktu, now a thriving Islamic center and commercial entrepôt, had enjoyed relative autonomy since 1433 C.E. under the rule of a confederation of Tuareg nomads. The Islamic scholars of Timbuktu, the *ulama*, were not only religious notables during this time, but exercised de facto political leadership over the city due to the symbolic capital gained from their religious authority. The appointment of the leader of the prayers (*imam*) at the main mosque known as Sankore generally reflected the political situation within the region at a given time. For example, under the rule of Mali the *imam* were black West Africans, or Sudanese according to the Arabic sources, while under the Tuareg the *imam* were Saharan and relatives of the Tuareg. Upon the conquest of Timbuktu, Sonni Ali purged the *ulama* of Timbuktu of any Tuareg influences and replaced them with scholars from North Africa and the Middle East. As a result, however, of Sonni Ali's execution or exile of many of the Saharan *ulama* of the city, the later *ulama* of Timbuktu declared him to be an infidel and recorded such in their major historical texts, the *Tarikh al-Sudan* and the *Tarikh al-Fettash*. Nehemiah Levtzion has argued that this declaration was due not so much to Sonni Ali's nominal adherence to Islam, which was quite the norm for his predecessors, as to his violent actions of a political nature against "the representatives of Islam."¹³ This interpretation is correct, but the litany of complaints leveled by the *ulama* against Sonni Ali rely to a great degree on religious arguments to support their position.

After Sonni Ali's death in 1492 C.E., his son was overthrown by an army commander who had the support of many of the Muslim notables in the newer western half of the empire. The leader of the coup, Askiya Muhammad, elevated the status of Islam within the empire and his own court and like Mansa Musa of Mali went on hajj. He even went so far as to elicit the advice of the noted Saharan scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Maghili, who wrote in support of the declaration of Sonni Ali as an infidel and the coup that replaced his dynasty with a more Islamic one. This event set a precedent for a discourse of reform that would be employed centuries later by the leaders of Islamic reform movements across West Africa. In effect, a new consensus was beginning to emerge in which Islam was to be a greater force for political and social change in the guise of Islamic reform.

The Early Expansion of Islam in Senegambia

Until its apex around 1350 C.E., the borders of the Mali Empire extended west to incorporate Senegambia, the lands in West Africa between the Senegal and

Gambia rivers. Senegambia, while usually on the periphery of the great savannah empires, was part of a very important foyer for the arrival of Islam into West Africa, in this case from the southwestern Sahara across the Senegal River valley. As mentioned earlier, the Senegal Valley was the home of the state of Takrur, a contemporary of Ghana, and most noted in the Arabic records for its Islamic government. The area had also been linked to the eleventh century C.E. reforming movement of the Almoravids that swept north across the Sahara and into Spain. The Senegal Valley and the northern reaches of Senegambia would come to exert a great influence on the progression of Islam throughout the rest of that region. The form that Islam took in Senegambia has been referred to by some historians as “maraboutic Islam,” reflecting the relative importance that the marabout, or clerics or holy men, have played in the Islamization of the area.¹⁴

To properly examine the early progress of Islam in Senegambia, we must employ David Robinson’s extraregional approach to a combined Senegalo-Mauritanian zone that reflects the profound influence that the southwestern Sahara exerted on the developing character of maraboutic Islam. It has been suggested that the more temperate maritime climate of the extreme western Sahara allowed for the creation of larger numbers of settlements that in turn produced a more intensive and permanent history of cross-cultural contact between the general area of the Senegal River valley and the Maghrib. Islam was a major component of this cross-cultural exchange. As a result, according to this interpretation, the religion was much more effectively implanted in northern Senegambia versus the Niger Valley that was connected to the Sahara and North Africa by a tenuous string of oases that could not support the greater level of contact between North Africans, desert nomads, and sedentary populations along the desert edge and to the south. The early and devout adherence to Islam in the states of Takrur and Silla, as noted above, and the support garnered in the Senegal Valley for the Almoravid reform movement support this interpretation.¹⁵

In the fourteenth century C.E., the Bani Hassan, an Arab nomadic tribe, began to migrate into the southwestern Sahara becoming the dominant political and military force within the region. In response, those indigenous Berber speaking nomadic groups that lost power to the incoming Hassan began to increasingly specialize their control over Islamic education, agriculture, and commerce in the region in an attempt to maintain their social vitality. These religious and commercial Berber lineages became known as *zawaya* after the Arabic term for a religious retreat community, and both the Hassan and *zawaya* lineages relied on clients and slaves to maintain their social positions. Thus a cleavage within society in the Senegalo-Mauritanian zone emerged between two collectives, one secular (though still Muslim) and politically reliant on military power and the other religious and commercial relying on its symbolic capital in Islamic learning. The military prowess of the Hassan enhanced their social capital and economic capital and vice versa

while the zwaya utilized their religious prestige to enhance their own social and economic capital, which in turn had a reciprocal effect on their religious standing in the region. This cleavage, however, was still developing during this early stage and it would not be until the outbreak of a violent wave of Islamic reform in the late seventeenth century C.E. that the different orientations of the Hassan and the zawaya would become solidified and result in conflict.

Meanwhile, in the Senegal River valley, social developments were also occurring that would affect the course of Islam in the area. By the late thirteenth century, a social division within the nomadic Fulbe pastoralists of the valley had been noted in an Arabic chronicle. Some of the Fulbe, referred to later by the French as *Tukulor*, were settling down in villages and towns and adopting a sedentary lifestyle. The Tukulor were led by the *Torodbe*, distinguished Islamic scholars and teachers who fall into the category of marabout. Around the beginning of the sixteenth century, Futa Toro was conquered by the Fulbe military leader Koli Tengella who established the Deniankobe dynasty. Like the Hassan, the Deniankobe were Muslims, and members of the dynasty were praised as good Muslims in the *Tarikh al-Sudan*. In the wake of the conquest, a similar social cleavage as that in the southwestern Sahara began to develop in Futa Toro. The Torodbe, in spite of their sedentary lifestyle, strongly associated themselves with the peasants among whom their symbolic prestige as marabout translated into charitable gifts to maintain the teachers and their students. Relations between the Torodbe and the ruling Deniankobe remained peaceful for almost two centuries, yet the Torodbe were critical of what they considered the secular basis for the power and authority of the dynasty. The Deniankobe were thus perceived to be a warrior aristocracy founded not upon Islam but military force.¹⁶

The southwestern Sahara and Futa Toro served as important conduits for Islam to the states and societies to the south in Senegambia proper. Chief among the early states of Senegambia was the Jolof Empire. At the time of its creation (ca. 1200 C.E.), the Jolof heartland was strategically located to participate in the trans-Saharan trade, and at its greatest extent, the empire incorporated the tributary Wolof kingdoms of Waalo, Kajoor, and Bawol, and the Seerer kingdoms of Siin and Saloum. The mythical founder of the Jolof state, Njaajann Njaay, is linked via his "Arab" father to the Almoravids and to the state of Takrur via his Tukulor mother in the oral traditions and subsequent written texts concerning the Njaay dynasty of Jolof.¹⁷ The traditions regarding his ancestry thus imply a strong connection with Islam and help to legitimize the rule of his dynasty. This aspect of the traditions also hint at the Islamizing role played by Jolof and by extension Futa Toro and southern Mauritania in relation to the Wolof states to the west and southwest. The influence of Islam in the Wolof states during Jolof rule was present yet confined to a small minority. Traveling zwaya and Tukulor clerics played an important role in spreading Islam into areas such as Kajoor and Bawol where notable schools were established in the towns of Pir and Ndogal. These scholars not only pursued

conversions, but intermarried with local Muslim families, thus extending their scholarly lineages among the Wolof. The Islamic connection with Futa Toro and the southwestern Sahara would continue, however, to be reinforced and maintain its importance throughout the coming centuries.

Islam and Senegambian Society

Islam, by the thirteenth century was thus entering Senegambia from two directions, the north, and as previously noted, the east via the West African Jakhanke clerics. The social order present in the Wolof areas of Senegambia also owed much to the east and in particular to the Mandé of Mali. Wolof social hierarchy generally corresponded to the Mandé model in which the population was divided into three strata: the free, those defined by their occupations, and slaves.¹⁸ In Wolof, the free, or *gor*, encompassed all of those who were not slaves or members of occupationally specialized groups regardless of wealth from poor peasant farmers to aristocrats. Although the *gor* may at first appear to exhibit a sense of egalitarianism among its members, a system of patron-client relationships maintained an internal hierarchy. In the rain-dependent environment of the savanna, wells were of absolute necessity to any settlement and represented a great investment of time and labor by the initial settlers. Those Wolof families that first broke ground for a well were able to establish a paramount position as chiefs or elders (*laman*) over later arrivals that was justified materially by their initial claim over the well and religiously by the presence of their ancestors at the site. The most powerful of the chiefly Wolof families would develop by the mid-sixteenth century into a virtual aristocracy (*garmi*) who ruled over their communities as representatives of the Jolof emperor maintaining order, collecting tribute annually from the commoners, and participating in military operations.

The Wolof *garmi* recognized the important contribution that Islam could make to their political capital and thus converted in addition to supporting and employing marabout. The commoners were likewise exposed to the influence of Islam from the north and the east, yet it is generally held that the Wolof peasants in the majority did not convert at this early stage or at best adopted some of the outward aspects of Islam without truly understanding them in a syncretic blend with dominant pre-Islamic practices. In terms of how Islam may have been affected by this patron-client relationship, the aristocrats, as patrons, were expected to aid and protect the peasants who, as clients, owed the *laman* and later the *garmi* their allegiance. The extension of the Wolof patron-client relationship to the marabout, as clients of aristocrats, would serve to increase the political claims of the *garmi* and yet, would eventually prove to be very problematic and a stimulus for conflict between the two groups over the ultimate source of political authority.

The occupationally specialized groups among the Wolof, the *ñeeño*, are sometimes referred to in the literature as *castes*. They were defined by the

occupation that their members inherited and preserved through endogamy. These occupationally specialized groups included, but were not limited to, blacksmiths, *tëgg*; leatherworkers, *uude*, and bards, *gewël*. The status of the *ñeeño* in Wolof society was influenced by a mixture of fear, respect, and ostracism due to the popular pre-Islamic belief in the mystical nature underlying the special abilities of the *ñeeño*. The *ñeeño* are so significant in Wolof society that the *gor* and the slaves, or *jaam*, are grouped together as *géér*, or those that are not of the *ñeeño*. The *gewël* occupied especially important positions in Wolof society as spokespersons, oral historians and teachers, diplomats, and as singers and musicians. Furthermore, the *gewël* have often been presented as the repositories and champions of pre-Islamic Wolof culture in the face of increasing Islamization among the Wolof.

Slaves, or *jaam*, composed the lowest strata of Wolof society and generally reflected the tendency in areas influenced by the Mande to distinguish between first generation slaves that as cultural outsiders were most disadvantaged and could be sold at any time and slaves that were second generation and beyond. The latter were culturally assimilated into Wolof society and could not be sold. Early sources regarding slavery and slave labor do mention slave raiding that was undertaken and an internal slave trade within the region that supplied the trans-Saharan trade to the north. Slaves within Senegambia were frequently employed in agriculture, and as the Wolof states continued to develop, were increasingly employed within the bureaucracies and the militaries of those states. It was incumbent upon Muslim slave owners to convert their slaves and provide them with a basic understanding of the beliefs and practices; however, the evidence concerning whether or not this process was largely carried out is lacking. At best, we can assume that the level of Islamization among slaves most likely mirrored that of their owners. The importance of slavery and slaves within Wolof society would increase with the rise of the Atlantic slave trade and play an important role in the conflicts between Islamic reformers and the secular authorities.

The breakup of the Jolof empire in 1549 C.E., the fall of Songhay in 1591 C.E., and the general political decentralization and social disruption that accompanied the rise of the Atlantic slave trade delayed somewhat the further development of Islam and the new consensus of revival, and it was some time before the forces that supported Islamic reform were able to galvanize and take action. By the time that this did happen, a new generation of Islamic scholars and notables had appeared who differed significantly from the *ulama* of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay. The earlier generations of *ulama* reflected an Islam that was mainly an urban phenomenon and characterized by the reliance upon Arabic as the sole language of instruction and scholarship and a heavy cultural influence from North Africa and the Middle East. In contrast, the new generation of Islamic notables that emerged during the era of the Atlantic slave trade reflected not only the political and social effects of that trade but a relatively new force within Islam in West Africa: Sufism. By 1800 C.E.,

Sufism and the Sufi orders would begin to play a vital role in the further extension of Islam outside of the cities with their markets and royal courts to the countryside of the farmers and pastoralists and in the subsequent movements of Islamic reform. However, the tide of reform would begin to flow first, before Sufism would begin to fully emerge and to become integrated into West African Islam and the movements for reform.

Islamic Reform and the West African Historical Context for Its Early Development

In 1673 C.E., a Berber marabout named Nasir al-Din launched an Islamic reform movement on the northern bank of the Senegal River valley that soon became nothing less than a revolution against the contemporary political, social, and economic situation. His revolution soon spilled over the southern bank of the river and the so-called War of the Marabouts briefly toppled the Wolof kingdoms of northern Senegambia. Nasir al-Din's movement is the first instance of Islamic reform and revolt in West Africa after the fall of the great empires and is illustrative of the historical context in which this and later religious conflicts took place. These revolts, in many cases termed as jihad, are not viewed here as wars of Muslims versus non-Muslims or as holy wars per se. Rather, the Islamic reform movements of West Africa whether militant or peaceful are examined as critiques of existing political, social, and economic conditions and as revolutions to change those conditions by instituting Islamic law and practices to a greater extent than in the past.

There are different interpretations of the Islamic revolutions that affected West Africa from the 1670s C.E. until the onset of European colonial rule in the late nineteenth century. Some scholars have focused on the ethnic component of these movements due to the prevalence of the Fulani clerics in positions of leadership in many of the jihad, and those dealing specifically with the Murids stress the connection between that movement and the Wolof.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the later jihad of the nineteenth century have also been considered by many historians as resistance movements, to greater or lesser degrees, against European colonization.²⁰ Boubacar Barry, in his study of the history of Senegambia from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, has produced the most comprehensive background to understanding the emergence and development of Islamic reform movements for that region. Barry gauges that the commercial reorientation that occurred during these centuries away from the Sahara Desert and toward the Atlantic coast disrupted the economy of Senegambia, which in turn caused political and social changes.²¹ The reason for the change in trade routes was the ever-increasing volume of commerce with various European powers with their bases on the coast. Of course, most of this new commerce was related to the Atlantic slave trade and the commercial traffic included not only

slaves but also grain, hides, and other products of the interior meant to support the slave trade or supplement it. The growth in the Atlantic slave trade was accompanied by an increase in war and conflict in the interior. The rise in violence was in some cases connected directly to supplying captives for sale on the coast and, in other cases, the wars reflected the changing political fortunes of states and societies that were trying to cope with the rise of the coastal trade and the subsequent shifts in political and economic power.

In addition to the effects of the Atlantic slave trade, much of West Africa during these centuries was also experiencing climatic and environmental change brought on by the southward expansion of the Sahara. The increasing desiccation of the northern reaches of West Africa caused the southern border of the Sahara, known as the Sahel from the Arabic term for *shore* (*al-sahil*), to move south 200–300 kilometers between circa 1600 and circa 1850.²² This alteration in turn forced the savanna grassland zone to retreat south as well. The human inhabitants of the region coped by either changing their suite of agricultural crops and animals or migrating south all the while enduring periodic droughts especially after circa 1750. The ill effects of the climatic change, however, are magnified when coupled with the catastrophe and war that was increasingly affecting the region during roughly the same period. Drought, war, and famine frequently combined from the latter part of the eighteenth century until the close of the colonial conquest circa 1900 to create crises for the population and particularly for the common farmers and pastoralists who bore the brunt of wars, raids, and hunger. Barry's thesis can be put to the test in a brief overview of the process of political decentralization and militarization in Senegambia.

Political Decentralization and Militarization

The sixteenth century witnessed the fall of the Jolof Empire in Senegambia and the much larger Songhay Empire in the Niger Valley and the beginning of a trend toward political decentralization and the militarization of society that would continue until the European conquest. While the Jolof capital was in a prime location to take advantage of the trade across the Sahara, it was far from the Atlantic coast and the emerging maritime economy. As the coastal trade developed, the subordinate Wolof states of the Jolof Empire that bordered the coast grew in wealth and power steadily becoming semiautonomous entities. The most powerful of the separate kingdoms that emerged after the collapse of the empire all had access to the coast and participated in the Atlantic economy, namely the slave trade. The Jolof Empire disintegrated in 1549 after Amari Ngoone of the leading laman family in Kajoor, the Paleen-Dedd, defeated the Jolof army after refusing to pay the yearly tribute. Kajoor was aided in this endeavor by its neighbor to the south, Bawol, whose leader was Amari Ngoone's maternal uncle. Upon the successful secession of Kajoor, Amari Ngoone was crowned the king, or *damel*, and after the death of his maternal uncle, inherited the title of *teen* signifying the "king of Bawol."²³ The

other component states, Waalo, Siin, and Saloum, also asserted their formal independence at this time relegating Jolof control to a kingdom in the interior occupying the core of the old empire.

The Songhay Empire was in a similar position to the Jolof Empire in terms of controlling the southern component of the trans-Saharan trade; however, Songhay was significantly weakened during the late sixteenth century due to civil wars. After a Moroccan army defeated the Songhay and occupied Timbuktu in 1591, Songhay resistance continued yet the empire was never able to reconstitute itself. Although the growing importance of the Atlantic economy in the sixteenth century did not directly cause the fall of these powerful states, the shift in commerce did play a role in their inability to recover. After the fall of Songhay, there were no large savannah empires to maintain order over huge regions. In most areas, smaller states oriented to the new slave-based maritime economy became the norm after 1591.



Map 1.2. Precolonial Senegambia showing political boundaries and the future sites of Darou Mousty and Touba in parentheses. Map by author.

An integral component to the process of decentralization that began in the sixteenth century was a general militarization of West African societies and states due in large part to the Atlantic slave trade. Broadly speaking, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed an increase in armed conflicts between and within African states and societies. Joseph Inikori has stressed the role played by European firearms in these conflicts in his “Gun/Slave cycle” thesis, yet firearms were only one component of this militarization.²⁴ Politically, warrior aristocracies whose power was based on military force came to replace the older aristocracies whose legitimacy had been based on semi-religious claims including original settlement.²⁵

Warrior aristocracies ruled the Wolof kingdoms that emerged from the breakup of the Jolof Empire and after 1695 came to increasingly rely on armies of slave soldiers, or *ceddo*, armed with firearms to wage war and pillage. By the nineteenth century, the commander of the slave soldiers had become so powerful that he and his officers had become, in effect, kingmakers replacing the council of chiefs that formerly elected the kings from a group of eligible candidates.²⁶ The kings themselves were usually nominal Muslims though some did distinguish themselves with their high level of piety. The slave soldiers resisted conversion and the term *ceddo* eventually came to be synonymous with *pagan*. The peasants within the kingdoms were largely unconverted to Islam or were superficially Muslim and lived in fear of the slave soldiers and frequently were the targets of punitive expeditions.

Kajoor and Bawol’s initial era of formal independence provides us with a glimpse into important historical factors developing at that time that would come to affect the future course of Islamic reform in the region. The first factor was the complex organization of the aristocratic families within both states that included one royal patrilineage and a number of royal matrilineages and the lack of any clear means of succession to either throne. To legitimately be king, one had to be a member of both the royal patrilineage of the time and one of the royal matrilineages. Such a system can be explained in different ways. The existence of the matrilineal families is often seen as a survival from the pre-Islamic era while the simultaneous presence of the royal patrilineal family is an indication of the growing influence of Islam. It has also been noted that such an organization could also be the logical outcome of aristocratic polygamy that often produced many sons of the same father who distinguished among themselves through their different mothers and matrilineal families. Wolof oral traditions attach much influence to the intimacy that connected princes to their mothers and their maternal relations. In the absence of primogeniture, many princes representing different matrilineages competed over the succession to the throne. Matrilineal inheritance, which was still prevalent during these centuries, ensured that each competing prince had the support of his mother’s family including their slaves who could be employed as soldiers and the family’s clients among the *ñeeño* and the *baadoolo*. Disputes over succession were frequent and involved killings, open warfare, and enslavement.

Dynastic struggles for power both within and among the Wolof kingdoms left an important mark on the history of the region and provided an important motivation for the development of Islamic reform.

Another factor was the continued expansion of Wolof power to the south, which strengthened the monarchy as an institution to the detriment of the local laman. The monarchy also drew power from incorporating prominent marabout into the state structure as clients. These marabout first received gifts and grants of land from Amari Ngoone in return for participating in important ceremonial functions at the court that served to add a sense of Islamic legitimacy to the ruler. This practice set an important precedent for future kings who would seek to retain this important base of support. However, such a tactic was also potentially dangerous as it provided an increasing power base in the form of agricultural lands and communities to a group that could claim an alternate source for political authority in Islam and thus emerge as a serious political rival to the aristocracy.

The Initial Phase of Islamic Reform and Jihad

The Islamic revolt of Nasir al-Din is illustrative of the factors discussed above and, as the first attempt at Islamic revolution in Senegambia and by extension in West Africa, provides a model for the arguments and tactics that would be frequently employed by later reform movements. The motives behind Nasir al-Din's movement were manifold and yet interrelated. Referring to Barry's thesis in a more specific manner, the construction of the French post of St. Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River is believed to have intensified the transformation of the economy of the Senegalo-Mauritanian area toward the coast, which in turn increasingly deprived the Berbers and Arabs of sources of food and slaves from the south generating conflict within the region.²⁷ Concurrently, the rising demand for slaves at the coastal entrepôt added to the growing level of violence in the region as states and warrior groups sought advantages over their rivals through greater participation in the slave trade. In the midst of these challenges, the Berber marabout, Nasir al-Din, began his movement by appealing to the regional monarchs to conform their rule more strictly to Islamic precepts. These appeals certainly had a religious tone and included demands to refrain from drinking alcohol and taking more than four wives, but more seriously, they implored the rulers to cease pillaging and enslaving their own subjects. After being rebuffed in the royal courts, Nasir al-Din took his message to the countryside addressing himself to that section of the population that was arguably suffering the most from the violence and enslavement. According to the director of the French company operating out of St. Louis, Nasir al-Din and his aids traveled widely preaching, "God did not permit kings to pillage, kill, or enslave their peoples, that on the contrary, kings were required to sustain their peoples and protect them from their enemies, and that peoples were not made for kings, but kings for peoples."²⁸

Initially, the revolt of Nasir al-Din enjoyed quick successes as his numerous followers defeated the aristocratic forces of Futa Toro and the Wolof kingdom of Waalo. In Kajoor, a dispute within the ruling matrilineage provided an opening for the Islamic reform movement to take hold there. The *lingeer*, or queen of the ruling matrilineage, had been stripped of her title by the newly crowned king, and seeking revenge, she allied herself and thus much of the military force of her family with a prominent local marabout and his followers. The combined force defeated and killed the king and installed a puppet acceptable to the both the *lingeer* and the marabout; however, the new damel was assassinated by the marabout's followers after he was caught drinking alcohol. The marabout then assumed power and declared himself a lieutenant of Nasir al-Din and remained in power until the king of Saloum invaded with a force that deposed the marabout and restored the secular aristocracy to power. Yet, the experience had significantly disrupted the political and religious climate in Kajoor and conflicts would continue to wrack the kingdom until 1695.

Nasir al-Din, meanwhile, was killed in battle with Hassani warriors in 1674 and the reform movement throughout the region began to suffer defeats at the hands of the resurgent aristocracies, aided in part by the French from St. Louis, who regained control in Waalo, Futa Toro, Jolof, and the southwestern Sahara. The long-term effects of the failed reform movement were twofold. First, in spite of the defeats on the battlefield, the undercurrent of Islamic reform as a means of religious, social, political, and economic change refused to die and, in fact, became entrenched in the region in the famous scholarly towns of Pir and Ndogal and in emerging Muslim communities such as Kokki, Luuga, and Ñiomre in the Njambur region of Kajoor.²⁹ Islamic reform was now an unavoidable force in Senegambia and would continue to rise up and challenge the secular political leadership. Nasir al-Din had in effect established a model that later reform movements would follow. The first phase of this model was characterized as the jihad of the mouth, or a verbal appeal, to the secular rulers to reform. If unsuccessful, this first phase was then followed by the second, the jihad of the sword, an armed campaign. The second long-term effect of Nasir al-Din's movement was the reinforcement of the warrior aristocracies in the Berber emirates, Futa Toro, and the Wolof kingdoms. One may at first be tempted to see these effects as producing extremely polarized societies in the region in which two factions faced each other for over two centuries across an ideological gulf. The two factions would come to be popularly referred to in Wolof as the *sëriñ*, who represented Islam, and the *ceddo*, who supported the secular political elite.

The Sëriñ and the Ceddo

In Wolof, *sëriñ* refers to an Islamic scholar and teacher, and historically, the Wolof *sëriñ* who occupied high social positions were male.³⁰ In a wider social

sense, the *sëriñ* of Wolof society included all of those who had placed themselves under the leadership of an Islamic figure. In this context, the *sëriñ* faction included the scholars and teachers whom the French referred to as marabouts, their families, students, and the peasants who lived under their authority. The relationship that existed between the marabout and his followers was indicative of the typical patron-client bond in Wolof society that bound those without power (baadoolo or peasants) to a figure of authority. The *sëriñ* provided religious direction for the community, education, theoretical protection from enslavement, and a hope for paradise in the afterlife, in part due to the presence of *baraka* (Islamic grace or blessing) in the body and teachings of the *sëriñ*. In return, his followers, whether students or peasants, contributed their labor or part of their harvests to the marabout's household and accepted his authority.

The emergence of *dëkku sëriñ*, or Muslim villages, was an important component of Islamic identity in the Wolof states. These villages or towns were inhabited solely by Muslims who had placed themselves under the guidance of a *sëriñ* and his family. The *sëriñ* scholars, acting as focal points of leadership, came to resemble the Wolof chiefs, or *laman*, while his followers, or *taalibe*, occupied a parallel position to the peasants or *badoolo* of other villages. However, the authority of the *sëriñ* theoretically rested on Islamic conventions, and this distinguished him from the Wolof chiefs. The presence of an Islamic school, or schools, was also central to the existence of the town. Children received their basic Quranic education in the school, and those who excelled could pursue advanced studies either within the community or elsewhere. In this alternate structure of authority, adherence to Islamic law, or *shari'a*, was the definitive difference between the Muslim and traditionalist towns.³¹

The *ceddo* represented the secular political leadership of Kajoor and its clients. The *damel*, or king, the royal court, the *jaami buur*, or royal slaves, and the *garmi*, or aristocracy, and its clients all constituted the *ceddo* faction. More specifically, for the Muslim peasantry of Kajoor, the word *ceddo* came to be applied to the royal slave soldiers who exemplified a non-Islamic lifestyle in their reputation for drinking alcohol and engaging in violence and banditry. Scholars have interpreted the Wolof kingdoms' participation in the Atlantic slave trade as directly contributing to the increasing power of the *ceddo* and the rise in warrior predation.³²

At first glance, the history of the conflicts between the *ceddo* and the *sëriñ* of Kajoor may seem to be of a singularly religious nature. On the one hand, there is the portrait of the *damel* and his followers as drunken pagans prone to violence and the enslavement of Muslims. Opposing them were the Muslim marabouts and their followers who called for Islamic reform within the government and society. However, as Lucie Colvin has pointed out, the nature of this conflict was also political, and many scholars have made the oversight of relying totally on Islamic clerical sources (the *sëriñ*) concerning this subject.³³

Taken at their word, the opinions of the clerics do illustrate the paradigm alluded to above of a conflict between “pagans” and Muslims. In fact, as Colvin has stated, when one consults written European sources of the conflicts, a different picture emerges that includes a view from the nobility’s perspective.³⁴

Based on this revised perspective, the members of the aristocracy of Kajoor did consider themselves Muslims and justified their position as rulers due to heredity and an interpretation of the shari’a. Therefore, in reality, the reformist marabouts could not have argued for outright conversion to Islam but rather a revival of belief among the nobility. Various kings were indeed known for their un-Islamic lifestyles that included drinking, enslaving Muslims, having more than four wives, and so forth. Other rulers, however, were remembered for their piety. Common to all of the damel were their claims, to one degree or another, to be Muslim kings. Colvin’s revised view of Islam and the Wolof monarchy and the emphasis on reform and revival on the part of the *sëriñ* has been adhered to in the present study that rejects the traditional *sëriñ*-*ceddo* dichotomy.

In many cases, the analyses of the conflict between the *sëriñ* and the *ceddo* have oversimplified what was a complex relationship between the two groups. In fact, the histories of the two factions are closely intertwined. Many marabouts cooperated with the state in order to increase their power and further safeguard their communities; likewise, the kings of Kajoor, particularly those of the Geej dynasty (1695–1886), actively sought out support from members of the Islamic faction. Whenever it was advantageous, both sides accommodated the other to advance their own interests. Similarly, the *sëriñ* and the *ceddo* factions were not monolithic in nature. Not all of the Muslim scholars agreed with each other, particularly in the cases involving armed jihad as a strategy against the political rulers of the state. Issues such as cooperation with the state and the legitimacy of jihad split the *sëriñ* community in Kajoor throughout its history. The *ceddo* also break their historiographical mold of pagan slave soldiers who avoid Islam. The *ceddo*, as well as the Wolof kings of Kajoor, frequently sought out Islamic marabouts in order to obtain amulets (*gris-gris*) which they believed to have protective powers.³⁵ Additionally, Amadou Bamba Diop has noted that many of the *ceddo* took on a more Islamic lifestyle later in life when they became too old to fight.³⁶

An examination of the career of Latsukaabe Faal who by 1695 had become king of Bawol and then Kajoor illuminates this very complex relationship. The founder of the Geej dynasty in Kajoor, Latsukaabe Faal (r. 1695–1719), played a key role in further defining the relationship between Islam and the state. Latsukaabe’s course of action in Kajoor was influenced by the tactics he had followed in the course of his consolidation of power in Bawol. Following a series of civil wars, Latsukaabe was crowned *teen*, or king, of Bawol in 1692. In his efforts to establish his matrilineage as the base of a new dynasty known as the Geej, Latsukaabe had to gain the support of the aristocrats, the *ceddo*,

and the *sëriñ* of Bawol. Even though the previous monarchs of Bawol had been Wolof Muslims, much of the kingdom was inhabited by non-Muslim Sereer who resisted Wolof-Muslim control.³⁷ Therefore, Latsukaabe identified the cause of Islam with the maintenance and extension of his political powers as a Wolof-Muslim ruler. Upon his ascension to the throne of Kajoor in 1695, Latsukaabe continued the policy of courting both factions as a means of safeguarding his own power.³⁸ In the wake of the unsuccessful War of the Marabouts (1673–78), one of Latsukaabe's most important reforms was directed toward the Muslim faction within Kajoor. He improved upon Amari Ngoone's earlier attempt integrate the leaders of the *sëriñ* into the apparatus of the state. These marabouts of the state were known as the *sëriñu lamb* (marabouts of the drum). They were given drums and other insignia, made eligible to serve the king militarily, and were awarded land and settlements in the frontier provinces.³⁹

In the northern region of Njambur, the *sëriñu lamb* came to occupy especially important positions. Njambur had the reputation of being a center for maraboutic power and Islamic education and had played a role in the War of the Marabouts on behalf of Islamic reform. The most important towns of Njambur such as Kokki, Luuga, and Ñomre were placed under the control of their respective *sëriñu lamb* by Latsukaabe. The *sëriñu lamb* of Kokki, Luuga, and Ñomre acted as intermediaries between their communities and the damel of Kajoor, yet they continued to preserve a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the political leadership of the kingdom. As "the greatest province of Kajoor, inhabited exclusively by Muslims," Njambur and its scholarly families exerted a powerful influence over Senegambian Muslims.⁴⁰ For example, the Joob family of Kokki was particularly renowned for the number of ulama, or scholars, that had come from its ranks.⁴¹

The creation of titled marabouts tied to the state was both an effort of reconciliation and a prudent plan to absorb the Islamic faction into the political realm and thus lessen the chances that they might again rebel against the political leadership of the state. Latsukaabe's reforms were not original in Kajoor: The political leaders within the Wolof states had long utilized marabouts as teachers and Islamic officials such as judges and scribes within their courts and would continue to do so until colonization.⁴² These Muslims were, however, in service to the ruler and could rarely influence his actions. They enforced the king's own claim to be a Muslim and added to his legitimacy in the eyes of the people while not putting any pressure on the king to strictly observe the *shari'a*.

The titled marabouts, such as the Joob *sëriñ*, eventually became something of a quasi nobility within the regions under their administration and a split soon emerged within the Muslim faction of Kajoor. Some Islamic scholars referred to as the *sëriñ fakk taal* refused or were unable to co-opt themselves to the apparatus of the political state and felt that those marabouts who accepted state titles had tainted themselves in the process.⁴³ The position of

some of the *sērīn fakk taal* was based on similar Islamic traditions to which Amadu Bamba would later refer in the second half of the nineteenth century to explain his own aversion to dealing with the political authorities of that period, be they Wolof or French. Allied to this avoidance of political connections was a complimentary suspicion on the part of the *sērīn fakk taal* of the use of armed jihad by Islamic leaders who claimed to be reformers of the faith. The presence of a dissident group of marabouts within the *sērīn* faction, who stood apart from the political authorities and the titled marabouts, can be observed as early as the latter half of the eighteenth century. The question of cooperation with or opposition to the political leadership of Kajoor and the legitimacy of jihad would continue to divide the Islamic faction throughout the nineteenth century and play an important role in the development of the Muridiyya and Amadu Bamba's own apolitical philosophy.⁴⁴

The Senegambian Jihad

In spite of the failure of the War of the Marabouts and the reforms of Latsukaabe, the tide of armed Islamic revolt within Kajoor did not abate. Rather, the Islamic revival movement entered a new era in the second half of the eighteenth century and did not reach its climax until the middle of the nineteenth century. The latter half of the eighteenth century was a period of crises in Kajoor and the entire region. A combination of drought, famine, and civil war coincided with changes in the patterns of Atlantic commerce. The Great Famine of 1750–56, for example, was partly a result of the declining ecological situation, but it was also due to a civil war in Kajoor that began in 1749 and lasted until 1766. The peasantry of Kajoor, meanwhile, were caught in the middle. In particular, the suffering affected those peasants who were living in the grain-producing regions of the Lower Senegal and Njambur and thus tied closely to both the Atlantic and Saharan commercial networks.

The expansion of the Atlantic slave trade had resulted in the increasing commercialization of agriculture to feed the trade, and during times of peace and good rains, the maraboutic communities of Njambur fared well. Due to its location on the desert-edge, Njambur also supplied the Berber societies north of the Senegal River with grain. However, during the crises of the latter seventeen hundreds, Njambur's location made it susceptible to upheavals from within Kajoor, from neighboring states such as Futa Toro, Waalo, and Jolof, and from the Berber states that were suffering as well.⁴⁵ Out of this half century of ecological and political crisis, a new era of Islamic reform began, characterized by a sharpening of the discourse of reform and an escalation in the frequency and violence of armed jihad. The initial impulse of this new phase appeared in Futa Toro from which it spread to Njambur and the rest of Kajoor.

In the 1770s, Abdul Qadir, in reaction to the regional political and ecological crises, led an Islamic revolution that took control of Futa Toro and

declared himself *almamy* (from the Arabic, *imam*, or prayer leader). His reform movement soon expanded and, allied with reform-minded Muslims in Kajoor, notably the *sēriñ* of Njambur, he implored the damel, Biraam Fatim, to submit to his religious authority. Oral traditions of both the royal court and the *sēriñ* note, however, that Biraam Fatim and his predecessor were already good Muslims.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Islamic schools in his kingdom at Pir and Kokki had been attracting students from the whole of Senegambia. When the emissaries of Abdul Qadir arrived in Kajoor they were given a good reception by Biraam Fatim, who was reported to have accepted Abdul Qadir's authority. However, upon the ascension of Amary Ngoone in 1790, the new king of Kajoor refused any further accommodation of clerical control and attacked the leading clerical community in Njambur and sold the Muslim captives into slavery. After an attempt by the reformists at retaliation, the king again took action and killed the representative of the reform movement in Kajoor, Malamin Sar, the *Sēriñ* Luuga (the *sēriñu* lamb of the community of Luuga in Njambur). Following his death, Abdul Qadir and the remaining *sēriñu* lamb of Njambur led an army against Amary Ngoone, but the *almamy* was defeated and captured in 1796 and his followers were sold into slavery.⁴⁷

A closer analysis of the events surrounding the 1790–91 revolt in Njambur reveals a complicated story. The revolt was not a universal movement among all of the marabouts of the region. Among those who rejected taking up arms against the damel was Amadu Bamba's great grandfather Muhammad al-Khayr M'Backé who was also known as Maharam M'Backé (d. 1802).⁴⁸ The illustrious Murid poet Shaykh Musaa Kâ commented on the Njambur revolt in one of his poems. He referred to Malamin Sar and Maharam M'Backé as colleagues, yet Maharam M'Backé had not joined the reform movement. Even after Malamin Sar was killed by the damel, Maharam M'Backé refused to join the other marabouts in their retaliatory attack against the king. Maharam M'Backé had ruled that the jihad was not legitimate and was only an act of political vengeance on the part of the *sēriñ*.

Following the final defeat of the reformist forces, Maharam M'Backé appealed to Amary Ngoone to free his captives and return their property in accord with the *shari'a*. According to Shaykh Musaa Kâ, the king granted his request and gave Maharam M'Backé a concession of land in northeastern Bawol where the marabout settled.⁴⁹ With his son, Habib Allah, Maharam M'Backé established a school on the land that the king had given him, and the town that grew up there became known as M'Backé-Bawol. Habib Allah's son Muhammad, better known as Momar Anta Saly M'Backé, was born in M'Backé-Bawol, as was his son Amadu Bamba around 1853. Within the sources, there is no reference to Maharam M'Backé being commissioned as a *sēriñu* lamb. Rather, the settlement was autonomous and reflected Maharam's critical stance toward both the *sēriñ* and the *ceddo* in favor of a belief in the supremacy of the *shari'a*. Even though the grant of land was freely made, it did serve the interests of both parties. Amary Ngoone could use the gift as

proof of his support of Islam and a step toward reconciliation with the larger Islamic party in Kajoor. The land grant also gave the king a Muslim-Wolof settlement in a frontier area of Bawol that he could trust not to rebel against the state.

Murid historiography regarding Amary Ngoone contrasts with the prevalent view of the king. Much of what has been written about Amary Ngoone reflects the attitudes of the Njambur Islamic faction that led the unsuccessful revolt. In spite of their defeat in 1790–91 and later losses, the eventual victory of the marabouts during the colonial period ensured that their interpretation of history would be dominant. Therefore, although Amary Ngoone is chiefly remembered for his defeat of the jihad and the enslavement of the Muslims who were captured, Murid sources remember that he did reward those marabouts who rejected the call for a jihad. The land grant to Maharam M'Backé is one example of the king's gratitude toward those Muslims who did not join the revolt. Serigne Bachir M'Backé, in the biography of his father, Amadu Bamba, provided further detail regarding Amary Ngoone and his attitude toward Islam and the marabouts in his realm. "Amary Ngoone liked the scholars and the pious. . . . The more a scholar hated and mistrusted him, the more the king insisted on reconciling himself [to the scholar] in order to calm him."⁵⁰ Such an interpretation of the Njambur revolt of 1790–91 reinforces Amadu Bamba's own rejection of armed jihad and provides us with a firm ideological base in Wolof history for Murid views regarding revolt against the state and involvement in secular politics. Further definition of Murid attitudes toward jihad and the state would be made in reaction to the conflicts of the latter half of the eighteenth century. Failed revolts by the *sëriñu* lamb in 1820 and 1859, the jihad of Mâbba Jaxu from 1861–67, and the jihad of Amadu Shaykhu from 1869–75 helped solidify Murid attitudes and the moral order framed by Amadu Bamba regarding the proper role of a Muslim in society.

The revolts of the nineteenth century will be dealt with in chapter 2. These revolts had the added context of increasing European colonial intervention in Senegambia and West Africa at large. These jihad thus constitute a final phase in the history of Islamic reform in the region. The colonial activities would strengthen even further the reliance on Atlantic commerce and would see the introduction of "legitimate" items of trade such as gum arabic and peanuts. Meanwhile, the second half of the nineteenth century would see direct French intervention in the conflicts between the secular and religious forces and the eventual colonization of the region. The nineteenth century also witnessed the ascendancy of Sufism in Senegambia and across much of Islamic West Africa. Sufism, in its ideology and in its organization, would come to be linked with the already established trend of Islamic reform and would also have to contend with the evolution of European colonization. Before dealing with Sufism in this context, however, it is necessary to discuss the early development of Islamic mysticism in West Africa.

Sufism and the West African Historical Context for Its Early Development

Within the early phase of the development of Islam in West Africa, it is difficult to identify a significant presence of Sufism as an ideology and as an organization. The distinction between Sufism as an ideology and as an organization rests on the different definitions and the resulting implications of the Arabic word *tariqa*. Most commonly, *tariqa* has been translated as “the way” or “the path” in an organizational sense that refers to the outward structure of a Sufi order. Yet, prior to the tenth century C.E., *tariqa* was defined in a methodological sense as a set of practices or exercises by which a Muslim could achieve a personal understanding or a unity with God. Knut Vikor has expressed the difference between the internal and external meaning of *tariqa* by using the terms *tariqa-ways* for the former and *tariqa-brotherhoods* for the latter. Reflecting the historical development of Sufism, Vikor further stated that one could have a *tariqa-way* without a corresponding *tariqa-brotherhood*, but a *tariqa-brotherhood* could never exist without its underlying ideology of belief and practice conceptualized as the *tariqa-way*.⁵¹

In its initial development in southwestern Asia, prior to the tenth century C.E., the *tariqa-way* was usually composed of a set of mystical doctrines and techniques such as *ta'wil* by which Sufis explored the allegorical and symbolic meaning of the Quran. Formulaic prayer rituals known as *wird* were also taught in addition to the practice of *dhikr*, in which one recollected and meditated upon the names of God. The *dhikr* could be recited in different forms of expression some silently and some vocally. The *tariqa-way* also encouraged its adherents to seek out and decipher signs of God in the natural world and in history (*ayat* in Arabic). This approach to Islam emphasized the concept of *batin*, or the inner, more personal experience of religion. Many Sufis followed an ascetic lifestyle in pursuit of *batin* renouncing wealth, politics, and physical comforts. The emphasis on the esoteric approach to Islam was not intended to replace *zahir*, the exoteric experience of Islam characterized most often by adherence to the *shari'a*, or Islamic law. Rather, Sufis sought to complement *zahir* with *batin*. The intended result of studying and practicing a particular *tariqa-way* was to achieve a personal understanding of God and *fana*, an annihilation of oneself within God. For centuries, variants of Sufi knowledge and practices were imparted by masters to students in a relatively informal and unorganized fashion by which individuals sought out recognized authorities for instruction usually in the leading urban centers such as Baghdad. There was no formal organization that bound the students to the teacher and vice versa and the numbers of the early Sufis were relatively small.

What then accounted for the development of Sufism, beginning around the twelfth century C.E., into the organized and popular Sufi orders? In his great synthesis of Islamic history, Marshall Hodgson made a correlation between the intensification in the development of Islamic mysticism and declining

social and political conditions characterized by dislocation and insecurity. Hodgson's historical context for the rise of mysticism and the Sufi orders was the disintegration of the Abbasid khalifate in southwestern Asia beginning in the middle of the tenth century C.E. and the final collapse of any semblance of Islamic political unity after the Mongol Conquests of the middle thirteenth century C.E.⁵² In the ensuing social and political turmoil, mysticism provided an inner consolation to many Muslims and the organization of the Sufi orders came to replace the imperial bureaucracy as a firm and identifiable source of social and political structure. As Hodgson stated, "The Sufi tie at once deepened the local moral resources, and tied them in to a system of brotherhoods in some ways as universal as the old caliphal bureaucracy had been, which had disappeared."⁵³ Furthermore, rather than representing a decline for Sufism and Islam in general, the Sufi orders along with the shari'a came to provide the foundation for the creation of an international Islamic order. Hodgson's interpretation that stresses the political and social context behind the transition of Sufism from solely being that of the tariqa-ways into the tariqa-brotherhoods can be applied meaningfully to West Africa.

The Qadiriyya Sufi order, founded by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani (1078–1166 C.E.), is usually cited as the first of the tariqa-brotherhoods that would come to command a permanent international presence in the Islamic world and was, indeed, the first Sufi order to appear in sub-Saharan West Africa. The development of the Sufi orders in general constituted an institutionalization of the tariqa-way giving a more formal structure to the basic master-disciple relationship. Most orders are organized hierarchically with the founding master or saint, usually referred to as a *wali*, or friend of God, at the top of a pyramidal structure. The successor of the founding saint, known as the *khalifah*, is not necessarily a hereditary successor, but in the case of the Murids, hereditary succession has usually been the rule. The next tier is composed of the individual masters, referred to in West Africa as *shaykh* or *muqaddam*, who were instructed by the founder, a khalifah, or a previous shaykh of the order. A shaykh has mastered the teachings and practices of the order and has been formally granted the authority to teach his own disciples and convey to them the specific wurd of the order. The shaykh thus constitutes a link within a scholarly and mystical chain of transmission, or *silsila*, which ties his disciples to the founder of the order and even further back in time to the Prophet Muhammad who Sufis consider to be their first master. In addition to the scholarly and mystical knowledge that is transmitted from master to disciple, a spiritual blessing or power known as *baraka* is also imparted as a part of the process.

The earliest evidence for the presence of Sufism as a tariqa-way in West Africa is difficult to decipher. Most sources point to the commercial and religious city of Timbuktu at the top of the Niger Bend in the fifteenth century C.E. and the desert edge north of the Senegal River in what is now Mauritania. The first carriers of Sufism into West Africa were North Africans and Saharan individuals who were members of the so-called *zawaya* Berber lineages who

took their designation from an Arabic term for a Sufi retreat or community. The *zawaya* occupied themselves with commerce and Islamic scholarship and teaching as opposed to the *hasaniyya* Arab clans who retained the role of desert warriors and raiders. Some sources cite Sidi Yahya al-Tadilisi, who was an imam in Timbuktu from 1431 to 1461 C.E., as one of the earliest Saharan links to Sufism, others claim the famous scholar al-Maghili (d. 1503 C.E.). The most reliable evidence points to the role played by the scholarly and commercial clan known as the Kunta who credit their ancestor Ahmad al-Bakka'i (d. 1514) with first identifying himself as a follower of the Sufi way and the Qadiri interpretation in particular.⁵⁴ Regardless of whom the first representatives of Sufism were in West Africa and when the *tariqa*-way actually appeared, it would still take several centuries for a distinct Sufi identity to coalesce in the form of the Qadiri order.

A leading role in the transformation of Sufism in West Africa from simply being a loose set of beliefs and practices of noted individuals from the *zawaya* families into the recognizable organization of the *tariqa*-brotherhood has been attributed to Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1729–1811) who was from a minor branch of the Kunta. In addition to gaining a reputation for his scholarship and piety, al-Mukhtar was also highly regarded due to his ability to moderate disputes between local factions. He was initiated into the Qadiri Sufi order and established what would long be regarded as the model for Sufi organization in West Africa among his followers at his settlement of al-Hilla. One of the most notable aspects of al-Mukhtar's model for a *tariqa*-brotherhood was the emphasis placed on heredity and kinship as a determinant for leadership of the order. A mid-level leadership was provided by a group of disciples known as *murid* who were engaged at a high level in the beliefs and practices of the order and were approved to pass on the *wird* of the order to others. The characteristics of the office of the *murid* were very similar to those of the *shaykh* or *muqqadam* of later orders. The *tilmidh* formed the base of the order and represented many different ethnicities and groups drawn from both sides of the desert edge. The *tilmidh* gained admittance to al-Mukhtar's order, which came to be known as the Mukhtariyya, by taking an oath of obedience. Gifts or tithes, known as *hadaya* were paid by the disciples to higher members of the order to support the educational function of the order and to be available for redistribution to disciples in times of need. *Tilmidh* could resettle within a Mukhtariyya community, but such a move was not a requirement. The Mukhtariyya order was spread west to Mauritania by Shaykh Sidiya who accumulated his own *tilmidh* and came to exert economic power and political influence over much of the area in addition to his high regard as a scholar, teacher, and Sufi. Sidiya's grandson, Sidiya Baba (d. 1924 C.E.) would come to play an important role in the development of the Murid order as both teacher and host to an exiled Amadu Bamba.

Emerging after the Mukhtariyya, was another West African branch of the Qadiri order founded by Muhammad Fadil Mamin (c. 1795–1868 C.E.), which

took root in western Mauritania. The Fadiliyya, as this branch of the Qadiriyya came to be known, was very similar in an organizational sense to the Mukhtariyya, but the founder had received not only the Qadiri wird from his father, but those of the Shadhiliyya Sufi order and the relatively new Tijaniyya order of Morocco. Amadu Bamba would later emulate the accumulation of a multiplicity of wird from various orders. Fadil's son, Sa'd Buh (d. 1917 C.E.) extended the reach of the Fadiliyya south of the Senegal River where he gained many disciples and frequently made tours.⁵⁵

Farther to the east, the transformation of Sufism into organized orders was also proceeding though just as slowly as in the west. There is evidence that the Qadiriyya may have taken root in Bornu during the latter half of the seventeenth century, but Hausaland would soon come to be a principal area for Sufi development and would see ultimately the first major combination of Sufism and Islamic reform and revolution as demonstrated by the Fulbe scholar Usman dan Fodio (1754–1817 C.E.), the leader of the Sokoto jihad. The Sokoto movement and its leader deserve to be treated here in some detail due to their influence on later movements as a type of model for the, at first glance, rather unlikely combination of Sufism and reform. The mixed nature of Islamization in Hausaland from the royal courts, to scholarly settlements, to rural villages provided fertile ground for both the introduction and combination of Sufism and Islamic reform.

“The Sokoto Model”: The Marriage of Sufism and Islamic Reform

The Hausa city-states of present day northern Nigeria have been considered by some scholars as possible successors to the medieval empires of the savannah. The major city-states were founded in the eleventh century, and Muslim Mande traders from the empire of Mali introduced Islam during the fourteenth century. Clerics from the Fulani ethnic group further reinforced the religion in Hausaland, but unlike their Muslim predecessors settled in the countryside rather than in the cities. In spite of the efforts made by these two groups of proselytizers, the aristocrats of the city-states vacillated from one generation to the next between strict observations of Islam and falling back on the older pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. The countryside largely remained unconverted. In spite of the common cultural heritage of the Hausa city-states, warfare between them was frequent and escalated during the eighteenth century. As usual, the peasantry suffered greatly from these conflicts and the Muslims fell victim to enslavement along with non-Muslims.⁵⁶

Usman dan Fodio's identity as a Sufi was a crucial part of his ideology of Islam and reform.⁵⁷ Sufism, in terms of its beliefs and practices, was not in itself the cause of Usman dan Fodio's reform movement. Rather, it was a very

important formative influence on him, and his Sufi experiences acted to validate him and his actions in a new way in the eyes of other Muslims and his own followers. The Sufi characteristics of his symbolic capital also served to distinguish him and others like him from the earlier generations of ulama who were either deemed ineffective in furthering Islam or under the influence of secular politics. His education began with his father who taught him Arabic grammar and Quranic recitation, and later as a young man, he traveled throughout Hausaland and the neighboring Sahara seeking out teachers to study with. He began his own teaching career as an itinerant missionary at the age of twenty, but continued to simultaneously pursue his own studies. It is unclear when he was first introduced to Sufism, but local traditions presage his later notoriety as a Sufi by noting that even as a youth Usman dan Fodio exhibited mystical powers and had authority over the *jinn*. The Tuareg scholar and Sufi Shaykh Jibril ibn Umar is the first clear link between Usman dan Fodio and Sufism, and he is credited with initiating him into the Khalwatiyya and Qadiriyya Sufi orders.⁵⁸ His Sufi education included works by the most prominent authors such as Ibn al-Arabi and al-Ghazzali, and by his mid-twenties, he was passing on his knowledge of Sufism to his younger brother Abdullah ibn Muhammad who would serve as his chief confidant and his lieutenant in the reform movement. The relationship between the two brothers was similar in some respects to the bond that would later develop between Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno.

With the beginning of his missionary work in 1774, Usman dan Fodio would soon begin to amass a significant following. He began preaching in the area surrounding Degel, the scholarly community that he had grown up in, and was assisted by his brother Abdullah and other disciples. The missions were largely directed not at the major Hausa cities but in their satellite towns and rural villages. Many of the satellite towns were fairly orthodox in their Islamic practice being founded by Muslims who had grown dissatisfied with the state of Islam in the royal courts and thus many supported Usman dan Fodio's call for reform. The rural villages where Islam was less known were a challenge, but there also he met mostly with success by preaching in the vernacular and composing sermons in the form of poems that could be read aloud to an audience by a literate disciple. These poetic sermons could thus be more easily taught, memorized, and transmitted orally among a largely illiterate population and instructed the listener in the precepts of Islam, Sufism, and the validity of reform.⁵⁹

Usman dan Fodio frequently went on retreats into the countryside during which he fasted and meditated in hope of achieving a mystical state, *hâl*, in which to experience God. At the age of thirty-six (1789–90 C.E.), he was rewarded with an experience that he described as follows.

. . . God removed the veil from my sight, and the dullness from my hearing and my smell, and the thickness from my taste, and the cramp from my two hands, and the

restraint from my two feet, and the heaviness from my body. And I was able to see the near like the far, and hear the far like the near, and smell the scent of him who worshipped God, sweeter than any sweetness; and the stink of the sinner, more foul than any stench. And I could recognize what was lawful to eat by the taste, before I swallowed it; and likewise what was unlawful to eat. I could pick up what was far away with my two hands while I was sitting in my place; and I could travel on my two feet [a distance] that a fleet horse could not cover in the space of years. That was a favor from God that he gives to whom he will. And I knew my body, limb by limb, bone by bone, sinew by sinew, muscle by muscle, hair by hair, each one by its rank and what was entrusted to it. Then I found written upon my fifth rib, on the right side, by the Pen of Power, "Praise be to God, Lord of the Created Worlds" ten times; and "O God, bless our Lord Muhammad, and the Family of Muhammad, and give them peace" ten times; and "I beg forgiveness from the Glorious God" ten times; and I marveled greatly at that.⁶⁰

This statement not only conferred divine favor upon Usman dan Fodio in the form of the mystical gifts that he described, it also delivered a *wird* in the form of the litany that he saw written on his rib. Further evidence of divine approval of his work came in the form of visions of the Prophet Muhammad and the founder of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani, who designated Usman dan Fodio as his earthly representative complete with robe and turban in one such instance in 1794. In the same vision, al-Gilani instructed him to spread the *wird* that he had been given and gave him "The Sword of Truth" to use against those who opposed Islam. Thus, in a single and very significant vision, Usman dan Fodio's status as a Sufi shaykh is confirmed by the highest authority and a sense of militancy is added to his work symbolized by the Sword of Truth. In further demonstration of his devotion to al-Gilani and the Qadiriyya way, Usman dan Fodio composed a poem in the Fulani language entitled "al-Qadiriyya" that his brother and adjunct Abdullah later translated into Arabic. While the poem is largely in praise of al-Gilani, the sense of militancy legitimized through Sufi mystical experiences is an important theme as demonstrated by the lines "Show me as a conqueror by your religion in these countries, Through the rank of Abd al-Qadir."⁶¹

Following the earlier experience of Nasir al-Din, Usman dan Fodio began the first phase of his jihad by extending his preaching to the royal courts of the Hausa kings. He appealed to the king of the city-state of Gobir, nominally Muslim at best, to reform his ways and bring justice to his realm. Gobir had recently conquered the neighboring city-state of Zamfara and was subjecting its population to continuous raiding for booty and slaves. Meeting with no success, he next traveled to Zamfara and preached there for five years condemning the enslavement of Muslims among other unlawful acts of violence. In 1804, after his community was attacked by a force from Gobir, Usman dan Fodio, following the instructions of al-Gilani via another vision, withdrew with his followers in an act of *hijra* that was directly modeled on the historical precedent set by the Prophet Muhammad in his withdrawal from Mecca to

Medina. The hijra resulted in the proclamation of an Islamic state and the launch of the military phase of the jihad. By 1808, Gobir had fallen to the reformist forces, and by 1818, most of the old Hausa city-states had either been conquered or had joined the reform movement to form the nucleus of the Sokoto Khalifate that would survive until the British conquest in 1905.

