# *A COMPANION TO* ANGELS IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY



*Edited by*

TOBIAS HOFFMANN

A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy

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# INTRODUCTION

Angels are, so to speak, situated between human beings and God. Like humans, they are rational creatures; like God, they are immaterial. This is what made angels interesting to medieval thinkers, whose treatises on angelology at times exceed in length those of theological and philosophical anthropology. Their motivation was not only to reflect on the role of angels in the history of salvation, as God's messengers and as protectors (or tempters) of human beings. They were also interested, and perhaps more so, in clarifying problems that concerned angels and humans alike. For example, angelology provided an ideal context for discussions about the ontological status of creatures, the characteristics and mechanics of knowledge, the conditions for the exercise of free will, and the supernatural destiny of rational creatures.

The present volume explores the philosophical side of medieval angelology as developed by Christian theologians.[1] As a matter of fact, some of the most famous doctrines of medieval philosophy were developed by discussing angels, such as Anselm of Canterbury's two affections of the will (for self-benefit and for justice), Thomas Aquinas's distinction of essence and *esse* (the act of existence), Duns Scotus's theory of an individual difference (*haecceitas*), and—as Timothy Noone argues in his essay—Scotus's doctrine of intuitive cognition. Literature on these topics tends to mention the angelological background of these doctrines in passing, at best. The emergence itself of these notions or theories from within the context of angelology, however, is something worth studying in its own right.

The idea that there are immaterial beings other than God is not unique to Christian theology. Not only other theological traditions, such as Judaism and Islam, but also pagan philosophers assumed their existence. Apart from God, Aristotle also posited other "separate substances" (that

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[1] Angelology also provides an apt context for sorting out theological issues, but these are not discussed here in their own right. For theological perspectives on medieval angelology, see, e.g., Charles Journet, Jacques Maritain, and Philippe de la Trinité, *Le péché de l'ange: peccabilité, nature et surnature* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1961); Barbara Faes de Mottoni and Tiziana Suarez-Nani, "Hiérarchies, miracles et fonction cosmologique des anges au XIIIe siècle," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome* 114 (2002): 717–51; and Serge-Thomas Bonino, *Les anges et les démons: quatorze leçons de théologie catholique* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2007).

is, bodiless intelligent beings) in order to account for the movement of the heavenly spheres. Neoplatonic thinkers posited angels as mediators between the One and humanity and in order to avoid any gaps in the hierarchy of beings. Accordingly, Christian theologians could assume their existence not only on account of Christian revelation but also on philosophical grounds. Carlos Bazán recently argued, however, that all philosophical arguments for the existence of non-divine separate substances as proposed by ancient or medieval philosophers fail, inasmuch as they are based either upon obsolete astronomical assumptions or upon questionable epistemological premises. He concludes that "[s]ince there are no valid philosophical demonstrations of their existence, separate substances should no longer be a subject of philosophical consideration."[2]

Whatever one might think about the demonstrative force of philosophical arguments for the existence of angels—a topic that will be addressed by Gregory Doolan in the first chapter—Bazán's conclusion that "their notion should be excluded from philosophical discourse"[3] does not follow. Rather, as I hope this volume will show, the notion of angels is eminently illuminating for philosophical reflections.

There are several advantages to discussing philosophical issues in connection with angels. First, taking the situation of angels into account implies transcending the conditions of material reality, allowing us to study creatureliness as such. Thus, angelology provided the medievals with the context for clarifying the act-potency composition of creatures as well as the individuation of substances in general. Second, this perspective simplifies complex issues by reducing the parameters to a minimum, much like classroom physics that calculates acceleration under ideal conditions by ignoring friction. Whether or not one believes in the existence of angels, the hypothesis of purely intellectual beings has a function analogous to contemporary thought experiments that investigate philosophical problems under idealized conditions.[4] For example, angelology was used as the context to discuss the most fundamental presuppositions for intellectual knowledge and to reflect upon the causes of acts of free will.

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[2] B. Carlos Bazán, "On Angels and Human Beings: Did Thomas Aquinas Succeed in Demonstrating the Existence of Angels?" *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 77 (2010): 47–85, at 80.

[3] Bazán, "On Angels and Human Beings," 47.