Conclusion

Thus, by the early decades of the nineteenth century, Islamic reform had been established as a means to affect social and political change. Although, the tactic of reform had met with mixed success in Senegambia, the recent victory of the Sokoto movement greatly buoyed the cause as other reformers such as Seku Amadu Bari who established the Islamic state of Maasina in 1818, and Umar Tal who would lead a major jihad in the latter half of the century came to be directly inspired by Usman dan Fodio's work. The Sokoto experience built upon the model that would be used in later attempts at reform. Armed jihad, for example, was to be preceded by a missionary stage of teaching, preaching, and making appeals to the secular political authorities. This would be followed by the act of hijra in imitation of the early history of Islam which would inaugurate the armed jihad and the creation of a theocratic state ruled according to the shari'a.

This aspect of the Sokoto model was not entirely new, but what was and would become truly significant about Usman dan Fodio's movement was the integration of Sufism into the rubric of reform. This incorporation of Sufism, however, was mainly limited to those aspects that could be referred to as the *tariqa*-way. In other words, Usman dan Fodio made use of the beliefs and practices of Sufism and their accompanying discourse of visions, miracles, and such, rather than the organizational principles of the *tariqa*-brotherhood manifested in a hierarchical order. There is little evidence that Usman dan Fodio actively pursued induction into the *Qadiriyya* order for the followers of his jihad or that he utilized the organizational aspects of the order to help guide the revolution. In this sense, the Sokoto reform movement differs from later examples, especially the Murid experience in which Amadu Bamba utilized the organization of the Sufi order in addition to Sufi beliefs and practices and made induction into the order a priority. As we will later see in the Murid case, the order itself served as the primary vehicle of reform and jihad. Yet, one should not downplay the role that Sufism played in the Sokoto jihad. The mystical experiences of Sufism acted as an important legitimizing factor for the movement and were integral in the accumulation of a potent form of symbolic capital by Usman dan Fodio. This symbolic capital was needed to both galvanize disciples for the difficult work ahead and to support the calls for reform made to the secular authorities.

The nineteenth century would witness the apex of the development of Islamic reform and the spectacular growth in the influence of Sufism within reformist ideology and Islamic society at large throughout West Africa and Senegambia. The historical context behind these trends is quite complex. In spite of the decline of the Atlantic slave trade in the early decades of the eighteenth century, the disruptive effects of that trade continued to plague many regions and an intracontinental slave trade was given new life with the rise of cash crop agriculture in the form of peanuts, gum arabic, palm oil, and so forth that were produced for the European market. Meanwhile, the second half of the nineteenth century would be greatly affected by the European conquest and colonization of much of West Africa. Islamic reform would thus have to contend not only with its previous foe, the local representatives of African secular authority, but would also have to deal with the imposition of European colonial rule through resistance, accommodation, or flight. This topic is the subject of chapter 2, which focuses on the historical milieu of the nineteenth century in Senegambia out of which the Murid Sufi order developed.

2

CONFLICT AND COLONIZATION

A NEW GENERATION OF SUFI REFORMERS

Introduction

Previously, that is to say, before the coming of Sēriñ Touba [Amadu Bamba], there was only anarchy because each village had its little king, and they did what they wanted and only force counted, but it was at the appearance of the Shaykh [Amadu Bamba] that a lot of things changed. This is because the Shaykh put the people on the right path that leads to Allah by establishing the jihad, that is to say, to master this earthly world and to think of the other because the other world is eternal. Thus, one can say that the change came from the jihad that the marabout imposed on the people. The jihad that he had established was the jihad of the soul; to conform oneself to the recommendations of Allah and to leave all that is forbidden.¹

This statement was made by a Murid historian and archivist, living in Darou Mousty, in reply to the question of how Amadu Bamba and the advent of the Muridiyya had affected the history of the region. It is actually a commonly held view among Murids and is not confined solely to Murid intellectuals. Two of the most important aspects of this historical interpretation are the allusions to a state of political anarchy prior to the emergence of the Muridiyya and the belief that jihad is truly a “holy war of the soul” or an internal struggle within oneself rather than an overt military action. The sentiments behind this statement also provide important clues in deciphering Murid conceptions of modernity as an awareness of change and give some indications of their sense of what was eternal within this notion of modernity. In this context, Amadu Bamba’s revolutionary mission put an end to the internal political and religious conflicts within Kajoor and the neighboring states of precolonial Senegambia and redefined the role of jihad for Muslims.² For the Murids, armed jihad was not considered a lawful or a viable option in conflicts with secular powers be they Wolof or French. The pursuit of armed jihad was deemed to be a corrupting influence upon reform movements and the theocratic states that they sought to create. In fact, from Amadu Bamba’s point of view, militant Islamic reform movements and the states that they created were

little different from their secular and aristocratic opposition that they increasingly came to resemble in terms of violence and destruction. The meaning of jihad for Amadu Bamba and his followers was now transformed to the inward spiritual struggle to reform oneself and live within the shari'a but was still contextualized as a means of social and political change and thus constituted a new variant of Islamic reform and modernization.

Amadu Bamba and his followers rejected both the authority of the secular political leadership and the methods employed by the old Islamic faction, particularly in the precolonial kingdom of Kajoor, in its struggles against the state. In its essence, the Muridiyya was a new synthesis of reformist and Sufi Islam and Wolof culture that emerged because of the conflicts within Wolof society between Islamic reformists and the secular political leadership. These conflicts had entered a new era in the late eighteenth century and peaked during the early years of French colonization, and it is in this period that one finds the foundations for the development of this new Murid ideology. The Murids, however, did not represent a complete break with the past. Amadu Bamba kept many of the reformist ideals of previous Muslim leaders that were widely held among Sufis such as an emphasis on education and the shari'a and a belief in the separation of Muslim and secular communities. Additionally, Amadu Bamba can be said to be representative of a new generation of Islamic and Sufi leaders that were emerging in the latter half of the nineteenth century characterized by figures such as Malik Sy, Saad Buh, and Sidiyya Baba. Another important component of the Murid synthesis was the fact that Amadu Bamba was Wolof and not Berber or Arab.

The era in which the Murid order was born witnessed the climax of the struggle between Islamic reformists and the representatives of political power in Senegambia. Additionally, the early years of the Muridiyya coincided with the initial phase of the imposition of French colonial rule in Kajoor, roughly from 1880 to 1904, and undoubtedly, French colonial expansion affected the development of the Murids. In the examination that follows, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate the two streams of modernization, Islamic reform and Sufism constituting one and French colonization the other, as each came to be intertwined in the history of the nineteenth century. Accordingly, the ideologies and tactics employed by each side adapted to this changing environment. Yet, the emergence of the order can still primarily be considered a product of precolonial history in which the power struggles between religious and secular powers played a predominate role albeit in the face of growing French influence and participation in this struggle.

The Sengambian Jihad of the Nineteenth Century

Almost from the beginning of the nineteenth century, one can begin to see the growing impact of French involvement in the Senegambian conflicts. The

career of the damel of Kajoor (1809–32) and teen of Bawol (1817–32), Birima Fatma Cubb, was characterized by a continuation of a policy of accommodation on the part of the secular Wolof political leadership toward the Islamic faction, yet this policy would eventually be undone, in part due to French intervention. Wolof oral tradition remembers Birima Fatma Cubb as a just

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Figure 2.1. Shaykh Amadu Bamba M'Backé, 1913. (Paul Marty, *Études sur l'Islam au Sénégal* [Paris: n.p., 1917]).

ruler and a Muslim who always tried to support the shari'a within his realm. He was noted for prohibiting unlawful marriages outside of the precepts of the shari'a, the abuse of alcohol, and pillaging.³ In the war that brought him to power, he was supported by Shaykh Bunama Kunta, a notable Qadiri Sufi, who was an opponent of Birima's political rival and reigning king, Amary Ngoone. Birima appointed Shaykh Bunama Kunta as the *xali* (from the Arabic, *qadi*), or Islamic judge, of Kajoor and gave him the province of Ndanx for his monetary support. The reasons behind the king's actions were very similar to those that had motivated Latsukaabe Faal a century earlier. By his close association with a scholar of the famous Kunta family, Birima hoped to strengthen his reputation as a good Muslim. The king could also rely on the *shaykh-xali* to support the legitimacy of his government vis-à-vis the Islamic faction of Kajoor, particularly in Njambur.

The king's efforts toward conciliating the Islamic faction were not entirely successful due in large part to the growth of French influence in the region and the resulting economic and political disruptions. The kingdom of Waalo, Kajoor's neighbor to the north and adjacent to the French posts at St. Louis and Richard Toll, was most directly affected by the growing French presence that after 1819, including a cash crop plantation scheme in Waalo with a treaty to safeguard French economic interests. Simultaneously, Waalo was also facing raids by *hassani* warriors from the state of Trarza on the north bank of the Senegal River who were, in part, spurred into action by a regional drought affecting societies both north and south of the river.⁴ Civil war between the aristocratic families of Waalo and their respective *ceddo* forces soon broke out over the allocation of customs duties paid by the French to the kingdom. In 1827, in response to the civil conflict between the aristocrats and the increasing peasant disaffection toward the continuing violence, an Islamic revolt began in Waalo under the leadership of Diile Fatim Cham, a *ñeño*. Within three years, the Islamic forces supported by much of the peasantry had swept across the kingdom and attacked the French at Richard Toll where the king of Waalo had fled.

Influenced by the success in Waalo, Diile Fatim Cham's spiritual master, the Sēriñ Kokki, Njaga Isa, led another revolt of the Njambur marabouts against the king of Kajoor. Although Njaga Isa was undoubtedly concerned like many other religious notables about the economic and political developments connected with French commercial expansion in the region, his revolt also smacks of political opportunism. The revolt of 1827 largely fails to stand up as a true Islamic reform movement due to its lack of sufficient justification, the personal ambitions of its leader, and its goals. As the Sēriñ Kokki, Njaga Isa had accepted a political commission, or title, from Birima Fatma Cubb, the king of Kajoor, who also happened to be his brother-in-law. The Sēriñ Kokki and his army were defeated by Birima, however, and they joined forces with Njaga Isa's disciple, Diile Fatim Cham, fighting in Waalo. Njaga Isa supported a candidate for the throne of Waalo who was opposed to the growing French

presence in the region. Njaga Isa's candidate was eventually defeated and the *sëriñ* was forced into exile among the Lebu of Cap Vert who had broken free of Kajoor's control and established an Islamic republic. The revolt of the Sëriñ Kokki appears to have been provoked not by the actions of Birima but by the increasing presence of the French in the region and his own political designs. Despite Birima's efforts to court the Islamic faction, the king could not affect the continued reorienting of Njambur's economy toward the French on the coast, and the jihad of 1827 is thus indicative of the larger historical context behind many of the conflicts between the *sëriñ* and the *ceddo*.

Umar Tal and the Emergence of the Tijaniyya Sufi Order

In the face of these developments in Senegambia, the Islamic reform movement across West Africa was gaining momentum as demonstrated by one of the most important and influential of the Islamic reform leaders of the era, the warrior-marabout al-Hajj Umar Tal. This son of Futa Toro also left an indelible mark on the history of Sufism in West Africa through his propagation of a new order, the Tijaniyya, and his use of Sufism in its ideological and organizational aspects to support his reform movement.⁵ Umar Tal's combination of Sufism and Islamic reform would exceed the degree to which Usman dan Fodio had relied on the Qadiriyya and his mystical resume to bolster his authority in the Sokoto jihad. Yet, the success of Umar Tal's actions can be judged as mixed at best. He took a leading role in transforming the Tijaniyya from an inconsequential influence into a major Sufi order in West Africa while also contributing to the sectarian conflicts within the Islamic community of the region that ultimately strengthened the position of those ulama, such as Amadu Bamba, who opposed the use of armed jihad as an expression of reform. Furthermore, in spite of Umar Tal's intention to strengthen and extend the *dar al-Islam* in West Africa, his reliance on warfare and inattention to statecraft produced much destruction and set the tone for the final era of reformist jihad in which Amadu Bamba came of age.

Umar Tal was born in the Podor region of Futa Toro in 1796 of nonaristocratic background during a time in which the Islamic state was entering a period of decline and facing increasing pressure from within and without. The ruling Toorodo regime of clerical families had, by that time, become something of a new aristocracy complete with hereditary succession and excluding from power those who were not of the premier scholarly families. The exclusionary nature of the regime and its incumbent practice of inequality were judged by many within Futa Toro to be a significant departure from the original ideals of the Islamic revolution that had brought the Toorodo into power. In effect, one aristocracy had come to replace another. It was in

this environment that Umar Tal was born and raised and initially educated. Yet, by the early 1820s, Umar Tal had left Futa Toro to continue his studies in Futa Jallon, another state in West Africa that had been founded by Islamic revolution. However, the theocratic nature of its government was facing a similar identity crisis as the Toorodo in Futa Toro. The generation that had led the revolution in the early eighteenth century had given way to a conservative clerical aristocracy dominated by two clans that frequently struggled over the political leadership of the state, waged war, and vacillated between continued involvement in slave raiding and engaging in the “legitimate” commerce with the Europeans on the coast. Growing social and political discontent among free Muslims and slaves who were excluded from positions of power would finally erupt in rebellion in the latter half of the nineteenth century in Futa Jallon.⁶

In spite of these crises, Futa Jallon had maintained its reputation for Islamic scholarship and learning, and it is mostly likely during his early sojourn in the state that Umar Tal became a Tijani Sufi.⁷ The development of the Tijaniyya occupies a paramount position in the historiography of Sufism in West Africa and the career of Umar Tal was a watershed in the progression of the Sufi way and the orders in West Africa. The order had been founded in Morocco in the late eighteenth century by Ahmad al-Tijani (d. 1815) and from its beginning presented itself as a challenge to the established Sufi orders. Al-Tijani claimed to have seen the Prophet in a vision during which he received the Tijani prayer formula and was informed that as the Prophet Muhammad was the “seal of the prophets,” he was the culmination of the Sufi saints (*wilaya* in Arabic, or friends of God).⁸ Rather than inheriting the prayer formula of the order through the standard means of the *silsila*, or chain, that stretched back across generations of Sufis to the Prophet, Al-Tijani could claim a much more immediate connection with the divine source and presented the Tijaniyya way as the last and most perfect Sufi way.

Umar Tal set out on the hajj in 1828 and remained in the Hijaz until 1831, thus distinguishing himself as the only leader of a major West African reform movement who could claim the title of *al-hajj*. Before he left Mecca to return home, Umar Tal was confirmed by Muhammad al-Ghali, who had been a disciple of al-Tijani and was the head of the order in the Hijaz, as the khalifah of the Tijaniyya for West Africa. The title of *khalifah*, or successor (to al-Tijani), granted Umar Tal great authority as the chief representative of the order in West Africa. After his return, Umar Tal would utilize this authority to attract disciples and build the Tijaniyya below the Sahara Desert into a formidable order and eventually launch one of the most important and widespread reform movements in West Africa.

Upon his return to West Africa, Umar Tal spent seven years in the court of Muhammad Bello who had succeeded his father, Usman dan Fodio, as ruler of the Sokoto Khalifate. Umar Tal’s Tijaniyya affiliation apparently caused him no problems in the court of Sokoto that was predominately Qadiri as

witnessed by his marriage to one of Muhammad Bello's daughters. He established small communities of Tijanis in Sokoto and in the Islamic state of Masina in the upper Niger Valley through which he passed after leaving Hausaland in 1838. By the early 1840s, Umar Tal had relocated to Jegunko on the northern edge of Futa Jallon and began to build a large and influential Tijani community. The Jegunko phase of Umar Tal's career saw him at the height of his scholarly abilities with the completion of a major text that is considered second only to the work of al-Tijani within the worldwide Tijani community. Likewise, the disciples that were attracted to him at Jegunko reflected the scholarly emphasis of his movement during this time.

From 1846 to 1847, Umar Tal undertook a tour of his homeland, Futa Toro, and attracted many new disciples who were critical of the Toorodo rulers. Umar Tal articulated the disaffections of the people of Futa Toro and accused the Toorodo of political and economic corruption, exploitation of the people, inaction in the face of pressures from the French and the Berber warriors, and religious ignorance. In proposing a solution, Umar Tal sought to revive the reformist ideals that had first launched the Islamic revolution in Futa Toro and presented the Tijaniyya as a vehicle to guide and legitimize an armed movement of revolution that sought change not just in Futa Toro but also across West Africa. Unlike his predecessors, Umar Tal was not content to simply advocate revolution in his native land but saw his work as a strengthening of the entire Dar al-Islam in West Africa. The thousands of disciples who joined his movement from Futa Toro identified with the increasingly militant messages being propagated by Umar Tal, yet he did not directly confront the Toorodo at that time. Instead, in an act reminiscent of the Prophet Muhammad's hijra, he established a new base at Dingiray in the Mande kingdom of Tamba to the northeast of Futa Jallon from which he demanded that the ruler of Tamba reform himself and his ways. In 1852, upon the king's refusal, Umar Tal launched an armed jihad in which his students were transformed into soldiers and emerged victorious.

Utilizing Futa Toro and Futa Jallon as bases for recruitment, Umar Tal extended his reformist military campaign to envelope the upper Senegal and Niger River valleys. The Bamana kingdom of Kaarta, labeled as a pagan by Umar Tal, fell to his forces in 1855. His strategy in relation to Futa Toro and the northern states of Senegambia was greatly affected by the failure of his forces to take the French fort at Medina on the upper Senegal River during a siege in 1857. From that point on, Umar Tal was forced to turn to the east away from the French and defeated the Bamana state of Segou on the Niger River in 1861. His next target may at first appear to have been an unlikely one, the Islamic state of Masina through which Umar Tal had passed on his way to found Jegunko years before. Masina had been founded in 1818 in the wake of a Fulbe-led jihad modeled after and with direct links to the jihad of Usman dan Fodio. The leadership of Masina had established close ties with the Kunta lineage of Qadiri Sufi clerics and both were opposed to Umar Tal's increasing

power and influence. In Umar Tal's attack against Segu, Masina supported the Bamana king against the Islamic reformer. After an appeal to admit their apostasy had been rejected, Umar Tal attacked Masina in 1862, and, after enjoying an initial period of success, was killed in a rebellion two years later.

Umar Tal's actions and, in particular, his disastrous war with Masina called many to question the legitimacy of his tactics in his quest for Islamic reform. The representatives of secular power were opposed to Umar Tal, but West African Muslims such as the Jakhanke clerics refused to support him and, as seen above, Masina and the Kunta Qadiris directly opposed him. Part of the reason for Muslim opposition and criticism of Umar Tal could be due to the sectarian nature of his movement in which the Tijani order was trumpeted as the superior way in relation to the older and more established Qadiriyya. Along these lines, the Tijanis criticized the Qadiriyya as elitist and out of touch with the masses and the times in opposition to Tijani calls for egalitarianism and the access of all to Islam. The Tijanis were also able to associate the Qadiri clerics with the earlier pattern of conciliation and indulgence of pagan or nominally Muslim rulers that had been a characteristic of the prior era of Islam in West Africa and now judged to be apostasy. Umar Tal also held the current generation of rulers in the Islamic states of Futa Toro, Futa Jallon, and Masina to have largely deserted the religious calling that had founded their states and to have, in their decline, come to resemble the pagan aristocracies that their ancestors had overthrown. The large amount of destruction and loss of life on both sides, the failure of Umar Tal to establish viable Islamic governments and societies in the wake of his conquests, and the continuing warfare after his death that stemmed from his jihad have also contributed to negative judgments on the part of some Muslims of his movement.⁹

In the aftermath of Umar Tal's death, the course of Islamic reform in Senegambia likewise entered a stage marked by fragmentation, continued violence, indigenous opposition to armed jihad on the part of secular rulers and Muslim notables, and increasing French involvement in the process and in the region generally. This new stage of Islamic reform witnessed the rise of a new generation of Islamic leaders such as Saad Buh, Sidiyya Baba, Malik Sy, and Amadu Bamba who forged new identities for their followers in efforts to cope with these changes. Even though Umar Tal's plans in Senegambia had been thwarted by the French in 1857, his writings, preaching, and his movement in general were very influential in the Wolof states. Although some scholars have pointed to the role played by the religious influence of Umar Tal in the 1859 Njambur revolt, the marabouts who took part were not calling for the destruction of Kajoor's political system. In fact, they were supporting their own candidate for the throne. The revolt, therefore, had much more of a political rather than a religious tone, and to further complicate matters, not all of the marabouts of Njambur participated in the revolt. The Islamic faction had split over the issue of cooperation with Faidherbe and the French against the monarchy.

The Final Phase of Armed Jihad in Senegambia

The 1859 Njambur revolt is an excellent example of the increasing complexity of the Islamic revolts of the latter half of the nineteenth century that had to contend not only with the aristocracies of the Wolof states but also with Muslim opposition to armed jihad and the growing influence and power of the French. Under the tenure of Louis Faidherbe as the governor of the French colony of Senegal from 1854 to 1861, and again from 1863 to 1865, the French began to expand their holdings from the communes along the coast into the interior. French commercial interests drove much of the colony's policies. Hoping to make conditions more favorable for the development of a peanut producing peasantry and seeking to gain control of the trade in peanuts and end their customs payments to local rulers, the French felt the need to "pacify" the region in order to ensure their control over peanut producers. Commercially, therefore, the French had to deal with the largest landholders in the region, the aristocracy, or *ceddo*, and the *sëriñ*. The kingdom of Waalo was Faidherbe's first target and was annexed by the nascent French colony of Senegal in 1855, after a brief but decisive war that caused much destruction and the flight of many Waalo peasants into neighboring states. This period in Kajoor, as in most of Senegambia, is thus a story of competing interests among the aristocracy, Islamic reformists, and the French imperialists.

Prior to launching his first campaign against Kajoor in 1860, Governor Faidherbe, from 1854 to 1859, had sought to incite another Islamic revolt against the *damel* by offering French support to the marabouts of Njambur. Those Muslims of Njambur who accepted the idea of French aid were led by *Sëriñ* Luuga, Njuga Lô, while those who were opposed to cooperation with the French were led by *Sëriñ* Ñomré and Silmaxa Joob, the father of Lat Joor, a future king of Kajoor. Those titled marabouts who refused to ally with Faidherbe considered the French to be the greater threat to their interests and were even reinforced by *ceddo* sent by the king.¹⁰ Faidherbe, meanwhile, had armed his *sëriñ* allies and launched an expedition in March 1854 that destroyed Ñomré and other clerical towns that were opposed to the French.

The candidate that the rebellious marabouts supported was Maajoojo Dégén Koddou Faal, a member of the Dorobe royal matrilineage. Maajoojo had gained the support of the *sëriñ* by promising them complete autonomy after the overthrow of the Geej dynasty. He was the favorite candidate of Faidherbe because he had agreed to allow a telegraph line linking the French posts of Dakar and St. Louis to be built through Kajoor and to cede parts of the province of Ganjool to the French in return for their aid. The rebellion broke out in November, and on December 25, 1859, the force led by *Sëriñ* Luuga engaged the army of the *damel*. The promised French aid was withheld and *Sëriñ* Luuga was killed and his army defeated. In revenge, the *ceddo* destroyed many of the Islamic communities of Njambur that had rebelled and torched their granaries.¹¹

Although the 1859 revolt had failed, the underlying factors that had caused warfare to erupt between Muslim leaders and the state were not resolved. After 1859, Muslim reformers outside of Kajoor took up the leadership of the armed Islamic revolt in the region and continued to apply pressure to the ruling class to “reform” themselves. In fact, the period from 1859, until the early years of colonial control was marked by periodic civil wars and French intervention in Kajoor. Even though the *sēriñ* of Njambur did not lead the later rebellions they did at times take part in them. According to the Murids, the continuing politicization of the Islamic reform movements of this period deprived Muslims of a true alternative to the *ceddo* regimes. In this context, the titled *sēriñ* and the *ceddo* were almost indistinguishable, particularly in the destruction caused by both sides during their wars. The question of proper Sufi affiliation, Qadiri or Tijani, was also affected by these conflicts. For this discussion, the movements led by Mābba Jaxu and Amadu Seexu bear the most influence in regard to the formation of Murid ideology in relation to the issue of jihad and the proper role of Islam in society and politics. Also central to the developments after 1859 was the role played by Lat Joor, a king of Kajoor and the last claimant to the throne, who at various times fought with and against both Islamic reformers. During an era of continuous hostilities between Islamic leaders and the state and growing French control over the region, Amadu Bamba emerged to create a movement of synthesis that sought to redefine Islamic identity.

The Jihad of Mābba Jaxu

Murid conceptions of the jihad of Mābba Jaxu and the events that led to the death of Lat Joor and the loss of independence to the French can be analyzed through tracing the activities of Amadu Bamba throughout this period. In Paul Marty’s view, Amadu Bamba’s experiences in the courts of Mābba and Lat Joor generated in him a desire to take power and become a political leader in his own right.¹² Later scholars, such as O’Brien, have generally followed this line of reasoning by stressing the influence that his father’s association with Mābba and Lat Joor had on Amadu Bamba and his own supposed political aspirations.¹³ However, as amply presented in his latest work, “*God Alone is King*,” James Searing has pointed out that Murid traditions that have been preserved concerning the life of the founder of the order continually point to Amadu Bamba’s aversion to the politics of the armed jihadists and the royal courts.¹⁴ This is not to say that Amadu Bamba’s experiences in the courts of Mābba and Lat Joor had no effect upon him. Rather these experiences had a negative influence upon him and led him to disavow completely the concept of the military jihad as a legitimate tactic of Islamic reform and revolution and a corresponding rejection of secular and temporal politics. This disavowal, however, was steeped in Islamic and, in particular, Sufi ideology and would become an integral part of Murid identity.

Even though Amadu Bamba was only a youth during the period that his father served Màbba, Murid traditions concerning Màbba and his jihad stress the experiences of the M'Backé family during this time in an effort to explain the origins of Murid attitudes toward jihad and secular rule. For example, certain actions taken by Màbba were judged by the Murids to have been inappropriate. His mistakes were attributed to his political awkwardness, his impatience, and his refusal to seek the counsel of others. Serigne Bachir M'Backé, a son of Amadu Bamba who wrote a biography of his father, even noted that Màbba was no *alim*, or Islamic scholar. Despite his shortcomings and faults, however, he was deemed by Serigne Bachir M'Backé to have rendered a service to Islam and the Muslims of Senegambia through calling attention to the threats posed by the aristocrats and the French. Furthermore, his goals of restoring Islam and protecting Muslims were judged to have been admirable and, in Serigne Bachir's analysis, made his mistakes excusable in the end.¹⁵

Màbba Jaxu, himself a disciple of al-Hajj Umar Tal and a shaykh of the Tijaniyya, began his jihad with the typical call to the rulers of the neighboring Wolof and Sereer kingdoms to conform to Islamic law and reform their practices. When his appeals failed, he relied on his army of Tijani disciples to accomplish reform. From his base in the southern Rip region, he attacked and conquered the kingdom of Saloum in 1862. In 1864, his forces moved against Bawol, and in the following year, he attacked Jolof. By 1865, Màbba had established a theocratic state governed by marabouts that attracted some of the most important religious and political figures in Senegambia.

Among those who were drawn to Màbba were Momar Anta Saly M'Backé (d. 1881), the father of Amadu Bamba, and Lat Joor, the future damel of Kajoor. Momar Anta Saly came from a long line of Islamic scholars and was himself a noted intellectual and teacher. As discussed in chapter 1, his grandfather, Maharam M'Backé, had opposed the armed jihad of 1790–91 and had received a grant of land for his settlement of M'Backé-Bawol where Momar Anta Saly was born. As a youth, he began his Quranic education and was most likely exposed to the apolitical leanings of his family's interpretation of Islam. After completing his basic education in his hometown, Momar pursued advanced study in Islam in Njambur under the tutelage of Massamba Anta Diop (Jooib). After his studies were completed in Njambur, Momar Anta Saly traveled to Saloum where he sought out Shaykh Muhammad Sall who was teaching in the village of Bamba. Following the completion of his education, Momar Anta Saly returned to M'Backé-Bawol and began teaching at the nearby village of Ndia-Kane.

Amadu Bamba was born in M'Backé-Bawol in 1853 while his father was pursuing his teaching career. After Màbba's forces had moved through Bawol and attacked Jolof (1864–65), he ordered all Muslims, the *ulama* (scholars), in particular, to emigrate to Saloum in an act of hijra from where his movement had started.¹⁶ Momar Anta Saly obeyed the order to leave and took his family to Saloum where he settled in the village of Porokhane serving as a *qadi* (Islamic judge)

to M̈abba while continuing to teach. His family also grew during this period when Ibrahima Faty (Maam Cerno) was born in 1865 in Porokhane.

Lat Joor arrived at the court of M̈abba in 1864 after losing a succession dispute in Kajoor to Maajoojo Faal, the candidate of the rebel s̈eriñ of 1859 who had supported concessions to the French. Lat Joor was of the royal matrilineage of the Geej family that had ruled Kajoor since 1693 and was thus a possible claimant to the throne. Despite his aristocratic origins, which would place him firmly within the camp of the ceddo, Lat Joor also had a strong connection to Islam and the s̈eriñ. According to oral tradition, Lat Joor had studied the Quran at Kokki in Njambur as a youth and was preparing himself for a religious career. Recognizing the appeal of Lat Joor's combined aristocratic and Islamic credentials, Demba War Sall, the commander of the Geej ceddo, had called upon him to pursue his claim to the throne after French forces invaded and installed Maajoojo Faal as king in 1861.¹⁷

It was at the court of M̈abba that Lat Joor renewed himself as a Muslim and became very well acquainted with Momar Anta Saly M'Backé. M̈abba had in fact welcomed Lat Joor under the condition that he and his followers revive themselves as good Muslims and observe the shari'a. Historians have debated whether or not Lat Joor's return to Islam under M̈abba was real or politically motivated as a matter of convenience.¹⁸ Serigne Bachir M'Backé, a grandson of Momar Anta Saly, believed that Lat Joor's religious revival was real and that he continued to be a good Muslim for the rest of his life. Furthermore, he attributed the successes that Lat Joor later enjoyed to his renewed dedication to Islam and noted that many among the ceddo had followed Lat Joor's example of religious renewal.¹⁹ Momar Anta Saly, meanwhile, had distinguished himself as a great scholar and teacher at the court of M̈abba and had attracted many students and followers. Among his followers was Lat Joor, who frequently sought out the marabout's counsel. The friendship that emerged between Lat Joor and Momar Anta Saly was demonstrated by the marriage between the marabout and one of Lat Joor's cousins.

In the midst of these developments linking Lat Joor and Momar Anta Saly, the jihad continued. M̈abba soon turned his attention to the still unconquered Sereer kingdom of Siin. His forces attacked the Siin army at Somb on July 28, 1867. In the course of the battle, the troops that Lat Joor had brought with him from Kajoor defected, M̈abba was killed, and his army defeated. There are different accounts regarding Lat Joor's abandonment of M̈abba at Somb, but all of the sources point to Demba War Sall, Lat Joor's military commander, or chief of the ceddo, and the role he played in leading Lat Joor away from M̈abba.²⁰

Lat Joor

Murid sources concerning the development of the relationship, or lack thereof, between Lat Joor and Amadu Bamba focus on the events following

the former's return to Kajoor after the failure of Màbba's reform movement and the position of Momar Anta Saly in Lat Joor's court. Regardless of the political motivations that affected Lat Joor's abandonment of Màbba, he still wanted to maintain his religious beliefs and went so far as to ask Momar Anta Saly to return with him to Kajoor as his qadi and counselor. In his biography of Amadu Bamba, Sēriñ Bachir M'Backé, making no mention of Lat Joor's disassociation with Màbba, justified Momar Anta Saly's acceptance of Lat Joor's request by quoting a *hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad that said, "Indeed, when God guides a single man to the right path thanks to you, it is better for you than the most expensive possessions."²¹ Momar Anta Saly thus legitimized his continuing association with politics by believing that serving as Lat Joor's qadi was a fulfillment of his religious duties and that helping Lat Joor stay on the true path of Islam would earn him a great reward in the hereafter. Arriving in Kajoor with Lat Joor, Momar Anta Saly was granted land around the village of Patar, near Lat Joor's court, where he settled with his family. In addition to advising Lat Joor, he farmed and taught his disciples. Amadu Bamba, meanwhile, had taken charge of the education of his younger brother, Ibrahima Faty (Maam Cerno), and had introduced him into his Quranic education.²²

The governor of Senegal, Pinet-Laprade, had authorized Lat Joor to return to Kajoor not as the damel but as the chief of the province of Geet (Guet). Lat Joor returned as such, but he did not remain in the position for long. In the preceding five years, the population of Kajoor had suffered much from the French incursions, famines, and epidemics. In many cases, the colonial practice of burning villages and confiscating harvests had directly caused famine, and the epidemics that followed only made the situation worse. A yellow fever epidemic swept through Kajoor from 1866 to 1867 and was followed by a cholera outbreak from 1868 to 1869 that even claimed the life of Governor Pinet-Laprade who died in August 1869.

Thus, Lat Joor returned to a Kajoor that had suffered greatly during the years since it had been invaded by the French in 1861. Not surprisingly, many attributed a divine origin to the events. Lat Joor saw his chance to exploit the situation when a reformist marabout known as Amadu Seexu took control of Futa Toro in 1869 and began preaching against the French presence. Lat Joor allied himself with Amadu Seexu and defeated two French expeditions sent against him in July 1869. In addition to the French, Lat Joor also had to deal with the Islamic faction of Kajoor, some of whom had previously supported the French against his family. Their support was necessary for him to be accepted as damel. A settlement was reached in June 1870 when Lat Joor agreed to accept Omar Niang, a representative of the Islamic faction, as his *jawriñ-mbul*, or second in command.²³

With the death of Governor Pinet-Laprade in August 1869 and the arrival of a new governor, François Valère, the French began to follow a new tactic of conciliation with Lat Joor and Kajoor. On July 28, 1870, Lat Joor was accepted

by the French as the damel of an independent Kajoor. Regarding the provinces that had earlier been ceded to France by Lat Joor's predecessor, a treaty was signed the following year in which Lat Joor agreed to abandon his claims to the provinces of Jander and Ganjool. In return, the provinces of Njambur and Sañoxor were returned to Kajoor and the French promised not to intervene as Lat Joor made a bid to also become the *teen* (king) of neighboring Bawol. A number of reasons within both Senegal and Europe caused the French change of heart. The French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–72) and the resulting declaration of the Third Republic undoubtedly influenced the decision to attempt an appeasement with Lat Joor. Within Senegal, European commercial interests were suffering from the constant warfare and upheavals and wanted peace, and the colonial government saw a chance to split the alliance between Lat Joor and Amadu Shaykhu and thus focus their efforts against the marabout in the short term.

The alliance that had existed between Lat Joor and Amadu Seexu broke down after Lat Joor made peace with the French and achieved his goal of becoming damel. Now that Lat Joor was the king of Kajoor, Amadu Seexu and his reformist message became a threat to his political power and the damel began to make alliances with opponents of Amadu Seexu. In 1874, Amadu's forces invaded Kajoor and defeated Lat Joor on two different occasions. Omar Niang, the representative of the titled *sëriñ* in Lat Joor's court, and the *Sëriñ* Luuga had defected with many of their followers in Njambur and put their support behind Amadu Seexu when he invaded Kajoor. The victories of the marabout caused the French much concern and led to an alliance with the damel to prevent Amadu Seexu's Islamic revolution from spreading throughout northern Senegambia. Lat Joor, supported by French colonial troops, was able to defeat Seexu's army in January 1875, and the marabout was killed at another battle the next month.

The aftermath of the defeat of Amadu Seexu in 1875 constitutes one of the first signs of a growing animosity between Amadu Bamba and the political leadership of Kajoor. The focus of Amadu Bamba's disillusionment was his father's role in these events as Lat Joor made and then broke numerous alliances with the French and the titled *sëriñ* and militant Islamic reformists all in an attempt to preserve and extend his political power. In relation to Amadu Seexu, Momar Anta Saly had ruled that according to his strict interpretation of the shari'a, the conflict that Amadu Seexu had termed a jihad had, in fact, been a war among Muslims and driven by temporal concerns. Of course, this decision could also be seen as an important justification on Islamic grounds for Lat Joor's opposition to Amadu Seexu's movement that sought to overthrow the damel of Kajoor. Momar Anta Saly's attitude toward Amadu Seexu was echoed years later by Serigne Bachir M'Backé, who considered Amadu Seexu to be a pretender who waged a war of conversion against people who were already Muslim. He concluded his passage on Amadu Seexu by stating, "God knows better what it [the jihad] really was."²⁴ Momar Anta

Saly's ruling not only repudiated Amadu Seexu's jihad, but it also forbade the enslavement of the prisoners and the confiscation of their property due to their legal status as Muslims. The victors, however, ignored this aspect of Momar Anta Saly's judgment and found other Islamic scholars, Majaxate Kala most notably, who were willing to support their position.

The tension that was building during this period between Amadu Bamba, his father, and Lat Joor was noted by Serigne Bachir M'Backé, who linked Amadu Bamba's growing aversion to secular and religious politics with his increasing devotion to mysticism. One piece of evidence of Amadu Bamba's unhappiness over his father's position can be found in the record of a conversation between Amadu Bamba and one of his earliest disciples, Massamba Joor. Amadu Bamba informed his friend that it would become necessary for him to leave his father if he [Momar Anta Saly] did not end his service to the *damel*.²⁵ In fact, Amadu Bamba had recognized that his father's position condemning the legitimacy of Amadu Seexu revolution could also easily be applied to Lat Joor's actions in defense of his throne. Both sides were, in effect, equally damned by their violent actions in pursuit of temporal goals. Amadu Bamba Diop, Lat Joor's grandson, also testified to the pressure that Amadu Bamba was exerting on his father at this time to quit his post. According to him, Amadu Bamba once slipped a note inside one of his father's books that read, "Even the most honest *qadi* [judge] has to settle his affairs with God."²⁶

Murid historiography continues to emphasize this developing feature within Amadu Bamba's character. In some ways, we can see Amadu Bamba's attitude as a return to the stance taken by his ancestor, Maharam M'Backé, who had distanced himself from both the aristocrats and the titled *sériñ* with his belief in the primacy of Islam and the *shari'a*. In an episode recalled in Murid sources that soon followed the conversation between Amadu Bamba and Massamba Joor, Momar Anta Saly sent Amadu Bamba to deliver a message to Lat Joor. Arriving before the king with his head lowered, Amadu Bamba gave Lat Joor the message and then left. Serigne Bachir M'Backé explained his father's cool treatment of the *damel* by stating that Amadu Bamba had, by this time, a deep distrust of kings. After Amadu Bamba had left the court, Lat Joor commented that, "This young man will be an obstacle to the domination of kings. But we will leave him alone here where he will do us no harm and where he will content himself with correcting the grammar of the negligent *ulama* without anyone fearing him."²⁷ Seen from the Murid point of view, Lat Joor's words illustrate the position that Amadu Bamba had taken toward politics, yet they are also prophetic of future events in which Amadu Bamba would refuse to recognize Wolof, and later French, suzerainty. It is also clear that Amadu Bamba was enough of a potential threat that Lat Joor wanted to keep him close within his court where his activities could be limited to "correcting grammar."

Amadu Bamba, however, soon found his distrust of the king proven. In addition to Lat Joor's repudiation of Momar Anta Saly's ruling, the king's acts of revenge against those Kajoor Muslims who had supported Amadu Seexu further made a negative impact on Amadu Bamba's views of Lat Joor and politics in general. In the wake of the defeat of Amadu Seexu, Lat Joor had ambushed and killed four notable marabouts from Luuga who had supported the jihad. Amadu Bamba himself saw the bodies of Muhammad Fati and Alé Lô, two men from prominent Njambur titled *sëriñ* families, who had been held captive and then executed by Lat Joor. The marabout later told his son, Serigne Bachir M'Backé, "When I stopped in front of the two bodies, I rejected whatever interest that I still had toward this world."²⁸ Momar Anta Saly resigned as qadi soon after, in reaction to Lat Joor's actions and partly at the behest of his son, Amadu Bamba.

Amadu Bamba and the Foundation of Murid Identity

After Momar Anta Saly's resignation as qadi, he retired to the village of M'Backé-Kajoor, with Amadu Bamba and their students where he died on December 12, 1881. Murid historiography simultaneously, around this point in time, begins to transform Amadu Bamba from a gifted young scholar into a Sufi master par excellence who is distinguished from his contemporaries and his predecessors in important and increasingly relevant ways. After his father's death, Amadu Bamba was able to assert himself much more and it is at this time that one can truly see the Murid order beginning to coalesce into a distinctive collectivity with its own ideology and identity. Renunciation not only of political power but also of everything within the temporal world including exoteric religious actions becomes an increasingly important part of Murid ideology and identity and figures prominently in the development of Murid historiography. This historiography simultaneously begins to build upon Amadu Bamba's symbolic capital and establishes Maam Cerno as an important presence in this process. For example, at the funeral of Momar Anta Saly, it was suggested to Amadu Bamba, by one of his father's colleagues, that he present himself to Lat Joor to offer the king his services. Amadu Bamba replied that he had no desire to visit kings, wanted no part of their worldly goods, and that he only sought honors from Allah who is the master over all. In further demonstration of his renunciation, Murid historiography also notes that Amadu Bamba refused his father's property that was due to him as an inheritance, relinquishing his share to the other family members.²⁹

Following the funeral, according to Murid sources, Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno journeyed to St. Louis to visit a renowned scholar by the name of As Kamara. During the course of their visit, As Kamara informed Amadu Bamba that he would become the "savior of the creatures of his era." He was

in effect prophesying that Amadu Bamba would be appointed by God as the *qutb al-zaman* or the “Pole of the Age.” In Wolof, the Arabic term is rendered as *boorom jamono* (master of the age). As Kamara’s statement is presented by Shaykh Moussa Kâ as a prediction of Amadu Bamba’s mission in life.³⁰ This revelation does, in fact, predate Amadu Bamba’s vision of the Prophet Muhammad by seven or eight years in which the Prophet formally conferred upon him the title of *qutb al-zaman*. Because this prediction was made by a respected Islamic scholar outside of the Murid community, the prophetic episode involving As Kamara lends an important air of independent confirmation within Murid historical narratives of Amadu Bamba as the *boroom jamono*.

The meeting with As Kamara also singled out Amadu Bamba among the other Islamic leaders of the time. According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ’s version of the event, As Kamara also informed Amadu Bamba that “he was unique and the best among the others on the path to God.”³¹ The word *path* in this case is not necessarily to be taken only in a literal sense. The Muridiyya, like other Sufi orders such as the Qadiriyya and the Tijjaniyya, refer to themselves as *yonnu*, a Wolof term which is synonymous with the Arabic *tariqa* (pl. *turuq*), or path, to God. Therefore, As Kamara is also noting the superior position of Amadu Bamba and the Muridiyya in regards to the other Sufi orders. The episode involving As Kamara combined with Amadu Bamba’s earlier statements and actions renouncing the temporal world constitute major events in the accumulation of symbolic capital by the founder of the Murid order, which soon began to be employed in attracting more disciples.

When they had returned to M’Backé-Kajoor from St. Louis, Amadu Bamba informed his *taalibe* that he would no longer be teaching them and that Maam Cerno would henceforth be the new master of those who wished to continue their studies.³² Maam Cerno was now the principal director of the *daara* or Murid school. Therefore, after the death of Momar Anta Saly, Amadu Bamba allowed those students who only wanted to study to leave him, but he did not deny education for those who wanted to remain and follow him. On the contrary, education combined with work would be presented by Amadu Bamba as the best course of action to be taken by a Murid *taalibe*. As we shall see later, Maam Cerno would come to epitomize the combination of study and manual labor within the Murid tradition.

Problems between Amadu Bamba and the political authorities of Kajoor arose again around 1882–83 when one of Lat Joor’s relatives became a disciple of Amadu Bamba. The aristocrat was instructed by Amadu Bamba to free his slaves and return the goods that he had taken from the prisoners captured in the 1875 war against Amadu Seexu. Amadu Bamba’s conditions for accepting the new disciple were thus a reiteration of his father’s ruling and a critique of the *ulama* who were serving the *damel*. When Lat Joor heard of the episode, he summoned Amadu Bamba to his court to explain himself and debate the question with his scholars. The marabout refused to present himself to the

king by referring to the Islamic tradition by which the king goes to visit the scholar rather than ordering him to the royal court. He cited as precedent the refusal of the famous scholar Malik ibn Anas to visit the court of the Abbasid ruler Harun al-Rashid due to his belief that the khalifah was only interested in secular matters. Following the example of Malik ibn Anas, Amadu Bamba informed Lat Joor that, "I would be ashamed if the angels saw me before the door of a sovereign for a [purely] secular affair."³³ Regarding Majaxate Kala, who had replaced Momar Anta Saly as Lat Joor's qadi, Amadu Bamba sent his former teacher a letter that read, "A scholar in the court of a king is like a fly on excrement."³⁴ Lat Joor was unable to punish Amadu Bamba due to the renewal of tensions with the French, and Amadu Bamba and his disciples in an act of hijra to distance themselves from the royal court moved to M'Backé-Bawol in late 1882 or 1883.

Lat Joor's troubles with the French during this period centered on the French decision to build a railway through Kajoor that would link Dakar and St. Louis. Lat Joor had previously agreed to the railway in 1879, yet due to political strife within Kajoor, he was forced to renounce his earlier position even though it meant certain French retaliation. In "*God Alone Is King*," James Searing suggests that the conflicts surrounding the railway were not over the simple issue of Kajoor's sovereignty but were in reality a power struggle between Lat Joor and his former second in command, Demba War Sall.³⁵ The break between the ceddo commander and political power broker and the king occurred during Amadu Seexu's war against Kajoor in 1875. Demba War Sall, who had led the defense of Kajoor, had spoken out against Lat Joor's alliance with the French. As a result, the ceddo commander was unceremoniously dismissed from his post as chief advisor (*fara-biir-kër*) by Lat Joor who felt the need to expand his base of support to include more of the notables and Muslims of Kajoor. The king's choice of a new advisor, Masekk Ndóoy, who was associated with the titled *sériñ* was meant to demonstrate Lat Joor's support for Islamic reform. He was also, in effect, trying to distance himself from the ceddo as represented by the Sall family.

Demba War Sall and his brothers had continued to command provinces with their estates and slaves in Kajoor after Demba's dismissal. However, in 1879, Lat Joor attempted to remove the Salls from their posts as provincial chiefs, and in retaliation, Demba War Sall put forward a young candidate for the throne of Kajoor who had stronger hereditary claims than Lat Joor. The electors and notables of Kajoor met and declared their support for Demba's candidate, Samba Lawbé. Even though Samba Lawbé had been elected as the new damel, Lat Joor still enjoyed French support and could not be removed from power. Therefore, Demba War Sall, who actually supported the railway project, engineered a plan in which Samba Lawbé would declare his opposition to the railway. To remain a figurehead for the sovereignty of the kingdom, Lat Joor would then be forced to also declare his opposition to the railroad, and he would subsequently lose his French support. By May 1881,

Lar Joor was indeed forced into the position of publicly voicing his opposition to the railroad. In retaliation, a French column invaded Kajoor, forced Lat Joor to flee, and installed a new king, Samba Yaaya Debbo Sukko, who proved to be a short-lived French puppet with no base of support within Kajoor.³⁶

Demba War Sall's plan succeeded in 1883 after a series of negotiations with the French, who removed Samba Yaaya Debbo Sukko as damel and recognized Demba's candidate, Samba Lawbé, as king. As a part of the settlement, Kajoor was declared a French protectorate. On his part, Demba had agreed to cede the land necessary for the railway to the French, to enforce the peace in Kajoor, facilitate the return of refugees, and support commercial development in the kingdom. Demba War Sall himself had an economic stake in this agreement, for he and his brothers controlled significant numbers of peasants and slaves who farmed for them and produced peanuts for cash. The cash crop economy was becoming increasingly important during this time and peanut exports from Kajoor had doubled from 40,000 metric tons in 1879 to 83,000 metric tons by 1882.³⁷ Peace and the maintenance of good commercial relations with the French were therefore very important and lucrative for the ceddo commander.

Samba Lawbé's three-year reign was, however, fraught with difficulties. The right of the damel to wage war on his neighbors and the issue of slavery were the main points of contention between Kajoor and the French.³⁸ The French saw Samba Lawbé's attack against the neighboring kingdom of Jolof in 1886 as a violation of the treaty of 1883. The issue of runaway slaves also reached a climax in 1886. As holders of large numbers of slaves, the damel and his ceddo were understandably upset that the French harbored runaway slaves if they arrived at a French post within Kajoor. Although the French were largely dependent on slave labor outside of their direct holdings for the success of the cash crop economy in peanuts and made use of slaves in their conquest, certain abolitionist statements and actions had to be made for public consumption in the metropole. In 1886, the French commander of the post at Tivaouane refused to return slaves who had escaped from Demba War Sall. The ceddo commander and his brother, Ibra Faatim Saar, arrived at the post supported by their cavalry and demanded the return of the slaves. The French considered this an act of rebellion and sent troops to Tivaouane. Unfortunately for Samba Lawbé, he was in Tivaouane trying to collect taxes he believed were due to him from its merchants when the troops arrived, and he was subsequently killed in a brief skirmish with the soldiers.³⁹

Lat Joor, who was living on the borders of the kingdom, was distrusted by the French and not recognized as a new damel. Instead of appointing a new king, the French reorganized the protectorate of Kajoor and abolished the monarchy. With the support of French merchants, Demba War Sall was named to the highest post within the new protectorate, superior chief of the

Cayor Federation. Cayor, as Kajoor would now be known, was separated into six provinces ruled by members of the Sall family and their allies. Two weeks after the reorganization, Demba War Sall, at the head of a French column, defeated and killed Lat Joor at Deqlé on October 26, 1886.

Prior to his death at Deqlé in 1886, Lat Joor had sought out Amadu Bamba seeking his blessing. At this meeting, Amadu Bamba tried to dissuade Lat Joor from going into battle and offered to accept him as a disciple. Lat Joor refused, yet Amadu Bamba prayed for him and gave him a cloak that would later serve as Lat Joor's funeral shroud. This meeting between the former king and the Sufi shaykh was long interpreted as a "passing of the torch" in the context of Wolof resistance to French colonization. According to this view, from this point on, Wolof military resistance against the French was over, and Amadu Bamba was now the focal point for a nonviolent opposition to colonial rule. Furthermore, according to this view, many of the partisans of the military resistance, the aristocrats, and the *ceddo* soon placed themselves under the new leader, Amadu Bamba, as Murid disciples. In reality, the episode involving Lat Joor and Amadu Bamba has been exaggerated in its significance. There was no passing of the torch, and, in fact, one could argue that by that time the "torch," being Wolof resistance to the French, had ceased to exist. Amadu Bamba's activities and the positions that he took in the following years vis-à-vis French colonial rule cannot be so easily construed as constituting "opposition" or even "resistance" to the French. Such an approach subsumes the internal dynamics of the Murid order and their historical agency and ignores the continuity within Amadu Bamba's ideology. He basically attempted to ignore the new political situation as he had attempted to ignore the previous one and increasingly justified his actions, or inactions, with a discourse steeped in Sufism and reform.

The New Generation of Islamic Reformists and Sufis

Though a good argument can be made for the emerging distinctiveness of the Murids in terms of their ideology and identity, Amadu Bamba and his followers were also a part of a larger regional movement that had many leaders and variants. This new generation of Islamic leaders reinterpreted Islamic reform and Sufism for their followers in ways that made the events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries understandable and that justified the actions and beliefs of this new generation. The events that they were faced with increasingly represented the coming together of the two modernizing forces of Islamic reform and Sufism, on the one hand, and French colonization, on the other. The movements that emerged during this era were necessarily movements of historical synthesis not only because they attempted to reconcile these two forces but because they also sought to strike a balance

between historical continuity and contemporary change. Accordingly, many members of this new generation distinguished themselves as independent sources of symbolic capital via their miracles, visions, and so forth and stand as the founders of branches and new orders rather than simply being another link in the chain. Aside from Amadu Bamba, other notables of this new generation stand out: Saad Buh, Sidiyya Baba, Malik Sy, Abdoulaye Niasse, Limamou Laye, and Bu Kunta.

Saad Buh was most likely born in 1850–51, a couple years prior to Amadu Bamba, in what is now eastern Mauritania on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. His family had an established religious network that stretched from sub-Saharan West Africa across the Sahara to Morocco. His father, Muhammad Fadil, had been a distinguished scholar, *sharif*, and Sufi known for his exoteric and esoteric knowledge and had founded the Fadiliyya branch of the Qadiriyya order to distinguish himself and his followers from the Qadiris of the Kunta network. In addition to his status as a Qadiri, Muhammad Fadil also claimed affiliation with other Sufi orders, including the Tijani, and dispensed the *wird*, or formulaic prayer, of several orders. Following his education, Saad Buh moved west and settled in the Trarza region to the north of the Senegal River and closer to the Atlantic economy and the French sphere of influence.

The young cleric did encounter some resistance from the older Islamic establishment in Trarza who doubted his miraculous powers and most likely saw him as a threat to their own status. As a result of this resentment and the political instability in Trarza, Saad Buh established two headquarters, one in the French colonial city of St. Louis and the other in the Sahara at Touizikht north of Trarza. Saad Buh began to build his community of followers in St. Louis in the late 1860s and simultaneously began to build an accommodationist relationship with the French colonial officials who saw his network as a useful asset to extend their control over the region. His Fadiliyya network encompassed most of the western Sahara and Sahel by the 1880s, and Saad Buh presented himself as an intermediary between the French and local political powers. The Fadiliyya did not possess agricultural lands other than date palm oases and aside from commerce, the order depended on gifts and donations from their adherents and the French. Saad Buh also drew many disciples from the Senegal River valley and regions to the south through annual tours accepting followers with both the Qadiri and Tijani initiations. Some of his most notable disciples came to accept important posts within the emerging French colonial administration thus extending the influence of the Fadiliyya within the colonial arena, and vice versa.

David Robinson has characterized the earlier phase of the relationship between Saad Buh and the French as one of interdependence in which partners used the other to advance their own interests.⁴⁰ Saad Buh wanted to maintain and strengthen the Fadiliyya network and saw friendly relations with the French as a pragmatic means to do so. While one of his brothers led

a militant revolt against the French, armed jihad, especially as a tactic against the Europeans, was condemned by Saad Buh as unrealistic in terms of a successful outcome and counterproductive to his mission of extending the Fadiliyya. In this opinion, he was reaffirming previously stated opposition to armed jihad as expressed by his ancestors but also adapting this opinion versus violence to the contemporary situation involving the French. While French colonial expansion was concentrated south of the Senegal River, the relationship between Saad Buh and the French remained untroubled, however, when the French set out to “pacify” the desert north of the river, Saad Buh objected but unsuccessfully. Saad Buh had justified his cooperation with the French internally to his Fadiliyya disciples as a means to maintain their autonomy in Mauritania and to exert their influence over colonial holdings south of the Senegal River from where much of their monetary support was drawn. The French conquest of Mauritania would obviously change this equation.

In the extension of French control north of the Senegal River, the French found a new ally in another member of the new generation of reformist and Sufi leaders, Sidiyya Baba. Baba was born in 1862 into a prominent scholarly family that governed a network based in southern Mauritania that exerted religious, commercial, and political influence from the Sahara south to the Gambia River. The network had been established in the 1820s by his grandfather, Sidiyya al-Kabir (d. 1868), who had been a student of Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti who, in turn, had been largely responsible for the initial extension of the institution of the tariqa-brotherhood, in the form of the Qadiriyya order, into West Africa through his lineage group, the Kunta. From his headquarters at Boutilimit, Sidiyya al-Kabir propagated the Kunta interpretation of the Qadiriyya, eventually devising his own approach to the teachings of the order that would take the same name as his network, the Sidiyya.

Sidiyya Baba emerged as the leader of the network and its Sufi order in the 1880s. Like his grandfather, he was a respected scholar and mystic and maintained the Sidiyya reputation as a diplomat and counselor for the region’s political contenders in an effort to ensure the peace and stability that was necessary to maintain and extend the network. It is in this context, that a relationship was established between Sidiyya Baba and the French. By the time Sidiyya Baba first visited St. Louis in 1898, southern Mauritania had witnessed several decades of political disorder in the forms of struggles for succession and political assassinations that came to threaten the survival of the Sidiyya network. In addition, the long-developing environmental crisis related to the increasing desiccation of the southern Sahara had resulted in migrations and rising population pressure in the region of the Senegal Valley that also contributed to conflicts over resources and political control of these resources. In the French, Sidiyya Baba saw the best chance for a successful future for his network and its spiritual and commercial enterprises.

In 1903, Sidiyya Baba issued a *fatwa*, or religious opinion, indicative of the relationship that had been established between the Sidiyya and the French that condemned armed jihad and hijra. The fatwa was obviously for public consumption and hoped to convince the populace of the unrealistic nature of armed resistance against the French and flight. The declaration pointed out the fractures and weaknesses within the dar al-Islam of the region and held that further armed revolts would only hasten the decline of Islam. Ironically, the best hope for stability and peace and the accompanying renewal of Islam, according to Baba, was French “pacification” and colonial rule aided by the *zwaya*. Baba believed that, in the course of the conquest, the enemies of the Sidiyya network and the Hassani warrior class that had caused so much violence and conflict would be eliminated or subdued.⁴¹

While Saad Buh and Sidiyya Baba were Qadiri reformers based north of the Senegal River, Malik Sy was a Tijani reformer who hailed from Futa Toro and established himself south of the river in Senegal, eventually making Tivaouane his headquarters. Malik Sy’s relationship with the French colonial authorities has typically been judged as one of cordial cooperation, yet in his analysis, Robinson has added the important caveat that Sy was “never an instrument of the administration” and that his actions and pronouncements vis-à-vis the French were always made with the interests of his own reforming mission first in mind.⁴² Malik Sy was born circa 1854 in the midst of Umar Tal’s jihad that relied on Futa Toro for new recruits. Although they shared the Tijani creed with the Umarians, Malik Sy’s family had not participated in the jihad. Nevertheless, Sy had to work hard during the early part of his career to divorce the French of the notion that every Tijani was a militant of armed jihad such as Umar Tal and Mabbà and inherently opposed to “Christian” overrule.

Malik Sy grew up in the same era of social, religious, and political turmoil as Amadu Bamba and the jihad, aristocratic counterattacks, and French expansion undoubtedly left their mark upon him. He pursued higher education in Islamic studies and Tijani Sufism and was confirmed as a *muqaddam* (the Tijani equivalent of a *shaykh*) of the order, thus gaining the authority to teach and elevate others to his rank. Like Saad Buh and Sidiyya Baba, Malik Sy did not flee French authority; in fact, he went so far as to maintain a house in St. Louis and married into several of the prominent Muslim families of the city. He did not cultivate a reputation for miracles as many of his contemporaries did, but instead established a firm reputation as a scholar and teacher of the highest order and by the 1880s had built a Tijani *zawiya* in St. Louis, the administrative center of the emerging French empire in West Africa. Yet, Malik Sy did not confine his activities to St. Louis. He traveled extensively throughout the Senegalo-Mauritanian region furthering his studies and promoting Islamization. For the support of his community, Malik Sy maintained fields south of St. Louis worked by his disciples. Agricultural labor and economic autonomy were greatly valued by Malik Sy and possessing such an

important agricultural base distinguished him from the two Mauritanian leaders discussed previously who had to rely on charity tours and gifts from Muslims and the French for their maintenance.

Following his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1888–89, Malik Sy settled in the village of Ndiarndé in a rural area of Cayor (formerly Kajoor) from 1895 to 1900. His move away from St. Louis could be construed as an act of hijra away from the colonial authorities and the urban milieu of the port. During this period, the French were consolidating their hold over Cayor and were very wary of the threat to their influence and authority that they perceived could come from Muslim notables such as Malik Sy and Amadu Bamba, who was arrested and sent into exile at the time that Malik Sy established his retreat in the countryside. The move could also be seen as *khalwa*, or the establishment of a Sufi retreat, in which a more aesthetic lifestyle of work, study, and meditation was pursued. In the time not spent in study or meditation, Sy encouraged his disciples to work producing millet for their own subsistence and peanuts for cash. At Ndiarndé, Malik Sy built a nucleus of “ninety-nine disciples” that would form a crucial base for a Senegambian Tijaniyya that expanded throughout the villages and towns of western Senegal as it was being incorporated into the French colony. In its growth, his emerging branch of the Tijaniyya took particular advantage of the Dakar-St. Louis railway line with its emerging stations and links to the burgeoning ports, such as Dakar, on the Cap Vert peninsula. Sy’s branch would later make its headquarters at Tivaouane in 1902 on the rail line.

While Malik Sy constituted one important aspect of the expansion of the Tijaniyya in Senegambia, the Niasse family of Kaolack provided the other important foundation for Tijani growth in the region.⁴³ Abdoulaye Niasse (1840–1922), the son of a marabout who had joined Mābba’s jihad, founded the Niassene branch of the Tijaniyya. After the death of Mābba, Abdoulaye Niasse formally joined the Tijaniyya order and continued to support the armed jihad that was now being led by Mābba’s son, Saer Maty Ba. However, by 1887, Abdoulaye Niasse had become completely disillusioned with the concept of the militant jihad due to Saer Maty Ba’s attacks against Muslims, and he left the movement and confined his activities to teaching and farming. This shift in thinking was a watershed moment for him and his branch and marks Abdoulaye Niasse as a member of the new generation of Sufi reformers who likewise refuted the use of violence in favor of the inner jihad. He later performed the hajj, visiting important Tijani centers along the way, and upon his return continued to teach and attract students who supported themselves by growing peanuts for the colonial cash crop economy.

The remainder of Abdoulaye Niasse’s career is somewhat similar to that of Amadu Bamba: He would be accused by rivals of planning armed jihad, exiled, and only allowed to later return under strict surveillance. In spite of these apparent setbacks, however, ever-growing numbers of disciples continued to flock to him. After his death in 1922, his son Ibrahima came to lead

the branch and presided over an even greater period of growth that also included other European colonies in West Africa. Historians of the Niasse branch and of the Senegambian Tijaniyya, in general, have stressed the egalitarian notions promoted by the order as integral to its success in attracting adherents. Malik Sy's followers were drawn from the various ethnic groups of the region who were attracted to a new identity that superseded any ethnic or occupational restrictions.⁴⁴ Further evidence of Tijani egalitarianism put into practice can be found in the ñeeño origins of Abdoulaye Niasse's family. The involvement of the Niasse branch in peanut production also contributed to the social mobility apparent within the order and proved to be very attractive to Senegambian merchants who became an important sector of disciples.

Though the Tijaniyya has crossed many ethnic boundaries in Senegambia, the Layenne order is primarily confined to the Cap Vert peninsula among the Lebu population of fisherfolk. The term *Layenne* comes from the Arabic and means "people of God."⁴⁵ In the wake of the failed 1790–91 jihad of the Njambur clerics, some of the refugees had fled to the Cap Vert peninsula where an Islamic state was founded. In spite of the presence of a theocratic government, however, Islam among the Lebu was heavily influenced by pre-Islamic beliefs and practices centered on the *rab*, or local spirits, that were comparable to the jinn. The founder of the order, Libasse Thiaw, was born in 1843 in Yoff and worked as a fisherman until the age of forty. In 1857, the Lebu lost their independence to the French who incorporated Cap Vert into the colony of Senegal. This act would mean that when the Layenne movement was later launched, it would run its course in the heart of the developing French colony rather than being a peripheral movement.

In 1883, Libasse Thiaw declared himself to be the Mahdi, and the reincarnation of the Prophet Muhammad and called for the people to reform their practice of Islam. The timing of his announcement was very important because the same year marked the beginning of the fourteenth Islamic century and the turning of the centuries in the Islamic calendar held the popular expectation of the appearance of such a leader as the Mahdi who would renew the faith. His announcement that he was the Prophet Muhammad reincarnated was very unorthodox and yet this aspect of his identity is crucial to understanding the Layenne Sufi order. In effect, he was imbuing his version of Islamic reform with a greater sense of African leadership by transforming the Prophet Muhammad from an Arab into a black African. This reinforcement of an African identity for the Layenne may have been a response to their proximity to the French and the more intense contact with European rule on the Cap Vert peninsula. The colonial government perceived the message of Libasse Thiaw, now known as Seydina Limamou Laye (the imam of God), as a threat in spite of his protestations that the true jihad was a struggle within the soul. He was arrested in 1887 and imprisoned on Gorée Island for several months. Upon his release and until his death in

1909, he continued to promote the peaceful jihad and submitted to French authority.⁴⁶

The final representative of this new generation to be discussed is Shaykh Bu Kunta whose importance lies not in his status as a Sufi reformer but as a social and economic organizer who helped to establish the social and economic model that would come to exist in many of the communities established by members of the new generation of Islamic leaders. As his name indicates, Bu Kunta was a member of the Kunta lineage of Qadiris, and unlike his Berber contemporaries Saad Bu and Sidiyya Baba, his base was south of the Senegal Valley, in Kajoor (Cayor). Utilizing his ancestry, Bu Kunta attracted many disciples who settled in his farming villages, and by the 1880s, he was an economic force in the production of millet and peanuts and in commerce. Agricultural production in his communities fed and maintained his existing base of disciples and attracted more. His economic success was dependent on security and stability and as a result he aided the French in their establishment of colonial control to protect and to insure his gains. In return, the French gained an important producer for the colonial cash crop economy and a source of social stability in the countryside that for long was only nominally under French control. Robinson has accordingly labeled him, "a model, in other words, for maraboutic enterprise in the emerging colonial economy."⁴⁷

Conclusion

Amadu Bamba thus constitutes the remaining link within this new generation. He is at once a representative part of this generation and yet stands apart from his peers. An instructive means by which to understand this dichotomy is to consider the leaders of this new generation of Islamic and Sufi reformers as "organic intellectuals." In Antonio Gramsci's sense of the phrase, "Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields."⁴⁸ For this analysis, some editing of Gramsci's understanding of organic intellectuals is necessary. Although economic changes have played an important role in this examination, they have not been seen as paramount as in a materialist or Marxist interpretation, and added to the sense of awareness on the part of the group is an understanding of historical place and role, particularly expressed in a religious or mystical discourse. Saad Buh, Sidiyya Baba, Malik Sy, and Amadu Bamba can all be seen as organic intellectuals emerging from the historical milieu of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and representing both similar and different constituencies based upon such

factors as ethnicity, Sufi affiliation, geography and environment, and individual and collective identities.

Can we then largely consider the older generation of Islamic reformers and Sufi mystics in the region who stood apart and even opposed the new generation as Gramsci's "traditional intellectuals?" According to Gramsci, traditional intellectuals had at one time been tied organically to respective groups, but in the aftermath of historical changes to these groups, their intellectuals remained largely unchanged and in a sense divorced "organically" from the new economic, social, and political situation. Much of this definition can be applied to the present analysis, yet there was historical continuity between the two sets of intellectuals and historical change was endemic during this time, thus making the distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals difficult at times. As Sufis, each of the notables greatly valued the silsila that linked them to previous generations of scholars and mystics upon whom their present knowledge was built and that ultimately linked them to the Prophet Muhammad. However, as has been and will be seen, the members of this new generation carved out different paths for themselves and their disciples that reflected the changing times by reinterpreting Islamic reform and Sufism. Obviously, one of the most influential of the historical changes affecting this generation was the imposition of French colonial rule.

True to the heterogeneous nature of the new generation, individual leaders dealt with this change in different ways. Saad Buh, Malik Sy, and Limamou Laye all had important bases of support in the French colony itself and Sidiyya Baba had argued against flight from French controlled areas. Likewise, some of the leaders such as Saad Buh, Sidiyya Baba, and Bu Kunta found in the French an important ally in the pursuit of their own goals. For other leaders, their interactions with the French were more problematic and characterized by conflict and exile before an eventual accommodation was achieved. The cases of Abdoulaye Niassé and Amadu Bamba stand out in this context. We must also keep in mind that French policies vis-à-vis the new generation of Sufi reformers was not monolithic and unchanging as can be seen especially in examining the Murid context. The older generation, or "traditional intellectuals" as well as the representatives of secular African power would also continue to play an important role in the development of these relations throughout the early colonial period.

With the death of Lat Joor in 1886, the prospect of armed resistance by the Wolof aristocracy of Kajoor against French control ended. However, by 1886, conditions within Kajoor had changed to such an extent that the death of Lat Joor was, in fact, a postscript to this story. Under French colonial authority, the ceddo led by Demba War Sall took over the chieftaincies of the new province of Cayor. Simultaneously, Amadu Bamba continued to forge the basis of a new Islamic order within Senegambia that rejected the authority of secular rulers be they the ceddo of the ancien régime or French administrators and the older established order of militant Islamic reformers. The arena

in which the forces of Islam and politics would face each other in the following decades would be the French colony of Senegal. Although this is not apparent from a reading of French colonial sources, the utilization of Murid historical sources does bear witness to the continuation of this precolonial struggle. Although the independent state of Kajoor had ceased to exist, the social forces that had helped to shape the precolonial history of Kajoor continued to surface during the colonial era. The tensions between the ceddo colonial chiefs and Amadu Bamba peaked when the arrest and exile of the marabout was engineered by the colonial chiefs in 1895. In the wake of this arrest, the Murid synthesis came into full being as the order coalesced in the new colonial environment, as will be examined in chapter 3.

3

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MURID SYNTHESIS

PERCEPTIONS OF AMADU BAMBA AND MAAM CERNO

Introduction

In the years following 1886, Amadu Bamba's notoriety and influence increased, and as more and more disciples were attracted to him, the Muridiyya began to constitute a real force in the new colonial society that was emerging. Within this new environment, French power, though not fully established, was respected by all. The colonial chiefs and the more conservative elements of the Muslim faction, meanwhile, had their own agendas that sought to preserve their own status and power. The Murids, due to their growing numbers, were perceived by some *sērīñ* of the older generation and the new colonial chiefs as religious rivals and political opponents, respectively. The precolonial conflict between Islamic reform and secular power entered a new stage after 1886 in which not only the Murids but also the other representatives of the new generation of Sufi reformers with their versions of a new moral order would eventually succeed.

The early foundation for the Murid synthesis of the various historical forces at work during this time was laid during this era. In one sense, the Murid synthesis redefined what it meant to be a Muslim, a proponent of reform, and a Sufi. In another sense, however, the Murid synthesis also had to deal with the influences and challenges posed by French colonization. Murid historical narratives begin to reflect on this process through their biographical portraits of Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno and their relationship. The portraits are drawn from both written and oral Murid sources. Through the focus on these two important leaders, we can see a dialogue emerge within Murid narratives regarding the proper behavior of Muslims and Murids vis-à-vis their shaykh, disciples, work, community life, and the secular world at large which would increasingly be identified with French colonization.

As mentioned in chapter 2, 1886 and the fall of the Wolof monarchy are not the germinal historical events in the development of the Muridiyya as they were previously thought. One can identify important factors in the construction of Murid identity much earlier in Amadu Bamba's life such as his experiences in the courts of Mabbà and Lat Joor. His father's death in 1881 is most likely the pivotal event in the transformation of Amadu Bamba from an emerging scholar into an emerging Sufi saint. It was after Momar Anta Saly's death that Amadu Bamba's career was truly launched and he was freed from any family constraints to pursue his role as the *boroom jamono*, or the "master of the age." From the standpoint of Murid historiography, however, Amadu Bamba's mission began not in 1886 or even 1881 but with his birth, and Murid intellectuals and disciples have produced a historical portrait of Amadu Bamba that not only confirms his mystical status from the beginning but also sheds important light on Murid perceptions of history and modernity. In the first part of this chapter, the Murid historiography surrounding the development of Amadu Bamba into a master of the age will be examined from the perspective of the followers of Bamba's younger brother, Ibrahima Faty M'Backé (or Maam Cerno). These particular Murid sources and informants understandably magnify the role that Maam Cerno played in Amadu Bamba's spiritual career. Through the inclusion of the Maam Cerno within this crucial part of the historical narrative, the younger brother is firmly placed as a member of the new generation of Sufi reformers, and in the process, his own organic base of support begins to be constructed through the employment of this narrative. On the other hand, the information provided by these sources is vital because Maam Cerno does not enter the French archival record until 1895, and there is precious little regarding Amadu Bamba until that time as well.

A Murid Taalibe and Shaykh

For information concerning the life of Maam Cerno prior to 1895, one must look to the writings of the Murid historians and poets and the oral traditions preserved by his taalibe and their descendents. A cross-fertilization of sorts has occurred over time between Murid written records and oral traditions. Amadu Bamba, Maam Cerno, and the early shaykh of the order were literate in Arabic, yet it was largely left to their sons to compose written biographies of their fathers and histories of the times that they lived in. Later generations of Murids also produced written sources in poetic and prose form. The production of the written sources, however, did not and has not caused a decline in the use and transmission of Murid oral tradition. The two kinds of sources have developed side by side and influenced each other. In some cases, my informants in the courses of their oral interviews referred to the written works, and one man had one specific book that he elaborated on. It is true, however,

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Figure 3.1. Shaykh Ibrahima Faty M'Backé (aka Maam Cerno), circa 1930.

that the use of oral tradition is more prevalent among the less educated or common disciples, and in many cases, their accounts contain details not present in the written record. These details do not so much deviate from the written record as they elaborate aspects of it. The differences that exist within the written and oral sources are “editorials” of a kind that regardless of their veracity speak volumes about the historical interpretations and perceptions of

the informants. These elaborations within the oral record will be noted and analyzed as they appear in the following chapters.

For these sources, the first indications of Amadu Bamba's future role as the boroom jamono appear at the birth of Maam Cerno. Among the sources consulted for this study, the general consensus is that Maam Cerno was born in Prokhane (Porokhane) in the Rip region of Saloum to Momar Anta Saly M'Backé and Soxna Faty Issa Joob. His mother was originally from Kokki in Njambur, the seat of the illustrious Joob family of scholars. However, there is some confusion regarding the actual year that Maam Cerno was born. Several informants provided 1862 as the year that he was born. Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, an archivist and historian in Darou Mousty, correctly maintains that Maam Cerno was born in 1865 and attributed the confusion to the differences between the Muslim and Christian calendars. According to his explanation, Maam Cerno was born on the first day of the battle at Paost-koto between the forces of Mâbba Jaxu and the French.¹ The family had to flee Prokhane on the same day that Maam Cerno was born due to their proximity to the fighting. Momar Anta Saly took his family to Diabacounda where Maam Cerno was baptized a week after his birth.²

The preservation of Maam Cerno's identity among the Murids has produced a multifaceted portrait of the man. At various times, he is considered a taalibe, a shaykh, a scholar, a teacher, a farmer, and a grand marabout in his own right. Within the framework of the Muridiyya, Shaykh Ibrahim Faty M'Backé was primarily the devoted follower of his older brother, Amadu Bamba. In this context, Murid descriptions of Maam Cerno focus initially on his birth and his connection to Amadu Bamba from the moment he was born. The most notable aspect of their view of Maam Cerno's birth is the belief that both brothers were destined from the beginning to serve a great religious purpose. Murids often compared the relationship that existed between Amadu Bamba and his younger brother to the story of Musa (Moses) and Harun (Aaron) within the Quran. This comparison pairs Amadu Bamba with Moses as the leader with the spiritual authority and Maam Cerno with Aaron as the spokesman and helper. The epic poem composed by the celebrated Wolof poet Shaykh Moussa Kâ about the life and work of Maam Cerno elaborates on this point. He wrote that Momar Anta Saly first told Amadu Bamba, on the day Maam Cerno was born, that he, Amadu Bamba, would be like Muhammad, and that Maam Cerno would be like Ali, or better that he [Amadu Bamba] would be like Moses and Maam Cerno like Aaron.³

Maam Cerno's disciples and their descendents have passed down different variations of this theme. One of the oral traditions collected in Darou Mousty about Maam Cerno's birth stated that when Maam Cerno was born, his father summoned Amadu Bamba and told him that Allah had answered his prayers and that Maam Cerno would be his adjunct for the mission that God had given him. Even though this version of Maam Cerno's birth roughly correlates to the episode described by Shaykh Moussa Kâ, this particular oral tradition

added that Maam Cerno was born eight days after the death of Soxna Jaara Buso, the mother of Amadu Bamba. In this oral tradition, the birth of Maam Cerno a week after the death of Amadu Bamba's mother is more than just a coincidence. Maam Cerno's birth is the divine answer to Amadu Bamba's prayers following the death of Soxna Jaara Buso. Amadu Bamba's loss of his mother is somewhat abated by the arrival of his younger brother who, from birth, is declared to be his aid in his life's work.⁴

Another oral version of Maam Cerno's birth confirms the idea that the relationship that existed between Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno was firmly established from the very beginning. According to this version, upon the birth of Maam Cerno, his father, Momar Anta Saly, summoned Amadu Bamba to come and see the newborn and told him that his younger brother would be with him always and would work for him "to obtain the reward of both worlds." Amadu Bamba, as this version continues, was in fact the first to pray for the infant.⁵ The occasion of Maam Cerno's baptism has been seen as another defining moment in the development of the relationship between the two brothers. According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, after baptizing Maam Cerno, Momar Anta Saly confided him to Amadu Bamba. Following this act, Amadu Bamba said that if he [Amadu Bamba] was a country, then Maam Cerno would be the road to that country. The author then stated that the two remained side by side.⁶

After Maam Cerno's infancy, the relationship between the two brothers solidified as Amadu Bamba guided Maam Cerno's Islamic education. During this period, the basic foundation that would link Maam Cerno as a taalibe to Amadu Bamba as his teacher, or *shaykh*, was founded, and according to Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, Maam Cerno was, in fact, the first taalibe of Sëriñ Touba.⁷ Considering that Amadu Bamba would later become the principal shaykh for thousands of Murids, this is a very honorable distinction and adds much to the bond between the two brothers. Additionally, when one examines the relationship between the two brothers, as presented by Murid sources, one is presented with the model relationship that should exist between any Murid taalibe and shaykh. The oral traditions and written records thus serve an added function as instructive devices that both present models of Murid behavior and simultaneously legitimize them.

Following Maam Cerno's baptism, the M'Backé family continued to live in Saloum until Momar Anta Saly agreed to serve as a qadi in the court of Lat Joor. When the family moved to Kajoor, Maam Cerno was in the midst of his Quranic studies.⁸ Aside from his studies under Amadu Bamba, Maam Cerno also began to work for his older brother. One oral tradition collected in Darou Mousty describes the first time that Maam Cerno labored for Amadu Bamba. According to this source, a Mauritanian had written three books for Amadu Bamba at a price of 15 francs. As the date of payment drew near, Amadu Bamba did not yet have the money to pay for the books. Therefore, he summoned Maam Cerno and together with Sëriñ Massamba Joob, they made a tour of many villages asking for donations to help pay for the books, but they

came back empty handed. Upon their return home, Maam Cerno told his brother to tire himself no longer. Maam Cerno's mother, Soxna Faty Issa Joob, gave Amadu Bamba the 15 francs that he needed to purchase the books. According to the source of this tradition, Sēriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, it was at this moment that the "missions" began.⁹ This interpretation is rooted in the importance attached to labors performed for one's shaykh within the Murid order. Therefore, the first instance of Maam Cerno working on his brother's behalf is a notable point in his life for Murids because it symbolizes the beginning of his many labors for Amadu Bamba and sets an important tone to his character as a dutiful and resourceful taalibe.

Maam Cerno had memorized the Quran by the age of thirteen and after his general education was completed under the tutelage of Amadu Bamba, he was sent to study under two great scholars of that time named Majaxate Kala and Mor Birama Diakhate. It appears from the oral traditions that both of the scholars were surprised and quite appreciative of the richness and depth of Maam Cerno's knowledge.¹⁰ Amadu Bamba's younger brother was quick to gain his own scholarly reputation that would eventually make him one of the most influential intellectuals within the Muridiyya.

Maam Cerno's link to Amadu Bamba and his mission was strengthened upon the death of their father, Momar Anta Saly, in 1881. As mentioned in chapter 2, in addition to Amadu Bamba's refusal to take his father's position in service to Lat Joor, it is widely held that he did not claim any of his father's property. Murid oral tradition in Darou Mousty, however, makes an important addition to this account. Amadu Bamba did in fact claim as his inheritance his father's Quran and Maam Cerno. He allowed the other family members to have everything else.¹¹ This account of the death of Momar Anta Saly and Amadu Bamba's inheritance was commonly known among the Murids consulted for this study and reflects the importance of Maam Cerno to the mission of Amadu Bamba.¹² Of all of his father's possessions, it is most notable that all that Amadu Bamba requested was his father's Quran. Thus armed with the holy book, his second request for his younger brother to aid him in his work provided Amadu Bamba with both the religious authority and symbolism of the Quran and a trusted lieutenant.

Murid sources in Darou Mousty also elaborated on the instance following the funeral in which Amadu Bamba visited the noted scholar As Kamara. In chapter 2, this episode was interpreted as an independent or objective confirmation of Amadu Bamba's elevated status as the boorom jamono within Murid historiography. The sources connected with Maam Cerno, however, weave the younger brother into this important event. In this context, Maam Cerno was also addressed by As Kamara who informed him that he was to be Amadu Bamba's adjunct in his mission as the boorom jamono. As Kamara elaborated on the relationship that would exist between the two brothers by stating that if Amadu Bamba was the prophet Sulayman (Solomon) then Maam Cerno would be Ifritou, or the jinn that aided Sulayman.¹³

Once his education was complete, Amadu Bamba instructed Maam Cerno to begin teaching. The extension of Maam Cerno's scholarly pursuits into the realm of teaching had several important effects. First, the premier taalibe of Amadu Bamba became a marabout and shaykh in his own right. Although he was still intimately tied to Amadu Bamba and his mission, Maam Cerno could now have his own following of disciples who contributed their labor, through their service to Maam Cerno, to the Muridiyya movement. Another product of Maam Cerno's teaching career was the religious function that he inherited as a brother and disciple of Amadu Bamba. For his students, Maam Cerno was not just an accomplished scholar and teacher but an important link to Amadu Bamba and the *baraka* (blessing) that he possessed. Maam Cerno was, in effect, part of the *silsila* or chain through which this divine power flowed. Maam Cerno's close association with Amadu Bamba, therefore, placed him within the highest ranks of the Murid shaykhs and, combined with his own reputation, made him a magnet for attracting disciples to the Muridiyya.

The scholarly aspect of Maam Cerno's identity is most commonly expressed by Murids in the appellation "Maam Cerno." Although Ibrahim Faty M'Backé was his proper name and the one that is cited in many Murid written sources and in almost all of the French archival sources, Ibrahim Faty M'Backé was known by his followers as Maam (grandfather) Cerno (teacher). The word *cermo* is of Fulani origin and translates as a learned Islamic teacher. Maam Cerno would eventually become the teacher of many famous Murid figures. Among his students were Sëriñ Massamba M'Backé who was a younger brother, Sëriñ Mactar Binta Lô, Sëriñ Momar Sy of Njambur, Sëriñ Mor Abdou Séye, Soxna Rokhaya Buso, and Samba Astou Joob. Maam Cerno also instructed two of the sons of Amadu Bamba, Sëriñ Muhammadu Moustapha and Sëriñ Falilou who eventually became the first and second *khalifah*, or successors, to Amadu Bamba, respectively.¹⁴

Even though Maam Cerno soon came to be regarded as an important scholar and teacher, he still pursued his own education. Some years prior to his exile to Gabon, Amadu Bamba arranged for Maam Cerno to study under Mor Birama, a scholar of the mystic sciences, for almost a year. At the end of his mystical studies, Maam Cerno was sent to Keur Makalla in Njambur where he taught Islamic law or shari'a.¹⁵ In the meantime, however, larger events were taking place in Senegal that would soon greatly influence the development of the new order.

The Coalescence of the Murid Order

When Amadu Bamba and his disciples arrived in M'Backé-Bawol around 1883, they were not exactly welcomed by the population. After several years, they were forced to leave the town, due to opposition from more conservative

Muslim elements, and were even jeered by some of the inhabitants as they left.¹⁶ The small group, including Maam Cerno and Shaykh Anta, another brother of Amadu Bamba, founded a new settlement not far away from M'Backé-Bawol that became known as Darou Salam. This move most likely occurred in 1886, the same year that Lat Joor in desperation visited Amadu Bamba and was later killed by colonial troops. While in residence at Darou Salam, Amadu Bamba continued to attract new followers. Many of the new arrivals were refugees fleeing attacks made by Ibrahima Njaay and the other newly installed colonial chiefs in Njambur against local Murids. The chiefs who were former leaders of the *ceddo* were trying to punish the followers of Amadu Bamba, who they regarded as a threat to their political power, by pillaging and burning Murid villages. The years leading up to 1888–89 are remembered by the Murids as an especially difficult time. The Muridiyya had been making converts, initially among the slaves and the peasantry, in the Muslim province of Njambur that had long been the bastion for the power of the titled *sëriñ*. The converts had followed the example set by Amadu Bamba and refused to recognize the authority of the local chiefs and did not pay them taxes, thus earning their wrath.¹⁷

Though the *sëriñu* lamb and other conservative Muslims of Njambur were opposed to the Murids for many of the same reasons as the chiefs, there was also a religious dimension to their opposition to the Murids. *Sëriñ* Bachir M'Backé commented at length regarding the relations between the Murids and other Muslims during this early period. In his view, some Islamic leaders were jealous of the growing popularity of Amadu Bamba and the loss of their own disciples and peasants to the Murid order. The losses were also having a monetary impact on the titled *sëriñ* who depended on their disciples and peasants for their economic support. Amadu Bamba's tolerant behavior toward these Muslim adversaries, whom Serigne Bachir compared to scorpions, was due to his belief that he had to treat his fellow Muslims as brothers. Apparently, Amadu Bamba's character eventually won over some of the Muslim notables who had "previously exercised temporal power," in Serigne Bachir's opinion, and they became his disciples.¹⁸ These Muslim leaders were obviously those titled *sëriñ* who had held land grants and had their own communities. Thus, the Murids were making inroads among the peasantry, the *taalibe*, and some of the prominent *sëriñ* and steadily growing stronger while the representatives of the old Muslim faction became weaker.

In the midst of these developments, Murid historiography claims that Amadu Bamba was a participant in mystical experiences that resulted in the further elevation of his spiritual rank. For example, the manner in which he located the site for the holy city of Touba and his vision of the Prophet Muhammad significantly added to Amadu Bamba's stature and public notoriety. The vision also contributed greatly to the symbolic capital of the man and his movement. After Amadu Bamba and his followers were forced to leave M'Backé-Bawol around 1886 and settle in nearby Darou Salam, it became

necessary for Amadu Bamba to take regular spiritual retreats from the town due to the increasing number of disciples that were flocking to him. These retreats took the form of journeys. According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, Amadu Bamba was “searching for the divine light of Touba.” At one point in his journeys, it was noted that the marabout spent a month under a tree at Fêto.¹⁹

During Amadu Bamba’s travels, Maam Cerno watched over his family, presided over the education of the disciples, and, as imam, led the five daily prayers in Darou Salam. Amadu Bamba’s successor or *khalifah*, Muhammadu Moustapha was born during one of his father’s journeys. After the birth, Maam Cerno dispatched a taalibe to find Amadu Bamba to inform him of the birth of his son. The marabout was found in the vicinity of Fêto where he claimed to have indeed found the holy light of Touba. The site where he had seen the light would eventually be the center of the holy town of Touba, the future capital of the Muridiyya. Upon his return to Darou Salam, Amadu Bamba gave his son the name of the Prophet Muhammad and informed Maam Cerno that the birth of his son had coincided with his discovery of Touba.²⁰

The process by which Amadu Bamba found Touba was presented by one oral informant in Darou Mousty, Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé, as a “search for the village of the Age,” which certainly compliments the position that Amadu Bamba would soon assume as the *boroom jamono*, or master of the age. A reliable source in Darou Mousty dated the establishment of Touba in 1887.²¹ Once the site for Touba had been found, Amadu Bamba sent Maam Cerno to build the town. Following the instructions of his elder brother, Maam Cerno led the taalibe in the tasks of cutting down trees and excavating the ground. Zinc, which was used in the construction of houses, was scarce at the time due to the political turmoil. Once Maam Cerno located zinc at Diourbel, Murid taalibe began to march by foot from Diourbel to Touba carrying the loads on their heads.²²

Shaykh Moussa Kâ recorded that Amadu Bamba remained in Touba for a long time composing poems, or *qasida*, in Arabic in honor of the Prophet Muhammad that were then learned and sung by groups of Murid disciples. Meanwhile Maam Cerno continued to supervise the taalibe in their work and education and order the day-to-day functions within the community. During this time, Amadu Bamba made a journey to Waalo. While there, he had a cordial meeting with Al-Hajj Malik Sy, the renowned scholar and emerging leader of the Tijaniyya Sufi order in Senegal, which further added to Amadu Bamba’s stature. After his return from Waalo, in what appears in Murid historiography as a mystical premonition of his exile, he informed Maam Cerno that he would soon be leaving to further his work for God and humanity. During his preparations for his departure, his second son, Falilou, was born. Shaykh Moussa Kâ’s account of the birth stated that the Prophet Muhammad miraculously appeared to oversee the birth of Falilou who would become the second khalifah of the Muridiyya.²³

Amadu Bamba, however, was not to remain in Touba. He instructed Maam Cerno to rebuild a town that had been known as M'Backé-Barry, which was across the border in Jolof.²⁴ According to Sëriñ Bachir M'Backé, the move to M'Backé-Barry occurred sometime around the years 1888–89. He characterized the move as a return to the first Wolof territory inhabited by the ancestors of Amadu Bamba.²⁵ As Shaykh Moussa Kâ recorded, “all of the taalibe, great and small” were reassembled at M'Backé-Barry.²⁶ M'Backé-Barry became the focal point for Murids who continued to flee the persecutions of the colonial chiefs that were increasing during this time. Also, Amadu Bamba received a vision of the Prophet Muhammad while living in M'Backé-Barry in which it was formally revealed to him that he was to be the qutb al-zaman. This vision, in addition to fulfilling As Kamara's earlier prediction, was a defining moment in the career of Amadu Bamba. From this moment on, he was no longer simply a scholar and teacher but a saint, or *wali* in Arabic, which means “friend of Allah.” As such, the qualities of Amadu Bamba that had already served to attract numerous followers in search of education, *baraka* (blessing), and spiritual guidance were magnified significantly. By extension, Maam Cerno and the other lieutenants of the order shared in the growing symbolic capital of their shaykh and employed this capital in recruiting their own disciples into the order.

As a result of the religious attraction of Amadu Bamba and the harsh actions of the colonial chiefs of Cayor, the migrations of people from Cayor toward Bawol and Amadu Bamba continued unabated.²⁷ With the immigrants, much to the disappointment of the chiefs, the sëriñu lamb, and the administration, went their labor and tax revenues. Faced with these losses, the colonial chiefs decided to act against Amadu Bamba by exploiting the French fear of an armed Islamic anticolonial jihad. Ibrahim Njaay, the chief of Njambur, Demba War Sall, the most powerful figure in Cayor as the superior chief of the Confederation of Cayor, and Ibra Fatim Sarr, a chief in Cayor and a cousin of Demba War Sall, led the attack against Amadu Bamba. In the ensuing struggle, Amadu Bamba would come to rely on Maam Cerno as his principal envoy to the colonial administration.

The Arrest of Amadu Bamba

The events surrounding the arrest of Amadu Bamba in 1895 represent the first real contact between the Murid order and the French colonial administration as two competing streams of modernization. For the various reasons explored below, this first contact was not amicable and was marked by tension and conflict. Considering the historical contexts of each trend, one could say that there was bound to be disputes between the Murids and the French and their competing visions of modernity and the future of the region. Yet, seen

with the benefit of hindsight, the arrest of Amadu Bamba is also the first building block upon which accommodation between the two sides was eventually built. This accommodation would necessarily address the different versions of modernity, Murid and French, that were in play at the time and that would eventually fuse together at many points. Much of what follows below concerning the arrest comes from Murid sources who present a distinct interpretation of the actions surrounding this event.

Acting first, Ibrahima Njaay and Ibra Fatim Sarr both sent spies posing as disciples to infiltrate the Muridiyya and to find evidence that Amadu Bamba was preparing for armed revolt.²⁸ The spies reported that Amadu Bamba was intending to use the former *ceddo* who had joined him as his army. The reports were supplemented by lists of aristocrats and *ceddo* who had become disciples of Amadu Bamba. Demba War Sall, in an effort to create a direct connection between Lat Joor and Amadu Bamba, provided the French with the names of relatives of Lat Joor who had joined the Murids. The chiefs intended to portray Amadu Bamba as the next resistance leader who was gathering the families of former fighters such as Lat Joor and Albury Njaay and adding “thousands” of *ceddo* to his army. The colonial administrators also received reports from their chiefs that Amadu Bamba was supplying his followers with guns.²⁹ The French investigated the charges but could find no proof that Amadu Bamba was preparing for war. However, the French accepted the reports of their chiefs with absolute trust and laid their failure to find any proof on Amadu Bamba’s cleverness. In 1891, Amadu Bamba was summoned to St. Louis to answer for himself. Depending on the source, either Amadu Bamba or Maam Cerno went to St. Louis and made a declaration of loyalty to the French. This act narrowly averted the arrest of Amadu Bamba at that time.³⁰

The French, however, were not convinced of Amadu Bamba’s peaceful intentions. Influenced by new reports they were receiving from the chiefs of Cayor and their spies, they considered Amadu Bamba’s most recent move to M’Backé-Barry in Jolof as an attempt to move himself farther away from French control and gather his forces for an attack. According to Serigne Bachir M’Backé, the governor again summoned Amadu Bamba to present himself in St. Louis. In his place, Amadu Bamba sent Maam Cerno to plead his case, yet the governor became enraged and ordered Commandant Leclerc to bring in Amadu Bamba. Believing that war was imminent, Leclerc, aided by Ibrahima Njaay, set out with a column of soldiers to arrest the marabout. Serigne Bachir M’Backé declared that his father was “ignorant of the gravity of his gesture in the eyes of the authorities.”³¹

When Amadu Bamba received word that a column had been dispatched to arrest him, he again sent Maam Cerno to the authorities to explain that he had been prevented from answering the first summons but was now able to travel himself; therefore, there was no need to mobilize soldiers. Although Maam Cerno’s message stated that his brother was not planning a revolt or war, his diplomatic efforts were in vain. When Maam Cerno caught up to

Leclerc at Jéwol, he delivered his message through an interpreter. Leclerc's response through the same interpreter, however, did not correspond to Maam Cerno's statements. It was at this point that Maam Cerno realized that the interpreter, supplied by a colonial chief (Ibrahima Njaay most likely) had altered his message in order to prevent a diplomatic solution that would save Amadu Bamba from arrest.³²

Maam Cerno then tried unsuccessfully to appeal directly to the governor. He was ordered to return to his brother, but the governor had supplied Maam Cerno with a guide who was under orders to get them lost during the night and to delay his return to Amadu Bamba. Maam Cerno was eventually forced to abandon the guide and used the stars to find his way home. When he finally returned to his brother, he found him at prayer, surrounded by his baggage. At this point, it appears that Amadu Bamba, due to the total confusion of the situation, had resigned himself to the fact that he was leaving. He called Maam Cerno to him and instructed his younger brother to continue to pursue his education in the religious sciences, to teach, and to farm. Maam Cerno was also placed in charge of the M'Backé family.³³ Depending on the source, Amadu Bamba surrendered himself or was arrested at Jéwol on August 10, 1895. He was tried on September 5, found guilty of planning a revolt, and sentenced to exile. On September 21, 1895, Amadu Bamba boarded a vessel bound for Gabon in French Equatorial Africa, where he would remain the next seven years.

The arrest and exile of Amadu Bamba was the beginning of the final chapter in the long history of conflicts between politics and Islam in Senegambia. Yet, this final chapter was played out within the new environment of French colonial rule. The liquidation of the office of the damel and the imposition of French administrators had done little to abate the tensions between the political leadership of Kajoor (Cayor) and the proponents of Islamic reform. Elevated to the status of colonial chiefs, the leaders of the *ceddo* faction utilized their influential positions within the relatively weak colonial administration to attempt a final blow against Islamic opposition in the form of Amadu Bamba's arrest in 1895. The periods of Amadu Bamba's exiles, the first to Gabon from 1895 to 1902, the second to Mauritania from 1903 to 1907, and the terms of house arrest in Jolof from 1907 to 1912 and in Diourbel from 1912 to 1927 would witness the spectacular growth of the Murid order, the rise of Maam Cerno as a grand marabout, and eventually a *détente* between the Murid order and a new generation of colonial chiefs.

The Exiles

The development of the Muridiyya during the exile proceeded as if *Sériñ Touba* [Amadu Bamba] was here. The colonialists never had confidence in *Sériñ Touba* because day by day the numbers of his *taalibe* grew, and they [the *taalibe*] had

placed the marabout above all things in this world and had fear of no one other than him and followed his counsels with a lot of attention. But, one must know that it was Maam Cerno who directed all, and it was him who ensured the interim in the absence of his brother. Maam Cerno did all that was necessary.³⁴

One of the most crucial moments in the life of Maam Cerno and in the history of the Muridiyya was the arrest of Amadu Bamba and his exile to Gabon in 1895. Murid historiography presents this period as one of great trials but eventual success. As mentioned previously, when Amadu Bamba was exiled to Gabon, he placed his family and taalibe under the care of Maam Cerno. On the quay at St. Louis, Amadu Bamba had laid his hands on the heads of his sons, Muhammadu and Falilou, and told them that he had confided them to God, to the Prophet Muhammad, and to Maam Cerno.³⁵ Following the departure of Amadu Bamba for Gabon, Murid oral tradition testifies that Maam Cerno totally devoted himself to watching over and caring for the M'Backé family and the taalibe. His agricultural harvests helped to feed the Murids during this time, and he also continued to teach. He introduced Sēriñ Muhammadu Moustapha and Sēriñ Falilou into their Quranic education, and when they had both learned the Quran, he initiated them into the study of the religious sciences.³⁶

While a prominent Murid written source, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, also described the role that Maam Cerno played during the exile to Gabon, there is also within the text a strong sense of a reunification of the Muridiyya during the exile. Serigne Bachir M'Backé, a son of Amadu Bamba, recorded that, "Shaykh Ibrahim [Maam Cerno] attended to the perfect execution of the recommendations of his brother and master. All of the Murids united around him." Serigne Bachir M'Backé continued by stating that, during this period, the Murids "united as the fingers of the same hand and struggled by their deeds and their efforts to stay on the path of their Lord in order to multiply the good works and persevere in education and work." He also maintained that under the leadership of Maam Cerno, the Murids never ceased to follow the teachings of Amadu Bamba even though there was a general feeling of depression among the disciples due to the absence of Sēriñ Touba.³⁷

In addition to taking care of Amadu Bamba's immediate family, Maam Cerno was also charged with the direction of the taalibe. Maam Cerno had to organize the labor of the taalibe and arrange for their education. He sent the disciples who wanted to work to the fields under the supervision of Shaykh Amadu Ndoumbé, and those who preferred to study, he sent to school. Students who were studying the Quran were sent to Sēriñ Daam Abdou Rahman Lô; the advanced students who wanted to pursue the religious sciences were educated in the home of Maam Cerno.³⁸ Serigne Bachir M'Backé attested that due to his scholarly achievements, Maam Cerno was especially qualified to carry out Amadu Bamba's instructions regarding the education of the disciples. Despite Maam Cerno's abilities and the unity of the Murids, the

tariqa still had to face continuing hostility toward the Muridiyya from many sides.

According to Sēriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, soon after Amadu Bamba had been exiled, the governor sent an emissary to Maam Cerno instructing him that the French administration intended to break up the daara based at M'Backé-Barry, send the Murid taalibe back to their homes, and then burn the school. These actions were designed to destroy the Murid order and scatter its followers. Realizing the threat to Amadu Bamba's mission that the French plans posed, Maam Cerno raised the ante. He replied to the governor that he himself could move, but burning the daara would not be possible, or rather that it would burn but at the same time as his family and taalibe. Maam Cerno's intransigence forced the governor to relent and reach a compromise. Maam Cerno and the principal Murid taalibe were allowed to remain together, yet they agreed to leave M'Backé-Barry after the harvest was complete. It was shortly after this episode, in late 1895 or early 1896, that Maam Cerno moved to M'Backé-Baol, which was closer to French control.³⁹

Maam Cerno's relocation to M'Backé-Baol was not successful, and once again, the inhabitants of the village refused to accommodate the Murids. According to a Murid informant, the people of M'Backé-Baol denied sanctuary to Maam Cerno because they feared French retaliation for harboring the Murids. The Murids themselves were not perceived as a threat; rather, their very presence in M'Backé-Baol made the town and its inhabitants a target for French actions directed against the relatives of Amadu Bamba.⁴⁰ Shaykh Moussa Kâ commented on the difficult situation in M'Backé-Baol by claiming that enemies of the Murids had threatened Maam Cerno that he would die with the family of Amadu Bamba and the taalibe. Indeed, Maam Cerno's brother, Amadu Faty, died in M'Backé-Baol, yet Shaykh Moussa Kâ did not mention the cause of his death.⁴¹

Therefore, Maam Cerno was forced to leave M'Backé-Baol and settled about three kilometers away from the town. This new site, however, proved to be very inhospitable. Extreme heat and bad conditions resulted in the death of eight people, including one of Amadu Bamba's sons and one of his sisters. The remainder of the victims were taalibe. According to one oral tradition, upon the deaths of Amadu Bamba's son and sister, Maam Cerno wept for the first time because, "he had a lot of pity for the family of his brother."⁴² The combination of the expulsions from M'Backé-Barry and M'Backé-Baol and the deaths of close family members and disciples certainly represented a low point in Maam Cerno's guardianship of the Murids. The portrait of Maam Cerno weeping for the first time in his life is indicative of the severity of the conditions faced by the Murid order during the first year of Amadu Bamba's exile to Gabon. It is also testament to the trials that Maam Cerno had to overcome in the course of his labors on Amadu Bamba's behalf and, again, a prime model of perseverance for any Murid. Seen in the context of Maam Cerno's eventual success following these early setbacks, these events are

further proof for the Murids of the legitimacy of the Murid mission and Maam Cerno's important role in the development of the Muridiyya. His emergence from these early difficulties also added to his own stature within the Murid hierarchy and justified his position as his brother's adjunct or right hand.

Following the deaths, Maam Cerno discovered that this new village was frequented by a number of jinn. He had consulted Maam Logué, a noted authority on jinn who told him that he must leave the village immediately. With the remainder of Amadu Bamba's family and disciples, he left and founded the new settlement of Gouye-N'Goura (Baobab of Success). Soon after the move, Maam Cerno received a letter from Amadu Bamba in Gabon that was written in the guise of a prayer. The letter instructed him to establish another town to be named Gouye Taggo (Baobab of Goodbye).⁴³ However, Maam Cerno did not remain in either of these towns. In 1901, he broke ground and presided over the digging of a well for yet another new settlement on the outskirts of Touba. The new town was named Darou Marnane and, as noted by Moussa Kâ, became known as a center for Quranic recitation, study of the *dhikr*, or Sufi prayer formulas, and performances of the *qasida*, or poems composed by Amadu Bamba in honor of the Prophet Muhammad. Maam Cerno remained at Darou Marnane-Baol until the return of Amadu Bamba in 1902.⁴⁴

As illustrated above, during the course of Amadu Bamba's exile to Gabon, Murid sources paint a portrait of Maam Cerno going through a very difficult period as he tried to take care of the family and the disciples. There is a great emphasis on the work that Maam Cerno performed during this period. Although he is believed to have consecrated all of his time and energy to farming and teaching, Murid sources emphatically point out that throughout all of his labors, Maam Cerno wanted nothing for himself and had but one objective; to follow the counsels of his brother and master, Amadu Bamba.

Upon the return of Amadu Bamba from Gabon on November 11, 1902, he summoned Maam Cerno to meet him. Murid traditions regarding the reunion of Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno relate a rather stoic encounter. Maam Cerno brought Muhammadu Moustapha and Falilou with him to meet their father. After Maam Cerno had greeted his older brother, Amadu Bamba informed him that he had obtained all that he wanted during his voyage. Maam Cerno replied that he had no regrets for all that had been confided to him.⁴⁵

This account of the meeting makes several important statements. It reinforces the Murid belief that Amadu Bamba's exile was in reality a mission that he performed for God. During his sojourn in Gabon, he had written more poems and furthered his studies, yet, as alluded to previously, there was also a mystical dimension to his exile. His trials in Gabon were considered part of his labors for God, and his successful completion of the exile elevated his religious stature in the eyes of his followers.⁴⁶ Tales of the miracles that he performed during the exile such as praying on the surface of the ocean when he was not allowed to pray on board the ship to Gabon and calming a lion that

the French had put in his cell also supported a positive Murid interpretation of the event. His return from exile was thus another stage in his religious development. For Maam Cerno, the work that he performed on behalf of Amadu Bamba during the seven years was a part of the labors that he, as a loyal taalibe, owed to his shaykh, Amadu Bamba. However, for the Murids and Maam Cerno's disciples in particular, the efforts undertaken by Maam Cerno during Amadu Bamba's exile to Gabon were extraordinary and earned Maam Cerno a privileged position in both worlds. In the words of one of the notables of Darou Mousty, "Maam Cerno did for Sëriñ Touba what no person had done for him [Amadu Bamba], because of that, Sëriñ Touba gave Maam Cerno what he had given to no one else."⁴⁷

After his return to Senegal in 1902, Amadu Bamba settled first in Darou Salam, but after a month, he moved to Darou Marnane-Baol.⁴⁸ Yet, he did not remain in Senegal for long. By February 1903, French anxiety over the growing strength of the Muridiyya, fueled by erroneous reports that the Murids were arming themselves, again began to peak. Many of these reports came from M'Bakhane Diop, a son of Lat Joor and the provincial chief of eastern Baol. Touba and M'Backé-Baol lay within his domain and, like Demba War Sall and the other colonial chiefs who engineered the arrest of Amadu Bamba in 1895, M'Bakhane Diop saw the Murids as rivals and did not relish the return of Amadu Bamba. As in 1895, Murid sources dwell on the diplomatic efforts made by Amadu Bamba in 1903 to reach an agreement with M'Bakhane Diop. Amadu Bamba once again decided to utilize the diplomatic abilities of Maam Cerno and sent his younger brother with Shaykh Anta, another brother, to speak to M'Bakhane Diop, but the chief refused to speak to them. Apparently, he would only speak face to face with Amadu Bamba himself. According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, the marabout informed the chief that he occupied himself only with matters pertaining to God and that M'Bakhane Diop should speak to Maam Cerno, and Shaykh Anta. M'Bakhane Diop, enraged, went to the governor and informed him that Amadu Bamba was once again gathering arms and planning a revolt.⁴⁹

In May, Amadu Bamba was summoned to St. Louis but refused the invitation with the now famous statement, "God alone is king." Amadu Bamba's long-held apolitical stance was interpreted by the French authorities in a very political way. In effect, his protestation of neutrality in secular affairs was perceived as opposition, and this sense of opposition was further fueled by the colonial chiefs who were being directly affected by the popularity of the Murid message. The following month, Amadu Bamba was arrested for a second time and exiled to the home of Shaykh Sidiyya Baba in Saout el-Ma in Mauritania where he would remain until 1907. Murid accounts of the second arrest of Amadu Bamba in 1902 indicate an important change of heart among certain members of the aristocracy of the Wolof states toward Amadu Bamba in spite of the continuing hostility of some of their peers. Coumba Ndofoène, the king of Sine (Siin), according to Shaykh Moussa Kâ and Serigne Bachir M'Backé,

defended Amadu Bamba against the accusations of M'Bakhane Diop. Furthermore, the night before he was taken into custody, many of the notables who would lead the colonial force charged with Amadu Bamba's arrest secretly visited the marabout to receive his prayers and blessings. The most distinguished of the notables who sought out Amadu Bamba in the middle of the night was Meissa M'Baye Sall, the eldest son and successor of Demba War Sall who had died earlier that year. Meissa M'Baye is even remembered to have "placed himself with the Murids who were preparing the baggage [of Amadu Bamba] as if he was one of them."⁵⁰ The new attitude of some of the Wolof aristocrats, particularly the younger members of the Sall family, in 1902 is symptomatic of the establishment of a *détente* between the chiefs and the Murids that began in this period and eventually led to the development of cordial relations between many chiefs and Islamic marabouts later in the twentieth century.

During the second exile, Maam Cerno was once again charged with the care of Amadu Bamba's family and the *taalibe*. During this period, Maam Cerno maintained fifty granaries for the support of the M'Backé family.⁵¹ Unlike the first exile, the relative proximity of this second exile made communications and visits with Amadu Bamba much easier. Letters written by Amadu Bamba and addressed to Maam Cerno, some of which were intercepted and held by the French, have been preserved in the colonial archives and in Darou Mousty.

One of the letters that can be found in the French archives was dated 1903 and is quite well known. In the letter, Amadu Bamba instructed Maam Cerno to warn those followers who might antagonize the French or the colonial chiefs that they would be abandoned in this world and the hereafter if they chose to do so. This statement may reflect the influence of Amadu Bamba's host, Sidiyya Baba, who had already come to an understanding with the French mutually benefiting himself and the Europeans. Furthermore, Amadu Bamba wrote that those Murids who wanted to read and write in Arabic should present themselves to Maam Cerno. Those who simply wanted to work without learning were instructed to go to Shaykh Anta M'Backé. Disciples who wanted to pursue both education and work were recommended to place themselves also under Maam Cerno. Finally, Amadu Bamba declared that anyone who wished to neither work nor study must be expelled from the Muridiyya.⁵²

In a letter that was most likely written early in his exile in Mauritania, Amadu Bamba reminded Maam Cerno of his order for his younger brother to remain in Darou Marnane-Baol. Maam Cerno was also told not to lend an ear to the words of those who only make conjectures without any arguments.⁵³ The context of this letter was most likely concerned with the problems that Maam Cerno was encountering in Darou Marnane-Baol with local Fulbe herders. Evidence of conflicts between the Murid community led by Maam Cerno and the Fulbe can be found in both Murid sources and in the colonial archives.

According to one informant in Darou Mousty, while resident in Darou Marnane-Baol, several of Maam Cerno's taalibe had been robbed and killed while they were working in the fields. They had been assaulted by Fulbe pastoralists who claimed the surrounding area as their pasturage. Maam Cerno complained to the colonial authorities and brought the matter to trial. The resulting judgment in favor of the Fulbe led Maam Cerno to believe that there was French complicity and hostility toward the Murids involved, especially on the side of the local colonial chiefs, M'Bakhane Diop in particular.⁵⁴

On June 28, 1903, the commandant of the *cercle* of Cayor, Victor Allys, received a letter from Maam Cerno requesting French permission for him to move to Cayor.⁵⁵ In retrospect, this letter represents the starting point of Maam Cerno's subsequent work in Cayor that culminated in the successful establishment of Darou Mousty in 1912. One might be tempted to question Maam Cerno's judgment in his desire to return to Cayor whose chiefs had been so hostile to the Murids in the recent past. However, the death of Demba War Sall, the president of the Confederation of the Chiefs of Cayor and an ardent opponent of the Muridiyya, in 1902 and the ascension of a new generation of chiefs such as his son Meissa M'Baye, had led to the creation of a more favorable environment for Murids within Cayor. In this context, Demba War Sall's death provided the Muridiyya with an opening into Cayor and gave Maam Cerno an opportunity to forge a new relationship between the Muridiyya and the colonial chiefs of Cayor.

In his letter to Victor Allys, Maam Cerno thanked the administrator for putting him in contact with Meissa M'Baye who was the chief of the province of West Sañoxor in Cayor. Meissa M'Baye had given Maam Cerno a tour of a parcel of land that he and his family and taalibe could live on and cultivate. According to the letter, Maam Cerno expressed a desire to return to the native land of his mother. He also attempted to lay a better diplomatic foundation with the colonial administration by stating his satisfaction with the commandant and his desire to create a better relationship with him. The enmity of M'Bakhane Diop in Baol was also undoubtedly instrumental in his desire to move to Cayor where the new generation of Sall chiefs would welcome him.