[4] See Dominik Perler, "Thought Experiments: The Methodological Function of Angels in Late Medieval Epistemology," in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance*, ed. Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz (Aldershot and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008), 143–53.

Third, it allows us to go beyond the empirical order and to consider what belongs to the essential core of things, asking questions such as these: Is communication without material signs possible? Is there time where there is no motion, and if so, what is its measure? By ignoring medieval angelology, we would neglect some of the most fascinating medieval debates about metaphysics, natural philosophy, philosophy of mind, and linguistics—debates that are significant far beyond the boundaries of angelology itself.

The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were particularly fertile in philosophically relevant considerations about angels. In the later decades of the thirteenth century, the discussions of angelology were increasingly freed from the confines of the textbook approach mandated by commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. Thinkers turned instead to other forms of delivery, especially the Disputed Questions. Thomas Aquinas's *Quaestiones disputatae de malo* contain a *quaestio* with twelve articles that is entirely devoted to demons. Giles of Rome's *De cognitione angelorum* is a detailed and highly influential treatise on the knowledge of angels. Richard of Middleton dedicates more than two-thirds of his forty-five Disputed Questions to angelology.[5] Other examples could be added to this list. Moreover, in the course of the thirteenth century, Aristotle played an increasing role in treatments of angelology. It was not so much his own view on separate substances that was at issue, but rather above all his natural philosophy (location, time, movement) and psychology (theoretical and practical knowledge) that had to be squared with Christian assumptions about angels. This led to greater philosophical depth and rigor, both in the attempts to incorporate and to refute Aristotle's thought.

The aim of the present volume is to provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the issues scrutinized within angelology, yet one that is narrow enough to give the volume a unified rather than encyclopedic outlook. While Neoplatonists and thinkers from the other Abrahamic religions also made an important contribution to angelology,[6] the volume focuses on a

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[5]  Richard of Middleton's *Quaestiones disputatae* are being edited by Alain Boureau. One volume has already appeared: Richard de Mediavilla, *Questions disputées*, vol. 4: *Questions 23–31, Les démons*, ed. and trans. Alain Boureau (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2011). The proportionally high representation of angelology in the disputed questions is due to the fact that Richard died before he completed the work; but even absolutely speaking, the number of questions pertaining to angelology is remarkable.

[6]  Numerous contributions of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim authors, as well as of some pagan Neoplatonic thinkers, are contained in the immense collection of texts edited by Giorgio Agamben and Emanuele Coccia, *Angeli: Ebraismo Cristianesimo Islam* (Vicenza:

relatively unified tradition of authors who dialogued with each other on the basis of a shared scriptural and patristic foundation and who were confronted with similar philosophical challenges. Most essays contained in this volume center on thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Christian authors. An exception is Peter King's chapter, which covers Augustine's and Anselm of Canterbury's accounts of angelic sin. These accounts are not only highly innovative in their own right but also foundational for later discussions of the topic. Renaissance and late scholastic authors are not covered here, although angels still played an important role for these thinkers. The latter, however, entirely abandoned the framework of scholastic discussions, while the former, though they still debated angelology in line with the medieval tradition, mainly expanded on existing theories rather than developing new ones.[7]

The volume builds upon and complements important work on angelology that has been published in the last decade or so. Two important studies by Tiziana Suarez-Nani examine angelic individuation, location and the cosmological function of angels in the universe, focusing on Thomas Aquinas, Thierry of Freiberg, and Giles of Rome. These studies have greatly contributed to the appreciation of the philosophical significance of medieval angelology.[8] A recent anthology by Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz covers a longer period, stretching from the twelfth century to the seventeenth, concentrating on angelic hierarchies, angelic location, and angelic knowledge and language.[9] Also noteworthy is an excellent chapter on angelology in Armand Maurer's book on William of Ockham, covering

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Neri Pozza Editore, 2009). For a concise account of pagan theories of angels, see Clemens Zintzen, "Geister (Dämonen): B. III. c. Hellenistische und kaiserzeitliche Philosophie," in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, ed. Theodor Klauser (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1950ff.), 9:640–68, at 652–68. Proclus had an important indirect impact on medieval theories of angelology in that he is the source of Pseudo-Dionysius's highly influential account of the celestial hierarchy. Pseudo-Dionysius distinguished between nine angelic choruses and related them to the ecclesiastical hierarchy. For his medieval reception, see David Luscombe, "The Hierarchies in the Writings of Alan of Lille, William of Auvergne and St Bonaventure," in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry*, 15–28.

[7] See the excellent article by Stephan Meier-Oeser, "Medieval, Renaissance and Reformation Angels: A Comparison," in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry*, 187–200. An example of a late scholastic treatise on angelology is Francisco Suárez' influential *De angelis, Opera omnia*, vol. 2 (Paris: Vivès, 1856).

[8] Tiziana Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et la philosophie: subjectivité et fonction cosmologique des substances séparés à la fin du XIIIᵉ siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 2002); Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas d'Aquin et Giles de Rome* (Paris: Vrin, 2002).

[9] Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz, eds., *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance* (Aldershot and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008).

the metaphysical composition and individuation of angels, angelic time, location, and motion, and also angelic knowledge and speech.[10] While the present volume contains some topics represented in all of these studies, namely, angelic knowledge and language, it has a stronger emphasis on metaphysical themes (the demonstrability of angels, angelic composition and individuation) and on action theory (angelic sin), while still giving due attention to angelic knowledge and communication.

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The volume contains nine original essays. The first chapter investigates the question of whether the existence of angels is manifest to us. Some theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas, identified the philosophers' non-divine separate substances with the Christian angels. Gregory Doolan studies Aquinas's philosophical arguments for the existence of angels. Doolan takes a unique perspective in asking what kind of demonstrative force Aquinas himself attributed to these arguments. According to Doolan, Aquinas thought that at least some of his own arguments for the existence of angels were demonstrative, rather than merely plausible. The Aristotelian-style argument for the existence of separate substances as movers of the celestial bodies yields for Aquinas only the conclusion that the celestial bodies are moved either directly by God or—for Aquinas more probably—through mediating angels. But, according to Doolan, arguments from the perfection of the universe seem to have demonstrative force for Aquinas. God is free to create or not create a universe, but under the supposition that he does, the order of divine wisdom requires that God create angels, without whom the universe would be incomplete. The sequence "non-rational corporeal substances—rational corporeal substances—God" would contain a gap if there were not, in addition, any incorporeal substances. Again, the perfection of the universe requires that there be a diversity of things, so that if God creates a universe, he will produce diverse creatures: some simple, some composite; some corruptible, some incorruptible. According to Doolan, Aquinas's arguments for the existence of angels reveal his fundamental views about the metaphysical structure of the universe.

Two chapters are concerned with the metaphysical structure of angels. John Wippel examines three theories regarding their composition. The

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discussions of this topic were driven by the concern that absolute simplicity and pure actuality are unique to God. Bonaventure thought that in order to protect God's privilege of absolute simplicity, it is necessary to view all creatures, including the angels, as composed of matter and form. Matter is the principle of mutability, of passive potency, and of individuation and limitation. Thus, Bonaventure holds that matter accounts for the angelic ability to undergo change and to be acted upon, and also serves as ground for their individuation and limitation. This "spiritual matter" differs from the matter of corporeal things in that spiritual matter is not extended. Therefore, it can only support spiritual forms. Aquinas rejects spiritual matter in angels on several grounds; for example, he deems matter to be incompatible with their intellectual nature inasmuch as he considered matter an obstacle to the act of understanding. For Aquinas, all creatures are composed of two principles, essence and the act of existing (*esse*), but only corporeal creatures are in addition composed of matter and form. According to Aquinas, the composition of essence and *esse* not only accounts for the exclusivity of God's simplicity; it also explains the uniqueness of God's pure actuality, because the essence of an angel (and of all other creatures) is in potency with respect to the act of existing it receives from God. Only God is identical with *esse* (i.e., only God is *esse subsistens*), while all creatures only participate in *esse*. Godfrey of Fontaines rejected the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures and maintained that they are only conceptually distinct. For angels to differ from the divine pure act and from divine simplicity, one only needs to maintain that they are composed of act and potency. This act-potency composition is not warranted by a composition of an angelic essence with something else, but rather is intrinsic to the angelic essence itself: in the essence of an angel, which coincides with its existence, there is potency together with a deficient degree of actuality. This composition is not a real composition, but a composition of reason, and yet this composition is not the product of the mind that conceives it, but rather belongs to the angel insofar it is more potential than God and more actual than lower things.