Maam Cerno also included a request for aid in the return of his brother and offered to have Amadu Bamba live with him in Cayor. In a very diplomatic tone, Maam Cerno stated that he did not want to be ostracized from the French for the rest of his life, and even if his brother was not released he would still have the same desire for good relations with the Europeans and with the present commandant's successors. Victor Allys forwarded Maam Cerno's letter to the secretary-general of the colony and in a handwritten introduction to Maam Cerno's request, the administrator wrote, "after all the information that I could obtain, Ibra Faty [Maam Cerno] and Momar Jara [another of Amadu Bamba's brothers] have always counseled their brother, Amadu Bamba, to obey the orders of the governor-general." However, Allys had also penciled in on a page of Maam Cerno's letter that he hoped that

Amadu Bamba would remain interred in Mauritania in the *zawiya*, or retreat, of Shaykh Sidiyya. On July 10, 1903, the secretary-general, acting on the advice of Victor Allys, informed the administrator of the cercle of Thiès (that included Baol) that he had authorized Maam Cerno's request to move to Cayor. The secretary-general expressed his concern that M'Bakhane Diop would try to stop Maam Cerno from leaving Baol and asked the administrator of Thiès to aid Maam Cerno's departure and prevent the chief from harassing Maam Cerno.

Maam Cerno's moderate attitude toward the French administration and his willingness to deal with the representatives of French power apparently created a rift between him and his followers and more conservative Murid elements in Baol that criticized his use of diplomacy. As a result of this distrust, Maam Cerno felt betrayed, especially because he had been left in charge by Amadu Bamba and had long been utilized by his brother as a diplomat with the French. He also felt that he was being denied the total support of the Murids that he deserved. Based on one oral informant in Darou Mousty, it appears that Maam Cerno's disagreements with other Murids in Baol over how to deal with the colonial administration could have also played a role in his desire to relocate to Cayor.⁵⁶

Even though Maam Cerno had been granted permission by the French to move to Cayor, it is doubtful that he actually moved in 1903. Rather than definitively moving in 1903, it is most likely that Maam Cerno spent time in both regions, preparing for his final move to Cayor once he obtained the approval of Amadu Bamba to move. One of the notables interviewed in Darou Mousty, Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, said that Maam Cerno did indeed leave Baol and move to Cayor in 1903. He also mentioned the problems with the Fulbe, but made it clear that when Maam Cerno moved he had the approval of Amadu Bamba. Another source, Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, said that Maam Cerno had lived in Cayor, in the town of M'Backé-Cayor to be precise, for four or five years before he founded Darou Mousty. This account would place Maam Cerno's move to M'Backé-Cayor sometime in 1907 or 1908. Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé also stated that Maam Cerno moved only after Amadu Bamba had instructed him to do so.⁵⁷ According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, as we shall see below, Maam Cerno received these instructions in 1908, a year after Amadu Bamba's return from Mauritania.⁵⁸ It is therefore most likely that Maam Cerno waited until 1908 to officially move to Cayor for good.⁵⁹

Regardless of when Maam Cerno actually left Baol, further examination of the correspondence between Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno sheds some light on the inner workings of the Muridiyya during this period, 1903–7, and informs us further about the nature of the relationship between the two brothers. For example, a letter which Amadu Bamba wrote to Maam Cerno in 1904 (AH 1322) had an air of warning about it. After the traditional greeting, Amadu Bamba informed his brother, "the majority of men are only wolves in

disguise. Therefore, beware of them.” The letter continued with Amadu Bamba stating that henceforth, he would now only write to Maam Cerno and a few others. This particular piece of correspondence also dealt with more mundane matters. Amadu Bamba asked Maam Cerno to safeguard his books that he had sent to him at Darou Marnane-Baol, and Maam Cerno was also instructed to send a tent as soon as possible. The letter closed with a reminder to Maam Cerno that he would receive a great reward in this world and in the next.⁶⁰ Maam Cerno also received a written request to send to Mauritania six young disciples, three who had a perfect command of the Quran and three who had learned enough of the religious sciences to teach others. Amadu Bamba made the request in order to provide instruction to young taalibe who were residing with him at the house of Shaykh Sidia in Mauritania.⁶¹

Several letters expressed Amadu Bamba’s gratitude to Maam Cerno. One letter began, “As soon as you will have received this message, be certain that I am completely satisfied with you, and that I have solicited for you, favors from God, that all the world will envy. Rejoice and do not doubt this satisfaction and the favor from your Lord that I transmit to you. God is the guarantor of our purpose.”⁶² Amadu Bamba evidently knew of some of the problems that Maam Cerno had encountered in leading the Murids during this second exile and wrote at least one letter of encouragement. In this letter, Maam Cerno was referred as “dear disciple” and reminded once again that he had received the blessings of God in this world and in the afterlife. Amadu Bamba added that the Lord had preserved Maam Cerno from perils and that he personally had protected Maam Cerno from danger by the grace of God and his Prophet.⁶³

Amadu Bamba supplied further proof of the existence of divine favor toward his brother in a letter written to Maam Cerno in 1905. He wrote that in the month of Sha’ban in 1904, he had said a prayer for Maam Cerno and later had inquired to himself whether God had answered his prayer. Amadu Bamba continued that his prayer was answered exactly one year later with Maam Cerno’s visit to him in Sha’ban 1905. The timeliness of his younger brother’s arrival was cited as evidence of the answered prayer. In addition, Amadu Bamba stated that if the visit had not occurred in Sha’ban 1905, misfortune would have befallen Maam Cerno.⁶⁴

When Amadu Bamba returned from Mauritania in 1907, he was placed under house arrest in Thièène in the cercle of Louga (Jolof). Maam Cerno, meanwhile, had founded two more towns, Khabane and Darou M’Bakoly, that were placed under the direction of Sēriñ Mactar. According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, Maam Cerno was still in Darou Marnane-Baol when Amadu Bamba summoned him to Darou Rahmane in Jolof in 1908. During their meeting, Amadu Bamba proposed to Maam Cerno that he should go to Cayor to found a village.⁶⁵ This is the first concrete reference to Amadu Bamba instructing Maam Cerno to go to Cayor to establish a new settlement.

Maam Cerno, with the approval of Amadu Bamba and with French permission soon left for Cayor. He arrived in the vicinity of M’Backé-Cayor, the former

residence of his family, and decided to found a new M'Backé-Cayor.⁶⁶ His reasoning behind the choice of this location is obvious and was stated in his letter to Victor Allys in 1903. Maam Cerno would remain at M'Backé-Cayor teaching and attracting more disciples until 1912 when he left, once again under the orders of his brother, to establish Darou Mousty near the frontier with Baol.

Murid Characterizations of Maam Cerno

Oral traditions concerning Maam Cerno, his position within the Muridiyya, and his relationship with Amadu Bamba have been dutifully preserved by the Murids who claim Maam Cerno as their master. It may initially appear that the oral traditions surrounding Maam Cerno are used solely to inform present-day followers about the life and work of the man. However, these traditions also serve as a model of proper Murid conduct for the disciples who listen to and pass on the stories themselves. The act of preserving and interpreting the oral traditions thus provides the Murid community with a sense of its own history and the meaning and application of that history for the present-day Murid.

The theme of Maam Cerno's subservience to Amadu Bamba is very prominent throughout the oral traditions cited for this study. Informants in Darou Mousty did elaborate, however, on some of the specific ways by which Maam Cerno was linked to Amadu Bamba. For example, at times, Maam Cerno's position was described in Wolof as the *jawriñ*, or lieutenant, of his brother. In this case, he was the chosen *jawriñ* of Amadu Bamba. Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé of Darou Mousty had this to say specifically of Maam Cerno's work as the *jawriñ* of Amadu Bamba, "It was Maam Cerno who was in charge of the missions, the education, the work, and all in general. Maam Cerno counted on no one but Sëriñ Touba, who was his hope in this world and the next. Maam Cerno behaved as a true taalibe towards Sëriñ Touba." He further characterized Maam Cerno's work for Amadu Bamba by saying, "One could say that if Sëriñ Touba was a shepherd watching over sheep or cows, then Maam Cerno was the staff by which he guided the flock."⁶⁷

These statements are very indicative of the basis of the relationship between Maam Cerno and Amadu Bamba. At its core, the bond that linked Maam Cerno to Amadu Bamba was the same that existed between any taalibe and any shaykh. However, one can say that in this case, the taalibe-shaykh relationship was definitely carried to a more intense level. Maam Cerno, as the taalibe, relied on Amadu Bamba for much more than just an education. The total devotion that characterized the attitude of Maam Cerno toward Amadu Bamba was generated by the desire to follow a spiritual master who could provide for his disciple in the material world and in the afterlife. The primacy of a Sufi shaykh is not a concept unique to the Murid order but is based upon

the popular saying among all Sufi orders that one who does not have a shaykh as a guide has Satan.

The various accounts of Maam Cerno's perfect behavior toward his brother, whether as a taalibe or jawriñ, are considered by many to be examples of proper conduct for present-day Murids and this has undoubtedly played a role in their preservation. The oral traditions that have been preserved by the descendants and disciples of Maam Cerno paint a vivid picture of his life and work, not so much to glorify Maam Cerno himself, but to demonstrate his fealty to Amadu Bamba and the Muridiyya's mission. This is very similar to the way that Murid Baay Fall disciples preserve traditions and seek to emulate the practices of Shaykh Ibra Fall vis-à-vis Amadu Bamba.

Complimentary to Maam Cerno's obedience to Amadu Bamba was his strict interpretation of the shari'a and his insistence on all who followed him to adhere to the law. His high regard for the holy law is another dimension of Maam Cerno's role as a model Murid taalibe. Regarding Maam Cerno's attitude toward the shari'a, Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé said, "No one could stop him from doing what Allah had recommended." He also added, "He did not cooperate with or accept anyone who neglected the recommendations of Islam. He preferred correct and proper taalibe who followed the *shari'a*."⁶⁸

Maam Cerno's attitude toward the shari'a contrasts quite sharply to the rather liberal behavior of Shaykh Ibra Fall and his taalibe, the Baay Fall. One might question how two such important figures within the Muridiyya, possessing different perceptions of the role of the shari'a, worked together. One informant in Darou Mousty stated that both men had the same spiritual chief (Amadu Bamba) and performed the orders that the marabout had given them.⁶⁹ This was a rather abrupt comment that acknowledged that there were certain distinctions between the two shaykh, yet their subservience to the will of Amadu Bamba served to unite them as disciples of the marabout. This view also points to an acceptance of both extremes regarding the application of the shari'a within the tariqa. Another informant added that Maam Cerno was, in fact, on good terms with Shaykh Ibra Fall and knew that the latter held him in great respect. Yet, Maam Cerno also was aware that Shaykh Ibra Fall felt that he (Maam Cerno) was too demanding in relation to the shari'a.⁷⁰

Maam Cerno's obedience to Amadu Bamba and his application of Islamic law are not the only aspects of his character and his role within the Muridiyya to have been preserved. In addition to naming Maam Cerno as the jawriñ of Amadu Bamba, Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry, a notable of Darou Mousty, continued his description of Maam Cerno's position within the order by stating, "Maam Cerno was the general of Sëriñ Touba. All who came to the home of Sëriñ Touba passed by Maam Cerno. There was no one between Maam Cerno and Sëriñ Touba. Therefore, Maam Cerno was his right hand."⁷¹ This characterization displays several different aspects of the relationship between the two brothers as remembered by Murid oral tradition. Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry's words conveyed a military interpretation that portrayed Maam Cerno

as the chief officer or general of Amadu Bamba. Even though the armed jihad had been disavowed by Amadu Bamba, the framework of the Muridiyya required its leaders to possess a great amount of organizational skills to guide the disciples in their religious, social, and economic lives. Important tasks, such as the founding of new towns and the organization of large workforces, were also delegated to Maam Cerno by Amadu Bamba. In this view, the oral sources constantly stressed that Maam Cerno was always acting under the orders of Amadu Bamba.

Sëriñ Modou M'Backe Barry also referred to Maam Cerno acting as a sort of chamberlain in the house of his brother. It was typical in precolonial Wolof royal courts for there to be a similar official, even lesser chiefs would also employ such a person. In the case of Amadu Bamba and the Murids, as the number of disciples (and supplicants) continued to grow, it was necessary to establish some form of control regarding access to Amadu Bamba. Once again, this was a role initially held by Maam Cerno.

Even in later times, after Maam Cerno had successfully established Darou Mousty, he is still pictured as the obedient servant and disciple of Amadu Bamba. Maam Cerno's attitude toward his relationship with Amadu Bamba is demonstrated in an oral tradition that compares his reactions to a summons by Amadu Bamba to those of Shaykh Anta. According to this tradition, whenever Sëriñ Touba summoned Shaykh Anta, he would stop immediately in whatever he was doing and go to Amadu Bamba. However, when Maam Cerno was called, he would prepare for twenty-four hours, and whenever someone asked him about his preparations before leaving, he would reply that he did not know if his brother was going to retain him or not. Therefore, Maam Cerno would pack all that he would need before answering the summons because he was never sure if he would return to Darou Mousty or stay with Amadu Bamba. Furthermore, it is remembered that Maam Cerno never told his brother that he wanted to return to his own home each time he was summoned. Rather, Sëriñ Touba always gave him the order to return after he had finished with Maam Cerno.⁷² Stories such as the one mentioned above, further reinforce the characterization of Maam Cerno as the taalibe or jawriñ of Amadu Bamba and illustrates the allegory of Aaron and Moses that Murids have used to describe the birth of Maam Cerno. Yet, Murid views of Maam Cerno also stress his own achievements (though always in his brother's service) and personality.

Perhaps the name *Maam Cerno* that translates to "grandfather scholar or teacher" is one of the best indications of Murid conceptions of the man. This appellation, by which Ibrahima Faty M'Backé came to be most widely known, is used primarily by the Murids and rarely appears in French documents. Aside from his service to Amadu Bamba, Maam Cerno is remembered by his followers and their descendents as a grandfatherly figure who provided for his disciples' material and religious needs. The image of a distinguished elder who served as a provider and protector for his community permeates many of the traditions and writings concerning Maam Cerno's life.

The characterization of Maam Cerno as a leader is not only recognized in his name and his title as shaykh. Another common reference to him is as the *boorum darou*, which means the owner or master of *darou*. In this case, *darou* (from the Arabic *dar* “abode or land”) refers to a place of settlement such as Darou Mousty. Even today, Maam Cerno is referred to as Boorum Darou and this phrase is sometimes used with *jëwëjef Boorum Darou* (thank you, master of Darou) before or after eating a meal.⁷³

Maam Cerno’s scholarly pursuits and the emphasis that he placed on education throughout his life certainly have helped to define his character, yet he is also remembered as someone who had no aversion to manual labor. On the contrary, work figured highly in Maam Cerno’s life and his ideology. Both Murid and French sources bear witness to Maam Cerno’s strong work ethic. One of the most colorful portraits of Maam Cerno within Murid oral tradition is as a farmer working in the fields. He is said to have tied his turban around his waist while he labored in the fields and to have kept pistols in his pockets in case of any trouble with local Fulbe herdsmen. In November 1914, a squadron of *spahis* under the command of Captain Beugnot made a tour of Cayor and passed through Guet province in which Darou Mousty was located. The captain noted that his column was given a good reception by a “*marabout-fermier*” (marabout-farmer) named Ibra Faty “who was the chief of a group of M’Backés.”⁷⁴

Maam Cerno’s reputation as a marabout-farmer contrasts sharply with the image of the Murid marabout as presented in French colonial studies such as Paul Marty’s work and later scholars who followed his example. This image focused on the exploitative and corrupt nature of the marabouts who did no work yet profited from the labors of their disciples.⁷⁵ Similarly, many of the leading Murid marabouts were reported to have relinquished their educational duties in favor of a life of leisure. From this perspective, the career of Maam Cerno is even more crucial. This is not to say that all Murid marabouts were like Maam Cerno. However, his status within the Muridiyya and the numbers of his followers and their descendents make his example extremely important. Maam Cerno’s strict interpretation of the shari’a and his combination of study and work served as a great influence upon his own taalibe who preserved their memories of him to explain their own position within the order and to inform the next generation of proper Murid behavior.

In his capacity as a Murid shaykh, Maam Cerno was authorized to initiate others as Murid shaykh. During his lifetime, Maam Cerno presided over the elevation of eighty-nine disciples to the rank of shaykh. Each of these shaykh were then eligible to teach their own students and initiate other shaykh. As mentioned previously, Maam Cerno was thus a crucial link for many Murids in the *silsila* or chain that connected the disciples to the *baraka* or blessing that flowed through Amadu Bamba. Maam Cerno’s own attitudes toward education and work also passed down to his shaykh and disciples. Therefore, the emphasis on labor and learning, which Amadu Bamba himself frequently

stressed, was not singularly confined to Maam Cerno alone but influenced all of those who sought his protection, learning, and guidance.

One of his nicknames does portray a lighter side to Maam Cerno's personality and the bond that existed between him and his followers. The nickname *Ndamal Darou* refers to Maam Cerno's physical stature and was used among his taalibe. *Ndamal* basically means "neither tall nor short." One of my informants in Darou Mousty, Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, elaborated about this nickname and posited that Maam Cerno's physical stature was due to the weight of the mission that he bore for Amadu Bamba.⁷⁶

Murid memories of Maam Cerno also refer to his early relationship with the French. According to Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, "The French had a lot of respect for Maam Cerno, yet they never had sincere confidence in one so close to Amadu Bamba."⁷⁷ Concerning the relations between the Muridiyya and the colonial administration, the Murids believed that Maam Cerno was seen by the French as the spokesman and lieutenant of Amadu Bamba and not as an independent shaykh. In this view, Murid oral tradition rightfully acknowledged that a degree of suspicion therefore tempered the respect that the French showed toward Maam Cerno.

Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé added another dimension to Murid interpretations of the relationship between Maam Cerno and the French. He agreed that the French did indeed have a lot of consideration for Maam Cerno. However, Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backe maintained that the French respected him because he always told them the truth whether he was speaking for himself or Amadu Bamba. Likewise, whenever he carried a message from the French for his brother, Maam Cerno never altered any part of the message.⁷⁸ In this context, the relationship between Maam Cerno and the colonial administration is still centered on his role as Amadu Bamba's lieutenant and diplomat, but Maam Cerno's own character also played an important part in the establishment of good relations with the French.

Although Maam Cerno's relationship with the French began as a part of his function as the spokesman of Amadu Bamba, it soon developed independently of his role as Amadu Bamba's lieutenant. Maam Cerno's move to Cayor and the eventual establishment and growth of Darou Mousty and its surrounding villages would further define this relationship. As will be seen in the following chapters, Maam Cerno was a very effective diplomat on his own part.

Conclusion

Thus, prior to the founding of Darou Mousty in 1912, Maam Cerno had already assumed a very important position within the Muridiyya as a premier taalibe, shaykh, jawriñ, teacher, and farmer. Murid oral and written sources concerning the life of Maam Cerno focus on his close relationship with Amadu Bamba and the work that he performed for his brother. However,

these sources also testify to the personality and multifaceted character of Maam Cerno. While he shared a similar mission with other Murid shaykh, such as Shaykh Ibra Fall and Shaykh Anta, Maam Cerno's strict devotion to the shari'a, his emphasis on education combined with work, and his singular relationship with Amadu Bamba set him apart from other Murid notables.

These characteristics also defined Maam Cerno in the eyes of his own taalibe and played an important role in the growth of the numbers of his followers. The preservation of sayings that are attributed to Maam Cerno also provides insight into the identity of Maam Cerno and how that identity has been preserved by his disciples and their descendents. Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, for example, related that Maam Cerno once said, "To be human, one must learn the Quran and the religious sciences, and at the same time work towards the goal of consecrating his life to the service of the all powerful Allah." Maam Cerno was also remembered as saying to one of his sons, "It is better to work than to count on others." Some of the sayings that have been preserved also deal with specific questions. For example, Maam Cerno once spoke with his taalibe regarding working during Ramadan. He said, "Those who do not want to work and fast have only to decline work, because it is I who recommend work, but the fast is a recommendation of God."⁷⁹

The Murid historical narratives that cover the early lives and experiences of Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno essentially attempt to personify emerging Murid notions of modernity as tied in to this idea of a synthesis of different historical forces: Islamic reform and mysticism and French colonization. This is a crucial period in Murid history in which the order first truly distinguishes itself from the surrounding milieu. In this assertion of Murid identity, it was essential to establish Amadu Bamba as a focal point and a model. The biographical portrait of the founder of the order within the narratives served this purpose and gave the emerging community a common touchstone in which they could identify Murid attitudes regarding the shaykh-taalibe relationship, work, community, proper conduct, and relations with secular power. Initially, the portrait attempts to link Amadu Bamba to other representatives of the new generation of Sufi reformers by commenting on his family's scholarly background, his own erudition, and his growing rejection of the tactics of the older generation of Islamic reformers. Yet, like his peers, his portrait must also serve to distinguish him and his particular interpretation of reform and the Sufi way from others. It is in this respect, that so much attention is paid in Amadu Bamba's biography to his accumulation of symbolic capital in the form of his vision of the Prophet Muhammad, his proclamation as the master of the age, and other miracles. His identity as a black African who possessed this level of symbolic capital would also come to be used by his followers to set him apart from some of his peers. Of course, in the process, the Murids are writing or orally composing a place for the order within the larger history of Islam in Senegambia and its subhistories of Islamic reform and Sufism that would continue to develop as time passed.

For the branch of the order that is the focus of this study, Maam Cerno plays a complimentary role in this process. In the historical narratives, he is put in the various roles of disciple, adjunct, and eventually a powerful shaykh with his own version of Murid identity that distinguishes him from other Murid notables. Aside from his leadership of the Muridiyya during the exiles of Amadu Bamba, the most defining period in the career of Maam Cerno was his establishment of Darou Mousty in 1912 and his subsequent leadership of the Murid community that emerged in the town and its environs. Although Maam Cerno had settled the town under the orders of Amadu Bamba, as Darou Mousty grew, he was recognized both by the populace and the French as a grand marabout in his own right. He soon became the recognized leader of the Murids of Cayor and Darou Mousty became his capital. However, within a larger Murid context, Maam Cerno was simply continuing his work for Amadu Bamba that had been assigned to him from birth.

4

TRANSLATING THE MURID MISSION

THE FOUNDING OF DAROU MOUSTY

Introduction

An examination of the founding and early settlement of Darou Mousty provides us with an excellent laboratory in which to examine how the Murid synthesis was actually acted upon by Murid leaders and disciples. In other words, how did a new community translate Amadu Bamba's reformist and Sufi ideology into their daily lives and actions, and in a sense, pursue this avenue of modernization. We must also consider how this Murid community related to the colonial administration and the modernization that was coming into rural Senegal from French rule. Darou Mousty largely reflected how relations between the French and the Murids developed over time from mutual estrangement and antagonism into an eventual mutual accommodation. Furthermore, this chapter will analyze how this process was explained and legitimized by the Murids.

It is at this point that we can also most fruitfully examine the Murid order as a "social imaginary." In Charles Taylor's latest study, he traces the development of a "modern social imaginary." In this context, Taylor defined a *social imaginary* as "the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations."¹ Taylor refers to the notion of an imaginary because he was not so much concerned with the theoretical aspect of this issue as with the ways in which common people imagine their society through images, narratives, and legends. This imaginary lends itself to a wider understanding among large groups and adds an important air of legitimacy to the society. One can see the ideological underpinnings of a Murid social imaginary being built within Murid historiography of the events of the preceding chapters. The Murid narratives of Amadu Bamba's actions and statements regarding Måbba Jaxu, Lat Joor, and the arrests and exiles provided his followers

with important images and symbols of a developing Murid moral order that acted to bind them to others within the community and simultaneously legitimized the Murid way. What truly makes a social imaginary relevant, however, is when it is acted upon and put into reality and then further added to. We can see an attempt at this in the founding of Darou Mousty and in its later development.

Within the French colonial archives, there is no mention of the existence of Darou Mousty specifically until after the beginning of World War I in 1914, almost three years after ground was initially cleared for the settlement. In order to get a picture of the events involved in the founding of Darou Mousty, we must first rely on Murid sources, oral and written, which can then be augmented by general information concerning the area that was recorded by the local Wolof colonial chiefs and the French. The prominent use of Murid sources is not based solely on the relative lack of other sources. The examination of the processes involved in the establishment of a Murid settlement from a distinct Murid point of view will fill a vacuum that has existed in Western scholarship concerning the tariqa as a whole, and the settlement of the so-called *terres neuves*, in particular. Often, previous authors have relied on the official French sources, the work of Paul Marty, and Western, especially Marxist and materialist, interpretations to explore the Muridiyya and the settlement process. While not discounting the usefulness of the French sources, this chapter will instead work from a Murid base of information while using colonial sources to complement or, in some cases, challenge the findings.

The Region

The site that Maam Cerno chose for the establishment of Darou Mousty is located about 30 kilometers east-southeast of M'Backé-Cayor and only 10 kilometers north of the border with Baol. Currently, the district of Darou Mousty is in the eastern section of the department of Kébémér and occupies 1,635 square kilometers. The district itself contains 318 villages and is divided into 6 classified rural communities, of which the community of Darou Mousty is the largest at 406 square kilometers. The population of the district in 2004 was around 74,000 and the rural community of Darou Mousty contained 27,000, constituting the largest town in the district.²

Today, the primary religion of the area is Islam, and there are four grand mosques. They are located in Darou Mousty, Darou Marnane, M'Backé-Cayor, and Fass-Touré. The first three mosques are Murid, and the mosque in Fass-Touré is Tijani. The Muslim population of the district in the mid-1980s was divided into the various Sufi orders of Senegal as displayed in table 4.1.

Relations between the Murids and the Tijanis in the area have long been very good. Fass-Touré, the only Tijani fief near Darou Mousty, was founded in

Table 4.1. Sufi affiliation in the district of Darou Mousty

Sufi Order	Percentage of Population (%)
Muridiyya	85
Tijaniyya	14
Qadiriyya and others	1

Source: Oumar Gueye, “Monographie de Darou Mousty,” report, 1986.

1894 by Sēriñ Cissé Touré, a disciple of Malik Sy. He also established a well-known Quranic school there that later became known as the Daroul Arkhan Ibnou Abil Arkam Islamic Institute. The relations between the sons of Sēriñ Cissé Touré and local Murid marabouts have always been excellent. In fact, many Murids from Darou Mousty have received their Quranic education at the Tijani school in Fass-Touré.³

The geography of the region is primarily a flat and featureless plain. The rain-dependent agriculture of the area is a mix of millet and peanuts. Millet, historically, has been the staple food of the regional diet, and even with the later importation of rice, it has remained the basic ingredient of the evening meal and is commonly mixed with yogurt as a drink. Peanut cultivation has been generally thought of as the primary agricultural pursuit of the Murid communities in this part of Senegal. The importance of the peanut as a cash crop is undoubted, yet, as we shall see, millet has always been the paramount attraction of Darou Mousty and the neighboring communities established by the Murids.

Although trees are now sporadically found dotting the fields, both historical studies and Murid sources mention the previous existence of forests in the region. The disappearance of many of these forests was due to the establishment of Murid settlements, such as Darou Mousty, and the continuing process of desiccation in the Sahel. Clearing the land of trees appears repeatedly in Murid accounts of the founding of villages and towns. The act of cutting down trees, except for the baobabs, may have had more than the practical value of creating open land to farm and build dwellings. Trees may also have represented old pre-Islamic religious traditions and practices that were centered on sacred groves. In this case, clearing the land also had the symbolic value of sweeping away the old to plant a newer Islamic society. In Darou Mousty’s case, however, two individual trees have been preserved and have entered the collective memory of the town due to their connections to Maam Cerno. A tree that he prayed under upon arriving in Darou Mousty, though now dead, still stands as well as a baobab under which he liked to sit.

The regional climate is Sudanic-Sahelian and is characterized by a very long dry season of about seven months and a short rainy season of about five months. The average rainfall for Darou Mousty can be seen below in table 4.2.



Figure 4.1. M'Backé-Kajoor, the Murid town from which Darou Mousty was settled. Photo by author, 1997.

Table 4.2. Average rainfall in Darou Mousty (in millimeters)

June	July	August	September	October	Total
55.2	39.6	150.4	124.5	14.0	369.7

Source: Oumar Gueye, "Monographie de Darou Mousty," report, 1986.

As a result of the dry climate, there are no permanent rivers or streams in the region that can be used for agriculture or pastoralism. The construction of wells is therefore paramount in importance. The water table in the region is normally between fifty and eighty meters below the surface, but during droughts, it frequently sinks even lower. Every town and village in the area needs to have access to a well, and the construction and maintenance of the well is a work and investment of significant labor.

Due to the reliance on wells and the labor involved in digging them, agricultural villages in the area are of a permanent nature, and the construction of the well is one of the first acts undertaken in the establishment of a new settlement. The digging and maintenance of the well and farming were the focal points for community labor, and in the past, local village chiefs typically organized

and controlled the labor of the community. Within the Murid communities, it was obviously still necessary to organize labor for community projects and farming. It has been generally thought that the Murid shaykh fulfilled the role of the traditional chief while his taalibe stepped into the shoes of the peasantry following the model established by Bu Kunta. On the surface, this view seems to be correct; however, upon further inspection, it does mask the multifaceted relationship between the Murid shaykh and the taalibe.

In 1911, the year that ground was cleared in preparation for the establishment of Darou Mousty, the Cercle of Tivaouane (Cayor) was divided into three colonial *circonscriptions* or provinces. The province of Sañoxor was under the administration of Meissa M'Baye Sall and was divided into six cantons. Diocounda Njaay was in charge of the province of M'Bakhol-M'Boul that was divided into two cantons. Meissa M'Baye's cousin, Macodou Sall was the chief of Guet province. His province, in which Darou Mousty was located, was divided into the following cantons as can be seen below in table 4.3 that also includes population figures for that year.

According to these figures, in 1911, we can surmise that the Wolof were the majority ethnic group in the province of Guet. Out of a population of 37,591,

Table 4.3. Guet province, 1911

Cantons	Chiefs	Population
<i>Wolof Cantons</i>		
Sagata	Laba Gueyé	2,917
N'Dagam	Madhy Gueyé	2,820
Mérina	Yougo Gueyé	1,412
N'Doyene	al N'Doye	2,507
Guet	Magaye Sall	5,611
N'Goll	Lat Kâ	1,852
Tchilmakha	—	3,393
N'Guéoul	Sangané Sall	5,374
Pehe	M'Bar M'Gane Fall	4,822
<i>Fulbe Cantons</i>		
Doumeya	Demba N'Gagne Bâ	650
M'Bére	M'Baye Nar Kâ	384
Fack	Samba Barra Lo	368
Larry N'Dialal	Malao Bâ	376
Larry Ferrédjé	Sagnébé Kâ	401
N'Dour-N'Ganado	Djibeyran Malic	2,029
Niassarnabes	Demba Tako So	2,197
<i>Other</i>		
Laobés		478
		37,591 Total

Source: ANS 11D1/1232, Correspondance: Listes des cantons de la province de Guet, 1908–11.

6,405 Fulbe were ascribed to the Fulbe cantons. The Fulbe were seminomadic cattle herders with pastures spread throughout the region. Although their numbers place them within a minority position, their overlapping land claims with Wolof peasants would be a source of friction and even violence as agriculturalists such as the Murids broke new ground for their fields and settlements in the twentieth century. The Sereer agriculturalists and Moor traders and marabouts were not counted in this census but would have been smaller minorities than the Fulbe.

The Establishment of the Town and Its First Years

In 1911, following the orders of Amadu Bamba, Maam Cerno and a group of his taalibe left M'Backé-Cayor to find the site on which Darou Mousty would be built and to clear the land. A copy of the letter in which Amadu Bamba instructed Maam Cerno to found a new town called Dar al-Mouhty has been preserved in the town's archives. The translation of the letter, composed in Arabic is, "In the name of Allah the merciful. . . . I request you to create a village, to baptize it Dar al-Mouhty, and to dig wells there. Peace be with you."⁴ In the Arabic original, the word *dar*, meaning "land" or "abode" was clearly used. The word *mouhty* in Arabic means "the giver" or "the supplier" and is also one of the ninety-nine names of God. One of my informants in Darou Mousty, Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry, added that Amadu Bamba had directed Maam Cerno to find a site in a forested area southeast of M'Backé-Cayor near the border of Cayor and Baol. Due to a later French cartographical error, Darou Mouhty became Darou Mousty and it is by the latter name that the town has been chiefly known. The name Darou Mousty appears on all of the French maps and is used by the inhabitants today.

Even though Amadu Bamba had given the orders for the creation of the town, Maam Cerno did have some freedom in determining its actual location. At least one oral source in Darou Mousty confirmed Maam Cerno's desire to found the new town not in Baol but in Cayor.⁵ This account reflects Maam Cerno's long-standing aversion, since at least 1903, to residing in Baol due to his previous troubles there. As mentioned earlier, his initial move from Darou Marnane-Baol was precipitated by numerous clashes with the local Fulbe. Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, one of Maam Cerno's sons, emphasized the clashes between the Murids and the Fulbe in his statements explaining his father's attitudes toward the location of Darou Mousty. He stated that when the colonial court heard the case between the herdsmen and the Murids and ruled in favor of the Fulbe, Maam Cerno promised to leave Baol and "he vowed never to return."⁶ Additional reasons for his desire to not live in Baol included corresponding trouble with the chief of eastern Baol, M'Bakhane Joob, and his poor treatment at the hands of the people of M'Backé-Baol

during Amadu Bamba's exile to Gabon. Another reason for the move from M'Backé-Cayor was the increasing shortage of cultivatable land in the area due to the growing number of disciples that were flocking to Maam Cerno.⁷ Amadu Bamba's decision to order Maam Cerno to found the new settlement of Darou Mousty was thus a logical move that would provide the land needed for the new taalibe and also take the pressure off M'Backé-Cayor. There is no indication in the Murid sources that the decision to found Darou Mousty and the determination of its location was ever conceived of as a hijra away from the orbit of French colonial control.

There are different accounts of the number of taalibe who participated in the establishment of Darou Mousty. O'Brien relied on Paul Pélissier's claim that 7 daara, or 150 taalibe, established the town after an initial scouting party of 12 had found the site.⁸ Cheikh Tidiane Sy reported that 100 Murid disciples founded the town.⁹ The oral informants in Darou Mousty listed a wide range of numbers that most likely reflects the presence of a small group during the initial phase of settlement and the arrival of more settlers throughout the first year of Darou Mousty's existence. For example, Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé said that there were 60 original taalibe. Baay Cerno Gaye noted that 210 Murids came to Darou Mousty in 1912, and Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry cited a number of 350.¹⁰ Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla did not give an exact number for the original taalibe but did say that when Maam Cerno left M'Backé-Barry in 1895 or 1896, he was accompanied by 220 of his own disciples.¹¹

The party that set out on foot from M'Backé-Cayor and headed to the southeast in 1911 to find the site for Darou Mousty was most likely made up of the sixty settlers cited by Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé. It is difficult to believe that Maam Cerno would have set out with only a dozen taalibe in light of past and continuing clashes between Murids and Fulbe herdsmen. Further evidence for a medium-sized initial party of disciples may lie in the relatively small number of names of the original taalibe that have been preserved. Of the various informants who were asked about the identity of the original taalibe, the same group of about fifteen names were most frequently referred to in the interviews. As evident below, only twenty-six names of the original settlers have survived in the scanty written documentation, including Moussa Kâ's poem, and in the memories of the oral informants of Darou Mousty and its neighboring villages that were consulted for this study. The survival of the following names and the histories behind the names were not simply due to the rank (e.g., shaykh) of the person. Some of the original taalibe listed below in table 4.4 never achieved a high rank, yet as we shall see, their presence at the founding of Darou Mousty served to single them out from the hundreds and later thousands of people who eventually came to live in Darou Mousty.

Various oral accounts were given for the process by which the location for Darou Mousty was found. In his account of the search for Darou Mousty, Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé told the following story that emphasizes his father's desire to found the settlement in an uninhabited region. After the

Table 4.4. The original Taalibe of Darou Mousty

Mactar Samba Joob*	Mor Joob M'Backé*	Pathé Sall*
Aliou Niang*	Sirré Joob	Mor Kharry Sylla
M'Baye Ká	Modu Kharry Gaye*	Aliou Njaay*
Ibra Fall Delbé*	Galaye Balla Fall	Oumar Joob*
Sēriñ Sakho	Mayacine Joob*	Ablaye Faye
Mawade Wade*	Modu Mactar Joob*	Modu Joob Temour
Balla Gaye*	Baay Mor	Malik Cissé*
Galaye Njaay*	Mor Joob Syl*	Balla Fall*
Mor Diamou M'Backé	Mactar Faye	

*Interviewed for this study, or descendant interviewed.

Sources: Interviews with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997; and Baay Cerno Joob, January 22, 1997; and Oumar Gueye, "Monographie de Darou Mousty," report, 1986.

group of Murid pioneers left M'Backé-Cayor, they traveled southeast past the future site of Darou Marnane-Cayor and the Tijani town of Fass-Touré. Nearing the area that Amadu Bamba had indicated, the party entered what was described as a forest and met an old man named Socé Njaay. This old man informed Maam Cerno that he was one hundred years old and that his father had lived a hundred years. He was thus considered to have a great knowledge of the forest. Maam Cerno asked him if there was any place in the forest where no one had ever lived, and Socé Ndiaye directed him to a place known as Ndiack. It was at this site that Maam Cerno directed the taalibe to begin to cut down trees and to clear the ground. This account, in light of later conflicts with the Fulbe over land, seeks to prove that the Murids were not taking pastureland away from the Fulbe.¹²

Another oral account from Darou Mousty stated that Maam Cerno received the letter from Amadu Bamba instructing him to establish a new town. The letter did not contain the location of the new town, yet it did tell Maam Cerno that he would find the site at 11:00 in the morning. Maam Cerno mounted his horse and left M'Backé-Cayor after the morning prayer and rode until 11 A.M. when he dismounted and determined the site for the town.¹³ In the letter ordering the founding of Darou Mousty, there was no mention of a fixed hour for the determination of the location of Darou Mousty, and one must suppose that this account is an example of the popularization of this episode of the history of Darou Mousty and an attempt to inject a mystical origin to the site of the town.

Baay Abdou Joob Samba elaborated on the search for the site of Darou Mousty by relating his father's role in the process. Sēriñ Mactar Samba Joob was the chief *jawriñ*, or lieutenant, of Maam Cerno and accompanied the search party. According to this account, once Maam Cerno and his disciples had found the site for Darou Mousty, they stopped and rested underneath the

tree that is now located across from the police station. They soon found out that there were some Fulbe herdsmen not far away, and Maam Cerno dispatched Sëriñ Mactar Samba Joob to investigate. At this point in the story, Baay Abdou Joob Samba stated that the Fulbe of that time did not want to cooperate with the other ethnic groups like the Wolof and Sereer. He also referred to his father's search for the herdsmen as an "execution of the *ndigal* [religious order] of his marabout." Sëriñ Mactar Samba Joob found the Fulbe, and after a series of unsuccessful negotiations, he reported back to Maam Cerno that the Fulbe refused to share the forest with others. Maam Cerno then reassured the taalibe that "the new village is ours and only our directives will be executed."¹⁴ The initial process of clearing the land took some time, and Maam Cerno, with new groups of pioneer taalibe, made periodic trips from M'Backé-Cayor to the site to observe the progress.¹⁵

The lack of a suitable water supply at the site was one of the most pressing problems encountered by the pioneers, and the accounts of thirst, hauling water over great distances, and digging wells have persisted in the historical memory of the participants and their descendants.¹⁶ Before the first well was successfully excavated, water had to be carried to the site by the taalibe themselves. Baay Mor, one of the two surviving original taalibe of Darou Mousty, remembered that prior to the completion of the first well, each taalibe was allowed only a half liter of water each day. He was one of the disciples whose job it was to transport the water to the emerging settlement. "I made the trip from Darou Mousty to M'Backé-Cayor with Sëriñ Mawade and thirty donkey carts to draw the water and take it to Darou Mousty."¹⁷ Baay Cerno Gaye's father, Sëriñ Balla Gaye Barakane, was among the first group of Murid disciples to arrive at the site. His father had told him that in the early days of clearing the land, the taalibe had traveled back to M'Backé-Cayor in pairs to eat and draw water "because at the beginning of the creation of Darou Mousty, there was a very great problem concerning water."¹⁸ The taalibe did try to dig a well at the site, but as remembered by Baay Dame Sall, their initial efforts were unsuccessful. Maam Cerno had placed his father, Sëriñ Pathé Sall, in charge of digging the first well, but it did not strike water. A second attempt was made, and at a depth of eighty-four meters, the second well reached the water table. This well was named Aïnou Rahmaty and served as one of the primary sources of water until the French built a large *forage*, or mechanized pumping station, in 1949.¹⁹

In addition to clearing the trees and hauling water to the site, the founders of Darou Mousty also had to defend themselves against the Fulbe. Before the process of Murid settlement had begun in this region of Cayor, it was populated partially by seminomadic pastoral Fulbe with the exception of the area around Ndoyenne. As of the mid-1980s, the only remaining Fulbe villages were Thiabouguel, Ndanke, Ndangou, Ndougou, and Goudy-Pey. During the pre-colonial era, the Fulbe of this area were under the authority of the Ardoladour, a jawriñ of the *buur ba Jolof*, or the king of Jolof.²⁰ Most of the Fulbe, due to

their pastoral lifestyle, did not create large permanent towns and their pastures were wide ranging. Their occupation also put them into a classic conflict with the growing number of agriculturalists moving into the region.

Although the choice of the site for Darou Mousty was supposedly made with the understanding that it had never been occupied previously, the simple fact that no one lived there did not mean that it was not claimed as pasture by the local Fulbe, which was the most likely source for the resulting range battles between the Murids and the herders. Maam Cerno was not unaccustomed to violent confrontations with the pastoralists, and in the fields around Darou Mousty, he is remembered to have frequently carried pistols in his pockets in case of a raid.²¹ A series of range battles between the Murids of Darou Mousty and the neighboring Fulbe began soon after the land was cleared for the settlement and intensified as agricultural fields were later cleared. There were casualties on both sides as a result of the clashes, and Maam Cerno eventually sought out the aid of the French commandant at Tivaouane who supplied him with some guns to defend the town and its fields. Armed taalibe continued to have battles with the Fulbe as late as the 1920s. In 1921, for example, there was a range battle at Darou Diop.²²

As well as tending to the material requirements of the establishment of the town and fighting off the Fulbe, the taalibe also tended to the construction of the religious foundation of Darou Mousty. After enough land had been cleared, the taalibe began to build a mosque and a house with seven rooms for Maam Cerno. According to Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, the construction of the mosque and the preparation of educational facilities was Maam Cerno's first occupation.²³ As his house was nearing completion, Maam Cerno formally moved from M'Backé-Cayor to Darou Mousty on March 12, 1912.²⁴ He passed his first day in Darou Mousty in prayer under the tree known as *yir*. This tree, although it is now dead, still stands along the road north to Sagatta in the central part of Darou Mousty, and has been preserved due to its historical importance. The evening of that first day, Maam Cerno retired to the nearby village of Thincoly where he remained until March 14, when his house was completed in Darou Mousty. This first house no longer exists and today, in its place, stands the police station.

Murid women began to settle and work in the new settlement when Maam Cerno moved into his house in Darou Mousty.²⁵ Although sources for the role of women in the establishment and development of Darou Mousty are limited for the male researcher, it is apparent that their labor was integral to the success of the town. When asked what place women had in the founding of the town, male informants replied that the women occupied themselves with women's work that centered on the household.²⁶ For male informants, the limited reply to this question was of a matter of fact nature, and I elicited similar responses when I posed questions regarding the work of blacksmiths and leatherworkers, for example. For my informants, women (like the blacksmiths and leatherworkers) fulfilled their prescribed functions within Wolof society

in the Murid town. I did, however, get a glimpse into female perceptions of the place of women in Darou Mousty's history when I was able to pose a question to a Murid matron through her son. Her reply was that women worked just as hard as men did in the development of Darou Mousty, and she also believed that the women were good and faithful followers of Maam Cerno and did their part for Amadu Bamba and his mission.²⁷

The preservation of oral history concerning the initial founding of Darou Mousty has served different functions. On one level, the memory of Maam Cerno's leadership in a pioneer settlement further defines his career in the eyes of his followers. The two most popular achievements of Maam Cerno, as presented by Murid sources, were his guardianship of the Murids during Amadu Bamba's exiles and the founding of Darou Mousty. The personal hardships that he underwent during the process are viewed as further testimony to his loyalty to Amadu Bamba and the Murid mission. Although his work in the establishment of Darou Mousty magnified his image within the order, the informants in Darou Mousty emphatically stressed that all of Maam Cerno's labors were on behalf of Amadu Bamba. Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, for example, noted, "He [Maam Cerno] established Darou Mousty under the order of his brother and spiritual guide, Sëriñ Touba [Amadu Bamba]."²⁸ Baay Abdou Joob Samba added that, "Maam Cerno did nothing without the order and permission of his brother, Sëriñ Touba."²⁹

In a similar vein, Maam Cerno is remembered to have placed great emphasis on the religious mission that was at the heart of the founding of Darou Mousty and explained the work that he and the taalibe had undertaken in religious terms. According to Baay Kabou Gaye, from time to time, Maam Cerno would call the taalibe together and talk to them about their aid in the construction of the settlement. During these talks, Maam Cerno told them that their work was of a divine nature because Amadu Bamba had given the order (*ndigal*) for the establishment of Darou Mousty.³⁰

On another level, the founding of the town has elevated the original taalibe of Darou Mousty to an exalted position as heroes. Like Maam Cerno, their histories have been passed down not only to preserve their memory but to also serve as a model for their descendents and other Murids to follow in the present, in effect contributing to the Murid moral order and the building of a Murid social imaginary now augmented with the personalities of common disciples. In the case of the two surviving original taalibe, Baay Mor and Sëriñ Malik Cissé, they are revered and respected today due to their role in the history of Darou Mousty. Furthermore, they are perfectly aware of their status and share a bond that was forged among the original settlers of the town. Baay Mor remarked that, "We [the original taalibe] were very numerous, now there remains only two, Sëriñ Malik Cissé and myself."³¹ Sëriñ Malik Cissé, in the course of his interview, referred to the other original taalibe as his "brother taalibe" and expressed his belief that after his own death he would be reunited with Maam Cerno and the original taalibe.³²

Many of the informants stressed the harsh conditions that the original settlers of Darou Mousty faced and then noted how their fathers and the other taalibe were brave, or courageous, and exemplary Murid taalibe. In his account of his father's role in clearing the land for the town, Baay Cerno Joob noted that the original settlers had to sleep outside during their first nights at Darou Mousty without any protection until they built themselves shelter. He added that his father had joined Maam Cerno to "behave like a true taalibe."³³ Baay Abdou Joob Samba agreed that the first settlers had nowhere to sleep during the first nights and that the conditions were very difficult due to the lack of food and water. He said that his father, Sëriñ Mactar Samba Joob, was among the bravest of the original taalibe.³⁴ Baay Cerno Gaye explained that the original settlers were able to harvest tons of millet because "they were courageous," and he noted that the taalibe of that time were "very correct with an exemplary behavior and they always made their ablutions before entering the mosque to pray."³⁵ Baay Abdou Mawade Wade began his interview by stating, "My father was Sëriñ Mawade, a taalibe of Maam Cerno Birahim, and he worked in the fields and was very brave and courageous."³⁶ Sëriñ Malik Cissé summarized the early days of Darou Mousty by saying, "During the creation of Darou Mousty, there were a lot of problems, but finally with the support of God and the courage of Maam Cerno Birahim and his taalibe they succeeded in very difficult conditions."³⁷ One of the descendents of an original taalibe spoke of his father in very gracious terms. Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall began his interview about his father Sëriñ Galaye Balla Fall by thanking God and the Prophet Muhammad and then said, "I thank very sincerely my father named Balla Fall because it is thanks to him that we have obtained that which we have from Sëriñ Touba, the hope of the two worlds, heaven and earth."³⁸

While Maam Cerno and the first settlers were hard at work building the town, clearing and planting their fields, and fighting off Fulbe raids during that first year (1912), the French archival sources describe a cercle largely at peace. In February, the administrator of Cayor was most concerned about the movement of Amadu Bamba and his extensive library from Thiéène (Cheyene) to Diourbel. There was no specific mention made of the founding of Darou Mousty or the activities of Maam Cerno. As for Cayor, the administrator noted that "a most complete calm" continued to reign in the region. The rains appear to have cooperated with the Murids during their first year at Darou Mousty. In August, the agricultural bulletin posted for the cercle noted the good rains and anticipated a fine harvest with peanuts of excellent quality. The report for September made similar claims, and in December, the harvests of peanuts and millet were described as abundant and of good quality.³⁹

The agricultural situation for the following year was mixed. In September 1913, the agricultural bulletin recorded a good start to the millet harvest, particularly in Guet and Sañoxor, however, by December, the situation had deteriorated and a generally bad harvest was recorded.⁴⁰ Earlier that year, March 4–11, 1913, the adjunct administrator, Sabatre, had made a tour of the

provinces of Guet, in which Darou Mousty was located, and M'Boul M'Bakol. In part, he was investigating a brawl in an area that the Fulbe used for calving. The fight was apparently between the herders and people of the neighboring villages. In this context, Sabatre noted that such incidents are almost constant in the region due to the ever-increasing numbers of Murids in the area. He also indicated that the Murids were very active in their recruitment of the local population without regard to age or sex. Echoing the standard administrative view of the exploitation of the Murid disciples by their shaykh, Sabatre stated that the goal of the marabouts of Amadu Bamba was to collect for "his profit" (i.e., Amadu Bamba's) half of the harvest of each disciple.

In a more serious tone, the French official also mentioned that a Murid had murdered the chief of the village of Romenus earlier in the month and attributed this event to the growing influence that the Murids enjoyed in the region. Furthermore, it was stated that this murder demonstrated the need to proceed without delay in instituting all measures of surveillance possible in the area. The chief of Guet, Macodou Sall, was ordered to apply the prescriptions of the decree of May 25, 1912, that would allow him to use force in an effort to clamp down on what was judged by the French as the disruptive effects of the Murids.⁴¹ Again, throughout this report there was no reference to Darou Mousty or Maam Cerno. Although it is obvious that the administration knew that the Murids were active and increasing in numbers in Guet, the failure of the French to find the source of Murid activity (Maam Cerno and Darou Mousty) did justify Sabatre's call for greater surveillance of the region. Sabatre's views of the Murids are also very illustrative of the official French attitude toward the order that would persist until the end of World War I in which the order was seen as a competitor and a potential threat to the expansion of French control.

Relations with the Local Colonial Chiefs and the Administration

Although the French themselves initially viewed the expansion of the Murid order with a mixture of suspicion and hostility, Maam Cerno's arrival in Cayor and his subsequent career in the cercle was a catalyst in the transformation of the relations between Wolof religious and political notables in Cayor, or in a more simplified categorization, the *sëriñ* and the *ceddo*. Under Maam Cerno, a new alliance was forged between the *tariqa* and the local colonial chiefs. In the case of this study, the relationship between Maam Cerno and Macodou Sall, the chief of Guet Province, takes center stage. Later, after World War I, this relationship would expand to include Macodou Sall's younger brother, Massamba Sall, who was made chief of the new canton of Darou Mousty. Placed within a historical context, the alliance between a *sëriñ*, and a Murid

at that, and a representative of *ceddo* power was important and signaled the beginning of a shift within local Wolof politics away from antagonism and toward cooperation between the two camps. The shift in local politics also was reflective of a similar change going on at the colony-wide level.

The earliest signs of Maam Cerno's desire to establish good relations with the Sall family came in 1903 when he originally requested permission from the French to move from Baol to Cayor and was subsequently given a tour of some land by Meissa M'Baye Sall who was the ranking chief in Cayor. A favorable relationship with the Sall family was an absolute necessity if Maam Cerno was to have a successful relocation to Cayor. Additional reasoning for the need for friends within the administration can be found in the animosity that had existed between Maam Cerno and the chief of eastern Baol, M'Bakhane Diop, and the difficulties that had resulted for Maam Cerno.

Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé explained the beginning of good relations between Maam Cerno and Macodou Sall by stating, "Sëriñ Touba [Amadu Bamba] told Macodou Sall that whatever you do for the profit of my younger brother, Maam Cerno Birahim, I will do the same for you." He then added that Macodou Sall happily went about weaving good relations with Maam Cerno and even visited him to ask his advice before doing certain things. The resulting friendship and mutual respect between the two leaders was demonstrated when Macodou Sall later named one of his sons after Maam Cerno. Contact between the two men was regular, and Maam Cerno frequently sent messengers to Macodou Sall with his advice or recommendations concerning a variety of issues. When the site for Darou Mousty had been found, Maam Cerno had sent Sëriñ Pathé Sall and Sëriñ Mor Job M'Backé to Macodou Sall to involve the chief in the delineation of the town. Later, two of the original *taalibe* and *jawriñ*, or lieutenants, of Maam Cerno, Sëriñ Mactar Samba Job and Sëriñ Mor Job M'Backé, would serve as Maam Cerno's regular envoys to Macodou Sall and the colonial administration.⁴²

As early as September 1917, the French were aware of the relationship being carved out between Maam Cerno and Macodou Sall. In a report sent to the Political Bureau, the administrator of Tivaouane stated that each year Shaykh Ibra Faty [Maam Cerno] gave gifts to Macodou Sall and his cousin Meissa M'Baye Sall. In another report, the administrator of the *cercle* complained to the governor of Senegal that Macodou Sall, in spite of his orders, only very rarely visited the region of Darou Mousty, and that it had been four or five months since his last visit.⁴³ The French were obviously worried about the lack of surveillance undertaken by Macodou Sall of Maam Cerno and the activities of the town. It could be interpreted that Macodou Sall's infrequent tours to Darou Mousty were a result of the good relationship that existed between the chief and the marabout and his lack of attention, a gift in itself, was a sign of their friendship and cooperation. Furthermore, Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla noted that Maam Cerno was older than Macodou Sall and Meissa M'Baye and was, therefore, something of a fatherly figure in the relationship,

and that the relations between Darou Mousty and the local chiefs improved even more during the reign of Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla M'Backé who was named as the khalifah of Darou Mousty after Mame Cerno's death in 1943.⁴⁴

World War I

The period from 1914 to 1918 was a crucial time for Darou Mousty and its inhabitants due to harsh economic conditions and growing French administrative intervention. The experience of these four years has left an indelible mark on the history of the town. The war years were the next big challenge faced by the new Murid community after the initial struggles to establish the town. Famines, droughts, and the French demands made on the resources of the colony combined to make World War I a very difficult time for the inhabitants of Cayor. For the most part, however, the war was an era of continued growth for Darou Mousty. In spite of the bad conditions during this time, the Murid community enjoyed a great deal of agricultural success that attracted many immigrants who were fleeing droughts and the French. World War I was also the period in which Darou Mousty began to be more intensely integrated into the French colonial administration and Maam Cerno subsequently began to construct a new relationship with the French. It was during the war that the two streams of modernization in the forms of Islamic reform and Sufism and French colonization truly began to merge after first clashing during and after Amadu Bamba's arrest in 1895. This new relationship on Maam Cerno's part was not so much as the adjunct of his older brother, Amadu Bamba, but as a grand marabout with his own fief and followers centered in Darou Mousty.

Prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe, the adjunct administrator of Cayor, Carrera, recorded in January 1914 that the political situation in the region was excellent and that the attitudes of the chiefs were always correct and that each was devoted to the French cause. Additionally, he noted the good spirit of the general population. The agricultural situation, however, was not so good. The millet harvest was very poor due to low rainfall during the previous rainy season and there was concern that the price of millet would rise as a result and remain high until the next harvest. The possibility of disease was also raised as a result of the poor harvest. The rare pastures of the cercle were in bad condition, and it was expected that many cattle, sheep, and horses would die during the coming year as a result of the lack of pasturage.⁴⁵

One of the greatest effects of the failed harvests was the emigration of peasants from the central and northern regions of Cayor in the general direction of Baol (and Darou Mousty). By March 1914, the French had noted this development and reported that in some villages in the cercle, entire quarters had left, most traveling toward the southeast. The first canton that was affected by the emigrations was Baouar in Sañoxor in western Cayor, but soon people

from all over Cayor began to move as well with the numbers increasing as time passed. It was believed by the authorities that many of the émigrés would eventually return to their villages at the end of the dry season and that most were simply leaving to find temporary work in towns such as Thiès and Kayes. However, the French also realized that many were leaving for good due to the attraction of the new Murid settlements in Baol and the border areas. In the words of the chief administrator, Graffe, “One family leaves first, then a second family follows, finally all of the quarter and then the entire village go and fix themselves definitively in the countryside newly opened by the railroad to exploitation.”⁴⁶ Murid shaykh were implicated as playing a central role in the emigration.

. . . the marabouts are without a doubt school teachers, but they are equally and especially great agriculturalists, and their disciples are more often in the fields than in class. Blessed by this easy and docile manual labor, they have some fields that are very well cultivated. . . . These disciples are recruited by their [the marabouts’] talibé who they send everywhere in the goal of catching some [new disciples] to serve in the agricultural labors. The process of proselytization employed is well known: the talibé, after having chosen his subject, the healthiest and most vigorous among the young men, gives him some gifts and promises other [gifts] more numerous and more important from his marabout who, moreover, will assure him a life exempt of all cares on this earth and a future life full of delicacies without prayers to say . . . on condition that he will surrender his family and recognize him [the Murid marabout] as sole master of his goods and of his person and his life, nine times out of ten the talibé succeeds in his mission and the sect finds itself having obtained some adepts while the marabout augments the number of his *élèves-colons* [student-colonists].⁴⁷

The French saw their local provincial and canton chiefs playing a neutral position in regard to the emigrations. The chiefs were unable to stop the people from moving and were reluctant to take up the issue with the Murid shaykh who were receiving the immigrants. Graffe noted regarding this issue that, “In general, the chiefs of the provinces and cantons are not partisans of the exoduses.” However, the administrator then stated that the chiefs do not voice their complaints toward the Murid marabouts and their taalibe, even though the emigrants are escaping the authority of the chiefs to go and work “as mercenaries in order to enrich those [the Murid marabouts] to whom they have given themselves and to permit them [the marabouts] to live in idleness, satisfying all vices and caprices of all sorts.”⁴⁸

According to Graffe, the chiefs were, in effect, powerless to stop adult emigrants from leaving their homes for Murid communities; however, he did suggest that the administration intervene in the case of minors, even in cases where the parents of a child had confided the youth to a marabout for religious instruction. In his view, whenever knowledge of such cases involving minors and marabouts came to the ears of the administration, the issue

should be vigorously pursued and the offending marabout severely punished. Also, Graffe wanted instructions to be issued informing the people who are the “victims” that they can rely on French authority to help them against “*les menées des marabouts mourides*.”⁴⁹

Regardless of whether or not the administrator was truly concerned about the children of Cayor, his plan to indict marabouts who had children in their charge as *taalibe* was a direct threat to the future of the order itself. Without new disciples the expansion of the order would be greatly impacted. This report also pointed to a growing French sense of consternation in which they saw the emigrations as a blow to the authority of the provincial and canton chiefs and by extension, to the French administration itself and its attempts at modernization. Although such concerns can be seen as very practical to the French colonial point of view, the reality of the emigrations and the experiences of the people involved were primarily contrary to early French perceptions. Paradoxically, one needs only to examine later French colonial documents in the form of monthly reports and such to gain insight into the true nature of the immigrations to Murid settlements.

In August 1914, the war in Europe began and the French began to mobilize the colony for the war effort.⁵⁰ Graffe was pleased that the people had responded more or less quickly to the call for mobilization. However, many Murid disciples had fled their homes in Cayor for more distant Murid settlements where they had sought refuge with the marabouts and had not yet been found. In Graffe’s opinion, these disciples recognized only the authority of their Murid shaykh, but he had been unable to gain any direct evidence that would condemn the marabouts for acting against the French. The colonial administration would continue a strict yet discrete surveillance of the marabouts to ensure that they were not engaging in treason by harboring deserters.⁵¹

At this time, the administration saw its subjects in Senegal from two different viewpoints. First, the colony was a valuable support for the Allies in terms of materials and soldiers, and second, especially at the beginning of the war, the majority of the colony’s subjects constituted a potential Islamic threat to that support.⁵² The French analyzed Muslim attitudes toward the war according to the different Sufi orders in Senegal. For example, the conduct of the marabouts of the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya was described as meritorious, especially that of Al-hajj Malik Sy of Tivaouane. Apparently, the Tijani leader followed the news of the war in France quite closely and said special prayers in the mosque for the success of the French army.⁵³ As alluded to above, the French were very suspicious of the Murid marabouts and complained of their lack of support even though they could not prove that the marabouts were organizing resistance to the French war effort.

The fact that the French were fighting against the Ottoman sultan was also seen as a potential problem.⁵⁴ The French were very concerned about the public opinion of the war among its Muslim subjects in Senegal and especially

the views of the marabouts regarding a war that was being fought against an Islamic state. By various means, the administration tried to fashion support for the Allies and demonize the Ottomans in the eyes of their Muslim subjects in Senegal and the rest of West Africa. One method used in an attempt to gain popular support was the production of colorful posters depicting the soldiers of the Allied powers marching together. In further attempts to shape public opinion of the war, the administration engaged in censorship and the control of letters, newspapers, and other printed material entering Senegal. During the war, the French intercepted certain Pan-Islamic journals printed in Egypt that were addressed to Amadu Bamba and Shaykh Anta M'Backé.⁵⁵

French fears of an Ottoman-inspired Islamic revolt among its subjects in Senegal soon dissipated as the war continued and as the Murids eventually began to cooperate with recruitment drives for soldiers.⁵⁶ For the military recruitment of Murids, the intercession and approval of Murid marabouts was necessary to the success of the program. As early as September 1914, the French were given evidence of the role that the religious leaders could play. The chief of the province of Sañoxor in Cayor, Meissa M'Baye Sall had been ordered to deliver forty recruits for the *Tirailleurs sénégalais*, or the Senegalese Riflemen (the French colonial army from Africa), but had encountered some problems getting permission from their families. He met with the heads of the families in an effort to convince them to part with the young men. The breakthrough only came when the marabouts of the families, who were Murid, advised them to let the recruitment proceed.⁵⁷

In November 1914, a cavalry squadron commanded by Captain Beugnot set out to make a tour of part of the cercle of Cayor to help galvanize support for the war effort and raise recruits.⁵⁸ On November 25, the party crossed the frontier into the province of Guet at a village named Keur Amadou Yalla and were met there by the assistant administrator, Savoureux, and the chief of the province, Macodou Sall. The party continued on and was met at the village of M'Barga, near Darou Mousty, by "a group of M'Backés." In a report of the tour, it was noted that the "group of M'Backés," led by the "marabout-farmer Ibra Fati [Maam Cerno]" gave a good reception to the squadron. However, the author of the report also speculated that the good reception was made more for political reasons than sincerity.⁵⁹

By February 1915, there were more signs appearing of approaching problems for the people of Cayor. They were struggling to pay off their debts to merchants incurred during the previous year and pay their taxes at the same time. Many were unable to pay their taxes and the French officials were simultaneously worried about the possibility of another famine later that year. In March, after a ten-day tour, the administrator noted that he had discovered a few regions within the cercle that did not have a harvest and only a small number of people who were suffering. He authorized an advance of millet for five months subsistence for these areas, and regarding the collection of taxes, he concluded that the majority of taxes due could still be collected in spite of

the unfavorable circumstances, because most people had kept a reserve of peanuts. For the remainder of 1915, the chiefs worked on the taxes for the next year and continued to recruit soldiers.⁶⁰

In July 1916, the colonial administration of Cayor, for propaganda purposes, was instructed by the lieutenant governor, Antonetti, to inform the people of the victory of the Arabs in taking the holy city of Mecca. Quinquaud, one of the French administrators in the cercle noted that this news was greeted in the best fashion by the Muslim public at large and by notable marabouts such as Al-hajj Malik Sy, Maam Cerno, Shaykh Bakkai Kounta, and others. In his report, the obvious use of propaganda on the part of the French is apparent. For example, the Ottomans were presented as the oppressors of the holy city, and France and its allies were also credited with the liberation of the city. Quinquaud also made it known that as a result of this Allied victory, the undertaking of the hajj would again be possible by the Muslims of Cayor.⁶¹ Such propaganda is another example of how the French were increasingly portraying themselves as a “Muslim power” in order to gain local support.⁶²

The final year of World War I was very difficult not only for Darou Mousty but for the entire cercle as well. Warnings of an impending drought appeared in the middle of the year. By the end of June, no rain had yet been reported in the region. Moreover, a famine was already in progress throughout most of the cercle and requests for grain were being submitted from all of the provinces of Cayor. The colonial administration of Cayor had made an appeal for aid to the *Société de Prévoyance*, but an error had occurred in the transmission of the telegram. Rather than the original order for two hundred tons of millet, the *Société de Prévoyance* received a request for only two tons that were duly sent. The adjunct administrator, Quinquaud, was fearful that the continuing famine, drought, and disease would harm the political state of the region. In particular, he noted that for years, many peasants, due to the lack of food, had been migrating to more hospitable areas, especially those areas under the control of Murid marabouts. In this context, Darou Mousty was specifically mentioned as one of the major destinations for the emigrants who were searching for better lands during this difficult period.⁶³

This famine that has reigned in the cercle for many years has had a repercussion on the political state of the region; the people are abandoning their villages and are going to more privileged regions particularly around Murid marabouts settled in fertile lands such as Dar Mousti (southeast of Guet), Diourbel, the Residence of Toul, etc. . . . that possess, thanks to the work of their numerous adepts, important reserves of millet. The authority of the canton and provincial chiefs diminishes each day and they become absolutely helpless to halt this movement of emigration that has on the other hand noticeably increased the influence of Amadu Bamba and his lieutenants.⁶⁴

The diminution of the authority of the chiefs and the corresponding rise in the stature of Murid marabouts such as Maam Cerno in the eyes of the

people was seen by some French officials as part of a sinister plot. Yet, in this case, we have a French colonial official, no less than the adjunct administrator of the cercle, who attributed the process to the simple fact that the colonial administration, including the chiefs, could not feed the people in times of famine. He also clearly pointed out that the only organization that was prepared to serve the needs of the peasants of Cayor at that time was the Muridiyya. It was not political intrigue that led to the decline of the chiefs and the rise of the marabouts but rather hunger and the desire for security that only marabouts such as Maam Cerno were able to satiate. In this context, Maam Cerno was perceived by the French as a competitor with the local chiefs for the allegiance of the people, and Darou Mousty was seen as a dangerous alternative to colonial rule. According to Quinquaud, the only way to combat this development was for the colonial administration to advance to the people all of the millet that they needed and to dig more wells.⁶⁵

The following month was no better than June. Commerce during July was “insignificant.” This may in part have been because many European merchants were leaving for France to avoid the *hivernage*, or rainy season. Millet, the staple of the region’s diet, was also very rare and expensive at this time. Additionally, merchandise imported from Europe and America was becoming more expensive each day, and life was becoming increasingly difficult for the people. Once again, Quinquaud’s monthly report reiterated the effects of the famine.

The chief of the province of Guet has signaled me for quite some time that a very great number of people from neighboring cercles and from certain parts of Cayor have come to the region of Dar-Mousti with the intention of settling around the marabout Ibra Fati M’Backé [Maam Cerno], brother and eventual successor of Serigne Amadou Bamba of Diourbel. This movement is due to two causes: the famine and the attraction exercised on the people by the chief of the Mourides [Maam Cerno] in the cercle of Tivaouane [Cayor].⁶⁶

Quinquaud noted that Darou Mousty was blessed with good fertile land and a considerable workforce composed of Maam Cerno and his taalibe who, as the administrator stated, were excellent farmers. In July 1918, the administrator noted that the granaries of Maam Cerno and his lieutenants were always full and had enough millet to supply all of the inhabitants of the region and the emigrants, “who chased from their villages by the lack of grain or attracted by the reputation of the brother of Amadu Bamba come to construct their homes in the neighborhood of Dar Mousti.”⁶⁷ Notably, Quinquaud’s report also mentioned that in addition to the material causes for the immigration to Darou Mousty, there was a definite religious attraction in the form of the person of Maam Cerno. As Amadu Bamba’s younger brother, Maam Cerno was still a source for the *baraka*, or blessing, that flowed from the founder of the Murid order. It is doubtless that many of the immigrants during this period were in part motivated by a desire to share in this power. If evidence was needed for

the baraka that existed in Darou Mousty, one only needed to look at the full granaries of the town that were feeding a region in the midst of a serious famine. Yet, taalibe were also drawn to the town due to the scholarly reputation of Maam Cerno and the schools that he had established. Of course, the process of studying under Maam Cerno was also a means of attaining baraka.

In reference to the developing importance of Darou Mousty, the French noted in 1918 that Maam Cerno's influence had become greater and the number of his followers had increased considerably over the years. In addition to hunger, the worldwide influenza pandemic was also driving people to Darou Mousty, which had not yet been affected by the sickness. However, as alluded to above, the good fortunes of Darou Mousty were not seen by the French as a positive development in the region. Rather than seeing the town as a boon to the people, most of whom were suffering from famine and influenza, Darou Mousty was considered part of the problem that was depopulating certain regions of the cercle. In the adjunct administrator of Cayor's view, steps had to be taken to stop the emigration that he believed was benefiting a Murid center and the prestige of its shaykh to the detriment of the colonial administration.⁶⁸ Darou Mousty was accordingly seen as a threat to the structures of colonial authority as the administration began to fear that the region would become a refuge for those escaping justice and military conscription. The French did realize, however, that the ultimate direction of Darou Mousty was not in Cayor but in Baol with Amadu Bamba, and that if the administration wanted results concerning the problem of Darou Mousty, they would have to address Amadu Bamba.

In the meantime, in an effort to directly combat the growing influence of Maam Cerno in Cayor, in July 1918, the administrator of the cercle prohibited people from moving to Darou Mousty without authorization. Macodou Sall, the chief of Guet, was instructed to set up a net of surveillance, in effect a cordon, around Darou Mousty to prevent immigrants from arriving in the town. It was also suggested by the colonial administration of Cayor that similar measures to prevent emigration to Darou Mousty be instituted in the neighboring cercle of Baol.⁶⁹ The effectiveness of the administration's plan to stop emigration to Darou Mousty was very doubtful. For example, the French did not have the complete support of the provincial chief of Guet. By October, Macodou Sall had still not visited the region of Darou Mousty and his last tour of the region had been in May. Also in October, the influenza pandemic arrived in Guet. One informant in Darou Mousty reported that the Murids of Darou Mousty burned the town in an effort to eradicate what they perceived as a plague.⁷⁰ For his failure to enforce the surveillance and to report the initial deaths due to the epidemic, the administrator wanted to reprimand and dismiss Macodou Sall. In Quinquaud's discussion of the failure of the cordon around Darou Mousty, the political and religious implications of the growing strength of Maam Cerno and Darou Mousty were cited, and the expanding influenza epidemic was treated as being of secondary importance.⁷¹

Quinquaud visited Macodou Sall in October in relation to the surveillance, and both of them made a tour of Darou Mousty. Quinquaud was struck by the agricultural richness of the town and the surrounding area. He noted that peanuts were being grown but he was especially impressed by the millet fields and recorded that, "One senses that the Mourites [Murids] have been taken seriously (by the hand) by their grand marabout [Maam Cerno] who obliges them to work and to cultivate immense stretches of land that six years ago were uncultivated and uninhabited."⁷²

Quinquaud's tour of Darou Mousty and first-hand encounter with a Murid community led him to change his attitude toward the town and its founder. In November 1918, the administrator of Cayor met with his counterpart from Baol and the resident of Toul at Darou Mousty and all agreed to end the previous measures undertaken to prevent emigration to Darou Mousty. Instead, the colonial chiefs were instructed to assist each other in their jobs and in the pursuit of deserters, delinquents, and criminals. Moreover, due to the increasing population of the region around Darou Mousty, the administrators now considered it urgent to fix the border between Cayor and Baol to prevent any disputes over land by neighboring canton chiefs. Darou Mousty, of course, was deliberately located in the cercle of Cayor, and as we shall see in chapter 5, future attempts by the administration to redraw the border to place the town within Baol would be met with resistance by Maam Cerno and his sons.

Murid Interpretations of the War

An important aspect of the accommodation reached in the final months of the war between the French and Darou Mousty was the war and Murid recruitment. The local administration had been quite critical of Maam Cerno regarding his lack of direct support for the war effort in the years preceding 1918 and had doubted his actions vis-à-vis the French in this regard. Quinquaud had complained in July 1918 that it was not until the latest recruitment drive launched on March 17 that Maam Cerno had furnished him with any recruits.⁷³ Maam Cerno was also accused by the administrator of harboring young men from other cantons who had fled to him to escape enrollment into the colonial force. In March and April of 1918, however, the marabout had sent the administration a contingent of recruits from Darou Mousty. Quinquaud noted after the recruits were delivered that they were probably furnished only because Maam Cerno sensed that sanctions would be placed upon him if he continued to refuse. Maam Cerno, meanwhile, had also provided his brother, Amadu Bamba, with a number of recruits.⁷⁴

Darou Mousty's role in World War I has survived in the oral traditions of the town. Several of my informants mentioned the demands made by the colonial government on Darou Mousty's granaries. According to Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye

Sylla, during the course of World War I, Darou Mousty delivered one hundred tons of millet and fifty tons of peanuts in response to a French request for aid during a famine caused by the war. Part of the donated food was also to be used to help the French feed their prisoners of war. The fact that the French never compensated Darou Mousty or Maam Cerno for their contributions during the war is remembered even today.⁷⁵

The focus of the town's memories of World War I, however, is not on the French or the pressure they exerted on Maam Cerno to provide food, or more importantly recruits; rather, the contributions toward the war effort are placed in a religious context. According to Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, Amadu Bamba had been approached by the colonial administration with a request for recruits to which he acceded. Maam Cerno was given a religious order, known as an *ndigal*, from his older brother to raise the troops requested by the French and he selected four hundred men from Darou Mousty to be inducted.⁷⁶ In light of Maam Cerno's service to his brother, it would have been impossible to refuse the request even if he was harboring deserters and men fleeing conscription. In this sense, the recruitment in Darou Mousty was done for religious reasons and was part of the continuing labors that Maam Cerno performed for Amadu Bamba. From this point of view, the French were correct to doubt Maam Cerno's sincerity in providing aid for the war because he delivered the recruits not due to an order from the French but due to a *ndigal* from Amadu Bamba.

The taalibe of Darou Mousty held a similar religious interpretation of the recruitment for World War I, and their descendents have preserved their fathers' views of the war effort. At the top of the list of the recruits from Darou Mousty were two of Maam Cerno's own sons, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla and Sëriñ Shaykh Awa Balla M'Backé.⁷⁷ Maam Cerno also sent at least four of the original taalibe who had helped to establish the town in 1912 to fight for the French. None of these four original taalibe were alive at the time that this research was carried out; however, I was able to interview their descendents. Generally, none of the veterans' descendents remembered any details about the war that their fathers may have told them. Sëriñ Barra Joob stated that his father, Sëriñ Omar Joob, had returned from World War I with the ability to read and write French. Prior to the war, Omar Joob had been in charge of the storehouses and granaries of Darou Mousty. Upon his return to Darou Mousty, he returned to his old job.⁷⁸

Sëriñ Balla Gaye was also one of the original taalibe sent off to war. His son, Baay Cerno Gaye, remembered that while his father was in Europe he and another taalibe from Darou Mousty had bought a pair of shoes and a mat that they sent as a gift to Maam Cerno. When Maam Cerno received the gifts, he dictated a letter to his soldier-taalibe in which he thanked them for the gifts, reassured them that they were true taalibe, and told them that he would never forget them in his prayers. He closed the letter by stating that God had accepted their actions in the best fashion.⁷⁹

Baay Abdou Mawade Wade noted that his father, Sëriñ Mawade, had been strong and in good physical condition and that this helped to make him a good soldier during World War I. Sëriñ Mawade had gone to war in the company of his good friend Mor Bassine Seck with whom he had farmed before the war. When the two returned to Senegal after being released from service, they decided to pass by Diourbel and see Amadu Bamba on their way home to Darou Mousty. Amadu Bamba received the two taalibe, thanked them, and blessed them. Upon their return to Darou Mousty, Maam Cerno did the same.⁸⁰ The personal gratitude expressed by the Murid saint and founder (and by Maam Cerno) was of enormous importance to the two Murid veterans and further vindicated their service during the war in a religious sense.

Baay Kabou Gaye recalled that when his father, Sëriñ Modou Kharry Gaye, had been chosen to become a soldier, Maam Cerno had called together all of those who would be leaving to fight and told them that, “Those who are going to leave for the war as taalibe of Boroom Touba [Amadu Bamba] will find success in the two worlds, here and in the eternal.” Baay Kabou Gaye also said that his father had returned with Sëriñ Mawade and had received the thanks and blessings of Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno who thanked them for fulfilling the recommendation that Sëriñ Touba had made of him.⁸¹

Among the informants, the issue of recruitment for service during World War I was treated as if it were simply another ndigal. In Darou Mousty, as in other Murid settlements, when a Murid taalibe joined the ranks of the army, he was following the ndigal of his marabout. Military service in this context was another way for the taalibe to serve Maam Cerno and by extension, Amadu Bamba. The faithful fulfillment of this religious order defined the Murid disciple as a true and loyal taalibe. Also, as mentioned by Baay Kabou Gaye, the Murid taalibe who agreed to enlist would ensure his good place in this world and the next as reaffirmed by Maam Cerno and Amadu Bamba.

Military service during World War I was considered an honor by the descendants of the Murid veterans.⁸² The honor laid not in the sacrifices made for the French but for the Muridiyya. In addition to their roles in founding Darou Mousty, their status as veterans only added to the religious credentials of the original taalibe who fought in World War I. The preservation of the knowledge of their fathers’ military service is testament to the value that the descendants have placed on this aspect of their fathers’ lives. Although participation in World War I was not on my original list of questions for the descendants of the original taalibe, Sëriñ Barra Job, Baay Cerno Gaye, Baay Kabou Gaye, and Baay Abdou Mawade Wade volunteered the information concerning their fathers’ military service as a part of the resume of their fathers’ work for Maam Cerno and the Murid order. Baay Abdou Mawade Wade had even preserved his father’s military identification card as a memento.

The most notable aspect of the raising of troops from Darou Mousty was the egalitarian nature of the process. It would have been easy for Maam Cerno to

simply send new or lower-ranking taalibe, such as former slaves, but he sent two of his own sons and at least four of the high-ranking original taalibe who had accompanied him to Darou Mousty. This was done to provide a good example to the families of the other recruits. If everyone in Darou Mousty was expected to play their part in the recruitment, Maam Cerno would have to make his own sacrifices and call on the original taalibe to also take part.

The French believed that there was a slight diminishment of Maam Cerno's prestige, even within his own entourage, as a result of his compliance with the orders to provide recruits. However, according to the administration, this effect was short-lived and emigrants continued to make their way to Darou Mousty. Within the oral traditions of the town, there is no mention of any reduction in Maam Cerno's authority as a result of gathering recruits for the war. As mentioned previously, the recruits considered this a religious duty because the orders came from Amadu Bamba via Maam Cerno.

Another important reason for Darou Mousty's participation in the war effort was the possibility that the contributions and the recruits that the Murids provided would eventually lead to better relations between Maam Cerno and the colonial government. Part of this belief stemmed from Blaise Diagne's efforts to link African aid with French postwar reforms. Although the oral traditions of Darou Mousty point to a degree of mutual respect well before World War I, it appears that the relationship took on a more positive note due to the behavior of the Murids during the war.⁸³ The fact that they had not rebelled and had in the end provided recruits for the French helped to revise the relations between Maam Cerno and the French. Quinquaud's tour of Darou Mousty in 1918 also played an important role in the development of a new French attitude toward the town and its founder. Relations between Amadu Bamba, the Murid order in general, and the French also shared in this thaw.⁸⁴ As seen above, however, during most of the war itself, there was a significant level of distrust on the part of the colonial administration toward the Murids, their activities, and their motivations.

Conclusion

This early phase of Darou Mousty's history is well remembered in the oral traditions of the town and further illustrates the character of Maam Cerno and the process of Murid settlement. Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé while reflecting upon this early period in Darou Mousty's history claimed, "Maam Cerno Birahim had the best agricultural fields because he had the experience and put himself to work the moment that he arrived in the company of his taalibe. Maam Cerno was the first farmer in Darou Mousty."⁸⁵ He also emphasized that Maam Cerno's first obligation was building the mosque and educational facilities. Once again, in the context of the founding of Darou Mousty, a dual

nature characterizes the figure of Maam Cerno as a farmer and a marabout in the oral traditions. This quote is also important because it addresses the success of the town (“the best fields”) and it links that success to hard work and a firm belief in Islam and the Murid mission.

Sēriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla had a similar view. He related that Amadu Bamba had made it known to Maam Cerno that the town that he would build would be peaceful and happy and receive gifts from God. Sēriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla then pointed out that Amadu Bamba’s predictions had come true by noting that there are many towns in the region that are older than Darou Mousty and still do not have a *forage*, or mechanized well, electricity or telephone service, yet Darou Mousty has all three. This observation is essentially correct, however, it is not limited to Darou Mousty alone. Many of the other towns and villages in the area that were also founded by Maam Cerno enjoy mechanized wells and other improvements.

People were genuinely attracted to a Murid marabout like Maam Cerno and not coerced or tricked by the machinations of a lazy holy man who grew fat on the labor of his disciples. The attraction was obviously religious in nature, but it could also be seen in economic and political terms. Many new disciples were searching for a better life, not only in the next world but in the present world as well. During times of famine and drought, the need to find sustenance drove many to seek out the marabouts. Politically, the marabouts could also be seen as representing an alternative to the chiefs and administrators. Even though the Murid marabouts paid their taxes and later provided recruits for the army, the source of their authority was not perceived to lie with the French but with Amadu Bamba and God. This distinction may not appear to be important on the surface but to the Murids it was of great importance.

The establishment of Darou Mousty was an attempt to realize the moral order that had been framed by Amadu Bamba in reaction to the conflicts among Islamic reform, secular politics, and French colonization. Understandably, this realization could not have existed in a social, economic, and political vacuum. Yet, Darou Mousty did enjoy a period of relative autonomy from the colonial state in which a durable foundation was laid for the development of a specifically Murid community in which Amadu Bamba’s vision of reform and mysticism could be pursued. The great success of this effort is testified to not only by the Murids but also by the French authorities who initially felt very threatened by the growth of Darou Mousty and the order in general. The warnings and protestations of the French officials that culminated in an attempt to virtually lay siege to the town reflects the extent to which Murid modernization was succeeding and attracting the surrounding population to the order. At this early point in the colonization of the interior of Senegal, French modernization particularly in its social and economic aspects could not effectively compete with the vision and reality of Murid modernization. This would change, of course, especially after the war when the colonial government was freed from the constraints of supporting the war effort in favor

of strengthening its administrative hold over the rural areas of the colonies. One would expect, perhaps, that when this extension of French power occurred it would have been contested by the Murids at every step as a threat to their own ideology and identity. As we shall explore in chapter 5, the Murids of Darou Mousty did oppose the French on some fronts, yet by and large they assimilated the growing colonial intrusion into their lives and in a very important case exploited their new status as colonial subjects to their own ends.

5

SYMBIOSIS

COLONIZATION AND MURID MODERNITY

Introduction

In the era following World War I, Darou Mousty continued to grow and to enjoy a good deal of relative prosperity. Maam Cerno further strengthened his position as the Murid leader of Cayor while the town became an even more attractive location for immigrants. Considering all of the satellite villages that Maam Cerno created near Darou Mousty and the agricultural production of the region, it could be argued that Maam Cerno had effectively created a sphere in which Murid modernization could take place. After World War I, Darou Mousty was transformed from a Murid settlement into the Murid center of Cayor. The town and its leader thus became involved, whether unwittingly or not, in larger religious, economic, and political issues within the colony of Senegal. Similarly, after 1918, there was a change in French policies and attitudes toward the Murid order. This change would offer new opportunities and new challenges from the direction of French efforts toward modernization in the interior of Senegal. A spirit of cooperation, particularly in economic and political matters, began to replace French fear and suspicion of the Murids. In fact, during the period following World War I, we can see the maturation of a symbiotic relationship between Murid and French modernization efforts resulting in a discernable impact upon Murid notions of modernity.

After the death of Amadu Bamba in 1927 and the ascension of his eldest son, Muhammadu Moustapha, as the first khalifah-général of the order, Maam Cerno continued to lead Darou Mousty. With the death of the founding saint, however, the hierarchy of the Murid order had to adapt to the change in leadership. Murid shaykh such as Maam Cerno had to subsequently redefine themselves to delineate and protect their positions within the tariqa. French colonial and Murid sources disagree concerning the nature of the relationship between Darou Mousty and Touba in the decades following

Amadu Bamba's death. According to information recorded by the colonial authorities, there was a complete deterioration of relations between Maam Cerno and Muhammadu Moustapha over the question of the succession. Murid sources, however, claim that Maam Cerno supported Muhammadu Moustapha, yet they also stress the autonomy and independence of Darou Mousty. It is most likely that the administration misinterpreted Maam Cerno's attempts to protect his autonomy in the face of changes within the leadership of the Murid order as outright resistance to the religious leadership of Muhammadu Moustapha.

The debates within the colonial administration concerning two attempts to transfer Darou Mousty to the cercle of Baol (also referred to as Diourbel, the administrative center of Baol) in 1930 and 1946 were in part manifestations of this rift within the leadership of the Murid tariqa. However, there were also economic concerns on the part of the colonial authorities and the Murid leadership in Baol who hoped to gain greater control over Darou Mousty's wealth. Precolonial political rivalries between Wolof aristocrats who were now serving as colonial chiefs also affected the debate over Darou Mousty's position within the colony. It is quite evident that by 1930, Darou Mousty had become very important religiously, economically, and politically, and an examination of the transfer debates proves this point while also providing valuable insights into the relations between the colonial administration, the Murid order, and Darou Mousty.

Maam Cerno's death in 1943 might appear on the surface to have been a drastic blow for the town and its inhabitants. However, Darou Mousty continued to develop on the firm foundations established by its founder. Maam Cerno was succeeded by his son, Sëriñ Muhammadu (Modou) Awa Balla M'Backé, who saw the town through the remainder of World War II and the second attempt to transfer the town to Diourbel. It was also under his direction that the town received a large, modern *forage*, or mechanized well, that began pumping water in 1949. The grand mosque whose four minarets now tower over the town was also constructed under the guidance of Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla.

The Continuing Development of Darou Mousty

Immigration was still the leading factor in the town's growth after 1918, and as Darou Mousty's population swelled, satellite villages were established in the surrounding region to provide more homes and cultivatable land, which, in turn, filled the granaries of Maam Cerno to capacity. During this time, Darou Mousty ceased to be just a town. The name was now sometimes applied to the entire area that had come to rely on Maam Cerno and his religious authority. Maam Cerno's influence understandably increased with the arrival of each

new immigrant and the founding of each new village. Though the presence of many new Murid adepts and families altered the physical appearance of the town and enlarged its social and economic influence, the underlying mission of the pursuit of Islamic reform and Sufism is still emphasized within Murid historiography of this period.

As Darou Mousty grew after World War I, it was eventually divided into two zones. The western zone, including the customs office, was placed under the jurisdiction of Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla M'Backé. He was in charge of the collection of taxes, the administration of public aid, and the recruitment of labor for the colonial administration. Another son of Maam Cerno, Sëriñ Modou Habib M'Backé, governed the eastern half of the town and was at the same time a qadi. The second khalifah of Darou Mousty, another son of Maam Cerno, Sëriñ Abdou Quddüs M'Backé, was the imam of the mosque and was charged with the correspondence and the maintenance of relations with the colonial authorities.¹ Sëriñ Mor Joob M'Backé had been named the chief of the village when it was created and continued on in this post after World War I.²

The continuing development of the town was not, however, free of problems. In the years following World War I, Darou Mousty was still periodically affected by influenza. The epidemic that had struck the area in 1918 continued to claim lives in the first year after World War I. During the month of July 1919, 207 persons died in the *cercle* due to *la peste*, or the plague, and a year later the epidemic had returned to Cayor via Baol. In January 1919, the administration briefly rejuvenated its plans to place a cordon around Darou Mousty to prevent the further spread of the disease. During that month, there were 200 confirmed cases of the flu in Darou Mousty and 300 suspected cases.³

In spite of the continuing epidemic, immigrants continued to make their way to Darou Mousty. Due to the increasing number of taalibe that flocked to the town after World War I, Maam Cerno instructed his sons and leading shaykh and taalibe to found other towns and villages near Darou Mousty. These villages acted as satellites of Darou Mousty, and even though each had its own Murid shaykh, they all recognized the suzerainty of Maam Cerno and Darou Mousty and identified themselves as taalibe of Maam Cerno. Following the establishment of Darou Mousty, Maam Cerno would eventually be responsible for the creation of more than fifty satellite villages.⁴

One of the earliest examples of a satellite village is Kosso, which was founded in 1923. Sëriñ Balla Fall, an original taalibe of Darou Mousty, helped establish Kosso, but the town itself was placed under the control of one of Maam Cerno's sons, Sëriñ Mahamadane M'Backé.⁵ Taif Joob, another satellite village of Darou Mousty, was founded in 1930 by Mayacine Joob, one of the original settlers of Darou Mousty, who was acting under the orders of Maam Cerno. In answer to a question about the relationship that existed between Taif Joob and Darou Mousty, one of Mayacine Joob's sons, Mustapha Mayacine Joob, stated that his village was under the protection of Darou Mousty, and all of the decisions concerning Taif Joob came from Darou Mousty. Further, Mustapha Joob

explicitly stated, "If we remain at Taif, it is to apply the recommendations that Maam Cerno Birahim gave to our father, Mayacine."⁶

These villages were placed under the responsibility of their founders or subordinates of Maam Cerno who, outside of their agricultural activities, also had the responsibility of teaching the taalibe. A share of the harvest from each town that was founded from Darou Mousty was sent back to Maam Cerno in recognition of his leadership. Several of the surrounding towns were also used by Maam Cerno to store harvested millet in his own reserve granaries.⁷ Such reserves were frequently used to feed the population of this part of Guet province during famines. In addition to providing an outlet for the burgeoning population of Darou Mousty proper, the satellite towns that were founded directly or indirectly by Maam Cerno through his followers further established Murid power in the surrounding region as represented by Maam Cerno. His control over the neighboring towns and the substantial agricultural production of the area soon made him a force to be reckoned with in the politics of the region.

One should not suppose that simply because Maam Cerno now enjoyed a good deal of his own success that his ties with Amadu Bamba were any less close. In fact, Maam Cerno's continuing relationship with his older brother remained a very important thread within Murid historiography. For example, at the birth of each of his sons, a messenger was sent to Amadu Bamba to request a name for the newborn. Before the death of Amadu Bamba in 1927, all of Maam Cerno's sons were named by his older brother to whom they were later sent for their studies. Furthermore, Maam Cerno continued to contribute a share of his own harvests to Amadu Bamba and his family. Both millet and peanuts were given to the marabout and his household. Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, for example, explained Maam Cerno's continued support of Amadu Bamba after 1912 by referring to a conversation between the two brothers on the eve of the first exile to Gabon. Amadu Bamba instructed Maam Cerno at that time to farm as much as possible. Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla also stated that, "for the most part, Maam Cerno had no other ambitions than to give his harvests to the family [of Amadu Bamba]."⁸ His continuing support of Amadu Bamba was the simple act of a taalibe working for his shaykh and reflects the underlying basic principle of the relationship between the two brothers that served as a religiously legitimized socioeconomic model for all Murids.

Baay Mor, one of the surviving original taalibe of Darou Mousty, was among those who were chosen by Maam Cerno with transporting part of the harvest of Darou Mousty (including its share of the harvests of the satellite villages) to Amadu Bamba in Diourbel. He remembered that one year he helped lead a caravan of one hundred donkeys loaded with millet and peanuts to Amadu Bamba's residence in Diourbel. He also noted that Maam Cerno would also send camels and ostriches to his older brother.⁹ However, not all of the harvests of Darou Mousty were consumed by the people of Darou Mousty or sent

to Amadu Bamba and his family. During times of famine, Amadu Bamba frequently contacted Maam Cerno in search of food to distribute to the hungry. One informant in Darou Mousty presented a figure of twenty tons of millet in answer to how much food Maam Cerno usually sent to Amadu Bamba to be distributed to the destitute.¹⁰

Darou Mousty was also very important in feeding the local population of Cayor during droughts and famines. According to the oral traditions of Darou Mousty and the reports within the colonial archives, Maam Cerno attracted many people to Darou Mousty during hard times due to the full granaries of the town. Baay Kabou Gaye stated that on many occasions, Darou Mousty emptied its millet granaries prior to the onset of the rains to feed the hungry.¹¹ Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye commented on this subject as well by noting that there were many people around Darou Mousty who would come to Maam Cerno for aid. Usually, the marabout would feed those individuals for up to twelve months. "He [Maam Cerno] did a lot for the people who came to him. He never told someone, 'I cannot solve your problem.' He gave everything to the people. Maam Cerno Birahim was always working and on the path to God."¹² This path, however, also led to a strengthening of the Murid trend of modernization in the form of expanding agricultural settlements that supported new religious and educational facilities. The arrival of large numbers of immigrants consequently served to validate the Murid notion of modernity in its religious and socioeconomic aspects in the eyes of both the original settlers and the new arrivals.

Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang said that his father generally divided the harvests of the town into three parts. The first part went to Amadu Bamba for his support and the taalibe who lived with him. The second part remained with Maam Cerno for the support of his family and disciples, and the final part was set aside for the needy. Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang elaborated that Maam Cerno provided aid to the people on an annual basis without regard as to whether or not they were from Darou Mousty or Murids. He also concurred that the granaries were sometimes emptied to feed everyone during times of famine. In addition, he noted that the agricultural largesse of Darou Mousty served as a magnet for later migrations to the town and its environs as individuals and families left their native villages to place themselves under the protection of Maam Cerno. During this process, Maam Cerno, according to Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang, never summoned or ordered anyone to come to Darou Mousty.¹³

The Attempt to Create a Canton for Darou Mousty

The French were not unaware of the growing success and popularity of the Murid form of modernization taking place in the area surrounding Darou

Mousty after the end of World War I. The growth of Darou Mousty and its satellite villages presented a challenge to French efforts to politically, socially, and economically guide the region. More and more, colonial subjects were voting with their feet as to what form of modernization was most useful in the present and held the most hope in the future. This challenge was not overt in terms of directly opposing colonial efforts at every step, but it did result in a series of negotiations that tempered the extension of French power and influence in the region and ultimately put a Murid stamp upon much of the colonial venture in the region.

By 1919, Darou Mousty had attracted enough attention for the French to call for the creation of a new canton in Guet province named N'Doyène N'Dagane N'Goll, also referred to as M'Bargha-Dar Mousti [*sic*]. In a letter to the lieutenant governor, the administrator of the cercle, Tellier, noted that a canton chief was specifically needed for the region of Darou Mousty due to its isolation on the frontier of Baol and Cayor, and the fact that it was not yet under the direction of a local canton chief. Furthermore, in the words of Tellier, "Today, the Murid sect has developed this region into the most cultivated of Cayor." In a reaction to the lack of surveillance that Macodou Sall had shown toward Darou Mousty, the official also noted that one provincial chief (Macodou Sall) could not be expected to personally direct his province and four cantons.¹⁴

The determination of a chief for the new canton was problematic for the administration. Tellier proposed that a candidate who had been put forward by Meissa M'Baye Sall, the chief of Sañoxor and the most senior of all of the local chiefs of Cayor, be given the post. This candidate, Abdou Issa Dieng, was seen by Tellier as a counter to the growing power of the chief of Guet province, Macodou Sall, a cousin of Meissa M'Baye Sall. According to the administrator, Macodou Sall was seeking to be the sole chief in the entire province, and the placement of a protégé of Meissa M'Baye in the canton in which Darou Mousty was located would check his power.¹⁵ Tellier had earlier quarreled with Macodou Sall over his handling of measures taken against the flu epidemic and had even attempted to dismiss him. The administrator's ill will toward Macodou Sall could also have been provoked by the chief's close relationship with Maam Cerno that in turn made Macodou Sall even more powerful. Tellier undoubtedly recognized that Macodou Sall had much to gain by keeping political control over the agriculturally productive region around Darou Mousty.

In his reply to Tellier's letter of support for the nomination of Abdou Issa Dieng, the lieutenant governor stated that because the proposed canton of M'Bargha was dependent on the province of Guet and not Sañoxor it would be better to consult Macodou Sall rather than Meissa M'Baye regarding the choice of a candidate. The candidacy of Abdou Issa Dieng was eventually rejected, and in April 1920, Tellier continued to lament that the vast region around Darou Mousty was still without a local chief to act against "the veiled

and hypocritical maneuvers of the actual chief [Macodou Sall].¹⁶ Unfortunately for Tellier, when a canton was later created for Darou Mousty in 1930, Macodou Sall was able to have his younger brother Massamba Sall named as the canton chief, thus cementing his relationship with Darou Mousty. Although there is no official colonial record of Maam Cerno's opinion in this matter, we can doubtlessly surmise that he welcomed the announcement of Massamba Sall as the canton chief for Darou Mousty due to the cordial and mutually beneficial relationship that he enjoyed with the new chief's older brother. Though the creation of the new post represented an inevitable intensification of colonial control, the actual appointment reflected the strong influence of local concerns on the part of the Salls and the Murids in this matter. The effectiveness of this action in terms of the extension of French modernization can thus be judged as mixed.

Another concern voiced by the French during the debate over the establishment of a canton for Darou Mousty was the absence of a French school in the town. In April 1919, the colonial authorities first suggested the establishment of a French school in Darou Mousty.¹⁷ In the face of an outright refusal by Maam Cerno, the French backed down on their proposal for a school, yet the issue would continue to be a source of contention between the colonial authorities and Darou Mousty for decades. The debate over the presence of Western education in Darou Mousty was one of the most direct conflicts between this branch of the Murid order and the colonial state and is indicative of the limits to which a symbiotic relationship between the two could develop. In light of Maam Cerno's accommodation of French colonial rule, cash crop production for a capitalist world market, taxation, and military conscription, the conflict over a colonial school is insightful. Even though the Murids of Darou Mousty were able to absorb and recast their participation in these other aspects of French modernization into the overall Murid sense of modernity, they were not able to conceive of doing the same in terms of Western education. One could envision physically sending Murid pupils to French schools easily enough, yet in the realm of ideas and values how would those disciples then incorporate this new influence into their own identity and awareness? The central question at this juncture was whether or not Western education could be absorbed into Murid modernity. The alternative of an organized secular educational system that could compete with Islamic schooling was never posed to the Murids or their historical antecedents prior to colonization, and thus there was no historical precedent to follow. In some respects, this conflict represents a limitation of this generation of Murids in terms of how they conceived of French modernization. In fact, it would not be until 1953 that the Murids would allow the construction of a French primary school in Darou Mousty, ten years after the death of Maam Cerno. It would thus be left to a new generation of Murid intellectuals to deal with this challenge, albeit in a different political and social context.

French schools aside, the official relationship between Darou Mousty and the colonial authorities remained cordial. In July 1919, Momar Diobou M'Backé, in his capacity as the chief of Darou Mousty, accompanied Macodou Sall to Tivaouane to celebrate Bastille Day with the colonial officials.¹⁸ Maam Cerno, meanwhile, began to curtail his travels in the region and settled down definitively in Darou Mousty. His last residence outside of Darou Mousty was in 1920 in the nearby town of Thinkoly, a satellite village of Darou Mousty. While there, one of his brothers, Shaykh Anta M'Backé, paid the marabout a visit and offered to give Maam Cerno the use of a car, but Maam Cerno declined saying that he had no need for a car and did not travel much anymore. Indeed, after Maam Cerno returned to Darou Mousty in 1921, he never left the town again except for visits to Amadu Bamba and to attend his funeral in 1927.¹⁹ Maam Cerno, however, did not drop out of public life. He now received visitors at his house in Darou Mousty and had no need to return these visits in part due to his growing stature.

The Death of Amadu Bamba

Amadu Bamba died on July 19, 1927. When news of his death reached Darou Mousty, a taalibe was sent to find Maam Cerno who then rushed to Touba to take part in his brother's funeral. According to the Murid oral traditions of Darou Mousty, there was no argument over the appointment of Muhammadu Moustapha M'Backé, the eldest son of Amadu Bamba, as khalifah-générale. According to one informant in Darou Mousty, it was Maam Cerno who nominated his nephew to succeed the founder of the order.²⁰ However, it was known in Darou Mousty at the time of Amadu Bamba's death that the colonial administration widely believed that Maam Cerno would succeed his older brother. Upon the ascension of Muhammadu Moustapha to the khalifate, Maam Cerno was said to have informed the authorities concerning the choice.²¹ Although the colonial administration recorded on numerous occasions following the appointment of the khalifah-général that relations between Darou Mousty and Touba had seriously deteriorated as a result of Maam Cerno not being named khalifah-générale, there was no mention in Darou Mousty of any ill will between Maam Cerno and his nephew. There was also no hint of any French role in the nominating process.

The discrepancy between the Murid sources and the colonial sources regarding the succession of Amadu Bamba and the subsequent breakdown in relations between Maam Cerno and Muhammadu Moustapha can be examined on several levels. The Murids interviewed in Darou Mousty regarding the death of Amadu Bamba and his succession did not place Maam Cerno's nomination of Muhammadu Moustapha for the khalifate within a time frame. Therefore, it is possible that his nomination came years after the death of

Amadu Bamba after the dust had begun to settle from the first attempt to transfer Darou Mousty to Baol (Diourbel). One must not forget through this process that Maam Cerno was a seasoned diplomat. His nomination and recognition of his nephew as khalifah-général could very well have been only a symbolic gesture without any real consequences for the autonomy of Darou Mousty. Such a symbolic recognition could have prevented Muhammadu Moustapha from making any claims on Darou Mousty, including tithes and such.²² The oral informants in Darou Mousty made no mention of Maam Cerno sending a share of his harvests to the Murids in Diourbel after 1927, yet Murids from Darou Mousty would still attend the *magal*, or pilgrimages, to the Murid capital of Touba in the cercle of Diourbel in later days.

One explanation for the exaggerated French view of bad relations between Maam Cerno and Muhammadu Moustapha can be found in the political and economic interests that were behind the attempts to transfer Darou Mousty to Diourbel in 1930 and again in 1946. Those who were against the transfer exploited the rift between Maam Cerno and Muhammadu Moustapha to pressure the French administration to oppose the move. The animosity perceived by the French between the two Murid leaders is best examined in the context of the first of two attempts to *rattacher*, or transfer, Darou Mousty from the administrative control of Guet province in Cayor (Louga) to Diourbel.²³ In both cases, the impetus for the transfer would come from Diourbel and would be based on religious, political, and economic concerns.

The Rattachement Debate of 1930

At first glance, the transfer debate of the 1930s appears to focus on the geographical location of Darou Mousty in relation to the administrative centers of the colony and French efforts to bring the town more firmly under their control. However, upon further study, the first attempt to transfer Darou Mousty was primarily a conflict between competing African religious and political factions that exploited the colonial administration for their own ends. Though Darou Mousty was not a serious threat to the supremacy of Touba as the symbolic heart of the Muridiyya, Maam Cerno's fief offered an inherent challenge in its autonomy to the centralization of the order under the khalifah-général and represented a rich prize as well. In addition to the religious rivalry between Maam Cerno and his nephew, Muhammadu Moustapha, a corresponding political struggle over the town was waged between the chief of Guet province, Macodou Sall, and M'Bakhane Diop, one of Lat Joor's sons. M'Bakhane Diop had formerly held a position as a provincial chief in Baol (Diourbel). In 1930, after a series of dismissals from various posts, he was serving as a chief in the cercle of Thiès. M'Bakhane Diop had also declared himself a Murid and a disciple of Muhammadu Moustapha. His



Map 5.1. Northwestern Senegal showing provincial colonial boundaries, circa 1930s–40s. Map by author.

goals in the transfer attempt, according to Macadou Sall, were to hurt the Sall family, whom he held responsible for his father's death and ultimately to take control of Guet province that had once been ruled over by his father. By 1930, the stage was thus set for Muhammadu Moustapha as khalifah-général to attempt to consolidate his control over the Murid order by establishing his authority over Darou Mousty and for M'Bakhane Diop to take his revenge against the Salls and possibly gain a more prestigious post within the colony.

On June 23, 1930, the administrator of Diourbel, M. Pal, addressed a letter to the governor of Senegal that called for the transfer of Darou Mousty to his cercle due, in his words, to the reliance of the people of Darou Mousty on Diourbel, Baol's administrative center.²⁴ In 1927, Guet province in which Darou Mousty was located had been transferred to the cercle of Louga without incident. The new administrative capital for Guet was now at Louga about 110 kilometers north of Darou Mousty. Diourbel, the capital of Baol was about

90 kilometers southwest of Darou Mousty. Tivaouane, the previous administrative center of the cercle of Cayor in which Darou Mousty had been located until 1927, was about 150 kilometers west of Darou Mousty.

The administrator's letter to the governor stated that Diourbel was only 45 kilometers away from Darou Mousty while Louga was far away. Due to this fact, he maintained that the people of Darou Mousty traveled to Diourbel rather than Louga for business and various services because Diourbel was closer. Pal even noted that Darou Mousty relied on the Kaolak Public Works department for the construction of a small forage because Louga was too far away. In his opinion, the situation as it existed in 1930 was a source of continual difficulties. Pal's knowledge of the distances between himself and Darou Mousty is somewhat suspect when compared to the actual distances on a modern map of Senegal (cited above). If a straight line is drawn between Darou Mousty and Diourbel, the distance is about 90 kilometers; however, there is no straight road between the two towns. The most likely route from Darou Mousty to Diourbel passed through Touba and M'Backé-Baol, which is a trip of about 140 kilometers. His argument that he is closer to the people of Darou Mousty was thus not exactly true and we must delve a little deeper into the arguments to get a clearer picture of the motives involved in the debate.

In response to the administrator of Diourbel's request, Camille Maillet of the colony's Political Bureau informed the commandant of Louga in July about the proposal. Maillet considered the subject of the location of Darou Mousty in relation to the administrative centers a valid issue; however, he was worried about the negative political ramifications if the transfer were to proceed. In particular, the governor feared the response of the provincial chief of Guet, Macodou Sall, who would be most affected by the move. Whether or not Maillet knew of Maam Cerno's opinion of the subject is unknown because he made no reference to the marabout. He concluded that a reserved attitude should be employed regarding the transfer issue and requested the commandant of Louga to submit a report with his advice on the subject.

The administrator of Diourbel was, however, very insistent on redrawing the border to incorporate Darou Mousty into his province, and in September, he again reported to the governor that the question of Darou Mousty's status was even more the "order of the day." Pal, in a direct appeal to the governor's chief concern, now cited that the transfer to his cercle would put an end to the troublesome issue of Darou Mousty's state of relative independence in regards to the colonial administration. Darou Mousty's autonomy, due in part to its location on the frontier between Louga and Diourbel, had in fact been commented on by the French ever since World War I. Anticipating the uproar that the transfer would cause among the political and religious figures involved, the administrator of Diourbel contended that the issue of firmer French control over Darou Mousty (through the transfer to Diourbel) should outweigh the concerns of any African political or religious figures involved. Although there was no direct proof that the transfer would increase French

control over Darou Mousty, the basis of this argument was very persuasive. Another factor in his argument was the construction of a railroad in Sine and the need for labor to complete the project. If Maam Cerno and his followers were placed within Diourbel, they could be more easily called upon to provide labor for this project.

Following this latest appeal from Pal in Diourbel, Edouard Terrac, the adjunct administrator of Louga, replied to Maillet's request for more information on the subject and his advice on how to proceed. Terrac had in fact consulted Macodou Sall and Maam Cerno regarding their views of the issue. His conclusion, based on the opinions of Macodou Sall and Maam Cerno, was to maintain the status quo. Terrac dismissed the point that Darou Mousty was too far from Louga for an effective administration of the town. Terrac most likely recognized that Darou Mousty was almost equally distant from both administrative centers. The governor disagreed on this point, however, and penciled in a note on Terrac's report that stated, "On the contrary, Darou Mousty has long escaped the control of the administration."²⁵

Terrac also argued against the view that, since the inhabitants of Darou Mousty were Murids, they would be better off if they were in the same cercle (Diourbel) as the khalifah-général of the order, Muhammadu Moustapha, and Touba, the headquarters of the order and site of Amadu Bamba's tomb. Terrac stated that Maam Cerno had in fact been on bad terms with Muhammadu Moustapha for quite some time and that he (Terrac) believed that it was actually Muhammadu Moustapha who was "the secret and profound origin of the transfer issue." In his opinion, Maam Cerno had broken off relations with his nephew over the succession of Amadu Bamba and the entire debate concerning the transfer of Darou Mousty to Diourbel was an attempt by Muhammadu Moustapha to bring Darou Mousty and Maam Cerno under his control. Although the commandant of Louga did not mention it, Muhammadu Moustapha had more than a religious stake in Darou Mousty. If the town was to recognize his authority and suzerainty, Muhammadu Moustapha, as khalifah-général of the Murids, would benefit economically from the tithes and gifts that the Murids of the town would be compelled to send to Touba. He would also have the surrounding area free to settle with shaykh and taalibe loyal to him. Terrac outlined the reasoning behind his position as stated below.

Here are the facts: the marabout Amadou Bamba, founder of the morite [*sic*] sect, had at his death, to the great prejudice of the Serigne of Darmousty, Thierno Ibra [Maam Cerno], his brother, designated as successor his son Mamadou Moustapha. Since then, the already strained relations between the marabout of Darmousty, an émigré [from Baol/Diourbel] for 23 years following a misunderstanding, [and Baol/Diourbel] have been completely interrupted. The actual politics of the marabout of Diourbel [Muhammadu Moustapha] aims at leaving no stone unturned to bring under his religious authority and dependence the region of Darmousty.²⁶

When Maam Cerno had been informed of the attempt being made to transfer his town to Diourbel, he immediately traveled to Louga. In the presence of Terrac and many of the other religious notables and colonial chiefs of the region, including Macodou Sall, Maam Cerno formally declared that he and his family would abandon Darou Mousty and move if the transfer proceeded. Maam Cerno's declaration in front of the adjunct administrator and the chiefs and notables of the cercle added much to the gravity of the situation. If Maam Cerno were to actually leave Darou Mousty, his disciples would follow suit and abandon the town and its rich fields. Maam Cerno and his taalibe were responsible for transforming a formerly destitute area into one of great agricultural productivity that fed the surrounding region. His threat to leave the town and its fields would thus have a great negative impact upon Guet province and the neighboring areas. It is especially interesting that the commandant of Diourbel, as stated earlier, was prepared to dismiss the opinions of such religious leaders as Maam Cerno, yet without Maam Cerno, Darou Mousty would largely cease to exist.

Macodou Sall's opinion, as chief of Guet province, also weighed heavily in Terrac's opposition to the transfer. Macodou Sall considered the transfer as the dismemberment of his province and an attack on his authority as a colonial chief and functionary of French power. The chief also believed that the transfer attempt was partly attributable to the "treasonous maneuver of the marabout of Diourbel [Muhammadu Moustapha] to gain control over a dissident religious faction." Macodou Sall continued that, "this is a direct attack on the rights of a family [the Salls] universally recognized in this region."²⁷ Macodou Sall's younger brother, Massamba Sall, was incidentally the chief of the canton or subdivision in which Darou Mousty was located. Terrac concluded from Macodou Sall's statements that if the transfer was approved, Macodou Sall's great influence and authority in the region would cause serious difficulties for the project.

After weighing the arguments made by both sides in the dispute, the lieutenant governor of Senegal, Beurnier, informed both administrators on December 8, 1930, that due to the extreme difficulties that would emerge as a result of the transfer of Darou Mousty to Diourbel, the decision had been made to leave the town within the administrative boundaries of the cercle of Louga. Beurnier acknowledged that Darou Mousty, due to its agricultural resources, exerted a strong economic attraction for Diourbel and posed a challenge to the religious authority of Muhammadu Moustapha, who was prevented from taking a share of the town's production. The lieutenant governor had based his decision on the refusal of Maam Cerno to formally recognize the authority of Muhammadu Moustapha, his threat to abandon Darou Mousty, and the resistance of the Sall family to the move. Beurnier did, however, see a need for a lessening of tensions between the two religious leaders. The Political Bureau of the colony believed that a future reconciliation could be discretely promoted using the construction of the mosque at Touba as a

pretext.²⁸ According to the lieutenant governor, it would be politically wise to aid such a reconciliation between the marabout of Darou Mousty and his counterpart in Diourbel to ensure better administration of the area.²⁹ His opinion was also based on a desire to avoid disruptions in the growing agricultural production of both regions due to continuing conflicts between Touba and Darou Mousty.