Aquinas's rejection of spiritual matter had an important implication for his position on angelic individuation. Giorgio Pini's chapter studies Bonaventure's view (as a representative of a traditional position), Aquinas's view, and the reactions to the Angelic Doctor. The problem of individuation concerns two questions (the first having two aspects): (1) What explains (*a*) the fact that an essence can be instantiated by several individuals that belong to the same kind, and (*b*) the manner in which it is

actually multiplied by several individuals?; and (2) What accounts for the fact that an individual, unlike an essence, cannot be instantiated into further individuals of the same kind? Since Bonaventure considers angels to be composed of spiritual matter and of form, he thinks that angelic essences are individuated in the same way as the essences of corporeal substances, namely, by the angelic form's being conjoined with spiritual matter. Aquinas defends an unprecedented view by holding that the individuation of angelic essences happens in a completely different way than that of material substances. The latter are individuated by the reception of forms in different parcels of matter. But since in his view angels lack matter, it cannot serve as a principle of individuation for angels. Hence he concludes that each angelic essence is individuated by itself, so that there are as many individual angels as there are angelic species, each angelic species being instantiated only once. Pini draws out three controversial implications of this view. First, God cannot create several individual angels that belong to the same species; second, the supposit (i.e., the individual angel) differs from the essence it instantiates only by a conceptual distinction; third, each angelic essence is completely actualized in its single instantiation, whereas in material substances no individual completely actualizes the potential of the essence. Pini outlines the immediate philosophical reactions to these controversial implications of Aquinas's position. The first implication was seen as a threat to divine omnipotence. The second seemed to entail that angels are necessary beings like God. The third had consequences for how one understands the structure of the universe. Without reverting to the hypothesis of angelic individuation by spiritual matter, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus proposed uniform theories of individuation of all created substances. In their view, the principle of individuation is a property that is added to the essence rather than being included in it. For Henry, it is a twofold negative property, namely, not-being-multiply-instantiated and being-distinct-from-everything-else. In his view, this negative property is obtained when an essence receives actual existence. For Scotus, the property added to the essence is a positive entity.

Medieval angelology also provided the context for highly innovative theories of natural philosophy, as is documented in Richard Cross's chapter on angelic time and motion. Angelic motion implies that angels are successively present in different places; hence to clarify how angels move, Cross's chapter starts with angelic location. According to some, including Aquinas, angels are in a place only inasmuch as they causally interact with the physical world. Angelic motion, then, means that an

angel has successive effects in different places. Merely causal theories of angelic presence were condemned in 1277 by the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier. In order to comply with Tempier, others, for example Duns Scotus, consider angelic presence to be independent of their operations. Although angels lack spatial extension, Scotus thinks they can be somehow contained in a place. For Scotus, angelic motion means that an angel travels through different places, a theory that is at odds with Aristotle's view that spatial indivisibles cannot move. Considerations about angelic duration also prompted the medievals to go beyond the framework of Aristotelian natural philosophy. For the medievals, angelic duration is measured by the *aevum*. According to some, the *aevum*, like eternity, is unextended, instant-like. Thus, it differs from time in that there is no succession of moments. But in their view, although the angelic substance is instantaneous (angels are not generated; they do not grow; they are incorruptible), the angels are not eternal, because they experience succession in some respects and are thus subject to time: not only because their intellections and affections are sequential but also because they move in the physical world. Others thought that the *aevum* is like time composed of periods or intervals; this entails the view that there can be an extended duration without any continuous physical movement. In this respect, however, the *aevum* would differ from time, which is relative to the movement of the heavenly spheres. Theories of the *aevum* as instantaneous duration, according to Cross, view it in metaphysical terms as an account of the persistence of substances, whereas theories of the *aevum* as consisting of periods understand it in physical terms as a kind of absolute time, that is, as a time that is not relative to physical motion.