The decision to keep Darou Mousty in the cercle of Louga did have a catch for Maam Cerno, Macodou Sall, and Darou Mousty. The lieutenant governor stated in his letter to the commandant of Louga that if the town was to remain in his cercle, it would have to be “retaken into the hands of the administration.” The governor was fully aware of the friendship and cooperation that had long existed between Maam Cerno and the Sall brothers, Macodou Sall, in particular. “The marabout Ibra Faty M’Backé [Maam Cerno] exerts his influence in full harmony with the chief of the canton [Massamba Sall] and the chief of the province [Macodou Sall], but it would be useful to discretely control this influence and direct it to the proper interest of the Murid cultivators and the general interest of the country.”³⁰ Simultaneously, the governor again cited Darou Mousty’s history of relative autonomy in the colony, and although he did not directly link the causes for this autonomy to the friendship between Maam Cerno and Macodou Sall, he did consider the monitoring of the relationship between the marabout and the chief instrumental in further incorporating Darou Mousty into the colony. In an effort to move further in this direction, Beurnier instructed the commandant to begin making frequent tours of the region around Darou Mousty to gain more information and bring the area more firmly under French control.

Although the attempt to transfer Darou Mousty to the cercle of Baol had failed, the debate pushed the town and its leader into a relative spotlight. In response to the complaints of the governor regarding the relative autonomy of Darou Mousty and orders from the Political Bureau, the adjunct administrator of Louga, Terrac, made a tour of the town from December 27 to 29, 1930. He was accompanied on this tour by Macodou Sall. Upon their arrival in Darou Mousty, Terrac and Macodou Sall were given an enthusiastic reception by the canton chief, Massamba Sall, the chief of Darou Mousty, Mor Joob M’Backé, and Maam Cerno. The adjunct administrator interpreted the good welcome as a sign of the satisfaction in the administration’s decision not to transfer the town to Baol. Speaking before about three hundred people, including the notables of the area and brothers and sons of Maam Cerno, Terrac encouraged everyone present to continue their good relations with the colonial chiefs. His initial impression of the town, which he had never seen and had not been visited by a French official since 1927, led him to proclaim Darou Mousty “the most beautiful town in the cercle.”³¹

In regards to the arguments that had been made about the relative isolation of Darou Mousty, Terrac noted that the residents still remembered the tours made by the administrators of the cercle of Cayor who had traveled all the way

from Tivaouane to visit the town. In an effort to bring Darou Mousty closer to the government, Terrac proposed to Maam Cerno the building of a road to link the town to Louga. Citing economic and political reasons for the project, the administrator gained the approval of Maam Cerno for the road that was to begin construction in January 1931.

The tour also included information about the wells of Darou Mousty. The water table was listed as 140 meters beneath the surface with most wells extending down to 184 meters. The installation of a large pump or forage was considered a necessity due to the depth of the wells and the fact that some traveled almost 30 kilometers to use the wells at Darou Mousty. In addition, it was recommended that a reservoir supplied by a forage be built for the use of cattle. Maam Cerno urged Terrac to send a technician as soon as possible to begin preparations for the construction of a forage. Terrac believed that Darou Mousty's water supply should be the administration's prime concern, and he recommended a technical study of the town's water supply.

Public health was also an important concern of the tour, especially the control of disease in the region. With the future road link between Darou Mousty and Louga, it would be necessary to take more serious measures to prevent the spread of epidemics. The pilgrimages to Touba undertaken by residents of Darou Mousty and the popularity of Darou Mousty itself as an important Murid site made the issue of disease control even more important in the eyes of the adjunct administrator. He suggested that a hygienist stationed in Kébémér visit the region of Darou Mousty every week to vaccinate the population. Maam Cerno agreed to the idea and the report also noted that the people of Darou Mousty had previously made a request for a doctor's aide to be stationed in the town.

The colonial officials next made a tour of the granaries of Darou Mousty. This part of his visit enabled Terrac to see for the first time what truly made Darou Mousty such an important town in the region, outside of its religious notoriety. In 1930, the town's reputation for agricultural abundance remained firmly intact. Terrac described Darou Mousty as the center of the most important agricultural region of the entire cercle. The millet harvest was abundant for 1930 and Terrac considered as justified the popular title of Darou Mousty as "The Granary of the Cercle" and "The Breadbasket of Cayor." After viewing the reserve granaries in each of the villages surrounding Darou Mousty, it was concluded that, as in previous years, the inhabitants of the region would not need to draw food reserves from the Société de Prévoyance.

At the request of Maam Cerno, Terrac also visited the granaries owned by the marabout himself. In the nearby village of Thinkoly, he was shown thirteen granaries each of which held twenty tons of millet. Another neighboring village, Kosso, had seven granaries of similar size, and Maam Cerno informed Terrac that one-tenth of the granaries were built almost twenty years ago. The adjunct administrator was greatly impressed by the prosperity that he found in Darou Mousty in spite of the general economic depression of the time.

Terrac believed that he had come to an understanding with Maam Cerno regarding the importance of the granaries of Darou Mousty to the colonial administration and the good of the entire region.

There was one area in which Terrac met with some opposition: a French school in Darou Mousty. Over the course of several conversations with Maam Cerno, the colonial official argued that such an important town should not remain in ignorance of the French language. However, Terrac concluded that numerous difficulties remained regarding this subject. The adjunct administrator noted that in future tours of the area, he hoped to change Maam Cerno's mind about the establishment of a French school.

Only a few months after Terrac's tour of Darou Mousty in December 1930, Macodou Sall felt it necessary to address a letter to the governor of Senegal to support further his claim over Darou Mousty. The chief recounted the history of the services that his family had rendered to the French and in particular, his own work. He made it clear that the transfer was in reality a dangerous affront to his prestige as a colonial chief. Furthermore, Macodou Sall openly stated that the forces behind the attempted transfer were not solely of a religious nature. He informed the governor that the former chief of Baol, M'Bakhane Diop, had played an important role in instigating the transfer. Macodou Sall stated that the son of Lat Joor had never forgiven the Sall family for having served the French against his father. Macodou Sall concluded his remarks by reminding the lieutenant governor that M'Bakhane Diop had become a Murid and an ally of Muhammadu Moustapha.³² The chief of Guet thus saw a link between the religious and political motivations behind the transfer.

Political conflicts over Darou Mousty even divided members of the Sall family. In 1931, the French received a report that Macodou Sall, Massamba Sall, and Maam Cerno were involved in tax fraud. The charges had been filed with the governor by Meissa M'Baye Sall, a relative of Macodou and Massamba Sall and the senior chief in the neighboring cercle of Tivaouane. According to Meissa M'Baye, Maam Cerno had opposed the transfer of Darou Mousty not because he was on bad terms with Muhammadu Moustapha but because it was in his immediate interest to remain in the cercle of Louga. He accused his cousins, Macodou Sall and Massamba Sall, with Maam Cerno's consent, of only recording a quarter of the actual population for the official census. They were also accused of only counting a quarter of all of the domestic animals in the province. In his view, the three notables were thus only delivering to the colonial administration one-quarter of the actual taxes collected in the region by the chiefs and were dividing the remainder among themselves. Meissa M'Baye estimated that each of the notables were earning no less than 50,000 francs each year in this manner. He further deemed that it was necessary to send a European functionary to Darou Mousty to take an accurate census of the people and animals.

On December 2, 1931, Beurnier informed Terrac of the accusations raised by Meissa M'Baye. The commandant was requested to send the most qualified

of his subordinates with a trusted interpreter to assess the truth of whether or not the census figures had been tampered with. The revision of the figures was to be done without the knowledge of the two chiefs and the marabout.³³ The investigation, however, did not turn up any evidence to support Meissa M'Baye's accusations. Macodou Sall retained his post, and there were no actions taken against Maam Cerno. It is most likely that Meissa M'Baye was acting alone in this matter. Even though Meissa M'Baye and Macodou Sall were cousins, their quarrel in 1919 over the appointment of a canton chief for Darou Mousty had evidently soured their relationship. The appointment of Macodou Sall's younger brother to this very important post had denied Meissa M'Baye the chance to appoint a canton chief for Darou Mousty that would be loyal to him. Meissa M'Baye's accusations against Macodou Sall, Massamba Sall, and Maam Cerno can be seen as his attempt at revenge against his cousins. Additionally, if Macodou and Massamba Sall were removed from office due to tax fraud, Meissa M'Baye might have been able to replace them with his own partisans.

Throughout the 1930–31 transfer debate, it is quite plain that the M'Backé family of Darou Mousty and the chief of Guet province maintained very cordial relations with each other as witnessed in a letter written on August 21, 1932, by Muhammadu Habib M'Backé, a son of Maam Cerno, to Macodou Sall. Muhammadu Habib stated that he considered Macodou Sall as a father and always wanted to remain close to him. He explained that he was writing the letter because Maam Cerno was stricken with a case of malaria, but made it known that the chief could always count on the loyalty of his father and the entire family in Darou Mousty.³⁴

The issues raised during the 1930 transfer debate did not disappear after the decision was made to maintain the status quo, as witnessed in the following postscript. In 1937, Macodou Sall alerted the commandant of Louga of a new attempt by Muhammadu Moustapha to take control of Darou Mousty. The chief stated that the Murid khalifah-général had recently declared that he would leave no stone unturned and would use all possible means, direct or indirect, to bring Maam Cerno and Darou Mousty under his authority. Macodou Sall further claimed that Muhammadu Moustapha was planning on evicting the population surrounding Darou Mousty and replacing them with his own disciples who would retain their loyalty to Touba. If this happened, Macodou Sall claimed that Maam Cerno would once again be obligated to abandon Darou Mousty.

The chief also accused Muhammadu Moustapha of seeking to create a "Murid kingdom" that would have to incorporate the "dissident religious faction" in Darou Mousty in order to be complete.³⁵ Part of this process would have to include the dismemberment of Guet province, which its chief was obviously opposed to. He claimed that such an action would diminish the administrative prestige that he has held for more than thirty-five years in the eyes of a population "devoted to the French cause." In Macodou Sall's opinion,

it was necessary to make known to the Murid khalifah-général in Touba that “*the mosque is one thing—the administration is another.*”³⁶ The chief closed his letter by reminding the commandant of the cercle of the decision made in 1930–31 to maintain the status quo.

The attempt to transfer Darou Mousty in the 1930s to a different administrative region was a manifestation of African political and religious rivalries within the French colony of Senegal that obliterated the old divide between the *sëriñ* and the *ceddo* as opponents and revealed important divisions within the Murid order and the French colonial administration. The modern political environment of the colony provoked a reorientation of the political and religious landscape and the production of a new set of alliances. Although the French certainly were concerned with strengthening their control over Darou Mousty, the course of the transfer debates continually revolve around the political and religious ramifications of the move. If the transfer were to be undertaken, the political authority of an important chief, Macodou Sall, would be ruined. Maam Cerno’s threat to leave the town would have greatly disrupted the lives of the region’s inhabitants who depended on the town for their material and religious needs. A successful transfer was an unlikely option for the French. The only benefits would have gone to Muhammadu Moustapha, if he could resettle the region with his own followers, and M’Bakhane Diop who could claim his revenge for his father’s death due to the Sall family and possibly gain Guet for himself. The decision to maintain the status quo was, therefore, a logical alternative for the French.

The Murid informants in Darou Mousty that I consulted for this study knew little about the details of the transfer debate of the 1930s. They did, however, have general insights into the relations among Maam Cerno and Macodou Sall, Muhammadu Moustapha, and M’Bakhane Diop. One of Maam Cerno’s sons explained his father’s aversion to having Darou Mousty transferred to Diourbel by noting the problems Maam Cerno had encountered in the cercle from 1895 to 1907 when a number of Murids under Maam Cerno’s care had been killed in clashes with Fulbe herdsmen. According to this oral source, when Maam Cerno took the case to court in Diourbel, M’Bakhane Diop, the provincial chief of eastern Diourbel at the time, ensured that the ruling of the court went against Maam Cerno and the Murids. After the defeat in court, according to Maam Cerno’s son, Maam Cerno pledged to leave Diourbel and never to return.³⁷ It is evident from this perspective that Maam Cerno preserved the memory of M’Bakhane Diop’s role in the affair even after M’Bakhane Diop became a Murid. Maam Cerno most likely saw M’Bakhane’s claim to be a disciple of Muhammadu Moustapha as a convenient alliance between the chief and the khalifah-général in which each aided the other in pursuit of their respective goals. Muhammadu Moustapha’s relationship with M’Bakhane Diop thus played a role in Maam Cerno’s resistance to the transfer.

The Death of Maam Cerno and World War II



Figure 5.1. The mausoleum of Maam Cerno in Darou Mousty. Photo by author, 1997.

Maam Cerno died on August 26, 1943, at 10 A.M. and was buried that night.³⁸ He was interred in Darou Mousty in a large mausoleum that, since his death, has become an important pilgrimage site for Murids across Senegal. He was succeeded by his son, Sēriñ Muhammadu Awa Balla M'Backé, who became the khalifah of Darou Mousty. Malik Cissé's only reference to the death of Maam Cerno acknowledged that even though Maam Cerno was no longer in Darou Mousty, his ideals and practices continued to guide the town.³⁹ If anything, the death of Maam Cerno increased the importance of the town as a holy place due to the presence of Maam Cerno's tomb, which became an important monument of collective identity for his followers.

The first major concern of the new khalifah was seeing the town through the hardships caused by World War II. Although the oral and written sources are rather scanty concerning Darou Mousty from 1940 to 1945, it is evident that the town had suffered greatly due to the contributions it was forced to make in manpower and food first to the Vichy government and later to de Gaulle's Free French administration. In the course of an interview with a colonial inspector named Abou Sar Lalla in 1947, the sons of Maam Cerno

stated that the “massive requisitions” made by the French on Darou Mousty’s granaries had strained the otherwise good relationship between Maam Cerno and the colonial administration during the last two years of his life.⁴⁰ In particular, the demands made in 1942 by the Vichy government of Marshal Pétain were cited as being especially difficult. Baay Moustapha Mayacine Joob stated in an interview that Taif Joob, a satellite village of Darou Mousty founded by his father, Sēriñ Mayacine Joob, was actually abandoned during World War II due to the requisitions being made by the French. Taif Joob was later resettled after the war.⁴¹ The demands made upon Darou Mousty and its surrounding villages thus appear to have been greater than those made during World War I in view of the more serious effects exhibited. In part, this is due to the greater degree of French control of the region that had especially come about in the wake of the 1930 transfer debate. Resentment of the requisitions, like those of World War I, still remains in the oral traditions of the intellectuals of Darou Mousty that are quick to cite the figures and the fact that the Murids were never compensated as promised.⁴² Abou Sar Lalla was told that Maam Cerno had even considered leaving the area to try and escape the French demands, but due to his advanced age and the large number of his followers, he decided to remain in Darou Mousty.⁴³ Although the town did weather the war years, within a year after the end of the war, Darou Mousty would face another threat to its existence in the form of a second attempt to transfer the town from Louga to Diourbel.

The Rattachement Debate of 1946–47

The causes behind the second attempt made by the colonial administration to transfer Darou Mousty to Diourbel differed from those that had led to the first attempt in the 1930s. The religious rivalry that had so characterized the first attempt had greatly subsided after the deaths of Maam Cerno in 1943 and Muhammadou Moustapha in 1945. Although Macodou Sall was still alive and remained chief of Guet province, his old rival, M’Bakhane Diop had also died during World War II. The main impetus for the transfer attempt in 1946–47 was the economic importance of Darou Mousty and its commercial links to Diourbel. However, as in the 1930s, the M’Backé family of Darou Mousty and its political ally, Macodou Sall, stood together in opposition to the transfer.

The transfer debate of 1946–47 began in May 1946 when Thiellement, commandant of the cercle of Diourbel, sent the governor a complaint that traders from Darou Mousty who traveled to Diourbel refused to pay taxes there while the traders from Diourbel had to pay the taxes to ship merchandise to Louga.⁴⁴ According to the commandant, the issue had been a source of perpetual conflict. In fact, his complaints echoed those of his predecessor in 1930 regarding the economic ties between Darou Mousty and Diourbel.

In September, the president of the chamber of commerce of Cayor-Baol, U. Perpère, endorsed the idea of transferring Darou Mousty and its surrounding villages to Diourbel, citing reasons of economic and geographic convenience. The commercial aspects of the transfer argument were further revealed when, on October 5, a petition was drawn up and signed by nineteen “notables” and merchants of Darou Mousty pledging their support for the transfer of the town to Diourbel to better accommodate commerce. Five Lebanese merchants signed as well as four local merchants. This petition was incidentally forwarded to the governor by the new chief administrator of Diourbel, Capela, who threw his support behind the signers and summarized their arguments. Capela noted the distance between Louga and Darou Mousty, the tax discrepancy, the difficulties transporting goods to and from Louga and Darou Mousty, and the resistance of Macodou Sall to the transfer.

The khalifah of Darou Mousty, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla M’Backé, and his brothers were aware that such a petition was being made by some of the residents of Darou Mousty and acted quickly to assert their own position regarding the transfer. One day after the petition had been signed, the sons of Maam Cerno wrote their own letter to the governor stating their position on the matter. The main points of this letter were as follows. First, due to all kinds of difficulties in Baol (Diourbel), Maam Cerno had been obliged to move and settle in a neutral area [Cayor] earlier in this century. Second, Baol had no claim on the territory of Darou Mousty that included more than eighty villages, most of which were established by Maam Cerno. Third, the agricultural wealth of the region of Darou Mousty was a source of great attraction to the *maisons de commerce* of Diourbel, and these businesses started the transfer debate to better control the millet and peanuts produced in the area surrounding Darou Mousty. Fourth, the people of Cayor and Njambur faced different problems than those of Baol, and the two peoples could never understand one another. Fifth, the men from Darou Mousty who had previously written letters to support the transfer were not qualified to speak for the town. They were former students who were brought to Darou Mousty by Maam Cerno and were now troublemakers. The Syrian-Lebanese merchants who had also taken actions supporting the move were foreigners who also caused trouble. They tried by their actions to provoke divisions within the independent body of the town. Furthermore, the attitudes of those supporting the transfer were contrary to the political views of the rest of the town and would result in complications. Sixth, as natives of Cayor, Darou Mousty solicited nothing from Baol and had maintained its existence independent of Baol. Due to the bad experiences of Maam Cerno, his family, and his followers during their sojourn in the cercle of Baol (Diourbel), they were now obliged to insist to be allowed to remain in the cercle of Louga.

The letter was dated October 6, 1946, and was signed in French and Arabic by ten of the leading members of the M’Backé family. The first signature was

that of the khalifah of Darou Mousty, Sëriñ Amadu (Modou) Awa Balla M'Backé. The other signers were Sëriñ Amadu Habib M'Backé, Sëriñ Shaykh M'Backé, Sëriñ Abdou Quddüs M'Backé, Sëriñ Muhammdu M'Backé, Sëriñ Ousman M'Backé, Sëriñ Habibu M'Backé, Sëriñ Shaykh M'Backé, Sëriñ Umar M'Backé, and Sëriñ Oumssatou M'Backé.⁴⁵

The letter was delivered to the commandant of Louga, Augais, who passed it on to the governor in a letter of his own dated October 8. In his letter, Augais admitted that many of the notables and inhabitants of Darou Mousty supported the proposal to transfer the town to Diourbel; however, contrary to the earlier petition, he claimed that the Syrian-Lebanese merchants saw neither advantage nor inconvenience in the transfer. Yet, he did concur that the religious leaders of Darou Mousty were very opposed to the idea. The commandant concluded that the economic benefits of the transfer for Diourbel were real, especially in tax revenues. He was certain, however, that the khalifah of Darou Mousty, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla M'Backé, would leave the region with all of his family and followers if Darou Mousty was placed within the administrative boundaries of Diourbel. He believed that the real reason behind the protransfer faction in Darou Mousty was the water problem of the town that had not yet been resolved by the administration in Louga. The quality of the water from the existing wells was very poor and deeper mechanized wells were needed. The commandant closed the letter with the promise of a future report concerning the water supply of the town.⁴⁶

On October 16, another petition supporting the transfer was drafted on the part of "The Notables, The Village Chief, The Veterans, and the Merchants of Darou Mousty." However, this second petition was actually drawn up in M'Backé-Baol, in the cercle of Diourbel, and sent to the governor by Capela, the commandant of Diourbel. The origin of this petition lends credence to Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla's claim that various interests in Diourbel were the real instigators of the transfer debate. The petition included the usual list of reasons supporting the transfer. The distance to Louga, the lack of a good water supply, and problems with transportation and travel to the town were cited.⁴⁷

Later in October, the commandant of Louga sent a follow-up report to the governor. Augais described the situation from economic and political points of view. Economically, he stated that Maam Cerno's family controlled vast tracts of agricultural land between Darou Mousty and Touba that produced peanuts and millet in abundance. Augais believed that if the khalifah of Darou Mousty, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla M'Backé, were to abandon these fields it would be a great loss to him. However, the loss would not be limited to the khalifah. These same fields had earlier been described on numerous occasions by the administration as the breadbasket of the cercle. The commandant's political point of view focused on the tomb of Maam Cerno located in Darou Mousty. By 1946, the tomb had become a very important pilgrimage destination, which drew Murid disciples from all parts of Senegal, including

Dakar and St. Louis. In Augais's opinion, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla would be very hard pressed to abandon the tomb.⁴⁸

Augais even tried to place the current transfer debate within the larger historical context. The commandant of Louga noted the character of the founder of Darou Mousty. Augais described Maam Cerno as "a highly educated marabout of irreproachable conduct."⁴⁹ He referred to the troubles between Darou Mousty and Touba that had developed in the wake of Amadu Bamba's death: "At the death of the Grand Sëriñ [Amadu Bamba], Ibra Faty [Maam Cerno] hoped to inherit the succession and take the title of the Khalifat of the Mourides. The designation of Moustapha M'Backé was a great disappointment for him. From that moment on, his relations with the Mourides of Touba (Diourbel) ceased almost completely. He confined himself to Darou Mousty and made it a very important center for study and cultivation, particularly that of peanuts."⁵⁰ Maam Cerno's descendants were described by Augais as enjoying complete autonomy vis-à-vis the khalifah-général in Touba "to whom they did not send a dime." In Augais's opinion, if Darou Mousty were transferred to Diourbel, Darou Mousty would not only lose its independence but Maam Cerno's family would lose thousands of francs as well in the form of tithes to the khalifah-générale. Another person and a participant in the 1930 transfer debate who figured prominently in Augais's reasoning was Macodou Sall who once again considered a transfer of Darou Mousty as an amputation of his authority as a colonial chief.

In November, the president of the chamber of commerce of St. Louis, L. Lesian, entered into the debate with his own opinions expressed in a letter to the governor. Lesian stated that the original reasons for placing Darou Mousty within the confines of Cayor, and later Louga, had been purely political, and that if the transfer was achieved it would risk provoking the followers of Maam Cerno, which he added, it would be wise to avoid. He did acknowledge the economic ties that linked Darou Mousty to Diourbel due to the reliance of Darou Mousty's merchants on the market there and the difficulties of the relative isolation of the town within the cercle of Louga. His solution was not to transfer Darou Mousty to Diourbel but to apply more flexible measures of control and economic interaction on the part of the cercle of Diourbel. In his view, the change of administrative boundaries was unnecessary and would be counterproductive.⁵¹

By December 9, 1946, the governor had made a decision against the transfer. Capela, the commandant of Diourbel, immediately addressed a letter to his superior in protest. He now cited the political consequences of allowing Darou Mousty to remain in Louga. He claimed that Murid shaykh had signaled him that "a certain agitation" would emerge in the region as a result of the decision not to transfer Darou Mousty. In addition, Capela stated that the Murids did not yet know of the governor's decision but were already distressed over the lack of movement toward the transfer. He accused Macodou Sall of using political intrigues to stall the process and stated that

the Murids were also planning a campaign of protest against the chief of Guet province.

As a result of Capela's letter, the governor, Oswald Durand, cabled the commandant of Louga warning him of this supposed threat of Murid insurrection and instructed him to make an urgent report on his knowledge of this subject. On December 20, after having studied the report sent to him from Louga and weighing the advice of all concerned, Durand decided to abide by his initial decision against the transfer. Additionally, he stated that he refused to carry out the transfer simply to satisfy "particular interests." These particular interests were undoubtedly those in Diourbel who supported the transfer.

Capela, however, would not give up pressing the issue. On January 21, 1947, he sent a telegram to the governor that included a report of a tour of Darou Mousty made by one of Capela's inspectors.⁵² In a brief note preceding the report, the commandant proposed "to create in this metropolitan area, inhabited by lettered and disciplined Muslims, a *commune de plein exercice*, that would be a part of the cercle of Diourbel, with no allegiance to the canton of Lâ in Diourbel."⁵³ The tour of Darou Mousty was made by Abou Sar Lalla, inspector of products and chief of Diourbel-Gossas Sectors. His goal was to provide Capela with information supporting the transfer of Darou Mousty to Diourbel. Notably, Abou Sar Lalla first met with the sons of Maam Cerno during the annual *magal*, or pilgrimage, to Touba. Maam Cerno's sons were participating in the *magal* and were visiting with the second khalifah-générale, Sëriñ Falilou M'Backé and his brother, Sëriñ Bassirou M'Backé, when Abou Sar Lalla first spoke with them. Sëriñ Falilou was a son of Amadu Bamba and had succeeded Sëriñ Muhammadu Moustapha as khalifah-général of the Murid order upon the latter's death in 1945. As evidenced by the cordial visit between the sons of Maam Cerno and the new khalifah-générale, relations between Darou Mousty and Touba were better than the tense relations that had existed between Maam Cerno and Sëriñ Muhammadu Moustapha. This first interview with the sons of Maam Cerno was followed with a second the next evening in Darou Mousty.

During the meeting at Darou Mousty, the khalifah of the town, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla, stated that he could not give a definitive answer to the question of the transfer without consulting the taalibe. The khalifah of Darou Mousty also displayed the considerable diplomatic abilities that had so distinguished his father. Without any mention of the political or economic ramifications of the proposed transfer, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla explained that it was his moral scruples that prevented him from approving of the transfer because his father had ardently resisted the move until his death. In his view, any action taken by him or his brothers toward the transfer would be a stain on the memory of their father and mark them as unworthy to be his children.

Furthermore, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla cited the close relationship that had existed between his father and the chief of the province, Macodou Sall, as

another obstacle to his approval of the transfer. The khalifah told Abou Sar Lalla he could take no action against Macodou Sall because he had been his father's moral support, particularly due to the influence that he enjoyed within the colonial administration. He considered any approval of the transfer on his part to be an act of disloyalty to his father and one of his chief confidants, Macodou Sall. Sēriñ Modou Awa Balla maintained that these moral reasons were the sole obstacles to his approval of the transfer. In a final statement, the khalifah concluded, "Otherwise, how could we reject the consideration and the benevolent interest that has always been shown to us by the Commandant of Diourbel, and in particular from our cousins in Baol whose home is the spiritual capital of our religious sect."⁵⁴

Darou Mousty's water supply was also a matter of concern for the inspector. He visited two wells and the *forages*, or mechanized wells. These early forages were not the large pumps that the French would later build in the town but smaller apparatus. Abou Sar Lalla had spoken with two young French technicians who were trying to repair the forages that had not been in operation for more than a month. He reported that they could not hide their consternation with the problems that they were dealing with regarding the pumps. The water from the wells had a foul odor and was dark in color. Emaciated horses pulled the cables that carried the water to the surface, sometimes from a depth of 180 meters.

In his conclusion to the report, Abou Sar Lalla provided his opinion of the situation and the future course of action that should be taken. At the forefront of his argument was a program of economic development for Darou Mousty that would accompany the transfer. The improvement of the wells was of absolute necessity to ensure the future of the town. Regarding the transfer of the town, Abou Sar Lalla stated that although the governor's conscience may be tempted to agree with the moral arguments of the khalifah of Darou Mousty, the economic factors of the transfer should be a far more powerful influence on his decision. In the opinion of the inspector, the economic life of the region far outweighed the interests and prestige of the M'Backé family of Darou Mousty or the question of the amputation of an important part of the province of Guet. Capela and the commercial interests of Diourbel undoubtedly shared this view. However, the tour failed to change the governor's mind and once again, an attempt to transfer Darou Mousty to Diourbel failed.

In the wake of the second transfer attempt, Darou Mousty was once again drawn closer to the administration and its modernization schemes with rewards for both sides. As a result of Abou Sar Lalla's report, the colonial administration began the construction of a large mechanized pumping station complete with a reservoir on the southern edge of Darou Mousty. The project was finished late in 1949 and an inauguration ceremony was held in the town on January 1, 1950. A photograph was taken of the occasion that has been preserved in Darou Mousty. It has been enlarged and nicely framed and is

displayed proudly in a room in the Maam Cerno Center. In the photograph, the sons of Maam Cerno, led by Sēriñ Modou Awa Balla, are at the sides of the high commissioner of French West Africa, Paul Béchard (waving his left arm and smiling). The second khalifah-général of the Murid order, Sēriñ Falilou M'Backé, and his brother Sēriñ Bassirou M'Backé are also present and in the company of the sons of Maam Cerno and Béchard. The photograph also contains numerous other Murid notables and colonial administrators and functionaries. Absent from the colonial documents surrounding this period is an equally important construction project in Darou Mousty. In 1948, under the orders of Sēriñ Modou Awa Balla, a grand mosque was constructed in the center of the town. The grand mosque's four towering minarets still dominate the skyline of Darou Mousty and can be seen for miles around. The two structures, the forage and the mosque, symbolize important aspects of the symbiosis that came to characterize the relationship between Darou Mousty, and the Murid order at large, and the French colonial administration. The pumping station was a modern improvement that was welcomed by both sides. The French could see the forage as a success for the civilizing mission and the Murids could consider it a well-earned reward and validation from God for their own mission. The grand mosque, meanwhile, was uniquely a Murid symbol that reinforced the underlying sense of direction for the community and served as a collective monument by which Maam Cerno's followers could identify themselves and their place in the religious and historical landscape of Senegambia.



Figure 5.2. The forage of Darou Mousty. Photo by author, 1997.



Figure 5.3. The grand mosque of Darou Mousty. Photo by author, 1997.

Conclusion

Earlier, it was argued that Amadu Bamba's inception of the Murid order was a movement to achieve a new synthesis of Islamic reform and Sufism for the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With the French conquest and the establishment of colonial rule, the Murid synthesis had to contend with a different thread of modernization that, as has been shown, initially clashed with Murid conceptions of modernity. The relationship that developed between the order and the French in the wake of World War I has justifiably been characterized as one of accommodation. In Darou Mousty's case, this accommodation was continually negotiated rather than imposed by one side or the other. In fact, one can speak of a mutual accommodation or even a kind of symbiosis that came to exist between the two sides. This relationship largely existed, however, at a distance to the advantage and disadvantage of Darou Mousty.

On their part, the French needed the Murids of Darou Mousty to promote agricultural productivity and ensure the success of a cash crop economy in peanuts. Just as important, the French also came to rely on Maam Cerno and his community to provide material support to the population and a sense of social order in areas outside of meaningful French control. In the absence of French administrators and the infrequent tours of colonial chiefs, a network in Cayor of Murid shaykh and taalibe linked to the overall hierarchy of the order culminating in Maam Cerno in Darou Mousty provided a conduit for the exertion of French power and influence. Whether it was military conscription, labor recruitment, tax collection, or simply the maintenance of peace and order, Maam Cerno and his followers became a vital part of the colonial venture serving as a kind of invisible or unofficial bureaucracy that connected the commoner to the colonial state. As a result, many of the French successes in the region came to depend on the Murids.

On their part, the Murids of Darou Mousty benefited from the position that they had achieved in the social and political environment of the colony. Whether the French relegated even reluctantly this intermediary relationship to the Murids or they preserved this position on their own accord to maintain some autonomy for themselves, the era after World War I sometimes characterized as the "age of administrative empire" witnessed a huge growth in the numbers of Murids. The French colony proved to be fertile ground for Amadu Bamba's message of reform and Sufi devotion. However, the Murids of Darou Mousty were not supreme. In the political environment of the colony, Darou Mousty came to rely on its local and regional colonial chiefs, Masamba and Macodou Sall, and by extension to its respective French administrator located in Tivaouane and later in Louga. The transfer debate is an excellent example of how the Murids on both sides of the issue exploited their connections to their respective colonial chiefs and French administrators to advance and defend their interests. Maam Cerno most definitely

needed the support and voice of Macodou Sall within the administration as his intermediary with the French and, by extension, the backing of the French provincial official to preserve his autonomy from Touba and Diourbel. Maam Cerno's actions in this case were not against the colonial state per se. His reliance on the Salls and the administrator of Louga, in fact, helped to further solidify the connection between Darou Mousty and the colony albeit by a particular conduit more advantageous to Maam Cerno.

The building of the symbiotic relationship between Darou Mousty and the colonial state was accomplished and justified by the Murids through further development of a Murid discourse of modernity. Colonial requirements and duties were translated by Murid shaykh and taalibe into *ndigal*, or religious obligations on the part of a disciple to a master. Material changes in terms of new technologies and the accumulation of wealth from involvement in the production of peanuts were interpreted not as validations of la mission civilatrice and French efforts of modernization but as divine affirmation of the Murid mission in the form of material rewards bestowed upon the community. The Murid discourse of modernity while rooted in the past was flexible enough to incorporate these changes as they evolved. This evolution among the common taalibe of Darou Mousty as it is reflected in their oral narratives is the subject of chapter 6.

6

MURID TAALIBE

HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND IDENTITY

Introduction

In his influential book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson examined the emergence of Western nationalism as a cultural artifact that was spawned as the result of the coming together of different historical forces.¹ It was *imagined* because the community was so large that not all of the members knew each other and therefore had to trust in a common image or ideal that bound them together in the absence of personal relationships. It was a *community* because in spite of individual differences and inequalities within the group, a feeling of belonging in an ultimately egalitarian sense existed among all members of the group. Anderson identified the spread of a capitalist print media in various European vernacular languages, as opposed to Latin, as instrumental in the formation of the English, French, Spanish, and other imagined communities. His analysis positioned books, newspapers, and religious tracts in the vernacular as the medium by which the speakers of different dialects of the same general language began to see themselves as related and started to identify with each other as English, French, Spanish, and such. This chapter considers the extent to which the Murid order is an imagined community and how, as an artifact of sorts, it was built and has been maintained as such by its members. In our case, a vital “medium” by which this imagined community has been built and sustained is the preservation, transmission, and accompanying interpretation by Murids of the life histories of the original taalibe who founded Darou Mousty in 1912.

The presentation of the following life histories poses many challenges and raises important questions. To what extent, for example, can we consider the oral testaments of the descendants of the early settlers to be authentic accounts of their fathers’ lives? On the other hand, how much of the information that was put forward was invented either consciously or unconsciously in reflection of the informants’ own self-consciousness and their views of their

fathers and the Murid order? Do the informants celebrate their father's or objectify them? Aside from this issue, the oral accounts also reflect the divergences and intersections between individual memory and identity and collective memory and identity. A portrait of Murid identity emerges from this overview that is marked by its complexity and consciousness. This consciousness is at once part of the past and present; it is informed by history and simultaneously a part of history. It is a consciousness of individuals and the Murid collective: the local and the global. Most importantly, this consciousness on the part of Murid taalibe constitutes an important link in the production of Murid modernity and situates the original settlers of Darou Mousty as heroes participating in changes of historical importance.

In a less theoretical context, the simple act of collecting and presenting the life histories of ordinary Murid taalibe helps to fill an important gap within our knowledge of the Murid order. Although much is known and has been written about Amadu Bamba, the principal leaders of the order, and their notable descendents, scholars have generally not studied the common Murid *taalibe*, or disciples, as individuals. This chapter presents a view of the Muridiyya from the bottom in order to illuminate a crucial segment of the Sufi order as represented by the original settlers of Darou Mousty. Such an approach lends support to Leonardo Villalon's questioning of the popular belief that Murid taalibe are completely subservient to their shaykh.² Villalon, a political scientist, has criticized the acceptance of Sufi ideology regarding the disciple-master relationship by researchers at face value without the support of research and fieldwork in Murid communities that reveals a more complex and fluid reality for this relationship in which both sides exercise agency and choice. Villalon did not dismiss the importance of the relationship, yet he legitimately questioned the degree to which the Murids have been described as an exceptional case. The life histories of the initial Murid pioneers of Darou Mousty examined below lend much credence to the value of questioning popularly accepted views of the Murid disciple-master relationship that have been influenced by old colonial stereotypes. At first glance, the narratives of the taalibe may seem to confirm the primacy of Murid shaykh and reinforce the image of dutiful Murid disciples. However, the Murid descriptions of the attributes of shaykh and taalibe are utilized by the informants as part of a discursive strategy that seeks to interpret aspects of Murid identity for their audience. In fact, the narratives of the taalibe reveal a relationship between Murid masters and disciples that was indeed fluid and negotiable.

Murid Identity and Amadu Bamba

In their religious origins, the Murid disciples who broke ground at Darou Mousty were already Muslims when they made the decision to follow the

Murid path. Conversion to Islam was therefore not a major factor in this decision; rather reform and revival under the Sufi rubric of the Muridiyya lay at the heart of the choice to follow the path of Amadu Bamba. A change in Sufi affiliation was, conversely, an important factor. Many of the new disciples were drawn from the oldest tariqa in Senegambia, the Qadiriyya, and from the more popular ascending order, the Tijaniyya. The Muridiyya was itself an offshoot of the Qadiriyya, and Amadu Bamba had been introduced to the ritual prayer formulas of the order by his father whose scholarly reputation eclipsed any reputation that he may have held as a Sufi. It fell upon Amadu Bamba to pursue advanced studies in mysticism, and in his scholarly travels, he also was initiated into the Tijani wurd and that of the Shadhili, thus following the example of many shaykh before him in accumulating multiple wurd of various Sufi orders. He maintained his contact with the Qadiriyya through his host during his Mauritanian exile, Shaykh Sidiyya Baba.

Even though Amadu Bamba did promote a wurd specific to the Muridiyya, he maintained that any could join the order using one of the other wurd of the other orders in an indication of the compatibility and links between the Muridiyya and the other Sufi orders of Senegambia. Therefore, when one became a Murid, it did not necessarily require a renunciation of a prior order and its wurd. Amadu Bamba even recommended reciting the Murid wurd with one of the others.³ If the ideology of the Murid order was so accommodating of the other Sufi ways, what was it about the order that compelled so many to declare their allegiance to this relatively new path. The answer lies in the person, or characterization, of Amadu Bamba and the role he came to play in the tariqa. As mentioned previously, like other great Sufi saints, Amadu Bamba had claimed to have seen a vision of the Prophet Muhammad while awake, during which he had been confirmed as the *qutb al-zaman*. This distinction as the “pole of the age” around which events would revolve was also not unique to Amadu Bamba. The notion that God appointed certain leaders to guide the *ummah*, or community of believers, for a certain period was not unique to West Africa; rather it was a widely held Sufi belief that dated back centuries and even had developed a centennial aspect in that the qutb was anticipated to appear at the turning of the centuries according to the Islamic calendar. The fourteenth century after the hijra began in 1882 C.E., the year after Amadu Bamba’s father had died and the year that he definitively set out on his own path.

Yet, it was most likely Amadu Bamba’s local Senegambian pedigree that when combined with his status as the master of the age and his reputation for miracles acted to set him apart from the other notable Sufi shaykh of his time. The archivist of Darou Mousty, cited previously, attached great importance to the Senegambian heritage of the Murid order by stating at one point, “Amadu Bamba created a place for the blacks within Islam.”⁴ The poet Ibrahima Joob Massar expressed a similar sentiment with the lines, “I no longer need either Baghdad or Fez / On seeing Jolof, I submitted entirely.”⁵ In this short poem,

Baghdad represents the Qadiriyya, the first Sufi order to arrive in West Africa, and Fez represents the Tijaniyya order that rose to prominence in Senegal in the nineteenth century and remains the largest Sufi order in the country today. In a Senegalese sense, the two cities symbolize the foreign or Arab origins of the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya versus the indigenous Muridiyya signified by Jolof.

Although these statements may be an expression of a sort of religious nationalism, the importance of such attitudes cannot be ignored in distinguishing the Murid imagined community from the other Sufi orders led by members of Amadu Bamba's generation. On the one hand, this sentiment in favor of an indigenous Sufi order could be a reaction against what was popularly and officially perceived to be the elevated and purer status of the *bidan*, or white, Islam of the Arabs of Mauritania.⁶ On the other hand, the shift in allegiance to the Murid order can also be understood as a critique of the older orders in terms of their perceived historical association with precolonial secular authorities or their involvement in the politics of armed jihad.⁷ Of course, the manner in which Murid beliefs and practices reflected to an extent the local social milieu and provided a new legitimacy to some Wolof cultural practices also accounted for the emphasis on a local identity for the order among Murids.

Rejection of the Arab orders that had formed the basis of precolonial Senegambian Islam was important in the process of defining one's position within the new colonial society. The Murid *daara*, or settlement, was not only a sanctuary but also a means by which a Muslim could gain a new role in society as a follower of Amadu Bamba. As a taalibe, the disciple found a home, work, education, and most importantly a means to enter Paradise after death. The order also sought to overcome some of the social divisions present in Wolof society to create a greater sense of equality among the adepts.

Murid Identity and Wolof Social Divisions

As briefly discussed in chapter 1, one of the primary divisions within Wolof society was between the *ñeeño*, or occupationally specialized groups, and the *géér*, or those who were not a part of these groups. Many scholars have referred to the occupationally specialized groups in West Africa as *castes* due to their inferior and inherited status in society. Organized around specific occupations such as iron working, leather working, and praise singing, the *tëgg* (blacksmiths), *uude* (leatherworkers), and *gewël* (praise singers or bards, also known popularly as *griots*) families practiced their crafts and lived separately from the *géér*. The *ñeeño* and the *géér* were endogamous and can be identified by their family names.⁸

The formation of Murid identity thus had to contend with the position of the *ñeeño* groups within the order. From an Islamic point of view, all believers

were equal; however, the reality of Murid existence in Wolof society necessitated a compromise that preserved the Islamic, and by extension the Murid, ideal while acknowledging the distinctions between the *ñeeño* and the *géér*. Questions regarding the *ñeeño* of Darou Mousty were posed to Murid intellectuals and several of the descendants of the original taalibe. Baay Cerno Job, a descendant of an original settler of Darou Mousty, responded to a question regarding the social status of the *ñeeño* taalibe during the early years of the town by stating, “At the time of Maam Cerno, one could not distinguish the griots (bards), the blacksmiths, or the slaves from the others because each worked for Allah, and on the path which goes toward Allah, there are no differences of skin or status, only the recommendations [of Allah] counted.”⁹ His reply stressed the ideological role of Islam in suppressing the differences between the occupationally specialized groups, the slaves (or former slaves), and the free. Moreover, whether or not the answer was totally accurate, it does inform us about the egalitarian ideals that the members of the community wished to pursue relative to precolonial Wolof social structures. The primacy of Islam in the formation of Murid identity was echoed by Sëriñ Modou M’Backé Barry who, in a reply to a question concerning Murid attitudes toward the *ñeeño*, said, “Maam Cerno did not see a lot of importance in the backgrounds of the taalibe. For him, what counted was the love of Allah, his master, on the right road conforming to the recommendations of the shari’a. On the contrary, he did not have relations with people who did not practice the shari’a.”¹⁰ Once again, religious concerns were considered to have precedence over ethnicity, social status, or occupational backgrounds within Murid ideology.

There is evidence to suggest that the Murids, in fact, recast the Wolof social divisions to fit the Murid mold. In response to a question regarding the nature of the occupational distinctions within the Murid order and Darou Mousty specifically, Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla replied that, “In the time of Maam Cerno, there were some problems with the *ñeeño* in the hearts of some taalibe, but each group of taalibe, according to their background, had its proper job. For example, the blacksmiths occupied themselves with iron working and the farmers with farming, etc.”¹¹ This more objective response noted the incompatibility between Wolof social divisions and Islam by referring to “the problems with the *ñeeño* in the hearts of some taalibe.” However, it is plain that these divisions continued as a natural aspect of Wolof society within a Murid town populated primarily by the Wolof. With the Murid emphasis on labor as an integral part of the overall Murid mission, the fact that each disciple had a particular job based on social status was easily accommodated within Murid ideology. Another descendant of an original taalibe, Baay Abdou Mawade Wade, held a very similar view. “Maam Cerno Birahim had taalibe who had different strengths in different trades or crafts. There were wood workers and carvers, blacksmiths, and shoemakers.”¹² From this point of view, the labor that each taalibe performed, whether farming or iron working, was

in service to Maam Cerno and Amadu Bamba and by extension to God. There was, therefore, a new underlying force for unity within Wolof society in a Murid settlement such as Darou Mousty that still maintained much of the pre-colonial social hierarchy. It is therefore possible to say that the Murids of Darou Mousty were trying to alter the basis for Wolof social hierarchy from precolonial notions of social status and occupational specialization to Sufi Islamic norms while still maintaining the hierarchy itself. This was an important part of the synthesis achieved by Amadu Bamba.

An alternative hierarchy based on Sufi Islamic ideology that focused on relations between disciples and masters was also present in Darou Mousty and existed alongside the older Wolof social distinctions. In fact, the disciple-master relationship fit rather well into existing Wolof patron-client relationships that had linked those without power to those with power, but once again, the Murids altered the basis for this relationship. Within the Murid community, there were two basic distinctions: *taalibe* and *shaykh*. The *taalibe* was technically a student who studied under and worked for a *shaykh* or a person of similar stature such as a *jawriñ*, or a lieutenant of a *shaykh*. The *shaykh* was one who had been instructed in the intellectual and mystical studies of the order and thus possessed a degree of symbolic capital. Each Murid *shaykh* was ordained as such by another *shaykh* of the order. A *shaykh* was authorized to teach *taalibe* and confirm other *shaykh*. However, all of the followers of Maam Cerno, regardless of their rank, were in essence *taalibe* of Maam Cerno and by extension, of Amadu Bamba. Likewise, all of Maam Cerno's disciples had entered his service as simple *taalibe*. The examination of the lives led by the original *taalibe* of Darou Mousty begins with a look at their backgrounds and how they came to place themselves under Maam Cerno's charge and to ultimately contribute to the formation of Murid identity.

The Origins of the Original Settlers of Darou Mousty

When Maam Cerno arrived at the cleared site that would become Darou Mousty, he was accompanied by sixty *taalibe*. Some of the *taalibe* had been in his company for quite some time and were simply following their *shaykh* to aid him in this new labor. As mentioned previously, all of the original settlers of Darou Mousty whose descendants were consulted for this study were Muslims prior to their involvement with Maam Cerno. Many had received their Quranic education under their families' guidance and had learned the rudiments of farming as well before joining Maam Cerno. Their motivations for placing themselves under Maam Cerno were varied, but most centered on the religious attraction or the symbolic capital exerted by the marabout.

Baay Kabou Gaye's account of his father's life is typical of many of the original *taalibe* who had served Maam Cerno prior to the establishment of Darou

Mousty. Sëriñ Modou Kharry Gaye was born in 1882 in the village of Kab-Gaye in Cayor and joined Maam Cerno in 1898 at the age of sixteen. He had heard Maam Cerno speaking in the village of Khabane in the region of Thiès and had immediately pledged himself to the marabout.¹³ Baay Kabou Gaye noted that his father, Sëriñ Modou Kharry Gaye, accompanied Maam Cerno when he moved from Baol to M'Backé-Cayor and was among the taalibe who searched with Maam Cerno for the site of Darou Mousty.¹⁴

Mor Jobou Syl had originally come from Taïba Syl. He became a taalibe of Maam Cerno in 1907 when the marabout was still living in Darou Marnane-Baol. Mor Jobou Syl accompanied Maam Cerno, Sëriñ Muhammadu Moustapha, Sëriñ M'Backé Bouso, Sëriñ Falilou, and Sëriñ Bassirou to visit Amadu Bamba who was still exiled in Mauritania until April 1907. After his return from Mauritania, Mor Jobou Syl remained one year in Darou Marnane-Baol. In 1908, he left Darou Marnane-Baol with Maam Cerno to resettle M'Backé-Cayor. Mor Jobou Syl lived with Maam Cerno in M'Backé-Cayor until Darou Mousty was established.¹⁵

For Modou Kharry Gaye and Mor Jobou Syl, economic motivations played no apparent role in their decisions to join the Murid order and become disciples of Maam Cerno. Both men became taalibe during very difficult times for the tariqa. Modou Kharry Gaye, in particular, would have shared in many of the hardships encountered by Maam Cerno during the exile of Amadu Bamba to Gabon. In their narratives, the descendants of both men emphasized the travels that each of their fathers made with Maam Cerno as he moved from one settlement to the next or visited Amadu Bamba in exile in Mauritania. Both of the original taalibe had thus earned important credentials due to their service to the Murid order prior to breaking ground at Darou Mousty. The allegorical nature of both men's histories when compared to popular representations of Maam Cerno's own life and labors are evident.

Some of the most prominent of the original settlers of Darou Mousty were related to Maam Cerno and had been recommended to him by Amadu Bamba. Mactar Samba Joob was originally from Kokki and was related to Maam Cerno through the latter's mother, Faty Issa Joob. Mactar Samba Joob was a member of the Joob family of scholars and, like Maam Cerno, a descendant of the Sëriñ Kokki, Njaga Issa Joob, who had led the 1827 revolt against the king of Kajoor. He was therefore a representative of the old Islamic *sëriñu lamb*, or titled marabouts, faction that had turned to the Murid order. Mactar Samba Joob had initially been accepted as a Murid taalibe by Amadu Bamba himself at Diourbel. His son, Abdou Joob Samba, recounted how his father had come to join Maam Cerno. One day while he was working in the fields, Mactar Samba Joob was summoned by Amadu Bamba who asked him what he really wanted. Mactar Samba Joob replied that he wanted to see Amadu Bamba's brother, Maam Cerno Birahim, become the best among Amadu Bamba's adjuncts. Amadu Bamba then sent Mactar Samba Joob to Maam Cerno who was living in M'Backé-Cayor at the time. When he arrived in

M'Backé-Cayor, Maam Cerno thanked Mactar Samba Joob for the kind words that he had said before Amadu Bamba. Mactar Samba Joob would work with Maam Cerno for the rest of his life, be ordained a shaykh by Maam Cerno, and become known as "Maam Cerno's right hand."¹⁶

Mactar Samba Joob was not the only member of the Joob family to become a Murid and be sent by Amadu Bamba to work for Maam Cerno. Mor Joob M'Backé was another original settler of Darou Mousty and a relative of Maam Cerno. Mor Joob M'Backé would come to achieve high rank within Darou Mousty by becoming a *jawriñ*, or lieutenant, of Maam Cerno.¹⁷ Another of the original taalibe of Darou Mousty who would achieve high rank, Sëriñ Modou Mactar Joob, was recommended to Maam Cerno by Amadu Bamba and was also a relative.¹⁸ Although kinship to Maam Cerno and membership in the Joob family were certainly not prerequisites for gaining high rank as an original taalibe, they were obviously important factors within the Murid community of Darou Mousty. The scholarly backgrounds of both the M'Backé and Joob families most likely put members of their families in an advantageous position within any Islamic community.

One of the original settlers of Darou Mousty who had served Maam Cerno the longest and attained high rank was neither a M'Backé or a Joob. Sëriñ Aliou Niang was a taalibe of Maam Cerno long before the founding of Darou Mousty. He was originally from Jolof and had become a Murid while Amadu Bamba was living in M'Backé-Baol. Upon Amadu Bamba's arrest and deportation to Gabon in 1895, the marabout personally confided Sëriñ Aliou Niang to Maam Cerno. Aliou Niang remained in the company of Maam Cerno for the rest of his life. His son, Baay Mactar Niang, recounted how his father had served Maam Cerno as he moved from M'Backé-Baol, to Darou Marnane-Baol, to M'Backé-Cayor, and finally to Darou Mousty. Sëriñ Aliou Niang would eventually become a lieutenant of Maam Cerno and be confirmed as a shaykh of the Murid order. Baay Mactar Niang also remembered that at some point after Darou Mousty had been founded, Amadu Bamba contacted Maam Cerno and requested to see Aliou Niang. Maam Cerno dispatched his son, Modou Awa Balla, to accompany Aliou Niang to Amadu Bamba's residence. When they had presented themselves to Amadu Bamba, the marabout asked Aliou Niang what he had been doing since he had placed him in Maam Cerno's charge. Aliou Niang replied that ever since the arrest and exile to Gabon in 1895, he had been working with Maam Cerno. Amadu Bamba replied, "If everyone did as you, I would not be so tired."¹⁹ This was obviously a great compliment from Amadu Bamba and was therefore presented by Baay Mactar Niang as evidence of his father's good service as a taalibe, shaykh, and *jawriñ* of Maam Cerno.

One of the original settlers of Darou Mousty had come to Maam Cerno via his other brother, Shaykh Anta M'Backé. Sëriñ Galaye Njaay was originally from a village named Gap. He had begun his Quranic study as a child under his father, and following the last wishes of his father, he continued his studies

after his death. Sëriñ Galaye Njaay's son, Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye, narrated how his father came to live with Maam Cerno.

For the ceremony of the eighth day following the death of his [Sëriñ Galaye Njaay's] father, Maam Shaykh Anta M'Backé had taken care of everything. After [the ceremony], Maam Shaykh Anta told him [Sëriñ Galaye Njaay] to become a Murid and he [Sëriñ Galaye Njaay] answered that his father had requested him to finish the Holy Quran before he did anything else. Maam Shaykh Anta told him to continue [his study of] the Holy Quran as his father had wished of him. When he had finished the Holy Book his mother gave him some clothing, and he left his village. He walked during the night to M'Backé-Cayor where he found Maam Cerno Birahim, and he declared himself a Murid, and Maam Cerno placed him in a *daara* [a group of taalibe who work and study together].²⁰

Apparently, Sëriñ Galaye Njaay's father was a Murid. It was very common for Murid leaders such as Shaykh Anta M'Backé and Maam Cerno to organize and pay for the funerals of Murid taalibe. When Shaykh Anta M'Backé called upon Galaye Njaay to become a Murid, he was in reality asking him to formally become a Murid taalibe and join a Murid *daara*.

Of the original *taalibe* who form the core of this study, almost one quarter were sixteen years old or younger when they joined Maam Cerno.²¹ Murid marabouts were frequently criticized by French officials in the late 1800s and early 1900s for singling out children to induct into the order, sometimes against the wishes of the parents. The fact that only about one-quarter of the original taalibe of Darou Mousty were sixteen or younger when they became Murids points to a greater variability in the ages of Murid converts. Baay Aliou Njaay, Sëriñ Omar Joob, Malik Cissé, and Sëriñ Modou Kharry Gaye all joined the order as young boys or teens. Omar Joob was from a village named Farbol near Pekesse and N'Gaye-Mékhé in Cayor and was not quite ten years old when his parents brought him to Darou Marnane-Baol and placed him under Maam Cerno's care as a taalibe. Omar Joob later moved with Maam Cerno and the other taalibe to M'Backé-Cayor and then helped found Darou Mousty.²² He later served in World War I and was placed in charge of the granaries and warehouses of Darou Mousty.

Malik Cissé, one of the two surviving original settlers of Darou Mousty interviewed during my fieldwork, became a taalibe of Maam Cerno during Amadu Bamba's exile in Mauritania (1903–7). His family was originally from a village called Gneel-Cissé. Malik Cissé stated, "It was during the deportation of Sëriñ Touba to Mauritania that my brother, Saër Cissé, brought me to the side of Maam Cerno Birahim. At that time, I was very young, but I don't know how old I was at the time."²³ His older brother then left to visit Amadu Bamba in Mauritania, and Malik Cissé remained with Maam Cerno and helped establish Darou Mousty in 1912. During our interview, Malik Cissé did state that he believed for some time that he would return one day to his native village, but Maam Cerno had told him that it was to him that the Lord had confided Malik Cissé.

Consequently, he never returned to Gneel-Cissé. Malik Cissé's induction into the Murid order was of a particularly permanent nature. Other original taalibe were allowed to return home at times for visits and to search for wives. Malik Cissé's situation was most likely the result of his young age upon entering the order. Understandably, Maam Cerno and the Murids of Darou Mousty had taken on the attributes of a surrogate family. Malik Cissé never mentioned seeing his brother or parents again, and he referred to the other original settlers of Darou Mousty as his "brother taalibe."

At least three of the original taalibe of Darou Mousty were considered adults when they joined Maam Cerno. Sëriñ Mayacine Joob was born in the village of Gouye Diama Diop in Ndoyenne in Cayor. He was taught the Quran by his older brothers and continued more advanced studies in Merina Syl. Mayacine Joob eventually became a Quranic teacher in Merina Syl and had forty students of his own when he met Maam Cerno. The marabout was passing through Merina Syl on his way to visit Amadu Bamba in exile in Mauritania (1903–7) when Mayacine Joob and two of his students decided to accompany him to Mauritania. When Mayacine Joob met Amadu Bamba, he presented the marabout with a horse as a gift. Mayacine Joob then returned with Maam Cerno to Darou Marnane-Baol, but after some time, Maam Cerno instructed him to return to his native village in Cayor and wait for him. After the founding of Darou Mousty, Mayacine Joob settled in the satellite village of Thincoly and, in 1929, established the new village of Taif Joob on Maam Cerno's behalf.²⁴ Ibra Fall Delbé, originally from the village of Piw Fall, was an adult and had finished his Quranic studies and was farming when he heard Maam Cerno speaking in M'Backé-Cayor. After hearing the marabout, he pledged himself to Maam Cerno and became a Murid.²⁵ Likewise, when Sëriñ Sirré Diop first joined Maam Cerno at M'Backé-Cayor, he was also an adult and had completed his Quranic education in his native village of Tbidé. His son explained that Maam Cerno chose him to be part of the taalibe who performed hard work in part because of his maturity.²⁶

Previous historians have commented on the means by which the Murids attracted new taalibe. The French colonial sources indicate a number of ways by which taalibe were brought into the order. Although pure religious attraction was noted, colonial authorities, especially prior to World War I, accused the Murids of abducting children and providing sanctuary to runaway slaves. The French were particularly concerned about the subject of children forced or tricked into the order. A French administrator in Cayor in 1914 illustrated his views of Murid recruitment by describing how older Murid taalibe would pick out "a victim" among the youth and then trick the child into becoming a Murid through small gifts. Paul Marty, using the reports of French administrators, noted how the parents of abducted children often went to the French to complain about the Murid marabouts. The earlier generations of French officials and the colonial chiefs who served as their main informers were by and large afraid of the growth of the Murids, and this fear could have certainly

affected their interpretations of how new taalibe joined the order and their resulting condemnation. Some Qadiri and Tijani shaykh were also possible sources of the recruitment stories, and Paul Marty noted that due to their hatred of the Murids and their loss of disciples to the order, their accounts could not be taken as objective.²⁷

When asked about this issue, one of Maam Cerno's sons, Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, stated that young taalibe were only accepted with the authorization of their parents, and those who did not have the approval of their parents were sent home. Murid marabouts were also accused of taking in runaway slaves to turn them into taalibe. This would have put them at odds with the slave-owning Wolof aristocracy, many of whom served as colonial chiefs. Even though Darou Mousty was established seven years after the decree of 1905 in which the French ended any recognition of slavery, this issue was still posed as a question to some of the Murids of Darou Mousty due to the survival of the institution long after 1905.²⁸ The general reply was that if a slave wished to become a taalibe, Maam Cerno would instruct the slave to return to his or her master and only if the master agreed would the slave be accepted as a disciple.²⁹

The Murids of Darou Mousty also indirectly provided some commentary on the accusations that the order abducted children from their families. The informants cited below were not specifically questioned about this issue. Rather, their statements were made in the context of the experiences of their fathers. Contrary to these accusations, Sëriñ Mactar Samba Joob, Maam Cerno's most important jawriñ, was instructed to return home to care for his parents when he initially presented himself to Amadu Bamba in Diourbel. Mactar Samba Joob returned to Diourbel four years later, after both of his parents had died, and was only then accepted by Amadu Bamba as a Murid taalibe.³⁰ His case may have been special due to his relation to Maam Cerno and his status as a Joob, yet kinship ties and social status were not the rules for this matter. Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall of Kosso, a satellite village of Darou Mousty, remembered a similar story about his father, Balla Fall. Balla Fall was apparently already a taalibe of Maam Cerno when his mother came to the marabout to request that her son be allowed to return with her to their village. She explained to Maam Cerno that her son was all she now had while the other women of the village lived more comfortably. Maam Cerno acceded to her wishes and sent Balla Fall home to take care of his mother with the promise that he would continue to provide for him in the future.³¹ Balla Fall later returned to Maam Cerno and settled in Kosso, one of Darou Mousty's satellite villages.

There was only one instance among the original taalibe of Darou Mousty where a disciple was not permitted to return home. Sëriñ Aliou Njaay had been a taalibe of Maam Cerno for seven years and had received his Quranic instruction under Maam Cerno when his father came to reclaim his son. Aliou Njaay was originally from Keur Amadu Yalla and was living in Maam Cerno's home

in M'Backé-Cayor. Aliou Njaay's father was a jawriñ of Maam Cerno and explained to his marabout that his son had left a camel, a horse, a cow, and a donkey at the family's home in Keur Amadu Yalla and that Aliou Njaay should return home to care for them. Maam Cerno replied that he could not allow Aliou Njaay to return home for many reasons. Aliou Njaay's mother and one of his grandfathers also failed to convince Maam Cerno to allow Aliou Njaay to return home. Aliou Njaay's son, Baay Cerno Njaay, who related this account, did not know why Maam Cerno refused the wishes of Aliou Njaay's family other than the fact that Maam Cerno relied upon Aliou Njaay and had great plans for him. Baay Cerno Njaay's reply is, in fact, indicative of the taalibe-shaykh bond that existed within the Murid order. The fact that Aliou Njaay had received his education under Maam Cerno meant that the taalibe owed service to the marabout. Maam Cerno was therefore entitled to refuse the request for Aliou Njaay's return home. Baay Cerno Njaay did not give any indication of his father's opinion of the matter. Despite this conflict, Aliou Njaay would remain with Maam Cerno for the rest of his life, and after the establishment of Darou Mousty, he was responsible for the settlement of a village on the eastern outskirts of the town that came to be known as Keur Aliou Njaay.³²

Although the accounts of the origins of some of the original settlers of Darou Mousty reflect a certain amount of Murid bias among the informants, much of the oral information is pertinent for understanding the lives of the original taalibe and how and why the memories of them have been preserved. The Murid accounts concerning the induction of new taalibe are also important in light of the early anti-Murid bias that existed among French officials and colonial chiefs who viewed the expansion of the order with suspicion and hostility. The process of lineal memory from father to son has played a large role in not only preserving the origins of the original taalibe but also in providing us with Murid interpretations of the meaning of these lives. The memories whether of the two remaining original taalibe or the descendents of their peers emphasize the religious motivations for joining the Murid order. It is evident that the symbolic capital of Amadu Bamba and, more directly, Maam Cerno played a large role in the attraction of these disciples to the order and their subsequent identities as Murids. Understandably, many of the experiences of the taalibe prior to the founding of Darou Mousty mirror the popularly known accounts of Maam Cerno's life and labors and lend further credence to his role as a model Murid taalibe. Lastly, the Murid accounts give us insight into how the inhabitants of Darou Mousty grappled with the integration of Murid ideas of equality and Wolof social structure. The variations in the ages and backgrounds of the original taalibe who joined the Murid order and Maam Cerno require us to reappraise who these early disciples were and their motivations for becoming Murids. What emerges is a more heterogeneous portrait of the Murid taalibe that includes children, adults, free peasants, prominent Muslim families, slaves, and the occupationally specialized groups.

The Lives of Murid Taalibe

Presently, there exists an incomplete portrait of the Murid taalibe. French colonial administrators and Paul Marty were the first Europeans to describe Murid disciples and their lifestyles. Murid taalibe were variously described as “victims,” “ceddo,” and “adventurous sorts” who were either abducted into the order or joined for political or economic reasons. Since Marty’s work, the issue of the exploitation of Murid taalibe at the hands of Murid shaykh has run consistently through Western studies of the Murids. In addition to French colonial viewpoints, Marxist analysis has also played a large role in the study of the order. The illustration of masses of taalibe laboring for an indolent shaykh has been frequently used to demonstrate the exploitative nature of the Murid hierarchy. Much of this type of discourse has relegated the Murid taalibe to a faceless mass devoid of any personality, sense of individuality, or agency.

Although O’Brien has raised the issue of rewards given to taalibe by their shaykh, and Copans has studied the disciples more from a perspective of them as individuals, a more detailed examination of the lives of Murid taalibe is necessary. The concentration on the experiences of the original settlers of Darou Mousty reveals a much-needed Murid point of view on this subject. A large part of the following examination revolves around Murid conceptions of their own or their fathers’ lives as Murid taalibe in which attitudes toward work are discussed. Additionally, the compensation and rewards received from Maam Cerno figured highly in the minds of the Murids interviewed for this study.

Work

Upon declaring oneself a Murid and accepting Maam Cerno as shaykh and spiritual guide, the choice would be made regarding where to place the new taalibe. Maam Cerno decided whether the new adept would be placed in a daara to work and study or perform a different function within the community. According to informants in Darou Mousty, there were guidelines that were followed regarding the assignment of a new disciple. Among the new Murid taalibe, those who were of the age to study the Quran (roughly ages 5 to 16) were enrolled in a daara. Only if a taalibe were old enough would the disciple be sent to work in the fields. There was even a provision made for new taalibe who were too old to work in the fields. These aged taalibe would be supported by Maam Cerno in a form of retirement.

The Murids to whom I spoke in Darou Mousty were quite adamant concerning the welfare and status of the taalibe within the Murid tariqa. All agreed that no taalibe of Maam Cerno had ever begged. They did admit that Maam Cerno became wealthy due to the agricultural production of his fields



Figure 6.1. The next generation of Murid Taalibe of Darou Mousty. Photo by author, 1997.

and the work of his taalibe. They stressed, however, that all that he had was given back to his taalibe in the form of food, shelter, tuition, allowances for marriage and having children, and eventually land and taalibe of their own, and finally the payment of funeral expenses.

As presented in the narratives, the activities of the taalibe in Darou Mousty directly mirrored the recommendations that Amadu Bamba had made known to Maam Cerno concerning the conduct of Murid taalibe. Some of the disciples only engaged in study, others only concerned themselves with work, and many, following the example of Maam Cerno himself, pursued both activities at the same time. The attitudes of the original taalibe and their descendants toward the work that they performed reflect Maam Cerno's beliefs about the importance of his own work for Amadu Bamba as regards the Murid mission. In addition to their work in Darou Mousty, which ranged from farming to teaching and studying to various administrative duties performed as shaykh or jawriñ, Maam Cerno's taalibe participated in many of the major works undertaken by the Murid order on behalf of themselves and the colonial state.

For example, Malik Cissé remembered when Amadu Bamba asked Maam Cerno to supply labor to help with the building of the foundation of the new mosque at Touba. Maam Cerno called all of his taalibe together to inform them of the news. Malik Cissé recalled that many of the taalibe were surprised

to hear of the project, and that Maam Cerno told them that a request made by Amadu Bamba must be executed as quickly as possible. Malik Cissé was a part of the labor force that Maam Cerno sent to work on the foundations, and he remembered working in the quarry at Ndock and carrying the rocks across a great distance to Touba.


Malik Cissé characterized his attitude toward the work by saying, "It was very difficult, but we were happy to do it because we counted only on Sëriñ Touba M'Backé."³³ He later was part of the contingent that Maam Cerno sent to the first khalifah-générale, Muhammadu Moustapha, to help build the railroad extension to Touba. Although there was a definite religious dimension to this labor done on behalf of Amadu Bamba, Malik Cissé and the Murid taalibe also took great personal pride in the work that they had performed. The acts of the establishment of Darou Mousty, the building of the mosque at Touba, and the construction of a rail link to Touba have achieved legendary status in the minds of modern Murid taalibe. Such labors were in themselves presented in the narratives as spiritual and physical trials for the Murids who took part in them and closely follow the examples set by Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno during the former's exiles. Malik Cissé was aware of this and stated after recounting his labors, "All that I have told you, I lived it!" with the emphasis on himself as the subject.³⁴

Several of the Murids interviewed in Darou Mousty were careful to distinguish between work recommended by Maam Cerno and Amadu Bamba and obligations ordained by God. The subject of working and fasting during the holy month of Ramadan was used as a popular example of this issue. Maam Cerno instructed his taalibe that if possible they were to continue to work while fasting; however, if one could not do both, then it would be incumbent to give up work in order to fast. Maam Cerno justified his position by stating that a recommendation of God had priority over that of a human (Amadu Bamba or himself).³⁵ One of Maam Cerno's sons, Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, added to this debate by saying, "He [Maam Cerno] always told his taalibe to love God for the next world that is eternal and to work for this world that is temporary."³⁶ Maam Cerno's statements to his disciples regarding the temporal nature of this world were also mentioned by Sëriñ Barra Joob. His father, Sëriñ Omar Joob, once told him that one day Maam Cerno was speaking to his taalibe and he told them to "Do everything to find Paradise." Sëriñ Omar Joob then asked Maam Cerno how one could do this and the marabout replied, "We must all say and do good things during our entire lives because this world is only a passage through which everyone will travel."³⁷ Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall's father told his son a similar story. Once again, Maam Cerno was surrounded by his taalibe and was speaking to them. "Maam Cerno told them one day that they must love God and work because one who works does this on behalf of his brother, Sëriñ Touba [Amadu Bamba], and if one loves God, this is because it is an obligatory recommendation of the Almighty."³⁸

Rewards and Welfare

Table 6.1 outlines the different stages in life through which a taalibe passed in Darou Mousty. While able-bodied, the taalibe contributed agricultural labor or a share of the harvest to the house of the marabout. Murid taalibe also frequently gave gifts to their marabout and performed other nonagricultural labors when called upon. When one consults the Murids themselves regarding the life of a Murid taalibe, an understandably different picture emerges of the relationship between the disciple and the shaykh that reflects a strong paternal bond. The most notable aspect of this Murid interpretation is the support that the taalibe received from the marabout. As a taalibe moved from studying the Quran to adulthood and eventually retirement, all of the disciple’s needs were met by the marabout. The shaykh or teachers within the household educated the taalibe in the rudiments of Arabic, the practice and beliefs of Islam, and memorization of the Quran. Particularly apt students could then pursue

Table 6.1. The stages of life for a Murid Taalibe



advanced Islamic studies in fields such as the shari'a or Sufism. The Murid shaykh also provided for the room and board of the taalibe during the initial period of work and study that generally lasted from six to ten years. Eventually, the disciple's marriage was arranged and paid for by the marabout. Finally, the taalibe was taken care of in retirement, and his funeral was conducted and paid for by the shaykh or his successor. Moreover, Maam Cerno even paid the taxes owed by the taalibe to the colonial government.³⁹ As one can see below, there were generally three ways that the taalibe who reached an advanced age could be maintained. He could enter the household of the marabout as a teacher or jawriñ, he could be given a house and his own fields, or given an entire village complete with taalibe to support him.

The chief jawriñ of Maam Cerno, Sëriñ Mactar Samba Joob was given the village of Darou Salam and a number of taalibe in thanks for his service. Baay Abdou Joob Samba recalled that even before his father had been given Darou Salam, Maam Cerno had rewarded his father in other ways. According to Baay Abdou Joob Samba, Maam Cerno summoned his father one day and told him that he was going to give him the three best things in Darou Mousty in recognition of his service: the most beautiful woman in the village as a wife, the best horse in Darou Mousty, and his best and finest *boubou*, or robe.⁴⁰

In spite of the material rewards given to the disciples, the religious benefits of being a Murid taalibe were never forgotten. Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye remembered that Maam Cerno had once offered a gift of money to his father, Sëriñ Galaye Njaay. However, his father told Maam Cerno that he would prefer the marabout's prayers on his behalf rather than the money. Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye also noted how in addition to paying for his followers' housing and providing food, Maam Cerno also helped his disciples find wives who were from their native villages or towns.⁴¹ Baay Fallou, in his résumé of his father's life, mentioned that all of Maam Cerno's taalibe received his thanks for their work and said, "Their marabout [Maam Cerno] aided them in all their plans. They were given villages, wives, houses, and the opportunity to travel."⁴²

The care exhibited by Maam Cerno toward his taalibe extended even to death. Upon the death of a disciple, the funeral was arranged for by Maam Cerno or his successor, the Khalifah Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla M'Backé. Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye's father died in 1964. Sëriñ Galaye Njaay had joined Maam Cerno at M'Backé-Cayor and had always performed the daily prayers with Maam Cerno who relied on Sëriñ Galaye Njaay's pocket watch to begin the prayers. After Maam Cerno's death in 1943, Sëriñ Galaye Njaay transferred his allegiance to Maam Cerno's son and khalifah, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla, and served him for another twenty-one years. Therefore, when Sëriñ Galaye Njaay died, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla took charge of his funeral and paid for all of the expenses. Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye remembered that the khalifah had explained his actions by announcing to those present that Sëriñ Galaye Njaay had been a good companion of his father, Maam Cerno.⁴³

A similar account was related by Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall of Kosso who was obviously greatly impressed by the care that had been exhibited by Maam Cerno and his family toward his father, a taalibe. Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall stated that when his father, Sëriñ Balla Fall had died, his “brother taalibe” from Darou Mousty came to Kosso to assist in the funeral ceremony and arrived even before the blood relatives of Balla Fall. Balla Fall had been an original taalibe of Maam Cerno and upon Maam Cerno’s death in 1943, Balla Fall had transferred his allegiance to Maam Cerno’s successor Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla and became his taalibe. Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla and several of Maam Cerno’s sons came to Balla Fall’s funeral and brought a cow, sacks of rice, and all that was necessary to conduct the funeral and help the family. Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall, who was around twenty-five years old at the time of his father’s death, fervently believed that all that had been done for his father’s funeral by the taalibe and the sons of Maam Cerno was in recognition and thanks for the service that Balla Fall had rendered during his lifetime, first to Maam Cerno and then to Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla. Mactar Balla Fall also reminded me of the promise that Maam Cerno had made to his father when he had sent him home to take care of his mother. At that time, Maam Cerno had consoled his young disciple by promising that “he [Maam Cerno] would do for him [Balla Fall] what his parents could not and that he would put Balla Fall in contact with others who would do all that he wanted.”⁴⁴ Mactar Balla Fall interpreted this statement as a promise of future support for his father that would extend beyond Maam Cerno’s lifetime.

While passing through the different stages of life, not all taalibe advanced their religious studies enough to become shaykh. This was even true of the original taalibe of Darou Mousty. Those taalibe who did not acquire this rank but still distinguished themselves in the service of Maam Cerno were granted many of the benefits that were accorded to shaykh of the order, including land and taalibe to work the land. The life of Sëriñ SIRRÉ JOOB is one such example. He was one of the original taalibe who came to break ground at Darou Mousty, and in 1913, he was given a daara complete with eighty taalibe. Despite a dedication to the study of the Quran, SIRRÉ JOOB’s main strengths lay in work and the direction of other taalibe. His daara contained taalibe who both worked and studied and, during the planting season, practically lived in the fields. One of SIRRÉ JOOB’s sons, Baay Cerno JOOB of Darou Mousty, recalled that during the early period of Darou Mousty’s existence, the directorship of a daara was not easy. His father had to not only organize the taalibe for their work but then he had to prepare them for their introduction to Quranic study. Sëriñ SIRRÉ JOOB was not confirmed as a shaykh by Maam Cerno, yet he received many of the same benefits and distinctions that accrued to a shaykh. Baay Cerno JOOB described his father’s elevated position as part of the thanks he received from Maam Cerno for his labors.⁴⁵

A similar story was told by Baay Shaykh Fall about his father, Sëriñ Ibra Fall Delbé. In return for the work that he had rendered to the marabout, Ibra Fall

was given an area on the southern edge of Darou Mousty that became known as Delbé. Even though Ibra Fall never became a shaykh, he still received land as thanks for his service and Delbé was attached to his name. When Maam Cerno died in 1943, Ibra Fall continued his work, but now at the side of the first khalifah, Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla M'Backé. Ibra Fall Delbé died at the age of eighty and was buried in Darou Mousty.⁴⁶

Advancement in the Murid Hierarchy: Shaykh and Jawriñ⁴⁷

Even though a taalibe could still enjoy a high status and certain material comforts without having to advance to the level of a shaykh, a taalibe who was elevated to the rank of a shaykh of the Muridiyya was accorded a certain religious respect only shared by other shaykh. Much of this respect was not only due to the educational achievements of the individual but also to the mystical attributes of the office. The shaykh was endowed with the *baraka*, or blessing, of his own teacher or *shaykh* and was part of the *silsila*, or chain, that linked him through his teacher to Amadu Bamba and even further back to Qadiri saints and to the Prophet Muhammad himself.⁴⁸

Shaykh of the Murid order fulfilled a variety of duties. Some became teachers in their own right. In this case, the shaykh would gather his own taalibe who would study under him and work for part of the day in his fields during the rainy season and during the harvest. The shaykh could set up his school in the local area or at some distant location. In 1912, there were at least three marabouts living in Saloum who had been confirmed as shaykh by Maam Cerno. All three had their own schools and taalibe. Likewise, there were also two Murid shaykh who claimed Maam Cerno as their spiritual father who were living and teaching in Sine.⁴⁹ The colonial archives also contain many references to itinerate shaykh and even one case in Cayor of a Murid shaykh who led a leper colony.

The nature of the relationship that existed between the taalibe and the shaykh, or marabout, has already been commented on from the point of view of the taalibe. Regarding the marabout's role in this relationship, there exists a relatively large body of work. For this study, one aspect of this prior historiography that focused on the Wolof social context of the taalibe-shaykh relationship is particularly applicable. Copans rightly believed that the personal level of the link between a taalibe and a marabout was based on the tenets of the long-standing Wolof patron-client relationship that from a Western materialist perspective could be considered exploitative. For centuries, those without power in Wolof society had sought the aid and protection of those in power or with access to political influence. The client then owed a debt of allegiance to the patron whether that person was a chief, an aristocrat, or a sëriñ.⁵⁰

In Darou Mousty, as in other Murid communities, the Wolof patron-client relationship fused with the Sufi Islamic notions of the taalibe and the shaykh

to strengthen the ties that bound the disciple to the master. The fact that some of the taalibe became shaykh did not weaken their bond to Maam Cerno. Although some of Maam Cerno's earlier shaykh had moved to different areas, the six original taalibe of Darou Mousty who later became shaykh all remained in Darou Mousty or in the general vicinity. They, as taalibe of Maam Cerno, maintained a very close allegiance to their own shaykh even as they exercised their authority over their own taalibe. Mor Joob M'Backé, Aliou Niang, Mactar Samba Joob, and Balla Gaye all initially remained in Darou Mousty. Sëriñ Mactar Samba Joob was later given the village of Darou Salam and a company of taalibe. Two other shaykh, Pathé Sall and Mayacine Joob, founded the villages of Doulounguël and Taif Joob on behalf of Maam Cerno and remained in their satellite villages.

Another distinction made between the followers of Maam Cerno concerned those who served him as officers charged with distinct jobs. These officers were known as jawriñ. The names and functions of Maam Cerno's jawriñ are noted below in table 6.2. The notion of the Murid jawriñ was based on a precolonial Wolof political office and was not part of a universal Sufi religious-social structure. Within the Murid hierarchy, the general Wolof conception of the jawriñ survived but was transformed to fit the needs of the marabout and the daara. The Murid conception of a jawriñ discontinued his role as a political officer and made him more of a lieutenant or adjunct of the marabout. In the case of Maam Cerno and Darou Mousty, taalibe (and shaykh) who served as jawriñ were charged with specific tasks. Therefore, there could be many jawriñ, each of whom was serving the marabout in a different job.

The functions of the Murid jawriñ have been commented on by previous authors. In a description of the daara that worked the fields of the khalifah-générale at Touba Bogo in the 1960s, Cheikh Tidiane Sy identified the director

Table 6.2. The Jawriñ of Maam Cerno and their functions

Mactar Samba Joob, the principal jawriñ of Maam Cerno, diplomat, and overseer of the other jawriñ.
Aliou Niang, jawriñ of taalibe. In charge of the western portion of Darou Mousty.
Baay Mactar Niang, jawriñ of taalibe.
Pathé Sall, jawriñ charged with the care of Maam Cerno's visitors. In charge of the eastern portion of Darou Mousty.
Mor Joob M'Backé, chief of the village and one of Maam Cerno's envoys to Macadou Sall and the French administration.
Modou Mactar Joob, <i>imam</i> , or leader of the communal prayer.
Socé Njaay, jawriñ in charge of the education of the taalibe.
Moussa Ká, jawriñ in charge of the education of the taalibe.
Mor Jobou Syl, <i>qadi</i> , or Islamic judge.

Sources: This list was assembled from interviews with several of the descendants of the original taalibe, including Baay Abdou Joob Samba, Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry, and Baay Mactar Niang.

of each daara as a jawriñ. In this context, the jawriñ was mainly charged with organizing the work of the taalibe. As a type of manager, the jawriñ formed the head of the organization of each daara. However, each daara also had its own Quranic teacher whose job it was to lead the taalibe in their religious education. The qualifications required for a taalibe to be appointed a jawriñ centered on his capacity to direct others in their agricultural work and not necessarily on the age of the taalibe or his education.⁵¹ This description of the Murid jawriñ differs somewhat from the role that Maam Cerno's jawriñ played in the establishment and development of Darou Mousty. Rather than simply being the labor overseers of the daara, the jawriñ of Darou Mousty more closely resembled the jawriñ of the kingdom of Kajoor by the fact that they held positions that included responsibilities much greater than those incurred in the directorship of a single daara.

Within the hierarchy of Darou Mousty, it is plain that some vestiges of the precolonial office of the jawriñ had indeed survived though it was now infused with religious rather than political connotations. Table 6.2 lists the taalibe of Maam Cerno who served as his main jawriñ and their functions. The jawriñ listed above were not in charge of single daara. Instead, they were placed in charge of various parts of the religious and socioeconomic functions of Darou Mousty. The *imam* (prayer leader) and the *qadi* (Islamic judge) were considered jawriñ as were the disciples in charge of organizing the Quranic education of the taalibe. The *daara*, or schools, of Darou Mousty were placed under the direction of five masters: Moussa Kâ (not the famous poet), Socé Njaay, Modou Gaye, Modou Mactar Job, and Balla Touré.

Mactar Samba Job, in particular, figured prominently in his position as the chief jawriñ of Darou Mousty. Today, Mactar Samba Job is variously described as Maam Cerno's principal jawriñ, his general, and his right hand. He is the jawriñ that most closely resembles the position that Maam Cerno held under Amadu Bamba. Mactar Samba Job, in addition to overseeing the work of the other jawriñ and carrying out the orders of his master, acted as Maam Cerno's chief envoy to Macodou Sall. His diplomatic functions strengthen his resemblance even more to Maam Cerno and his work as Amadu Bamba's chief jawriñ.⁵²

In Darou Mousty, there were some taalibe who were charged with the direction of a daara who were accorded the status of a jawriñ. Malik Cissé stated that he was a jawriñ in charge of a daara on the western edge of Darou Mousty. Yet, it was not necessary in Darou Mousty for a taalibe to be labeled a jawriñ to act as the head of a daara. As mentioned previously, SIRRÉ Job was in charge of a daara composed of eighty taalibe, yet his son did not describe him as a jawriñ. Ibra Fall Delbé was also given a village and taalibe, but he also was not a jawriñ. Regarding the latter two taalibe, their sons described their positions as a type of reward for the services that they had rendered to Maam Cerno.

The qualifications necessary to become a jawriñ in Darou Mousty mirrored those required to be a good taalibe. Baye Fallou, a son of Mor Jobou Syl who

was a *jawriñ-qadi* of Maam Cerno, noted that a *jawriñ* must first be a true and determined *taalibe*. He must enjoy the confidence of his marabout and be able to carry out his responsibilities perfectly. In 1913, Mor Jobou Syl had been named a *jawriñ* at the new settlement of Darou Mousty. Baay Fallou noted, however, that even before his father became a *jawriñ* and the *qadi* of Darou Mousty, he enjoyed the respect of all from Darou Marnane-Baol to M'Backé-Cayor. Mor Jobou Syl served Maam Cerno until the marabout's death in 1943. At that point, he renewed his allegiance as a *taalibe* to Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla. Remembering his father's years serving Maam Cerno, Baay Fallou remarked that his father was a good and obedient *taalibe* and listened only to the *ndigal* (religious injunctions) of Maam Cerno.⁵³

In all the aspects of their labors, the *jawriñ* of Darou Mousty were emulating the example set by Maam Cerno and consequently reinforcing the ideology behind that example. It is important to remember that Maam Cerno himself was a *jawriñ* of Amadu Bamba and provided his *taalibe* with a model of the relationship that should exist between the *jawriñ* and his master. Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé holds a view that is generally accepted in Darou Mousty of Maam Cerno's position as a *jawriñ*. "Maam Cerno was chosen by Sëriñ Touba as a *jawriñ*, or a right hand. Maam Cerno was in charge of the missions, education, work, and everything in general. Maam Cerno counted on no one but Sëriñ Touba who was his hope in this world and in the next, and he behaved as a true *taalibe* toward Sëriñ Touba."⁵⁴

The belief that a *jawriñ* is first and foremost a good and trustworthy *taalibe* of his shaykh is at the core of the relationship between the two. Added to this foundation is the idea that the material needs of the *jawriñ* will be provided for during his lifetime, and also that through his service, he will enter Paradise after his death. If a *jawriñ* needed any kind of instruction as to the nature of his office, an account of relationship that existed between Maam Cerno and Amadu Bamba, which was commonly known, served that purpose. Because Maam Cerno held a wide range of responsibilities from diplomatic missions to the colonial authorities to the organization of education and work for his *taalibe*, he is remembered as a most capable *jawriñ* of the highest order. In the case of Darou Mousty, the office of the *jawriñ* was similar to the position of a shaykh in the manner that they fit into the Murid hierarchy. For example, all of the *jawriñ* and shaykh of Darou Mousty, who in most cases were charged with their own *taalibe*, were themselves considered *taalibe* of Maam Cerno. Likewise, Maam Cerno was a *jawriñ*, shaykh, and in his essence, a *taalibe* of Amadu Bamba.

Conclusion

In his latest work, *The Ethics of Individuality*, Kwame Anthony Appiah, in the context of a discussion of invention versus authenticity, grappled with the

question of whether our identities are acquired in a prepackaged form gained from the world around us or are created by us as individuals.⁵⁵ Appiah rightly criticized both extremes of each possibility in favor of a middle ground in which one's identity has both personal and collective dimensions created from our social interactions and influenced by relative forces of history. Appiah continued that collective identities share a general structure. First, they are built upon the existence of an available public discourse by which all can recognize themselves as members of the group. For the Murids of Darou Mousty, this public discourse exists in the forms that have been central to this study, oral traditions and life histories, biographies, and written histories, yet it also exists through poetry, song, art, and iconography. The different sources for this discourse can also be used in combination in the drafting of historical narratives. Not infrequently, my Murid oral informants made complementary use of written sources to augment their own oral accounts. Furthermore, according to Appiah, collective identities require members of a group to internalize popularly generated labels as a process of identification. The characterizations of Maam Cerno, Amadu Bamba, and even the original settlers within the Murid discourse have provided a multitude of heroic labels that Murids have sought to assimilate for themselves. "Devoted," "brave," "pious," "industrious," "lawful," and "steadfast" are all common labels that permeate the oral and written sources concerning Murid shaykh and notable disciples. These labels have in turn been appropriated by the taalibe in their own historical narratives of either themselves or their ancestors in relation to the founding of Darou Mousty and the lives that they led there. The fact that these attributes have been incorporated into the historical narratives should not be seen as diminishing their historical use or validity, rather such additions are valuable editorial tools within Murid discourse that provide us with Murid perceptions of identity and history.

Finally, in Appiah's analysis, collective identities reflect common patterns of behavior within the group. Of course, much of the general behavior within Murid communities is due to Islam and Wolof social and cultural norms, yet Murid towns such as Darou Mousty also display distinct behavior in relation to Murid interpretations of the disciple-master bond, work, and hierarchy. At a more localized level, the inhabitants of Darou Mousty have acted to more precisely define their branch of the order by stressing within their discourse those attributes, namely Islamic education and strict attention to the shari'a, that they believe distinguish them from other Murid communities or branches of the order in terms of their own behavior and practices. From this, one could add to Appiah's interpretation that an individual could easily exhibit different levels of collective identity. In our case, a member of the community of Darou Mousty is at once a follower of Maam Cerno, a Murid Sufi, and a Muslim and thus able to relate to others at these different levels within different discourses.

The Murid disciples who founded Darou Mousty obviously possessed individual identities and an accompanying sense of agency. They were subjects, in

a grammatical sense, of what they saw as undertakings of historical importance, which in turn reflected upon the further development of their identities in their own eyes and in the perceptions of their descendents. Their actions contributed to the further development of the two trends of modernization that most impacted the order, Islamic reform and Sufism, and French colonization. The founding of Darou Mousty and its satellite villages, the agricultural labor, and Islamic study are the chief activities that permeate the accounts of the taalibe and reflect the Murid mission of reform and mysticism that was pursued in their settlements. As for the second source of modernization, Murid taalibe have also infused activities such as military service, colonial labor, cash crop production, and interactions with the administration into their narratives and translated their actions in this regard into a Murid discourse that was recognizable and valued by their fellow taalibe. Yet, the notable religious figures for the disciples of Darou Mousty, chiefly Maam Cerno and Amadu Bamba, continued to provide an integral part of the larger social context from which the discourse of Murid identity was framed. From a wider perspective, their identities were also impacted by the larger historical context in which Darou Mousty found itself as a community infused with the Murid synthesis of Islamic reform and Sufism in a French colony in West Africa in the twentieth century. This multifaceted Murid identity that influenced the production of local historical narratives and was, in turn, influenced by these narratives lay at the heart of the imagined communities of settlements such as Darou Mousty, and most importantly, this identity proved to be malleable and able to assimilate further historical developments.

CONCLUSION

MURID HISTORICAL IDENTITY

Following two days of interviews in Wolof with a Murid intellectual and archivist in Darou Mousty, my research assistant and I were exiting his compound when our host shook my hand and said to me in English, “I know your country very well.” The man with whom we had been discussing Murid history then laughed and told me that he had driven a taxi in the Bronx for a number of years. After earning enough money, he had returned home to devote himself to studying and preserving the history of the order and that of Darou Mousty and Maam Cerno, in particular. Such a story may seem striking at first. It goes against the standard conception of rural and, in this case Muslim, villages and towns in Africa as locked into tradition and outside of Western modernity. Yet, the signs that the opposite was true were to be found across Darou Mousty. Posters advertising a Murid gathering in Italy had been brought back by a returning Murid expatriate and hung in telephone booths as mementos of the sense of Murid community abroad. Such signs were also present in the surrounding countryside. When I visited Taif Joob, one of Darou Mousty’s satellite villages, a great deal of construction was going on in the middle of the community. I was informed that a new modern mosque was being constructed under the ndigal of the khalifah of Darou Mousty, at that time, Sëriñ Abdu Quddūs M’Backé. I was also told that funds to help build the mosque were being sent home by young Murid men from Taif Joob who were then working in Italy. I was told a similar story in another satellite of Darou Mousty, Darou Marnane, where a grand mosque was being built.

On one level, such experiences can be seen as the results of globalization and the intrusion of the global into the local scene, yet, on another level, they can be seen from the opposite perspective. Travel abroad in search of economic opportunity has replaced working in the fields for some Murid taalibe of Darou Mousty; however, the motivation for working abroad remains distinctly Murid. Remittances are sent back to home and shaykh by Murid disciples working overseas, and in return, some Murid shaykh often make tours of these far-flung Murid communities. Travel and work abroad can be seen as an economic necessity in many cases, but once again, the Murids of Darou Mousty have incorporated this very contemporary movement into their sense



Figure 7.1. A new grand mosque under construction in Darou Marnane, a satellite town of Darou Mousty. Photo by author, 1997.

of identity. The Murid mission of reform and Sufism has now been extended to such places as Milan and New York, which are fast becoming part of a recognizable Murid historical landscape.

The interpretation of modernity put forward at the beginning of this book is essentially one that depends on a sense of historical identity. This identity is multifaceted, it exists at both the individual and collective levels, and furthermore, it tends to assimilate and blend historical forces that have usually been dichotomized as global and local. In a related vein, anthropologists and political scientists have noted how African societies have assimilated material goods from other continents into their cultures and given them new senses of indigenous meaning and value.¹ The Murids have done the same with such things as mechanized wells and cement block houses, yet more importantly for the context of the present study, the Murids have also absorbed and assimilated the historical contexts behind these exchanges into their own historical identity. Thus, seemingly disparate topics such as the Kunta tilmidh, the jihad of Mābba Jaxu, World War I, and the twentieth-century global market economy have become meshed into the Murid historical narrative and given an indigenous meaning.

The Murid synthesis that Amadu Bamba forged sought to redefine the role of a Sufi Muslim in a world that was modern and dynamic in the local and global senses. This role was characterized by an apolitical stance toward

secular powers and institutions and a complimentary rejection of militant jihad. Work, education, and an emphasis on self-sufficiency also characterized this role. The synthesis, however, was neither static nor was its authorship confined to Amadu Bamba. The changes brought on by the imposition of colonial rule affected this synthesis as the Murids accommodated the administration, military recruitment, taxation, and the extension of French modernization into the interior. It was at this point that other Murid notables such as Maam Cerno, Shaykh Ibra Fall, and Shaykh Anta came to contribute to this venture imprinting their own individual interpretations of the Murid synthesis onto their followers. Maam Cerno's vision of Amadu Bamba's mission focused, as we have seen, on the pillars of work, Islamic education, and obedience to Islamic law. Shaykh Ibra Fall, meanwhile, focused on the aspect of work as a form of worship and stressed this as the prime duty for taalibe on behalf of their shaykh. Shaykh Anta distinguished himself commercially and became very involved in the economic life of the colony. All three also engaged with the colonial administration when necessary. The Murid synthesis while springing from a common source thus reflects a multifaceted community with different interpretations of the Murid experience in its historical and contemporary senses.

There is a discernable process of Murid historical identification that incorporates and situates historical changes and events into their sense of modernity. In general, Appiah considered that our identification is largely achieved through the employment of narratives and life stories. Our life stories are then related to other larger contexts such as religion or ethnicity. One can see a similar process at work in the case of the Murids of Darou Mousty. The oral and written historical narratives and life histories that have been produced by those associated with Maam Cerno have, in the process of recording and transmitting history, reinforced and further defined Murid collective identity. These efforts help bind the community together, and their sum, the body of Murid historiography, stands as a public monument that all can identify with and attach meaning to. Yet at the same time, the "heroes" within these narratives and traditions, be they Amadu Bamba, Maam Cerno, or the founding settlers of Darou Mousty, affect the individual identities of Murids who see in them models of proper behavior that, in fact, contribute to the maintenance and development of a moral order. Steeped in the symbolism of reform and mysticism, Murid historiography acts as a legitimizing force for the overall Murid mission. This is not to say that Murid history as it has been recorded by Murids is not true. Its truth exists on different levels, much like the Sufi notions of *batin*, or inner truth, and *zahir*, or outer truth.

Murid modernity, much like Murid identity, is therefore hybrid and has sprung from different sources. It was not created in isolation in a remote area of the West African savanna, nor was it established entirely in opposition to an alternate modernity arriving from Europe via colonization. In fact, the production of Murid modernity hearkens back to Hodgson's statement about

transmutation in relation to the creation of the “modern” world. This may appear to be a rather chaotic rendering of Murid notions about historical change and their place in history, yet what grounds Murid conceptions of change is their belief in what can roughly be correlated to Baudelaire’s concept of “the eternal.” Baudelaire believed that an ongoing search for the eternal was a hallmark of the modern age as people sought to identify continuity between great historical changes. For Baudelaire, art was an important medium through which people attempted to discern the eternal from the contemporary. This examination posits the production, transmission, and interpretation of historical narrative in its various forms as an equally important medium. For the Murids, the eternal was not a static notion from a reactionary fundamentalist point of view; rather it was the Sufi mystical path that had a link to the past, local and global relevance for the present, and a way to the future. Amadu Bamba and Maam Cerno were configured within Murid identity as the representative guides on this path that many of my informants referred to as “the hope in this world and the next.”

APPENDIX 1

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ
بَعْدَ الْبَسْمَلَةِ وَمَا يَلِيكَ
مِنَ الْحَيَاتِ الْمُبَشِّرَاتِ وَفَعْدُ
أَنْزِلْ فِي بَعَاءِ تِلْكَ الْمَعِينَةَ
وَبِالْحَقِّ وَالْمَعْرُوفِ
وَعَلَيْكُمْ السَّلَامُ يُبَشِّرُكُمْ حَيْثُ
رَدَّ كُنْتُمْ وَالسَّلَامُ

Figure A.1. Copy of the letter from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno calling for the establishment of Darou Mousty. Courtesy of Archives de la Fondation Maam Cerno, Darou Mousty.

Translation following the invocation and salutations:

I recommend to you to create a village to be baptized “Dar al-Mouhty” (the abode of the giver) and to dig wells there. Peace be with you.

APPENDIX 2

أَمُوذُ بِاللَّهِ مِنَ الشَّيْطَانِ الرَّجِيمِ وَلَا حَقَّ لِقَوْلِهِ قُوَّةُ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ
 الْعَلِيِّ الْعَلِيمِ بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَصَلَّى اللَّهُ
 تَعَالَى عَلَى سَيِّدِنَا وَمَوْلَانَا مُحَمَّدٍ وَعَلَى آلِهِ وَصَحْبِهِ
 وَخَيْرِ خَدَمِهِ وَسَلَّمَ تَسْلِيمًا **هَذَا هُوَ فَتْيَةٌ**
 لَشَيْخِنَا إِبْرَاهِيمَ الْبُرْهَانِيِّ خَادِمِ الْحَدِيثِ الرَّسُولِ
 الْمَكِّيِّ

صَلَّى اللَّهُ تَعَالَى عَلَيْهِ بِأَلِيهِ وَصَحْبِهِ وَخَدَمِهِ وَسَلَّمَ تَسْلِيمًا
 هَذَا فَتْيَةٌ لِمَا مَجْرُوعِي الْإِسْلَامِ وَأَمَلُ أَرَاغِي
 سِرِّجُ مَوْسَى كَخَادِمِ الْخَدِيمِ مَوْكُوعِي عَمْرٍ وَصَحْبِهِ
 بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الْإِلَهِ الْعَالِمِ بِبِيَدِهِ مَوْمُ لَشَوْهَ لَيْفِي جَابِي بِيَدِهِ
 عَقَّةُ النَّبِيِّ بِعَلِّهَا بِيَدِهِ هُوَ الَّذِي يُرِيدُ الْمُرِيدِ
 وَهُوَ حَقُّ صَمَدٍ وَجَاهِي شَيْخَانِي دُوكُوعِي وَوَاوِي
 تَرَسْتِي بِي عَدَلٍ شَرُوعِي بِعَدَدِ كَمَلِي الْوَحِيدِ
 تَسْبِيحِي لِي بِسُجُودِي جَدِيحِي بِفُكُوعِي لَجُورِي كَيْفِي وَوَيْحِي
 تَسْبِيحِي لِي خَيْرِ الْخَلْقِ أَكْ صَابِيحِي كَسْبِي بِي لَيْلِي بِي وَوَيْحِي جَامِيحِي
 تَسْبِيحِي لِي جَنَّا وَمَا مُحَمَّدُ الْإِسْرَاقِيُّ فَذِي خَلْدٍ لِي لَمَدِي
 دُنْيَا لَشُدِّي حَرْكِي سَعُودِيحَالِي خَيْرِ النَّوَرِيِّ وَأَمَدُ دُجُوعِيحَالِي
 وَابِي تَسْبِيحِي أَمْرِي
 الْمَكِّيِّ

Figure A.2. First page of Shaykh Moussa Kâ's epic, *The Testimony of Maam Cerno Biraahim*. Unpublished.

Translation:

I, Shaykh Moussa Kâ, taalibe of Shaykh Amadu Bamba M'Backé, composed these verses about Maam Cerno Birahim.

I begin with Allah, he who does what he wants in regards to a disciple. We must thank Allah by believing in him and loving him at the beginning of our prayers. Then, thinking of the prophets who are no longer in this world, without forgetting the best of creatures, Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) and his faithful companions for it is because of his grace that we have all been created. His absence from the earth hinders no one from speaking of him and his history. If this world was eternal, Muhammad would not be dead and those who go to Mecca would not be presenting him their good wishes.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 3.
2. See, for example, Alice Conklin, *The Civilizing Mission* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
3. A. J. Arberry, *Sufism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), 119.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Carl Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism* (Boston: Shambhala, 1997). The introduction contains a very useful and concise overview of the development of Orientalist, Muslim fundamentalist, and Muslim modernist views on Sufism, its origins, and history.
6. Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 201.
7. *Ibid.*, 202–22.
8. Carl Ernst and Bill Lawrence, *Sufi Martyrs of Love* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 12–13. The author also challenged the notion of decline by juxtaposing the recurring sense of nostalgia among Sufis for an earlier age of purity with the belief in centennial renewal. Annemarie Schimmel also made this point in terms of early Sufi self-criticism. See Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 20.
9. However, this was not the case universally as demonstrated by Jamil Abun-Nasr's statement that the Tijaniyya was one of the first orders to cooperate with the French in Algeria and that Salafi attacks versus the Sufi orders were considered by the colonial authorities to be attacks on the French administration. Jamil Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in the Modern World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 12.
10. The Wahhabiyya was not the first instance of criticism of Sufism from within the Islamic world. The fourteenth century Hanbali scholar Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1328 C.E.) had ardently argued against Sufism and the pervasive influence of the orders on religious life.
11. Paul Marty, *Études sur l'Islam au Sénégal* (Paris: n.p., 1917), 282.
12. *Ibid.*, 280.
13. *Ibid.*, 223–31.
14. *Ibid.*, 230.
15. Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS) 17 G 39 (my italics).
16. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 165–222.
17. *Ibid.*, 201.

18. See, Jean and John Comaroff, *Modernity and Its Malcontents* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), x–xii.

19. See Friedman’s chapter in Bruce Knauff, ed., *Critically Modern* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 8, 287–313, and Jonathan Friedman, *Cultural Identity and Global Process* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994). Knauff’s edited book is an excellent collection of essays spanning the range of recent arguments concerning “modernity” and the existence of “alternative modernities.”

20. Charles Piot has noted how some proponents of post-modernist theory have replicated the notion of a static and bounded non-Western society when delineating between postmodern societies and modern or pre-modern societies. See, Charles Piot, *Remotely Global* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 22.

21. Knauff, *Critically Modern*, 32.

22. Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 39.

23. Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of Islamic Brotherhood* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 286.

24. *Ibid.*, 82, 97, x, 168.

25. See David Robinson, ed., *Paths of Accommodation* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).

26. See James F. Searing, “*God Alone Is King*”: *The Transformation of Wolof Society, 1860–1928* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002). See also the recent PhD dissertation by Cheikh Anta M’Backé Babou that links the development of the Murid order with prior Islamization in Senegal, especially at the grassroots level that has escaped the view of most historians. Babou also notes how the Murids have coped with “modernization” but in its Western form, especially in urbanization in Senegal. Cheikh Anta M’Backé Babou, “Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya: The History of a Muslim Brotherhood in Senegal, 1853–1913” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2002).

27. See Jean Copans, *Les Marabouts de l’Arachide: La Confrérie Mouride et les Paysans du Senegal* (Paris: Le Sycomore, 1980).

28. James Scott, *Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976).

29. See Christian Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1981).

30. Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 5.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Searing, “*God Alone Is King*,” xxi–xxiv.

33. Ousseynou Cissé, *Maam Cerno Birahim* (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2001).

34. Louis Brenner, *West African Sufi* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 10–13. See also, Louis Brenner, *Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in a West African Muslim Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) for an examination of how Islamic education has developed in response to “Western modernization” (i.e., colonization and independence) in Mali.

35. Charles Baudelaire, *The Mirror of Art* (New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1956), 126–30.

Chapter 1

1. With the exception of the possible Almoravid involvement in the decline of Ghana and references to the state of Takrur’s implementation of the shari’a, or Islamic

law. Also, there are historical references to jihad waged by emperors of Mali versus southern peoples to capture slaves in Arabic sources. See for example, Nehemia Levtzion and J. F. P. Hopkins, eds., *Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2000), 186, 188.

2. For an earlier version of this approach see, Martin Klein, "Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia," *Journal of African History* 13, no. 3 (1972): 419–41.

3. Humphrey J. Fisher, "Conversion Reconsidered," *Africa* 43 (1973): 27–40.

4. See Al-Bakri's account in which he describes how the unconverted ruler of Ghana provided for a mosque next to his palace for the convenience of Muslims visiting and working in his court and how Muslims were exempted from the dusting and prostration rituals that all other visitors made when entering the presence of the ruler. Levtzion and Hopkins, *Corpus*, 79–80.

5. Said Hamdun and Noel King, *Ibn Battuta in Black Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1995), 39, 58. Ibn Battuta also remarked that due to the safety of the road between Walata and the capital of the empire, one did not need to travel with guards or companions. This journey was reported by Ibn Battuta to have taken twenty-four days.

6. Levtzion and Hopkins, *Corpus*, 77.

7. *Ibid.*, 64.

8. For the Jakhanke, see Lamin Sanneh, *The Jakhanke Muslim Clerics* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), whose analysis stresses the scholarly identity of the group. For an opposing view of the Jakhanke that emphasizes their commercial importance, see Philip Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975). In Robert Launay, *Beyond the Stream* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), the author, an anthropologist, presents a study of a Juula town in northern Ivory Coast that has redefined its identity over time in a seamless balance between "the local and the global."

9. Sanneh, *The Jakhanke Muslim Clerics*, 22–27.

10. Robin Horton, "African Conversion," *Africa* 41 (1971): 85–108. For an alternative approach to Horton's ideas, see Fisher, "Conversion Reconsidered."

11. Levtzion and Hopkins, *Corpus*, 82.

12. *Ibid.*, 289–97.

13. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, *A History of Islam in Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 69–70.

14. The origin of marabout is a French transliteration of the Arabic term *al-murabitun* (a person of the *ribat*, or retreat or fortress). *Al-murabitun* is also the origin for the term *Almoravid*.

15. Levtzion and Pouwels, *History of Islam*, 77.

16. *Ibid.*, 78.

17. James F. Searing, *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce: The Senegal River Valley, 1700–1860* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 7–12.

18. For information on the origins of the Mande social system, see Tal Tamari, "The Development of Caste Systems in West Africa," *Journal of African History* 32 (1991): 221–49. For the Wolof, see Abdoulaye-Bara Diop, *La société Wolof: Tradition et changement. Les systèmes d'inégalité et de domination* (Paris: Karthala, 1981).

19. See David Robinson, *The Holy War of Umar Tal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), and John Hanson, *Migration, Jihad, and Muslim Authority in West Africa* (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1996). For the Fulani component, O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal* and James F. Searing, "God Alone Is King": *The Transformation of Wolof Society, 1860–1928* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann) for the Wolof.

20. For example, Martin Klein, *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968).

21. Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, trans. Ayi Kwei Armah (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 44–125.

22. James L. A. Webb, *Desert Frontier: Ecological and Economic Change along the Western Sahel, 1600–1850* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 1–11.

23. Searing, *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce*, 12–13.

24. Joseph Inikori, "The Import of Firearms into West Africa, 1750–1807: A Quantitative Analysis," *Journal of African History* 18, no. 3 (1977): 339–68.

25. The rise of the Bambara state of Segu in the upper Niger River valley is another good example of the breakdown of civil order and the militarization of state and society. See Richard Roberts, *Warriors, Merchants, and Slaves: The State and the Economy in the Middle Niger Valley, 1700–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987).

26. See again, Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 81–93 for the eighteenth century, and Mamadou Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle: Pouvoir cedido et conquête coloniale* (Paris: Karthala, 1990) specifically for Kajoor during the nineteenth century.

27. See Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 50–54 for his account of Nasir al-Din and "The War of the Marabouts."

28. As quoted by Searing, *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce*, 25.

29. For information regarding the importance of Pir and Ndogal as centers of Muslim power, see Jean Boulègue, "La Participation Possible des Centres de Pir et de Ndogal à la Révolution Islamique Sénégalienne de 1673," *Contributions à l'Histoire du Sénégal*, Cahiers du C.R.A. No. 5 (Paris: Karthala, 1987), 119–25.

30. Although the common historical picture of the sēriñ, or marabouts, is that of a male figure, there is one instance of a female Murid shaykh or khaalifa or both named Sokhna Magat Diop who had inherited her father's office upon his death and led the taalibe of her family. For more information regarding her, see Christian Coulon, "Women, Islam, and *Baraka*," in *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, ed. Donal B. Cruise O'Brien and Christian Coulon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 113–33, and Christian Coulon, *L'Islam au féminin: Sokhna Magat Diop, cheikh de la confrérie mouride* (Talence, France: Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire, Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux, 1990). In addition, Amadu Bamba's youngest daughter, Sokhna Maïmouna M'Backé, founded the Murid village of Darou Wahab and its school. See Madike Wade, *Destinée du mouridisme* (Dakar, Senegal: Côte Ouest Informatique, 1991), 133. Even though women commonly served as Quranic teachers, particularly for children, women who were part of a sēriñ lineage would have been well placed to advance their religious careers. More research on women of sēriñ families, including the M'Backé family, is certainly needed. In addition to Coulon's work, one could look to Julia Clancy-Smith's work on Lalla Zaynab, a nineteenth-century North African woman who inherited the leadership of a Sufi center and her father's following, as an example of this type of research. See Julia Clancy-Smith, "The Shaykh and His Daughter: Implicit Pacts and Cultural Survival, c. 1827–1904," in *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Jean Boyd's book about Nana Asma'u, a daughter of Usman dan Fodio, is another illuminating work. See Jean

Boyd, *The Caliph's Sister, Nana Asma'u, 1793–1865: Teacher, Poet and Islamic Leader* (London: Frank Cass, 1989).

31. See Diop, *La société Wolof*, 236–37, and Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 87–90.

32. For example, see Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 44–94, for an overview of the social and political organization of Kajoor and the transformation of the society and the political structure of Kajoor. For a general picture of Senegambia during the era of the Atlantic slave trade, see Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa*. Barry, however, has claimed that Curtin has minimized the impact of the Atlantic slave trade in Senegambia. See Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 39. Martin Klein characterized the era of the Atlantic slave trade as a time of increasing polarization of society between the warrior aristocracy and the peasantry. By reaping the profits of the slave trade, the warriors grew more powerful at the expense of the peasantry, and in reaction, the peasants turned increasingly to Islam and the *sériñ* as an alternative political and social structure. See Martin Klein, “Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia,” 419–41. Searing’s emphasis in *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce* on the Atlantic slave trade and its attendant effects on the region was countered in Webb’s *Desert Frontier*, in which the author placed more importance on the desert trade involving slaves, horses, and grain.

33. See Lucie G. Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor: A Case of Successful Resistance to Jihad,” *Journal of African History* 15, no. 4 (1974): 587–606.

34. A source contemporary to the middle of the nineteenth century is Abbé David Boilat, *Esquisses sénégalaises* (Paris: Karthala, 1984), 89–97, 308–9. Boilat’s information subsequently influenced later works such as Victor Monteil, *Esquisses sénégalaises* (Dakar, Senegal: I.F.A.N., 1966), 85–88.

35. Boilat, *Esquisses sénégalaises*, 285, 301–2, 309.

36. Amadou Bamba Diop, “Lat Dior et le Problème Musulman,” *Bulletin de l’Institut Fondamental de l’Afrique Noire* 28 B, nos. 1–2 (1966): 498–99.

37. The Sereer were truly non-Muslims by the fact that they followed the precepts of Sereer religion and did not claim to be Muslim. Until the colonial period, the Sereer put up a stiff resistance to Islamization that they also associated with Wolofization. For information concerning the Sereer religious practices, see Boilat, *Esquisses sénégalaises*, 78–80, 179, and James F. Searing, “No Kings, No Lords, No Slaves: Ethnicity and Religion among the Sereer-Safen of Western Bawol, 1700–1914,” *Journal of African History* 43 (2002): 407–30. Concerning the eventual conversion of one segment of the Sereer to Islam, see James F. Searing, “Conversion to Islam: Military Recruitment and Generational Conflict in a Sereer-Safen Village (Bandia), 1920–38,” *Journal of African History* 44 (2003): 73–94.

38. See Searing, *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce*, 18–26 for an examination of the establishment of Geej power in light of its origins in Bawol and Latsukaabe’s politically driven policies toward the *sériñ* and the *ceddo*. Searing also comments that the most common interpretation of Latsukaabe as the king of the drunken and violent *ceddo* comes from Islamic clerical sources.