Angelic knowledge is the subject of two chapters, covering Bonaventure and Aquinas (by Harm Goris) and Duns Scotus (by Timothy Noone). For Aquinas, who rejects the theory of spiritual matter, the intellectual nature of angels raises the question of whether an angel is simply his knowledge. Aquinas denies this and argues that the angel's intellectual substance is its first act, while its actual knowledge is its second act. In discussing angelic knowledge, the medievals generally distinguished between the natural and the supernatural order. Bonaventure's and Aquinas's explanation of angelic natural knowledge is in part inspired by Aristotelian epistemology. Thus, they postulate intelligible species in angels, which are what concepts are in contemporary epistemology, that is, the means by which one understands reality. For the angels the intelligible species are innate rather than obtained through abstraction. Bonaventure, however, allows that angels can also attain knowledge through abstraction as well as by

means of innate species. He posits that angels, like humans, have an agent intellect, because he thinks that a perfection that is granted to a lower creature should not be denied to a higher creature. Additional means of obtaining knowledge are the angel's own essence as well as illumination by higher angels. According to both Bonaventure and Aquinas, the scope of angelic natural knowledge covers material things, other angels, future contingents to the extent that they can be known in their causes, and God as seen in his effects. Supernatural knowledge, in their view, allows the blessed angels to know the divine essence as well as some mysteries of grace.

In Scotus's theory of angelic knowledge, the distinction between abstractive and intuitive knowledge is central. Abstractive knowledge is had by means of intelligible species, whereas intuitive knowledge, which is not mediated by a species, is the direct grasp of something in its actual existence. Contrary to Aquinas, who thinks that higher angels have more potent intelligible species than lower angels, and to Henry of Ghent, who rejects intelligible species and replaces them with an all-encompassing "scientific habit," Scotus argues that all angels require one intelligible species for each knowable universal. Like Bonaventure and Aquinas, Scotus considers the intelligible species to be innate to the angels. In contrast, the angels have self-knowledge through intuitive knowledge. In general, knowledge of singulars and of the existence of contingent things requires intuitive knowledge, because for various reasons innate species are unable to convey knowledge of them. Noone suggests that Scotus's novel and influential theory of intuitive knowledge was inspired by Bonaventure, who holds that knowledge of singulars requires the angels to direct their gaze to the things known rather than knowing them by means of innate species.

The particular mode of angelic knowledge by way of illumination from other angels is dealt with in Bernd Roling's chapter, on angelic speech and communication. Roling focuses on four alternative theories advanced by Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, as well as on their historical antecedents. Augustine highly influenced later accounts in two respects: first, he developed the theory of a purely mental internal word, which is spoken in thought before it is communicated to others. Second, he was critical of the ability of signs to convey knowledge infallibly. This gives rise to two difficulties, which had already been discussed by Aquinas's older contemporaries: First, how do the mental and the spoken word differ in angels? Second, in case angelic language uses signs, then how are the angels able to decode the signs without using further signs? Aquinas and his forerunners rejected signs as a means of

angelic communication; therefore they had to find an alternative way to differentiate mental from spoken words. For Aquinas, what marks this difference is the speaker's will that orders a mental concept—an intelligible species—to a hearer. The only difference between a communicated concept and one kept private lies in the relation to the addressee which the concept obtains through the speaking angel's will. Giles of Rome is critical of Aquinas's theory and rehabilitates signs as the means of angelic speech. In his view, the speaker's will is insufficient to mark the difference between an internal and an external word, since one and the same internal word (that is, one and the same intelligible species) is the means to convey knowledge of a variety of things. Simply sharing a species with a listener does not provide that listener the precise thought that the speaker wants to communicate. For Giles, angels employ *signa intelligibilia*, which express precisely the speaker's intention and are tailored to the addressee. Duns Scotus again rejects signs as means of angelic communication. According to his theory, angels speak by means of a direct influence on the intellect of the hearer, either by generating in him an act of knowledge, or a species as the medium of knowledge, or both. Contrary to these three theories, William of Ockham simply identifies mental with spoken words. The mental words are of themselves knowable by other angels; therefore whatever an angel thinks is manifest to the hearer. For Ockham, all angelic language, indeed all angelic thought, is therefore public.