39. For information on Latsukaabe’s land grants to marabouts, the restoration of Pir, and so forth, see Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 94–96.

40. This phrase was used by Serigne Bachir M’Backé in reference to the importance of Njambur as a center for Islamic education. See Serigne Bachir M’Backé, *Les bienfaits de l’éternel: ou la biographie de Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba M’Backé*, trans. by Khadim M’Backé (Dakar, Senegal: I.F.A.N., 1995), 25.

41. Serigne Bachir M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 25. The author credited the ancestor of the Joob family, Mukhtar Ndoumbé (1701–83 c.E.), with the establishment of Kokki as a center for Islamic scholarship. The verses that Serigne Bachir M'Backé quoted about the ancestor of the Joob family and the foundation of Kokki contrasts somewhat with Webb's view that the Idaw al-Hajj of Mauretania founded the most important clerical towns of Njambur during the reign of Latsukaabe. See Webb, *Desert Frontier*, 35–36.

42. Lucie Colvin, "Islam and the State of Kajoor," 587–95. More than a century after Latsukaabe's reign, in 1851, the Abbé David Boilat traveled to the royal court of Kajoor and met a Tukolor marabout who was educating the children of the commander of the ceddo in "all the precepts of the religion of Mahomet." See Boilat, *Esquisses sénégalaises*, 170.

43. None of the sêriñ fakk taal have ever been properly identified and the term seems to have been loosely applied by scholars to those marabouts who did not hold office as the sêriñu lamb did. It is quite possible that some of the sêriñ fakk taal were younger members of prominent families who were simply not in line to inherit the position of sêriñu lamb and therefore became known as fakk taal. Regardless, the existence of a group within the Islamic faction that avoided politics and based their ideology on Islamic traditions regarding this subject was certain in the states of Kajoor and Bawol as will be seen below. For more information concerning the sêriñu lamb and the sêriñ fakk taal, see Diop, *La société Wolof*, 236–45.

44. Mamadou Diouf refers to those Islamic leaders who did not ally themselves with the state as fakk taal and describes their functions as that of a *boorom daara*. See Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 95. In my fieldwork, *boorom daara*, or master of the school, was commonly applied to Murid teachers and shaykh, and the phrase can also refer to the head of a settlement or community.

45. Webb, *Desert Frontier*, 35–43. Webb has stated that during this period, the Trarza Berbers gained an upper hand in the Wolof states through political intrigue and outright violence. The Trarza militarily supported a claimant to the throne of Kajoor in 1760. After their successful intervention, according to Trarza oral tradition, the new damel was forced to pay tribute to the Berbers and allow them to pillage an area of Kajoor for a month each year. To the north of Kajoor, Waalo was particularly at risk from the Trarza Berbers who raided its population, and refugees from Waalo were not welcome in the neighboring Wolof states due to their own problems. In 1764, Waalo, allied with Jolof, unsuccessfully attacked Kajoor. The following year, Kajoor retaliated and plunged Waalo into a civil war of its own. To make matters worse, droughts in the Trarza homeland in the early 1770s only increased Berber pressure on the Wolof states.

46. See Colvin, "Islam and the State of Kajoor," 599. See also Diop, "Lat Dior et le Problème Musulman," 506–8, and David Robinson, "The Islamic Revolution of Futa Toro," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 8, no. 2 (1975): 204–5.

47. There are different versions of the cause of the conflict of 1790–91. Some dynastic traditions claim that the marabouts of Njambur began their revolt with the enthronement of Amary Ngoone. The damel replied by attacking and defeating the marabouts at Kokki and Pir. According to clerical sources, the revolt was the result of a ceddo raid against Luuga. After the raid, the captives, including relatives and students of the Sêriñ Luuga, Malamin Sar, were sold into slavery by the ceddo. After a series of retaliatory strikes by both sides, the sêriñ of Njambur united in a rebellion against the state. See Searing, *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce*, 156–58, for an

overview of the events of 1790–91. Regarding the differing explanations, see Diop, “Lat Dior et le Problème Musulman,” 504.

48. Contrary to previous scholarship such as Cheikh Tidiane Sy, *La confrérie sénégalaise des mourides* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1969), 104–5, Murid sources do not claim Futa Toro as the original home of the M’Backé family. Rather, Muhammad al-Khayr M’Backé was originally from Jolof and his family is referred to as Wolof. There is definitely the possibility that some of the distant ancestors of the M’Backés had been from Futa Toro (i.e., the family name of Bâ), but at least by the time of Muhammad al-Khayr, the family were definitively Wolof in language and culture. See M’Backé, *Les bienfaits de l’éternel*, 24.

49. M’Backé, *Les bienfaits de l’éternel*, 24. The episode regarding the land grant given to Maharam M’Backé by Amary Ngoone was referred to by Serigne Bachir M’Backé. The translator of *Les bienfaits de l’éternel*, Khadim M’Backé, added the reference to the poem of Shaykh Musaa Kâ in a footnote. Musaa Kâ’s statement that some of the marabouts were freed following Maharam M’Backé’s appeal to the damel contrasts with other sources that contend that the captives were sold into slavery by the king. See Diop, “Lat Dior et le Problème Musulman,” 504, and Diouf, *Le Kajor au XIXe siècle*, 96–106.

50. M’Backé, *Les bienfaits de l’éternel*, 24.

51. Knut Vikor, “Sufi Brotherhoods in Africa,” in Levtzion and Pouwels, *History of Islam*, 441.

52. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2, 202–3.

53. *Ibid.*, 221.

54. Levtzion and Pouwels, *History of Islam*, 442–44, and Khadim M’Backe, *Études islamiques, Vol. 4: Soufisme et confréries religieuses au Sénégal* (Dakar, Senegal: I.F.A.N., 1995), 27. There is a recent English translation of the latter source, see Khadim M’Backé, *Sufism and Religious Brotherhoods in Senegal*, ed. John Hunwick, trans. Eric Ross (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2005).

55. Levtzion and Pouwels, *History of Islam*, 444–46, M’Backé, *Études islamiques, Vol. 4*, 27–28, and Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 162–69, 178–81.

56. For overviews of the early history of Islam in Hausaland, see Levtzion and Pouwels, *History of Islam*, 82–86, and Mervyn Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth: The Life and Times of the Shehu Usman dan Fodio* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 3–9, 15–41.

57. Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth*, 133. Hiskett judged that ultimately Sufism and not Islamic fundamentalism or reform governed what Usman dan Fodio said and did.

58. Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth*, 60, and Levtzion and Pouwels, *History of Islam*, 446.

59. Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth*, 42–43, Levtzion and Pouwels, *History of Islam*, 85–86, and Hiskett, *Tazyin al-Waraqat: A Study of the Life and Times of Abdullah B. Muhammad, First Emir of Gwandu* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1963), 85, 105.

60. As quoted by Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth*, 64–65.

61. Hiskett, *Tazyin al-Waraqat*, 105.

Chapter 2

1. Interview with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla of Darou Mousty, January 27, 1997.

2. The word *jihad* actually translates as “striving or exertion” toward God, and not necessarily as a holy war or struggle. In fact, there are two recognized forms of *jihad*.

The greater form is the spiritual struggle that Amadu Bamba professed was the only acceptable form. The lesser form is the *jihad al-sayf*, or the jihad of the sword, which is an armed struggle in self-defense of Islam. Of course, the word and its concepts have been liberally translated throughout history. For more information on jihad, see in Mircea Eliade et al., eds., *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1987), vol. 8, s.v. “Jihad,” by Rudolf Peters, 88–91, and Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1959).

3. The source of this oral tradition is Tanor Latsukaabe Fall as used by Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 136.

4. Searing, *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce*, 169–73.

5. Regarding the career of Al-Hajj Umar Tal, the standard study is Robinson, *The Holy War of Umar Tal*.

6. Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 148–57.

7. Robinson, *The Holy War of Umar Tal*, 37.

8. See Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya*, for an analysis of Al-Tijani and his order including the branch in West Africa.

9. Within the movement itself as the fighting dragged on there was a growing disillusion and fatigue, see John Hanson, “Generational Conflict in the Umarian Movement after the Jihad: Perspectives from the Futanke Grain Trade at Medine,” *Journal of African History* 31 (1990): 199–215, and Hanson, *Migration, Jihad, and Muslim Authority*.

10. Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 188.

11. *Ibid.*, 191–94.

12. Marty, *Études sur l’Islam au Sénégal*, 223.

13. O’Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 38–40.

14. For this new interpretation of the events surrounding the revolts of Mäbba, Amadu Seexu, and Amadu Bamba’s role in the political struggles which followed the death of Lat Joor, see Searing, “*God Alone Is King*.” This study demonstrates the value of using Murid oral and written sources in order to gain a more comprehensive view of the factors surrounding the arrest and exiles of Amadu Bamba. An excellent source on Mäbba in the context of French expansion in Senegal is Klein, *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal*.

15. M’Backé, *Les bienfaits de l’éternel*, 26–27. The author’s partial absolution of Mäbba’s mistakes is especially interesting in relation to the questions surrounding the death of one of Amadu Bamba’s grandfathers during Mäbba’s relocation of Muslims to Saloum. Some scholars have reported that the grandfather was killed while others say he died of natural causes during the emigration. Serigne Bachir noted that Amadu Bamba’s paternal grandfather, Habib Allah, was nearly ninety years old when Mäbba gave the order to emigrate and due to his advanced age excused himself from moving. There is no mention of his death or murder.

16. *Ibid.*, 24–26. M’Backé notes that it was customary for a student to affix the name of a teacher or the name of the teacher’s home village or province to a child’s name, thus Momar Anta Saly named his son Amadu Bamba M’Backé. The author also explained that Mäbba’s order to emigrate was motivated by his fear that the *ceddo* would retaliate against all Muslims in revenge for Mäbba’s wars.

17. Searing, “*God Alone Is King*,” 40. The source for this oral tradition is Bassirou M’Baye, a Wolof bard.

18. See Klein, “Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia,” 431.

19. See M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 29. Regarding the statement that many followed Lat Joor's example, M'Backé added, "That God thank him [Lat Joor] for this good work."

20. Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 234–35. For Demba War Sall, Lat Joor's religious reform and relationship with Mâbba were merely a means to an end, namely, his return to power in Kajoor. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the followers of Lat Joor were becoming increasingly unhappy with life in Mâbba's theocratic state. Another variant of this episode points to collusion between the French and Demba War Sall. The French in this case agreed to allow Lat Joor to return to Kajoor in return for his treason against Mâbba. If one judges this issue in relation to the events that occurred after the death of Mâbba, it is most likely that Demba War Sall did cooperate with the French to return to Kajoor. Diouf analyzed all the different possibilities of the role that Lat Joor played in the death of Mâbba and links Demba War Sall to the French. In his view, the subject of French plans to build a railway through Kajoor that would link Dakar and St. Louis play a prominent role in Demba War Sall's actions.

21. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 30–31.

22. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé of Darou Mousty, January 20, 1997.

23. Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 235–40.

24. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 55.

25. *Ibid.*, 107.

26. Diop, "Lat Dior et le Problème Musulman," 525.

27. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 107.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Searing, "God Alone Is King," 94–96. Among the works cited by Searing is Mouhamed Moustapha Ane, *La vie de Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba*, trans. by Amar Samb (Dakar: n.p., n.d.), 6. Amadu Bamba's statements were made in public, and many who heard the exchange replied that Amadu Bamba must be crazy (*dafa dof*). This episode appears to be the origin of the saying that the Murids are crazy. For the Murids, however, they saw the appellation as an honor that demonstrated the belief that Amadu Bamba held his religious beliefs above all secular matters, even matters that involved kings.

30. Interview with Serîñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla of Darou Mousty, January 26, 1997. Cheikh Tidiane Sy also mentioned the meeting between Amadu Bamba and As Kamara, but he maintained that Amadu Bamba was only seeking the Qadiri wîrd and asked As Kamara to send him on to Shaykh Sidia in Mauritania. Cheikh Tidiane Sy, *La confrérie sénégalaise des mourides*, 107.

31. Shaykh Moussa Kâ, "An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim" (unpublished), 19.

32. Interview with Serîñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997. There are two possible origins for the word *daara*. One possible origin is the Arabic *dar*, which means home or land as in *dar al-Islam*. Another possible source is the Arabic term used in Mauritania for a school, *madrassa* or *medersa*.

33. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 55–56.

34. Searing, "God Alone Is King," 98.

35. *Ibid.*, 55–57.

36. Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 257–75.

37. Searing, "God Alone Is King," 58.

38. See Marin Klein, *Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 64–66.

39. Diouf, *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle*, 279–80.

40. Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 161–77.

41. *Ibid.*, 178–93.

42. *Ibid.*, 194.

43. For an overview of the Niassé branch, see Christopher Gray, “The Rise of the Niasséne Tijaniyya, 1875 to the Present,” *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara* 2 (1988): 34–60.

44. For example, see Ibrahim Marone, “Le Tidjanisme au Sénégal,” *Bulletin de l’IFAN série B* 32, 1 (1970): 136–215.

45. For sources on the Layenne, see Cécile Laborde, *La confrérie layenne et les Lébou du Sénégal* (Bordeaux, France: Centre d’études d’Afrique noire, 1995), and M’Backé, *Études islamiques*, Vol. 4, 77–81.

46. An informational website on the Layenne order contains useful discussions of the concept of the Mahdi and the historical background of the movement. Go to <http://www.layene.sn>.

47. Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 200.

48. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 5.

Chapter 3

1. Interviews with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé of Darou Mousty, February 17, 1997, and Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997. According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, Maam Cerno was born on a Thursday (and also died on a Thursday). He also stated that Maam Cerno had lived seventy-nine years and eight months when he died in 1943. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 3. According to the Islamic calendar, Maam Cerno died in the year AH 1362, which would place his birth in the year AH 1282, which began in May 1865. Martin Klein dated the battle mentioned by Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla as November 24–28, 1865. See Klein, *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal*, 85. It is most likely, therefore, that Maam Cerno was born in late November 1865 and lived seventy-eight years and three months according to the Christian calendar.

2. In an interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997, he added that the place where Maam Cerno’s baptism was performed was named Kharté.

3. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 11–12.

4. This version of the birth of Maam Cerno is according to an interview with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla on January 26, 1997, and roughly matches other oral versions.

5. This second version is according to an interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997.

6. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 12.

7. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé, February 17, 1997. In another oral source concerning Maam Cerno’s education, Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla acknowledged that Amadu Bamba was the principal teacher and master of Maam Cerno yet added that Maam Cerno’s first teachers were Sëriñ Niang and Shaykh Anta. Shaykh Anta was another of Maam Cerno’s older brothers. Apparently, the two had been appointed by Momar Anta Saly to start Maam Cerno’s education, but after a brief

time, Amadu Bamba took charge of the education of his younger brother. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26–27, 1997.

8. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997.

9. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997.

10. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 17, 1997. In another interview on January 20, 1997, Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé also commented on how Maam Cerno continued his studies of the sciences, or *xam-xam* (knowledge) in Wolof, but only mentioned Khalima Diakhate Kalla (Majaxate Kala) as the teacher of these advanced studies. He did add, however, that Maam Cerno was accompanied by Sëriñ Massamba Joob, Sëriñ Mayacine Umy Joof, and Sëriñ Barra Kharry Gaye who also went to the home of Sëriñ Majaxaaté Kala to learn “the books of history.”

11. A more detailed version of the inheritance episode can be found in Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 15–16. According to this source, the Quran had originally belonged to Momar Anta Saly's father, Balla Issa Bourry, who died at the hands of the Fulani.

12. See interviews with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997, and Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997, both of Darou Mousty.

13. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla of Darou Mousty, January 26, 1997. The reference to Sulayman and Ifritou can be found in Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 19. As Kamara was referring in this instance to Surah xxvii, “The Ant” in the Quran in which Solomon was aided by a jinn. Ifritou refers to a great jinn.

14. This short list of students was compiled from the interviews with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 17, 1997, and Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997.

15. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 24–26. Also, it was noted that at the completion of his studies with Mor Birama, Maam Cerno composed a poem of eight lines. This is the first reference that I have seen regarding writing by Maam Cerno, however, in March 1997, just prior to my departure from Senegal, Khadim M'Backé, a researcher at Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire (IFAN), informed me that religious poems had been composed in Darou Mousty. He specifically mentioned that the second khalifah of Darou Mousty, Sëriñ Abdou Khoudoss M'Backé, was a noted poet earlier in his life.

16. O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 144–45. O'Brien stated that the Murids remained at M'Backé-Bawol for three years. He also cited local reaction to Shaykh Ibra Fall's unorthodox behavior as a reason for the Murids being forced to leave M'Backé-Bawol. According to the chronology used in this study, this would place their departure from M'Backé-Bawol around 1886.

17. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 65–66.

18. *Ibid.*, 65–66.

19. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 21.

20. *Ibid.*, 22. There is some debate over why Amadu Bamba selected the name “Touba” for this site. The Wolof word for religious conversion to Islam is *tuub*, however, O'Brien, in *The Mourides of Senegal*, 47, stated that the Arabic word *tuba* meant “the finest” or “sweetest.” Hans Wehr defined the word as “blessedness.” See Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. J. Milton Cowan (Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, 1976), 571.

21. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé of Darou Mousty, February 17, 1997. He also gave the year 1887 as the date for the establishment of Touba.

22. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997. Shaykh Moussa Kâ wrote that Shaykh Modou Ndoumbé gathered all of the taalibe for the work involved in establishing Touba. Furthermore, Amadu Bamba, himself, traced out the foundation of the mosque so that it pointed toward Mecca. He also told Maam Cerno that the site for the initial mosque was where he was when he saw the holy light. The construction of Touba was not solely performed by Maam Cerno. Shaykh Ibra Fall and "all of the great taalibe of that time" aided in the labor. Kâ, "An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim," 22. The tomb of Amadu Bamba is now located on this spot.

23. Kâ, "An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim," 23. The author added that due to the presence of the Prophet Muhammad at his birth, Sëriñ Falilou M'Backé undertook the pilgrimage or hajj to Mecca. There was no date provided for Amadu Bamba's journey to Waalo, the premonition of his exile, or the birth of Sëriñ Falilou, yet it appears, due to the length of Maam Cerno's subsequent study with Mor Birama, his work at Keur Makalla, and the rebuilding of M'Backé-Barry that there was an interval of at least two years, if not more, between the journey to Waalo and Amadu Bamba's arrest and deportation in 1895.

24. M'Backé-Barry is referred to by French sources as Touba Jolof or the second Touba.

25. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 66. The French interpreted the move as an attempt by Amadu Bamba to escape their surveillance and build his forces.

26. Kâ, "An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim," 26.

27. Serigne Bachir M'Backé stated that peasants, village chiefs, Murids, shaykh, and princes all came to Amadu Bamba at M'Backé-Barry, which further galvanized the opponents of the Murids to take action. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 26.

28. The use of spies by the colonial chiefs is even remembered in Murid oral traditions. For the most part these traditions correspond to French archival sources and Murid written sources, such as the work by Serigne Bachir M'Backé. In an interview with Serin M'Baye Gueye Sylla of Darou Mousty on January 26, 1997, he talked about the spies who posed as taalibe who questioned other disciples concerning Amadu Bamba and his plans and then reported back to the chiefs. According to this oral source, "due to the grace of God," the spies never found anything that could condemn Amadu Bamba.

29. Searing, "God Alone Is King," 79.

30. Commandant Leclerc recorded that Amadu Bamba came to St. Louis himself and denounced some of his disciples in exchange for not being placed under arrest, and Governor Merlin noted that it was Maam Cerno who came. See Oumar Ba, *Ahmadou Bamba: Face aux autorités coloniales (1897–1927)* (Dakar: Abbeville, 1982), 29–49.

31. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 68.

32. *Ibid.*, 69.

33. *Ibid.*, 70.

34. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé of Darou Mousty, January 20, 1997. The phrase *Sëriñ Touba* was used by most of the subjects interviewed to refer to Amadu Bamba. In this case, he is obviously the sëriñ of Touba.

35. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 17, 1997.

36. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997.

37. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 73–74.

38. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997. Also see M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 73–76.

39. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 17, 1997. There are several versions concerning Maam Cerno's departure from M'Backé-Barry. According to Serigne Bachir M'Backé, before Amadu Bamba had left to meet Leclerc at Jéwól, he instructed Maam Cerno to remain [at M'Backé-Barry] as long as he could and if conditions became difficult to return to Baol. The author later stated that Maam Cerno had to remain in M'Backé-Barry long enough to conduct the harvest. At the time of the exile, September, the rainy season, or *hivernage*, was just ending and the crops were not yet ready for harvest. After the harvest was complete, Maam Cerno moved to M'Backé-Baol. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 70, 73. Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla said that Maam Cerno was instructed to leave M'Backé-Barry after the rainy season and notes that at the time, M'Backé-Barry had neither water nor electricity. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26–27, 1997. Shaykh Moussa Kâ gave the year as AH 1313 (1895–96) as the date when Maam Cerno moved to M'Backé-Baol. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 27–28.

40. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997.

41. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 27.

42. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26–27, 1997. According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, among the dead were Sëriñ Muhammadu Lamine Bara M'Backé, Amadu Bamba's third son; Shaykh Modou Yadally; and Mor M'Backé Lo, the *muezzin* of Maam Cerno. He also added that Amadu Bamba's first son, Sëriñ Muhammadu Moustapha M'Backé, fell sick as well yet survived. See Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 28.

43. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 28.

44. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26–27, 1997. Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé did not relate the episode near M'Backé-Baol but did concur that Darou Marnane-Baol was established after the move to M'Backé-Baol and that it was in Darou Marnane that Maam Cerno remained until the return of Amadu Bamba in 1902. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 17, 1997. Also, Shaykh Moussa Kâ mentioned Maam Cerno performing his ablutions at “Darou Marnane of Touba” and noted the religious reputation of the town. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 5, 34. Serigne Bachir M'Backé recorded that Maam Cerno chose to settle everyone in Touba due to its distance from neighboring villages. M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 74.

45. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997. It should also be noted that even though Maam Cerno played a very prominent role during the exile, he was aided by other Murid shaykh including Shaykh Ibra Fall who sent Maam Cerno gifts and food to help take care of Amadu Bamba's family and the disciples. See M'Backé, *Les bienfaits de l'éternel*, 76–77.

46. Another reference to this belief can be found in a letter sent by Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno while the former was in exile in Mauritania (1903–7). I obtained a copy of this letter from Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla who, as an archivist and historian, maintains a large collection of letters, photographs, and such dealing with the history of Darou Mousty, Maam Cerno, and the Muridiyya in general in the archives of the Fondation de Maam Cerno in Darou Mousty. For the present study, I was able to find thirteen letters written by Amadu Bamba and addressed to Maam Cerno that I was allowed to photocopy. For future reference, these letters will be cited as AFMC,

“Correspondence from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno,” dated, if possible, and the number of the letter (1–13). This particular letter is not dated, but Amadu Bamba stated that in 1895 he had made a pact with God. AFMC, “Correspondence from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno,” #5.

47. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997.

48. M’Backé, *Les bienfaits de l’éternel*, 80.

49. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 43–44.

50. *Ibid.*, 44. See also M’Backé, *Les bienfaits de l’éternel*, 82–85.

51. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 35.

52. Even though the Arabic original and French translation of this letter can be found in the Archives Nationales du Sénégal, I obtained a copy from Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla’s archive in Darou Mousty.

53. AFMC, Correspondence from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno, no date, #7. This letter also contains four sets of verses written by Amadu Bamba in the home of Shaykh Sidia.

54. Interviews with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26–27, 1997, and Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé, February 17, 1997. It is likely that this complicity actually involved the colonial chief of eastern Baol, M’Bakhane Diop, who the French knew was harassing Maam Cerno. Shaykh Moussa Kâ also mentioned the battle with the Fulbe near Darou Marnane-Baol and added that more than a dozen Murids were wounded and two killed in the fighting. He also noted that the governor delegated M’Bakhane Diop to oversee the litigation. The trial was held in Diourbel and presided over by the “malicious” judge Diaga Khéne who sought, according to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, to gain control over the region around Darou Marnane-Baol. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 35–36.

55. Maam Cerno’s letter and the subsequent French correspondence in regards to his request can be found in ANS 11D1/1223, Tivaouane correspondence, 1903.

56. Interview Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26–27, 1997.

57. Interviews with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997, and Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé, February 17, 1997. According to Shaykh Moussa Kâ, Maam Cerno left Darou Marnane-Baol during the same year that the judgment in favor of the Fulbe had been delivered. Following his departure, he surveyed the land near the future site of Gawane but determined that it was not large enough for his needs. However, Maam Cerno instructed Shaykh Anta Gawane to settle in the area and bring it under cultivation. Maam Cerno then returned to the daara [Darou Marnane] where he passed the dry season. See Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 36.

58. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 37.

59. This line of reasoning is also supported by information provided by Baay Fallou Mor Jobou Syl, a descendent of an original taalibe. Baay Fallou Mor Jobou Syl stated that his father, Sëriñ Mor Jobou Syl, had joined Maam Cerno in 1907 at Darou Marnane-Baol and had traveled with the marabout to visit Amadu Bamba in Mauritania prior to his return from exile in April 1907. Baay Fallou Mor Jobou Syl said that his father then returned with Maam Cerno to Darou Marnane-Baol and remained there one year with the marabout before they moved to M’Backé-Cayor. His dating of events would then place the final move to M’Backé-Cayor in the first half of 1908. Interview with Baay Fallou Mor Jobou Syl of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.

60. AFMC, Correspondence from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno, 1904, #2.

61. AFMC, Correspondence from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno, no date, #9.
62. AFMC, Correspondence from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno, no date, #4.
63. AFMC, Correspondence from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno, no date, #10.
64. AFMC, Correspondence from Amadu Bamba to Maam Cerno, 1905, #11.
65. Kâ, “An Account of the Testimony of Maam Cerno Birahim,” 37. Maam Cerno’s move to Cayor was delayed for a short time due to the death of a relative and the arrival of the month of Ramadan. This evidence for a date of Maam Cerno’s possible move to Cayor in 1908 roughly corresponds to the date 1907–8 given by Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé, February 17, 1997.
66. In my interviews with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997, and Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997, they indicated that the old site for M’Backé-Cayor was on the edge of the present town and was in ruins.
67. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997.
68. *Ibid.*
69. Interview with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997.
70. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997.
71. Interview with Sëriñ Modou M’Backé Barry of Darou Mousty, January 23, 1997.
72. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997.
73. Additionally, during the month of Ramadan, the daily announcement of the beginning of the fast and the first prayer of the day, before sunrise, is preceded by the recitation of “*bismillah* Maam Cerno” (In the name of Allah, Maam Cerno) several times.
74. ANS 11D1/1236 for the written report and 11D1/1240 for a typed copy of this report.
75. Marty, *Études sur l’Islam au Sénégal*, 109–11, 348–52. In Marty’s account, the Murid shaykh, for the most part, replaced the precolonial Wolof chief at the top of village hierarchy. The analyses of O’Brien and Copans focus more on the Murid organization as it existed in the 1960s and 1970s and therefore examine the issues of exploitation and maraboutic domination in a more recent era than the time frame for this study. O’Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 3–5, 82. Copans, *Les marabouts de l’arachide*, 233–36, 243–58.
76. Interviews with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997, and Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26–27, 1997.
77. Interview with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26–27, 1997.
78. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997.
79. *Ibid.*

Chapter 4

1. Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004) 23.
2. This data is in part from a government report on the district of Darou Mousty that was shown to me in Darou Mousty. The report entitled “Monographie de Darou Mousty” was dated 1986 and signed by Oumar Gueye, the commandant de brigade de generale territoire de Darou Mousty. The recent population statistics come from <http://www.minifinances.sn/estp2004.html>.

3. Gueye, “Monographie.”

4. The original letter, in Arabic, and a French translation were found in the archives of Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla of Darou Mousty (AFMC). See appendix 1 for a copy and translation of the letter.

5. Interview with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla of Darou Mousty, January 27–28, 1997.

6. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé of Darou Mousty, February 18, 1997.

7. Gueye, “Monographie.” According to Gueye, the site chosen for Darou Mousty was previously known by the Wolof as Toky-Ndiack and by the Fulbe as Seane-Ndianky.

8. O’Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 186, and Paul Péliissier, *Les paysans du Sénégal: Les civilisations agraires du Cayor à la Casamance* (St. Yrieix, France: Imprimerie Fabrègue, 1966), 344–45.

9. Sy, *La confrérie sénégalaise des Mourides*, 155. Sy referred to the original taalibe as *lakhassaye*, which he translated as “adepts dressed in poor clothing.”

10. Interviews with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé of Darou Mousty, January 20, 1997; Baay Cerno Gaye of Darou Mousty, February 17, 1997; and Sëriñ Modou M’Backé Barry of Darou Mousty, January 23, 1997.

11. Interview with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 27–28, 1997. He stressed that the 220 disciples were Maam Cerno’s own taalibe who had been initiated by him into the order.

12. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M’Backé, February 18, 1997. I asked several others about the founding of the town in general, but he was the only one to include this variation of the story.

13. Interview with Baay Mactar Niang of Darou Mousty, January 26, 1997.

14. Interview with Baay Abdou Joob Samba of Darou Mousty, February 19, 1997.

15. Interview with Baay Kabou Gaye of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.

16. All of the interviews with the original taalibe or their descendants mentioned the water problem and in many of the studies of the Murids, such as O’Brien and Péliissier, the story of hauling water was used in the brief reference to Darou Mousty.

17. Interview with Baay Mor of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997. Sëriñ Mawade’s son, Baay Abdou Mawade Wade, confirmed that his father made the trips between Darou Mousty and M’Backé-Cayor with Baay Mor and the thirty donkeys to supply the new settlement with water. Interview with Baay Abdou Mawade Wade of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.

18. Interview with Baay Cerno Gaye of Darou Mousty, February 17, 1997.

19. Interviews with Baay Dame Sall of Douloungué, February 25, 1997, and Sëriñ Modou M’Backé Barry, January 23, 1997.

20. Gueye, “Monographie.”

21. Interview with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 27–28, 1997.

22. Gueye, “Monographie.”

23. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M’Backé, January 20, 1997.

24. Gueye, “Monographie.” However, Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla stated that according to the colonial administration, the date for the founding of Darou Mousty was March 4, 1912, but I saw no indication of this in the ANS archives. Interview with Sëriñ M’Baye Gueye Sylla, January 27–28, 1997.

25. Interview with Baay Cerno Gaye, February 17, 1997. In O’Brien’s brief account of Darou Mousty, he stated that women did not arrive in the town until 1919 when a deep well was dug. See O’Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 186.

26. Interviews with Baay Cerno Joob, January 22, 1997, and Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 27–28, 1997.
27. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 27–28, 1997.
28. Ibid.
29. Interview with Baay Abdou Joob Samba, February 19, 1997.
30. Interview with Baay Kabou Gaye, February 24, 1997.
31. Interview with Baay Mor, February 24, 1997.
32. Interview with Sëriñ Malik Cissé of Darou Mousty, February 20, 1997.
33. Interview with Baay Cerno Joob, January 22, 1997.
34. Interview with Baay Abdou Joob Samba, February 19, 1997.
35. Interview with Baay Cerno Gaye, February 17, 1997.
36. Interview with Baay Abdou Mawade Wade, February 24, 1997.
37. Interview with Sëriñ Malik Cissé, February 20, 1997.
38. Interview with Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall of Kosso, February 25, 1997.
39. ANS 11D1/1236, Rapports mensuels du cercle Cayor-Tivaouane, 1912–15.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997. Concerning the message sent from Amadu Bamba to Macodou Sall, one of my informants, Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry, told me that it was his father, Sëriñ Mor Joob M'Backé, who had carried the message. Interview with Sëriñ Modou M'Backé-Barry, January 23, 1997.
43. ANS 11D1/1242.
44. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997.
45. ANS 11D1/1240, Rapports mensuels du cercle de Tivaouane, 1914.
46. Ibid. The administrator was also concerned about the effects on European commerce in the region because of the movement of so many people. Throughout the French reports of the immigrations, there are no details concerning exact numbers of people who were moving. The general scale of the movements does appear, however, to have been large.
47. Ibid. The administrator continued for quite some time in the usual French criticism of the Murids and their techniques of recruitment.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. There are two excellent sources on the participation of West Africans in the *Tirailleurs sénégalais*, or the Senegalese Riflemen, which was an army made up of French colonial subjects. For an overall history of the army, see Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991). For a more detailed examination of the experiences of Senegalese recruits in World War I that focuses on oral sources, see Joe Harris Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).
51. ANS 11D1/1240.
52. For additional French attitudes during this period, see Christopher Harrison, *France and Islam in West Africa, 1860–1960* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 118–36.
53. ANS 11D1/1236.
54. ANS 13G 67, Politique musulman 1906–17. This file also contains references to letters that the Ottomans had distributed in Africa that were directed to Muslims in

French and British colonies. The Arabic circulars informed the reader that all Muslims who were helping the Allies against an Islamic state would be “eternally condemned to the fires of hell.” Evidence of further German-Ottoman propaganda in West Africa can be found in ANS 19G 2, Questions musulmans 1906–18. In this dossier is a French translation of an Arabic letter dated December 1914 that was found in a mosque in Yola in Niger. The letter was from the Ottoman sultan and repeated the threat to Muslims who fought against him. The letter also said that the Germans had taken Paris and four towns in England. It also warned the Fulbe Muslims that the English were going to prevent them from praying.

55. ANS 19G 4, Surveillance de l’Islam, propaganda Islamique par l’image et la presse 1906–17. This dossier contains evidence that the French were concerned about Pan-Islamic materials entering Senegal at least as early as 1906. The Egyptian journal *Al-Moayed* was mentioned in particular as a subject of concern. In 1910, the French confiscated twelve packages containing portraits of the Ottoman sultan and his ministers in Dakar. This file also contains the references to Amadu Bamba and Shaykh Anta’s subscriptions to Arab journals and such.

56. In ANS 13G 67, there is a letter from the lieutenant governor of Senegal, Antonetti, to the governor-general of the A.O.F. in which he claims that based on the attitude of Amadu Bamba since the beginning of the war, he thinks that the marabout can be trusted. Further evidence of this change in French attitudes toward their Muslim subjects in regard to this matter can be found in ANS 19G 1, Situation de l’Islam 1906–16 in the letter entitled, “Measures d’ordre Politique” under section II entitled, “Instructions et Mesures d’ordre politique intéressant plus particulièrement la masse des Indigènes.”

57. ANS 11D1/1236, Rapports mensuels du cercle Cayor-Tivaouane Residence 1912–15. In his study, Lunn noted that maraboutic pressure was one of the three most prevalent means of recruitment. The other two methods most used were conscription by local chiefs and capture. See Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 33–58.

58. The recruitment drives during the first year of the war were made in an effort to fulfill a quota for a reserve force of West Africans and to make up for French losses. The goal was a reserve of 20,000 soldiers, however, by August 1914, this force numbered only 16,000 (2,000 of whom were from Senegal). By October 1915, after three recruitment drives, the colonial administration had raised 3,350 recruits from the regions of Senegal outside of the Four Communes. From October 1915 to April 1916, an additional 7,500 men were conscripted from the protectorate. However, from November 1916 to April 1917, recruitment dropped to only 2,500. In October 1917, the governor-general, Joost Van Vollenhoven, due to his fear of rising resentment toward conscription in the West African colonies, temporarily suspended the recruitment drives. See Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 35.

59. ANS 11D1/1236. There is a note penciled in on this report that Shaykh Anta was also present at the reception. There is a typed version of this report in 11D1/1240, Rapports mensuels du cercle de Tivaouane 1914.

60. ANS 11D1/1236. Provincial chiefs, canton chiefs, and other notables were charged by the commandant of the cercle with the delivery of recruits to fulfill the quota required for the cercle. The French did not supervise the actual recruitment undertaken by the local chiefs, which sometimes took on the form of a manhunt as the chiefs employed all means necessary to fill their quota and therefore escape punishment for not delivering enough men. See Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 40–41.

61. ANS 11D1/1242, Correspondance du cercle de Tivaouane: 1916–27.
62. French efforts to define their empire as a Muslim power has been an important theme put forward by David Robinson most recently in *Paths of Accomodation*.
63. ANS 11D1/1242, Correspondance du cercle de Tivaouane: 1916–27.
64. ANS 11D1/ 1243, Rapports mensuels, cercle de Cayor, residence de Tivaouane, 1918.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. ANS 11D1/1243. Quinquaud, the adjunct administrator implied that the influenza epidemic was also playing a role in the immigration to Darou Mousty.
69. Ibid.
70. Interview with Sêriñ Modou M'Backé Barry, January 23, 1997. This informant did not know the details or the exact month concerning the burning of Darou Mousty, but he did say that it was done due to “the plague.” Quinquaud’s tour of the town around this time made no mention of the event. It is possible that the epidemic had arrived much earlier (due to Macodou Sall’s failure to report it) than October and the town had been rebuilt by the time of the tour or that the burning was done in the final months of 1918 after the tour.
71. ANS 11D1/1243. On account of Macodou Sall’s excellent record, Quinquaud declined to punish the powerful chief. Also, Quinquaud cited the containment of the influenza epidemic as an additional reason for the cordon set up around Darou Mousty.
72. Ibid. In his report entitled, “Tournée à Dar-Mousti,” Quinquaud had placed in parentheses after the title the comment, “the richest region each year.”
73. The recruitment drive of 1918 was different from previous years due to the appeal made by the Senegalese politician and deputy, Blaise Diagne, for West Africans to join the army in return for French reforms of the colonial system. Diagne met with the leading chiefs of Senegal and the most important marabouts, including Amadu Bamba and Al-Hajj Malik Sy to explain the reasons for his support of the latest recruitment drive and to solicit their help. Subsequently, the recruitment drive of 1918 was the most successful of the war (7,900 recruits in three months raised from Senegal) and encountered the least resistance. Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 81.
74. ANS 11D1/1243. Paul Pélissier also noted Darou Mousty’s early reputation as a sanctuary for those fleeing military service. Maam Cerno, however, had to follow Amadu Bamba’s order for Murid taalibe to join the army. Pélissier considered Maam Cerno’s delivery of recruits to have been fashioned by the marabout of Darou Mousty as an example for other Murid shaykh to follow. Countering Quinquaud’s claim that Maam Cerno had not provided recruits earlier than 1918, Pélissier also referred to an earlier recruitment drive undertaken by Maam Cerno. His dates for this earlier drive in Darou Mousty, which he himself questioned, are 1916–17. Pélissier claimed that Maam Cerno, at one point, delivered two hundred “enthusiastic recruits” during a single recruitment drive. Pélissier, *Les paysans du Sénégal*, 345–46.
75. Sêriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla mentioned that the French needed additional supplies to feed their prisoners of war. Interview with Sêriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 27–28, 1997. Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé told the same story of Darou Mousty contributing to the French war effort by giving 900 kilograms of millet and 600 kilograms of peanuts. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997. Sêriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé referred to the aid that his father gave to the French in the wars

(World War I and II) and added that to this day the French have not paid the debts that they promised to pay Maam Cerno in return for his aid. Interview with Sēriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 18, 1997.

76. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997.

77. Ibid. Maam Cerno was not the only Murid shaykh to send his own sons to World War I. One of Shaykh Ibra Fall's sons died in battle in World War I. O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 154.

78. Interview with Sēriñ Barra Joob of Darou Mousty, February 16, 1997. The acquisition of French and other *toubab*, or European habits, by veterans of World War I has been noted by Lunn. See Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 163–73, 192.

79. Interview with Baay Cerno Gaye, February 17, 1997.

80. Interview with Baay Abdou Mawade Wade, February 24, 1997.

81. Interview with Baay Kabou Gaye, February 24, 1997.

82. The honor bestowed upon the returning veterans was not limited to Murid taalibe. Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 187–92.

83. Péliissier, *Les paysans du Sénégal*, 346.

84. Paul Marty concluded as early as 1917 that Amadu Bamba had confined himself to a saintly role and was no longer a threat. Marty, *Études sur l'Islam au Sénégal*, 231.

85. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997.

Chapter 5

1. Gueye, “Monographie.”

2. Much of this information was confirmed in an interview with Sēriñ Modou M'Backé Barry of Darou Mousty, January 23, 1997.

3. ANS 11D1/1244, Rapports mensuels du cercle de Cayor, 1919. There is also a health report in this file for Darou Mousty for the month of September 1919. It lists eighty-five births and eleven deaths for the month.

4. Interview with Sēriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 18, 1997. I was able to visit six of the towns as a part of my fieldwork.

5. Interviews with Sēriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 18, 1997, and Sēriñ Mactar Balla Fall of Kosso, February 25, 1997. Sēriñ Bassirou Anta Niang received his early education in Kosso, and the town is now under the control of Sēriñ Maam Mor M'Backé, a son of Sēriñ Mahamadane M'Backé.

6. Interview with Baay Moustapha Mayacine Joob of Taif Joob, February 25, 1997.

7. ANS 11D1/0955, Correspondance relative à l'affaire Brahim Khalil et au rattachement de Darou-Mousty au Baol, 1930–33.

8. Interview with Sēriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997.

9. Interview with Baay Mor of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.

10. Interview with Sēriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997.

11. This statement was made in reply to a question posed about the use of the harvests of Darou Mousty and did not concern the subject of charity. Interview with Baay Kabou Gaye of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.

12. This statement was also made in reply to a question posed about the use of the harvests of Darou Mousty and did not concern the subject of charity. Interview with Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.

13. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 18, 1997.

14. ANS 11D1\1242, Correspondance du cercle de Tivaouane, 1916–27. The candidate, Abdou Issa Dieng, was related to the Sall family through Demba War Sall and was described as approximately 40 years old, intelligent, and noble. At this time, the only canton chief in Guet was Yoro Coumba who administered Thilmakha. It was proposed that Macodou Sall be limited to the Peuhl canton of N'Dour and his own canton of Sagata-Merina-Guet.

15. *Ibid.* Regarding this issue, Macodou Sall was trying to force the chief of the canton of Thilmakha, Yoro Coumba, out of power. Yoro Coumba was a veteran of the *tirailleurs* and in return for his good service was given the post of a canton chief. His canton was mainly composed of Fulbe, and the control over this semimigratory population was part of the cause of the strife between the two chiefs. In November 1919, Yoro Coumba sent a dispatch to the administrator of the cercle accusing Macodou Sall of wanting to take over the entire province in the hope of becoming *damel*, or king. Also, the appointment of Yoro Coumba was seen by many of the local chiefs as a threat to their power base because Yoro Coumba was not of the local aristocracy. Macodou Sall, after many years, eventually won this contest when Yoro Coumba was dismissed in 1927.

16. *Ibid.* Incidentally, in a routine report on the state of the indigenous chiefs in 1920, it is noted that Macodou Sall administered the canton of N'Doyène N'Dagane N'Goll without remuneration. It was proposed that his salary be increased from 9,100 francs to 11,000 francs to make up for this discrepancy.

17. ANS 11D1/1244.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Interview with Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry, January 23, 1997.

20. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997.

21. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997.

22. O'Brien reported that a struggle for the succession of Amadu Bamba lasted for several years after his death in 1927. According to O'Brien, Maam Cerno and his half-brother, Shaykh Anta, disputed Muhammadu Moustapha's claim, but Maam Cerno soon withdrew his claim in favor of Muhammadu Moustapha. Shaykh Anta did not recognize his nephew until 1939. O'Brien, referring to French archival evidence, correctly noted that even after Muhammadu Moustapha's recognition as *khalifah-générale*, many Murid leaders refused to send him monetary support or shares of their harvests. See O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 61–64.

23. French archival sources continued to refer to region that had made up the pre-colonial state of Kajoor as Cayor even after much of the area had been split between the cercles of Tivaouane and Louga. Furthermore, the sources frequently refer to the cercles by the names of their administrative centers. Thus Cayor is referred to many times as Tivaouane, its capital, prior to 1927. After 1927, Cayor, in relation to Darou Mousty and Guet province, was for the most part dropped in favor of the name Louga, the area's capital after 1927. Yet one can still find the cercle of Louga referred to as the "cercle of Cayor" after that year. Similarly, the cercle of Baol is frequently called by the name of its capital, Diourbel. Thus the "cercle of Baol" is synonymous with the "cercle of Diourbel."

24. ANS 11D1/0955, Correspondance relatif au rattachement de Darou Mousty au cercle de Diourbel, 1930–31. This file contains all of the correspondence, reports, and such that were generated as a result of the debate over the transfer of Darou Mousty.

There is also a letter in this file dated July 15, 1930, from the doctor of the local post of Diourbel to the commandant of Baol in which the transfer of Darou Mousty to Baol was mentioned as the only way to stop the spread of a flu epidemic.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Muhammadu Moustapha had received permission from the French to build a great mosque in Touba for the Murid order in 1929. Also in 1929, the French, with Murid labor, began construction of a railway that would link Touba to Diourbel, the administrative center of Baol. The railway was completed in 1931 and work on the mosque began that same year. The railway and the mosque provided Muhammadu Moustapha with a context to assert his position as khalifah-général by making appeals to all Murids to contribute either labor or money to the projects. Many of Maam Cerno's taalibe were sent to Diourbel to aid in the construction of the railway and the mosque (see chapter 6). Amadu Bamba's own desire to see a great mosque built in Touba greatly aided Muhammadu Moustapha's calls for support. O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 64.

29. ANS 11D1/0955.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. ANS 1Z56, Papiers de Macadou Sall, affaires politiques et administratives.

33. Ibid.

34. ANS 11D1/1242.

35. Ibid. Macodou Sall also stated that the Murid khalifah was also trying to gain control over other dissident Murid factions in Sine-Saloum in the cercle of Kaolack.

36. Ibid. The original document had this phrase underlined.

37. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 17, 1997.

38. According to the Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, by the hijra calendar, Maam Thierno was 79 when he died. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 26, 1997. Baay Kabou Gaye stated that his father was among a group of original taalibe who recited the Quran twice daily in Maam Cerno's mausoleum in memory of the marabout. Interview with Baay Kabou Gaye of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.

39. Interview with Malik Cissé of Darou Mousty, February 20, 1997.

40. ANS 11D1/0951, Rattachement de Darou-Mousty au cercle de Diourbel, 1946–47.

41. Interview with Baay Moustapha Mayacine Joob of Taif Joob, February 25, 1997.

42. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 18, 1997.

43. ANS 11D1/0951. Abou's report also states that the descendents of Maam Cerno had extensive lands in Diourbel. One son had settled in Misra; another son, Amadu Habib, was living in Thiaski; and Abdou Rahmane (*le cadet à M'Backé*) was always in Baol. Only Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla retained holdings at M'Backé-Cayor, but he also possessed vast fields near Garage and Bambey in Diourbel.

44. ANS 11D1/0951. All of the information that follows regarding the second attempt to transfer Darou Mousty is in this file.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid. It is entirely possible that many of the people of Darou Mousty who supported the transfer blamed the lack of progress on this issue on Louga and felt that a change in regional administrations would lead to an improvement in the water supply.

47. Ibid. The chief of the village (Darou Mousty) signed his name as Cheikh Fall. According to all of the other sources, Habib M'Backé is the chief of Darou Mousty.
48. Ibid. The population of Darou Mousty was cited as 1,500.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. ANS 11D1/0951. This file also contains the text of Abou Sar Lalla's tour of Darou Mousty and his interviews with Sëriñ Modou Awa Balla and others.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.

Chapter 6

1. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991).
2. See Leonardo Villalon, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 115–99.
3. For the Murid wird, see M'Backé, *Etudes islamiques*, Vol. 4, 62–65.
4. Interview with Serin M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 27, 1997.
5. As cited in M'Backé, *Etudes islamiques*, Vol. 4, 57.
6. Robinson, *Paths of Accomodation*, 5.
7. Searing, "God Alone Is King," 46–48. In this passage, Searing recounts a discussion on Amadu Bamba's attitudes toward the jihad of Ma Ba Jaxu with a Murid historian and son of Maam Cerno.
8. An excellent study on the occupationally specialized groups in Wolof society at the village level can be found in, Judith Irvine, "Caste and Communication in a Wolof Village" (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1973). This type of social division is not unique to the Wolof; it is shared to some extent by fifteen other West African ethnic groups. For the position of the blacksmith in Mande society, see Patrick McNaughton, *The Mande Blacksmiths* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
9. Interview with Baay Cerno Joob of Darou Mousty, January 22, 1997.
10. Interview with Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry of Darou Mousty, January 23, 1997.
11. Interview with Sëriñ M'Baye Gueye Sylla, January 27–28, 1997.
12. Interview with Baay Abdou Mawade Wade of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.
13. Sëriñ Pathé Sall, another of the original taalibe and a shaykh and jawriñ, also joined Maam Cerno when he was at Khabane. Interview with Baay Daam Sall of Doulounguël, February 25, 1997. None of the other sources consulted for this study mention the town of Khabane or how long Maam Cerno was there.
14. Interview with Baay Kabou Gaye of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.
15. Interview with Baay Fallou Mor Joob Syl of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.
16. Interview with Baay Abdou Joob Samba of Darou Mousty, February 19, 1997.
17. Interview with Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry, January 23, 1997.
18. Interview with Baay Modou Faty Gueye Joob of Darou Mousty, February 15, 1997.
19. Interview with Baay Mactar Niang of Darou Mousty, January 26, 1997.
20. Interview with Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye of Darou Mousty, February 24, 1997.
21. It is possible that more than four were under this age when they joined Maam Cerno, but these were the only disciples for whom I had definite information, from the

interviews, regarding their ages or if they were children. Another of the original disciples, Balla Fall, for example, could very well have been younger than sixteen, but his son did not remember at what age he met Maam Cerno. Interview with Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall of Kosso, February 25, 1997.

22. Interview with Sëriñ Barra Joob of Darou Mousty, February 16, 1997.

23. Interview with Malik Cissé of Darou Mousty, February 20, 1997.

24. Interview with Baay Moustapha Mayacine Joob of Taif Joob, February 25, 1997.

25. Interview with Baay Shaykh Fall Delbé of Delbé (Darou Mousty), February 13, 1997.

26. Interview with Baay Cerno Joob, January 22, 1997.

27. ANS 11D1/1237, Correspondance, cercle de Tivaouane, 1912–15, and ANS 11D1/1240, Rapports mensuels, cercle de Tivaouane, 1914. Both of these files contain reports by French officials that accuse Murid marabouts of abducting children. See also Marty, *Études sur l'Islam au Sénégal*, 276, 281–82.

28. The decree of December 1905 did not actually abolish slavery in the French colonies. It did abolish the enslavement and sale of persons and prohibited the return of runaway slaves by the colonial administration. The slave trade was forced underground in many instances after 1905, and the degree to which the 1905 decree was applied varied from cercle to cercle. For more information, see Klein, *Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa*, 126–40. See also Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts, *The End of Slavery in Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 282–307.

29. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé of Darou Mousty, February 18, 1997.

30. Interview with Baay Abdou Joob Samba, February 19, 1997.

31. Interview with Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall, February 25, 1997.

32. Interview with Baay Cerno Njaay of Keur Aliou Njaay (Darou Mousty), February 13, 1997.

33. Interview with Sëriñ Malik Cissé, February 20, 1997.

34. *Ibid.* According to Malik Cissé, Sëriñ Muhammadu Moustapha had first consulted Maam Cerno about asking the French to help with the railroad extension to Touba. Maam Cerno agreed to the project, however, when Sëriñ Muhammadu Moustapha raised the issue with the French they told him, “there was not a good black who could finance it.” The outcome was the French providing the engineers and capital and the Murids providing the labor.

35. Interview with Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye, February 24, 1997. A variation of this story was also told by Sëriñ Barra Joob and Baay Cerno Gaye.

36. Interview with Sëriñ Bassirou Anta Niang M'Backé, February 18, 1997.

37. Interview with Sëriñ Barra Joob, February 16, 1997.

38. Interview with Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall, February 25, 1997. He also listed several prayers that Maam Cerno had instructed his taalibe to pray. This litany was to be said for the disciple's mother and father and then on behalf of all Muslims. If one said these prayers daily, then upon the day of judgment, the taalibe would have no problems with his mother, father, and the whole Muslim community.

39. Interview with Baye Mactar Niang, January 26, 1997.

40. Interview with Baay Abdou Joob Samba, February 19, 1997.

41. Interview with Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye, February 24, 1997.

42. Interview with Baay Fallou of Darou Mousty, January 20, 1997.

43. Interview with Baay Cerno Njaay Galaye, February 24, 1997.

44. Interview with Sëriñ Mactar Balla Fall, February 25, 1997.

45. Interview with Baay Cerno Joob, January 22, 1997. Although his father's directorship of a daara was in itself a job performed for Maam Cerno, Baay Cerno Joob explicitly interpreted his father's position as a reward.

46. Interview with Baay Shaykh Fall Delbé, February 13, 1997.

47. Of the sixteen descendants of the original taalibe and two of the remaining original taalibe of Darou Mousty that I talked to, only six of the original taalibe had been appointed as shaykh by Maam Cerno. Throughout his lifetime, Maam Cerno confirmed a total of eighty-nine shaykh of the Muridiyya.

48. The silsila of a shaykh confirmed by Maam Cerno would proceed to Amadu Bamba then to the Mauritanian head of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, Shaykh Sidia, then to his father, Sidi Muhammad, then to Shaykh Sidia al-Kebr, and back to Sidi Abd al-Qadir, the founder of the Qadiriyya, the first Sufi tariqa, and then to the Prophet Muhammad.

49. ANS 13G 67, Politique musulman 1906–17.

50. Abdoulaye-Bara Diop frequently addressed this subject in his study of Wolof society. He identified the *baadoolo* (those without power), or free peasantry, as being in the position of clients. They owed the aristocracy and chiefs taxes and labor due to their position. See Diop, *La société Wolof*, 158–59, 181–96, 263–85.

51. Sy, *La confrérie sénégalaise des Mourides*, 228. The author also states that at that time, the late 1960s, there were 260 families living in Touba Bogo. The taalibe were divided into 50 daara of 13 to 14 persons each and the ages of the taalibe ranged from 12 to 40 years old.

52. The information concerning Mactar Samba Joob and his position as the principal jawriñ of Maam Cerno is widely known among the descendants of the original taalibe and the M'Backé family of Darou Mousty. It should also be noted that Mactar Samba Joob was also one of Maam Cerno's shaykh. One of Mactar Samba Joob's sons, Baay Abdou Joob Samba, was interviewed, and Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé provided some information about the functions of the principal jawriñ. Mactar Samba Joob was not alone in his work as an envoy of Maam Cerno. Another of the jawriñ, Mor Joob M'Backé also served a diplomatic function as an envoy between Darou Mousty and the colonial authorities. Interviews with Baay Abdou Joob Samba, February 19, 1997; Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997; and Sëriñ Modou M'Backé Barry, January 23, 1997.

53. Interview with Baay Fallou Mor Joob Syl, February 24, 1997. He also noted that Maam Cerno always told his taalibe to work and to love Allah, and even up to the present, the inhabitants of Darou Mousty greatly respect prayer and work.

54. Interview with Shaykh Astou Faye M'Backé, January 20, 1997.

55. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 17–21, 65–68.

Conclusion

1. See, for example, Piot, *Remotely Global*, and Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

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The Murid order, founded in Senegal in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, grew into a major Sufi order during the colonial period and is now among the most recognizable of the Sufi orders in Africa. Murids have spread the voice of Islam and Africa in concert halls and on the airwaves through pop singers—especially Youssou N’Dour—and the image of Shaykh Amadu Bamba M’Backé, the founding saint of the order, often used to grace the covers of works concerning Islam, African culture, abolition, and European colonization.

In this insightful and revealing study, John Glover explores the manner in which a Muslim society in West Africa actively created a conception of modernity that reflects its own historical awareness and identity. Drawing from Murid written and oral historical sources, Glover carefully considers how the Murid order at the collective and individual levels has navigated the intersection of two major historical forces—Islam, specifically in the contexts of reform and mysticism, and European colonization—and achieved in the process an understanding of modernity not as an unwilling witness but as an active participant. Ultimately, *Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal* presents the reader with a new portrait of a society that has used its notion of modernity to adapt and incorporate further historical changes into its identity as an African Sufi order.

John Glover is associate professor of history at the University of Redlands in southern California.

"This very well-researched and argued book explores the tales, stories, and narratives of the making of Murid modernity. Glover meticulously provides insight into the processes of Wolof appropriation and refashioning of Sufi Islam during the phase of consolidation of colonial rule. By telling the history of the Muriddya not from the center, Touba, but from the periphery, Darou Mousty, Glover recovers the very pluralist nature of the brotherhood as well as the constant reformulation and recomposition of Ahmadu Bamba's message. The book is a major contribution to our understanding of Islam in West Africa."

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—James Searing, professor and chair, department of history, University of Illinois at Chicago

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