The volume concludes with two chapters on angelic sin. This issue highlights the exercise of free will under ideal conditions, for although angels are supremely intelligent creatures that were created without any inclinations to evil, some, according to Christian teaching, sinned while others remained steadfast. Peter King studies the topic in Augustine and Anselm of Canterbury. While earlier patristic authors focused mostly on the nature of angelic sin, Augustine also wonders what caused Lucifer— the highest angel and the first of them to sin—to make an evil choice. For Augustine, Lucifer's sin was pride and envy. His sin of pride consisted in turning his will toward himself and away from God. The cause of the sin is nothing other than Lucifer's will. For Augustine, there is no way of searching for a prior cause that would underlie the evil will, for the nature of sin consists precisely in that it is rooted in an evil will that freely chooses to sin. Although Lucifer's sin is not traceable to an antecedent cause, it is not done without reason. The reason he sinned was love for himself, and the reason the good angels did not sin was love of God. Anselm of Canterbury builds upon Augustine and aims to show that Lucifer meets all the conditions that qualify him as a moral agent. Because he is a moral

agent, he can be held fully responsible for his sin. According to Anselm, a moral agent is neither ignorant of what he should do, nor irrational. Since for Anselm happiness and morality do not necessarily coincide, a rational agent might calculate that an act is to his advantage, although it is immoral. He is free to choose the act because it is advantageous or to reject it because it is immoral. In fact, for Anselm a moral agent has two fundamental motives: a will-for-justice and a will-for-advantage. King sees in Anselm's theory of angelic sin an anticipation of contemporary rational decision theory. Lucifer's sin was a choice made under uncertainty, for he could not know whether God was going to punish him. But he had strong reason to believe that he could sin with impunity. So he weighed the expected utility of the outcomes—sinning vs. not sinning—and concluded it would be advantageous to sin. His sin, then, was fully rational on Lucifer's own terms. Therefore, it meets the criteria for imputability. Yet, despite being rational, the act was immoral, and hence Lucifer was justly punished.

Starting with Aquinas, theories of angelic sin were marked by the influence of Aristotle's account of practical rationality, either because they were attempts to integrate this account as much as possible, or because they were rejections of such attempts. Angelic sin became a test case for whether intellectualist accounts of *liberum arbitrium* (free decision) result in intellectual determinism and whether voluntarism implies irrationality. My own essay studies explanations of the possibility of angelic sin, as well as of the angels' obstinacy in evil after the sinful choice. The problem with an Aristotelian approach to angelic sin is that, in Aristotle's eyes, evildoing requires ignorance of what ought to be done here and now, but the consensus was that the angels were not subject to such ignorance. One solution, first developed by Aquinas, was to claim that the angels were not ignorant about the divine rule about how they should act, but they failed to pay attention to it; thus Aristotle's requirement of some cognitive shortcoming as a condition for evildoing would be upheld. Aquinas's voluntarist opponents argued that in principle sin cannot be traced to any cognitive deficiency. Sin results not from a mere mistake, but from wickedness. Cognitive error, then, does not cause sin, but is rather consequent to sin. The case of the fall of the angels highlights the cognitive and appetitive conditions of a radically free choice between alternative possibilities. Investigating the obstinacy of demons, however, brings to light which factors eliminate alternative possibilities. With regard to the latter problem, Aquinas fully embraces intellectual determinism: after their sin, the angels do not have access to any new knowledge, for only

supernatural knowledge would transcend the scope of what they already know, but by sinning they have forsaken the possibility of receiving supernatural knowledge. Their knowledge is fixed, and because their desire corresponds to their knowledge, their choice is fixed as well. For Scotus and Ockham, the angelic will of itself remains as free after the sin as it was before, and therefore only an external cause can fix their will in its evil choice. Ockham radicalizes Scotus's theory: God himself causes the demons' hatred of God.

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As these summaries suggest, this collection of essays can be read like a survey of medieval philosophy, albeit considered from a particular, uniquely illuminating perspective. The structure of the universe as a whole, the metaphysical texture of creatures, theories of time, knowledge, freedom, and linguistics—many of the most original and ingenious contributions of medieval thought came to light in the context of angelology.